Remaking Downtown Toronto: Politics, Development, and Public Space on Yonge Street, 1950-1980 by Ross, Daniel Gallagher
  
 
 
 
 
 
REMAKING DOWNTOWN TORONTO: POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND PUBLIC 
SPACE ON YONGE STREET, 1950-1980 
 
 
DANIEL G. ROSS 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAMME IN HISTORY 
YORK UNIVERSITY, 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
 
MARCH 2017 
 
© DANIEL G. ROSS, 2017 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
This study explores the history of Toronto’s iconic downtown Yonge Street and the people who 
contested its future, spanning a period from the 1950s through to 1980 when the street was 
seldom out of the news. Through detailed analysis of a range of primary sources, it explores 
how the uses and public meanings of this densely-built commercial strip changed over time, in 
interaction with the city transforming around it. What emerges is a street that, despite fears for 
its future, remained at the heart of urban life in Toronto, creating economic value as a retail 
centre; pushing the boundaries of taste and the law as a mass-entertainment destination; and 
drawing crowds as a meeting place, pedestrian corridor, and public space. Variously understood 
as an historic urban landscape and an embarrassing relic, a transportation route and a people 
place, a bastion of Main Street values and a haven for big-city crime and sleaze, from the 1950s 
through the 1970s Yonge was at the centre of efforts to improve or reinvent the central city in 
ways that would keep pace with, or even lead, urban change.  
This thesis traces the history of three interventions—a pedestrian mall, a clean-up 
campaign aimed at the sex industry, and a major redevelopment scheme—their successes and 
failures, and the larger debates they triggered. The result is a narrative that ranges widely in 
theme: planning, automobility, and youth culture; vice, moral regulation, and citizen activism; 
capitalism, corporate power, and urban renewal. Engaging with the North American and 
international historiographies of these topics, it places the politics of downtown in Toronto in 
larger historical context. It offers an account of urban transformation that emphasizes 
complexity in the interaction between ideas, structures of power, and the often idiosyncratic 
decisions of a range of downtown actors. An increasingly interventionist local state, dynamic 
capital investment in retail and real estate, and diverse citizen mobilizations all contributed to 
transforming Yonge Street, helping to create the modern, globalized downtown shopping street 
and public space we know today. 
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Introduction: The Street and the City 
 
In September 1975, Toronto threw its first birthday celebration for Yonge Street, 180 years 
after it opened to traffic. Downtown businesses, civic leaders, and citizens came together to 
honour the street and its evolution from colonial road to bustling urban thoroughfare. For 
five days, retailers on Yonge decorated the sidewalks and offered special promotions, 
alongside a series of public events intended to draw people downtown. These included free 
musical performances in nearby Nathan Phillips Square and the lighting of “the world’s 
largest candle,” an 11 million candle power flare visible across the city, atop a downtown 
skyscraper on the night of September 5. The next day, a crowd of 1,000 watched as Toronto 
Mayor David Crombie gave official sanction to “180 Years Yonge Week,” before helping cut 
and share out a 300lb birthday cake in front of City Hall.1  
The cake was painstakingly decorated with a 1795 map of the colony of Upper 
Canada–now Ontario—just one of many references to Yonge Street’s particular place in 
local history. Earlier on the same day, reenactors bearing muskets and clad in green felt 
marched down the street to commemorate the Queen’s Rangers, the soldier-settlers who 
carved out what was then the colony’s first north-south road, and the basis for agricultural 
settlement in the area. Past and present mingled freely as their leader, portraying 1790s 
Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe, bantered about the dramatic changes of the past 
two centuries. He expressed both pride and amazement to see the muddy little outpost of 
York—population 600 in 1795—transformed into the modern city of skyscrapers, 
subdivisions, and subways of the 1970s. Yonge’s anniversary was seen as an important date 
for the entire city, not in the least by its main organizers, merchant group the Downtown 
Business Council, who promoted it as the “birthday of downtown Toronto.”2  
However, any suggestion that the intertwined stories of Yonge Street and Toronto 
could be reduced to a 180-year narrative of progress was complicated by the undercurrent 
of anxiety that ran through the festivities. Toronto chose to celebrate Yonge Street at the 
                                                  
1 “Week of cakes, drums for city’s birthday,” Toronto Star, Aug. 30, 1975; “180 years Yonge,” Globe and Mail, 
Sep. 6, 1975. 
2 “Downtown: 180 years Yonge,” Toronto Star, Aug. 26, 1975. 
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moment when its future seemed most in doubt. In the months leading up to the anniversary 
local newspapers were full of controversy over the street’s problems, including flagging 
retail sales, the proliferation of body rub parlours and sex shops, and plans by the regional 
municipality to widen it into a commuter thoroughfare. The Downtown Business Council 
admitted that the event was intended to counter the perception that Yonge was in decline. 
“Nobody else is going to do it for us,” explained the merchant group’s managing director, 
“so we’ve got to create some positive publicity, promote the street properly, and clean it 
up.” Commissioned to write a song for the occasion, local crooner Tommy Ambrose 
captured the mood with lyrics describing Yonge Street as a friend in need, “a loved one that 
has seen better times.”3 There was hope, but also anxiety, about what the future might 
bring.  
The story of 180 Years Yonge Week highlights some of the complexities of the 
relationship between Toronto and Yonge Street in the second half of the twentieth century. 
First, it conveys some of the street’s significance to the city, and to the many people who 
were invested in its future. Amid widespread urban change, Yonge appeared as an historical 
through-line linking Toronto’s humble beginnings to its dynamic present, and Simcoe’s 
uncertain Loyalist settlement to the 1970s metropolis of 2 million people. “Toronto grew up 
alongside Yonge Street,” argues a popular history written a few years later, “and Yonge 
Street is a reflection of the city itself.”4 Geographically it mattered too. Yonge was, as a 
newspaper editorial summing up the 1975 celebrations explained, Toronto’s “datum line,” 
dividing the city into east and west; as a major north-south route it pointed the way for 
urban expansion, connecting the older urban core with its largest and most affluent suburbs 
to the north.5 
While the anniversary celebrations took in the whole street, they were, like this 
study, particularly focused on one small stretch of it: the dozen city blocks that made up the 
core of downtown Yonge Street, running roughly between College and King Streets. For 
nearly a century this part of Yonge had been Toronto’s main shopping and entertainment 
destination, a site of consumption but also a key public space used by a wide cross-section 
                                                  
3 “Retailers use past to help Yonge St. future,” Toronto Star, Aug. 4, 1975. 
4 William Kilbourn, Toronto Remembered: A Celebration of the City (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984), 21. 
5 “Recalling the wolves…,” Globe and Mail, Sep. 6, 1975. 
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of the city’s population. Anchored by the flagships of two major department store chains 
and hundreds of smaller businesses, it abutted on one side the growing financial district, 
and on another City Hall and the city’s administrative centre. It was the section of the city 
that was busiest, that contained the most prized real estate; that evoked the most vivid 
memories. It was this aging but popular commercial strip that people referenced when they 
described the week as “downtown’s birthday bash.”6 To the merchants and civic leaders 
behind the event, the media, and many other Torontonians, Yonge Street was downtown.  
Second, the story of Yonge’s 180th records the ambivalence that defined attitudes 
towards this important place in the postwar decades. On the one hand, there was criticism 
and concern. Beginning in the 1950s, the idea that downtown Yonge had (as Tommy 
Ambrose put it) “seen better times” became commonplace in Toronto. Urban 
transformations—suburbanization, redevelopment, demographic change—were altering 
the patterns of city life, threatening the business contexts that had made Yonge a success. 
The spectre of decline, inseparable from discussions of the urban future in postwar North 
America, seemed to loom over Yonge’s commercial landscape, in many places unchanged 
since the beginning of the century. In a modernizing city, that constancy might spell 
stagnation, or even obsolescence; worse, those changes that were occurring on Yonge, 
including new retail and entertainment trends, were rarely interpreted in a positive light. By 
the late 1960s Yonge was seen as both the “heart of Toronto” and the part of downtown 
most in need of improvement. 
On the other hand, there was optimism and enterprise. Lost sales or public criticism 
were seldom met with inaction. It is no coincidence that Toronto celebrated the anniversary 
of its main drag for the first time in 1975, a moment when controversy over the street was 
at its peak. The organizers of 180 Years Yonge Week were confident that Yonge’s history 
could be employed to secure the strip’s doubtful future. Historical re-enactments, special 
birthday sales and promotions, lobbying to have Yonge recognized as “the world’s longest 
street”;7 all of these attractions were part of an attempt to leverage the street’s centrality to 
                                                  
6 “Sex industry not invited to Yonge party,” Toronto Star, Aug. 29, 1975. 
7 The origins of that erroneous but persistent designation are in the 1975 birthday celebrations. See Jay Myers, 
“Yonge Street,” Globe and Mail, Dec. 2, 1976.  Guinness World Records removed the category of longest street 
from its listings in 1999, and now lists the Pan-American Highway as the world’s longest road. 
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the city, and the best aspects of its past, to create value. By drawing people downtown, they 
would reinvigorate the shopping and entertainment strip. By further cementing the bonds 
between Yonge and Toronto, they would ensure that their street—and the livelihoods 
attached to it—would not be forgotten. The week-long birthday festivities are just one 
episode in a longer history of improvement agendas that extends over decades. People who 
valued Yonge, whether business owners or shoppers, citizen activists or politicians, saw in 
its changing circumstances not just problems, but possibilities.  
A street at the heart of the city 
This study explores the history of downtown Yonge Street and the people who contested its 
future, spanning a period from the 1950s through to 1980 when the street was seldom out 
of the news. Through detailed analysis of a range of primary sources, including government 
and corporate records, citizens’ letters and petitions, newspapers and planning reports, I 
trace how the uses and public meanings of this densely-built commercial strip changed over 
time, in interaction with the city transforming around it. My analysis reveals a street that, 
despite fears for its future, remained at the heart of urban life in Toronto, creating 
economic value as a retail centre; pushing the boundaries of taste and the law as a mass-
entertainment destination; and drawing crowds as a meeting place, pedestrian corridor, and 
public space. Variously understood as an historic urban landscape and an embarrassing relic, 
a transportation route and a people place, a bastion of Main Street values and a haven for 
big-city crime and sleaze, from the 1950s through the 1970s Yonge was at the centre of 
efforts to improve or reinvent the central city in ways that would keep pace with, or even 
lead, urban change. This study examines the history of those interventions—planning 
experiments, clean-up campaigns, redevelopment schemes—their successes and failures, 
and the larger debates over urban development they triggered. It explores the relationships 
between citizens and an iconic street in an attempt to reconstruct what people thought 
about the city, and how they acted to shape it. 
The result is a narrative that ranges widely in theme: planning, automobility, and 
youth culture; vice, moral regulation, and citizen activism; capitalism, corporate power, and 
urban renewal. In three discrete sections, this thesis engages with the North American and 
international historiographies of these topics, placing the politics of downtown in Toronto in 
larger historical context. It offers an account of urban transformation that emphasizes 
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complexity in the interaction between ideas, structures of power, and the often 
idiosyncratic decisions of a range of downtown actors. An increasingly interventionist local 
state, dynamic capital investment in retail and real estate, and diverse citizen mobilizations 
all contributed to making the period from the 1950s through the 1970s a creative—if at 
times chaotic—period in politics and urbanism in Toronto. Urban experts and growth-
oriented administrators cast their gaze on Toronto’s largely unplanned streetscapes, and 
they saw much that could be improved. Influential local businesses and the country’s first 
modern land development corporations consolidated their power, and applied themselves 
to the profitable business of the creative destruction of the older city. Both in response to 
these changes and as part of the surge in civil society activism that characterized the era, a 
range of citizens and community groups—from business associations to environmentalists—
demanded an unprecedented role in working out the urban future. At no time before or 
since has such a diverse array of futures been imagined for the city’s core, and the debates 
of the postwar decades continue to influence urban development today.  
In an attempt to account for the interrelated impact of a range of downtown actors, 
trends, and ideas, I approach this story at two levels: the local and the global. Both, I argue, 
are essential to understanding the remaking of Toronto’s downtown. In a city more than 
ever connected to the world, larger economic developments and the international 
circulation of ideas had great influence; however, their impact also depended on local 
agendas, personalities, and circumstances. In Toronto, the idea of downtown pedestrian 
zones, part of the repertoire of modernist urbanism since the 1940s, took on a life of its own 
in the 1970s as a symbol of political reform, downtown rejuvenation, and mass rejection of 
the automobile. Likewise, the dramatic rise and fall of “Sin Strip,” a collection of body-rub 
parlours and sex shops that dotted Yonge from the late 1960s, contains echoes of the 
transnational sexual revolution and its discontents; but when viewed from street level, local 
factors—redevelopment pressures, Yonge’s Main Street image, the mobilizing of new 
political constituencies—also played a decisive role. Finally, the postwar rebuilding of 
Yonge’s low-rise retail landscape through projects like the Eaton Centre was influenced by 
both the local agendas of citizens, civic-authorities, and Canada’s largest retailer, and the 
wider, trans-Atlantic embrace of modernist reconstruction as a path to urban vitality.  
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A view from the street  
“Think of a city,” asked celebrated urbanist Jane Jacobs in 1961, “and what comes to mind? 
Its streets.”8 She wrote those words in the context of a sustained rebuttal of mid-twentieth-
century modernist planning, with its apparent disregard for human-scaled environments like 
the street. But Jacobs was also speaking to something larger: the idea that the street is one 
of the essential elements of the city, and perhaps its most universally recognizable image. 
Streets make the city, whether as places of encounter, corridors from place A to place B, or 
as destinations in their own right. Viewed from on high through maps or satellite images, 
they appear as an ordering framework and an essential system of mobility; from the 
sidewalk level of the flâneur, they are a site of life and unexpected experience. The crowded 
street is the original public realm, and it should be no surprise that for more than a century 
it has been the starting place for thinkers from a range of disciplines seeking to understand 
and interpret the city.9  
For the historian, the street can be a uniquely productive point of entry into the 
urban past. This study reads the street as a constitutive part of the city’s history. It is rooted 
in the story of a single thoroughfare, which over the years has connected countless people 
to work, leisure, politics, and their fellow citizens. Here Yonge is the through-line connecting 
a range of historical episodes and actors to each other and to the urban fabric. In all of its 
complexity and inconstancy, it is a fitting metaphor for the larger city. But a view from street 
level provides more than a useful narrative device. Focusing in on Yonge Street allows this 
study to explore larger historical processes affecting the city and society within a clearly 
delineated space.  
Wider developments like the sexual revolution or corporate concentration become 
more tangible, more easily unravelled when rooted in this specificity. Equally, detailed 
analysis of their impact on urban lives and forms helps better understand these processes at  
                                                  
8 Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), 29. 
9 See the “grand tour” of fascination with the street in Nicholas Fyfe, “Introduction: Reading the Street,” in 
Fyfe, ed., Images of the Street: Planning, identity, and control in public space (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 1-12. 
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Image 1: Map of Yonge Street by Meredith Sadler. 
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a national or global level. However, in this account downtown Yonge Street is not only the 
background to the action, a site where political struggles, economic improvement programs, 
or planning experiments played out. It also emerges as an important, dynamic factor 
influencing those episodes and processes. Yonge’s built form, its economic functions, the 
symbolic meanings and political possibilities people invested in it all play important roles in 
the story.  
Yonge stands out among Toronto streets, but it is not unique as an urban landscape 
rich in historical meanings. Other major thoroughfares, from Montréal’s rue Sainte-
Catherine to Sydney’s Oxford Street, have been the subject of productive historical 
investigations.10 In fact, recognizing the complexity of interactions between people, 
representations, and urban form has become a central concern for historians of the urban 
past around the world, for whom the idea of the city as a site has gradually been replaced 
by more contingent and active notions of place and space.11 By applying some of their 
insights to a time and place and to several themes—local politics, private redevelopment, 
the regulation of public space—underrepresented in the historical scholarship on Canadian 
cities, I hope to re-assert the importance of a spatially-informed approach to writing the 
kind of detailed analysis of urban transformation and politics presented here.12 In other 
                                                  
10 Paul-André Linteau, La rue Sainte-Catherine. Au cœur de la vie Montréalaise (Montréal : Les Éditions de 
l’Homme, 2010), Pierre Anctil, Saint-Laurent. Le « Main » de Montréal (Montréal : Septentrion, 2002), Garry 
Wotherspoon and Clive Faro, Street Seen : A History of Oxford Street (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1996).   
11 See Michael B. Katz, “From Urban as Site to Urban as Place: Reflections on (Almost) a Half-Century of U.S. 
Urban History,” Journal of Urban History 41:4 (2014): 560-66 and Simon Gunn, “The spatial turn: changing 
histories of place and space,” in Gunn and Robert Morris, eds., Identities in Space: Contested Terrains in the 
Western City since 1850 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 1-14. 
12 There is a vast literature on the “spatial turn” in the social sciences and humanities, beginning with 
foundational works like Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social 
Theory (London: Verso Press, 1989), Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 
and David Harvey’s writings on Paris, assembled in Paris: Capital of Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
The present study is informed most of all by scholars who have productively applied a focus on space and 
place in their historical work. In Canada this includes, but is not limited to, studies of urban ethnic 
communities, exemplified by geographer Kay Anderson’s “The Idea of Chinatown: The Power of Place and 
Institutional Practice in the Making of a Racial Category,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
Vol. 77, No. 4 (Dec., 1987): 580-598; literature on gender and sexual identity in the city, including Carolyn 
Strange, Toronto’s Girl Problem: The Perils and Pleasures of the City, 1880-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1985); studies of commemoration and public memory such as Ronald Rudin, Founding Fathers: The 
Celebration of Champlain and Laval in the Streets of Quebec, 1878-1908 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2003); and urban environmental histories like Jennifer Bonnell’s Reclaiming the Don: An Environmental History 
of Toronto’s Don River Valley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). In the United States there is an 
emerging spatially-focused literature on downtown transformation, including Max Page, The Creative 
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words, to paraphrase historian Leif Jerram, I want to make the “where” of this story just as 
important as the “what” and the “why.”13  
Politics of place 
I find the idea of “politics of place” useful for understanding how people in Toronto related 
to Yonge Street. Influenced by the work of scholars including Dolores Hayden and Max Page, 
I define this idea as an attachment to the specificity of a place—both physical and 
symbolic—that manifests itself in the political sphere.14 Downtown Yonge Street, I argue, 
was as much composed of abstract meanings and lived experiences as it was of bricks, 
buildings, and lampposts.15 Through representations they encountered, through discussion, 
but most of all through personal experience and longstanding use, people invested this 
landscape with memories and meanings. They became attached to the street, the uses they 
made of it, and asserted ownership over it. This thesis is most of all concerned with the way 
that these personal or group identifications with the street were represented in the public 
sphere through the media, citizen mobilizations, or the discourse of elected officials. In 
other words, it traces the emergence and impact of a set of political stances and debates 
that were bound up in a distinct and significant place.  
One result is that this account uncovers a diversity of political expression and citizen 
engagement that has previously been muted in our historical memory of the period. Our 
understanding of the postwar decades in Toronto, and in particular the turbulent city 
politics of the 1960s and 1970s, has been dominated by the perspectives of a small group of 
progressive politicians, activists, and thinkers who were themselves politically active at the 
time.16 Their writings, while often thoughtful and informed, have reproduced many of the 
                                                  
Destruction of Manhattan, 1900-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and Alison Isenberg, 
Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004). 
13 Leif Jerram, Streetlife: The Untold History of Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 13.  
14 Page, The Creative Destruction of Manhattan, esp. 252-53, see more broadly the pioneering Dolores Hayden, 
The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).  
15 Edward Relph’s classic definition of a place is a combination of physical setting, human activities, and 
assigned meanings. Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 1976). 
16 Perhaps the most widely known writing on the period is by former reform politician and activist John Sewell. 
See Sewell, The Shape of the City: Toronto Struggles with Modern Planning (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1993) and Up Against City Hall (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1972). Other influential accounts of 
the period include Jon Caulfield, The Tiny Perfect Mayor (Toronto: Lorimer and Co., 1974) on the mayoralty of 
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political binaries of the time—young urban reformers vs. “Old Guard” councillors, rapacious 
land developers and righteous community activists—and cemented them in the public 
imagination. In this study I work towards a more balanced account, one that grants agency 
to actors on all sides of the era’s debates, and does not uncritically accept received accounts 
of the period. Politics of place is one way to both acknowledge and move beyond long-
entrenched political divisions to understand the ideas and decisions of the wide range of 
people who engaged with downtown Yonge Street.  
That includes those who put their labour and capital to work on the street—
merchants, corporate investors, department store employees, sex workers—but also others 
who encountered Yonge as shoppers, commuters, or newspaper readers. This thesis 
explores, for example, the motivations of the thousands of people across Toronto who 
wrote to the mayor in the early 1970s, protesting the conversion of failing retailers into 
body-rub parlours. This was an unprecedented outpouring of opinion, triggered as much by 
attachment to the specificity of place as engagement with the moral or social issues 
perceived to be at stake. As this example suggests, feelings of ownership inspired efforts to 
protect or restore. This meshed well with nostalgia about an idealized urban past, or with 
the opposition to social and cultural change—whether in attitudes towards sex or inter-
generational relations—that galvanized social conservative reaction in the postwar decades. 
Including the category of place in analysis of citizen activism around youth misbehaviour, 
public propriety, or sexual expression complicates and enriches our understanding of this 
important political phenomenon. But the politics of Yonge Street were never exclusively 
reactive or conservative. People asserted ownership over the street not just to protest 
changes, but to make them: to imagine better, sometimes radically different futures. Paying 
attention to politics inspired by place helps us to understand why and how this happened. 
 
                                                  
David Crombie (1972-78). More broadly, the legacy of urbanist Jane Jacobs, who lived in Toronto in the 1960s 
and 1970s and participated in many of the planning debates of the time, is given great attention. See for 
example Christopher Klemek, “From Political Outsider to Power Broker in Two ‘Great American Cities’: Jane 
Jacobs and the Rise and Fall of the Urban Renewal Order in New York and Toronto,” Journal of Urban History 
38:2 (2008): 309-22; for a re-evaluation of her importance, see Richard White, “Jane Jacobs and Toronto, 1968-
1978,” Journal of Planning History 10:2 (2011): 114-38. 
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Contested terrain, contested futures 
Competing claims of ownership made downtown Yonge Street contested terrain. On the 
basis of their attachments to the street, a wide and varied cast of historical actors disputed 
its form and function, whether through business decisions, the political process, or day-to-
day use. This was most obvious in the proliferation of often conflicting plans to improve, 
revitalize, or rebuild the strip, and debates over their enactment.  Some of these schemes 
succeeded, others failed; all were contested. For example, when the regional municipality of 
Metro Toronto attempted to put into action longstanding plans to widen Yonge into an 
automobile artery, downtown politicians and planners responded with proposals to curb 
traffic, pedestrianize, and beautify; in 1966 and again in 1972 a colossal redevelopment 
project by retail giant Eaton’s was opposed by citizens who organized to express public 
attachment to historic buildings and concern for maintaining the street’s Victorian 
sociability and scale. From this contestation and the resulting negotiations emerged the 
street as we know it today.  
At almost any given moment in the postwar period, in fact, people were imagining 
multiple futures for Yonge Street.17 Plans and improvement agendas were often rooted, this 
thesis argues, in fundamentally different images of the future. From the 1950s through the 
1970s, at least four different visions were articulated for Yonge: modern, comprehensively 
planned shopping core; pedestrian-friendly “people place”; edgy, big-city entertainment 
destination; nostalgized Main Street commercial strip. At times impractical or grandiose, 
these futures cannot be dismissed as exercises in speculation: they were an integral part of 
the way people understood the changing city and its possibilities.18 Encounters between 
conflicting agendas for Yonge triggered larger discussions, in public and in the corridors of 
power, over the development of the postwar city. Closing Yonge Street to cars in the early 
1970s brought into focus the possibilities of planning a human-scaled downtown; it also 
offered Toronto a site of conversation about public space and its civic, commercial, and 
recreational purposes. Likewise, the imminent demolition of Toronto’s Old City Hall in 1966 
                                                  
17 I am indebted to Jennifer Bonnell for her simple and effective idea of “imagined futures.” Bonnell, 
Reclaiming the Don, esp. xx-xxii. 
18 On the importance of future thinking to understanding historical subjects, see David Engerman, 
“Introduction: Histories of the Future and the Futures of History,” American Historical Review (Dec. 2012): 
1402-10. 
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drew attention not just to the municipal administration’s apparently callous attitude 
towards built heritage, but also to the larger question of locating the public interest in 
private redevelopment.  
It was never enough simply to imagine a better urban future. This study uses politics 
as a lens for understanding the different types of power exercised in Yonge Street’s 
transformation. It examines, first of all, the ways in which representations of the future 
were employed to mobilize political support for collective projects, whether rigorous 
policing, the closing of streets to traffic, or the modernization of Yonge’s built landscape. 
But it also digs below the surface of those projects, exploring the ways they took shape 
outside of the public eye, according to structures of economic or administrative power that 
were rarely subject of protracted debate. The influence of capital looms large here. Much of 
the dynamism in this story, the imperative for urban change, was supplied by private 
decisions to invest—or disinvest—in Yonge Street’s economic development. This thesis pays 
particular attention to the influence of the redevelopment process, which over several 
decades not only rebuilt a substantial section of the street, but also helped create a 
speculative market in downtown land that had far-reaching impacts on Yonge’s future. In 
my account of the Eaton Centre project, I describe not only how the project was framed 
and, to an extent, “sold” to Toronto, but also of the land assembly, corporate investment 
structures, and larger economic context that made it possible. The result is a narrative that 
connects the turbulent politics of redevelopment with corporate decision-making and the 
power of capital investment to reshape the downtown landscape.  
Major private and public improvement projects hogged the headlines, but people 
also acted out their claims on Yonge Street on a more personal, immediate level. Daily 
occupancy and use of the street was a form of contestation, particularly for those lacking 
the public voice, political influence, or economic power of municipal authorities, business 
leaders, or recognized urban experts. Small merchants and craft vendors occupying sidewalk 
space with advertising or their wares; youth or party-goers using the street as a meeting 
place; sex workers discretely circulating among weekend crowds or boldly advertising their 
services: all were asserting their right to the street in their own way. Ongoing, street-level 
contestation was not limited to the weak or marginalized, however; like city politics, it too 
had its power relationships. Police, for example, made their presence felt on Yonge each 
13 
 
day, regulating use and behaviour through both formal and discretionary powers. In these 
ways, like all well-used public spaces, Yonge was a medium for the negotiation of day-to-day 
politics.19 That the issues at stake were mundane does not mean they were insignificant. 
This study finds that quotidian squabbles over noise levels, pamphleteering, or soliciting 
mattered, and over time could have as much impact on the street as higher-level debates 
over urban renewal or transportation policy.20 
A history of change 
This thesis explores a transformative period in the history of downtown Yonge Street, and 
the unprecedented public debates that helped drive that change. But Yonge, like other 
successful commercial thoroughfares, has always been a street in transformation, changing 
in interaction with the modern city and urban region that grew up around it. In 1873 local 
clergyman and historian Henry Scadding marvelled in his nostalgic Toronto of Old at the 
speed at which the street had been “so solidly and even splendidly built up,” on its way to 
displacing King Street as the city’s principal commercial thoroughfare.21 Three decades later 
the small but prosperous wholesale and retail businesses that characterized the street in 
Scadding’s day were being bought up and repurposed or torn down as land values soared 
and competition for consumer dollars stiffened. Interviewed by the Globe in 1908, retiring 
merchant John Wanless expressed regret to see the business he had established fifty years 
previously close its doors; the newspaper was more sanguine, calling the closing of the 
Wanless store “time’s advance…mak[ing] room for new enterprise,” in this case the 
relentless expansion of department store giant Simpson’s.22  
By the time redevelopment on Yonge was halted by the Great Depression, the three 
to four-storey Victorian streetscape admired by Scadding had evolved. Yonge in the mid-
twentieth century retained the identity it had taken on in the nineteenth: that of a bustling 
commercial artery offering shopping and entertainment to a wide cross-section of 
Torontonians. But some of those functions were now housed in denser, modern 
                                                  
19 Nicholas Blomley, Rights of Passage: Sidewalks and the Regulation of Public Flow (London: Routledge, 2010), 
18-19.   
20 A similar point about the importance of everyday law and policy is made in Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law 
on the Street: City Governance in an Age of Diversity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
21 Henry Scadding, Toronto of Old (Toronto: Adam, Stevenson & Co., 1873), 377. 
22 “A Yonge Street Landmark,” The Globe, July 23, 1908.  
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constructions, including imposing block-sized department stores, ornate theatres, and a 
series of solid corporate office buildings clustered south of Queen Street. The piecemeal 
transformation of the street and its adaptation to new technologies and patterns of use 
would continue throughout the twentieth century, quickening during the period 
investigated in this study, and after.23 Most recently, in the twenty-first century Yonge’s 
landscape has been dramatically altered by a series of large-scale residential developments 
that have set its street-level retail at the base of sixty and eighty-storey condominium 
skyscrapers. Contemporary changes on Yonge are explored in more depth in the conclusion 
of this thesis. 
In the past, as now, not every observer appreciated Yonge’s heterogeneous built 
landscape, seemingly always in the process of becoming. In 1927 influential architect John 
Lyle made front-page news when he speculated whether “any city in the world of a similar 
size can show a shabbier street than Yonge Street: a meaner lot of shops, or a worse 
conglomeration of false fronts.”24 This kind of criticism of the utilitarian, sometimes gaudy 
commercial façade presented by Yonge would be amplified in the postwar era. Others 
complained about congestion, both on sidewalks crowded with shoppers and on the 
pavement, where streetcars and growing numbers of private automobiles vied for space. 
But this excess of vitality was also viewed as one of the street’s greatest attributes. Yonge 
Street was crowds, wrote another observer in the 1920s—“loitering crowds, hurrying 
crowds, window-shopping crowds, buying crowds”—and many people appreciated being 
part of the big-city bustle it offered, surely a sign of the city’s economic success and social 
cohesion.25 It is important to remember that crowds meant not just bargains and thrills, but 
also livelihoods: this busy street was a workplace for thousands, whether shop clerks, 
tailors, cooks, accountants, or cab drivers. Toronto celebrated Yonge Street first and 
foremost not for its beauty, but for its obvious prosperity.  
The street was also valued as a major downtown public space. Yonge at mid-century 
was a Main Street landscape to which many people were attached, the site of Friday night 
                                                  
23 For two perspectives on 1990s and 2000s changes on Yonge, see Evelyn Ruppert, The Moral Economy of 
Cities: Shaping Good Citizens (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) and Beth Moore Milroy, Thinking 
Planning and Urbanism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010). 
24 “Says Yonge Street Shabby; Has Mean Shop Fronts,” Toronto Star, Jan. 31, 1927. 
25 “Swarming Christmas Crowds Transform Downtown Toronto,” Globe, Dec. 21, 1925. 
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cinema and Saturday shopping, of Labour Day and Santa Claus Parades. Soldiers went off to 
two World Wars marching down Yonge Street, and in 1918 and 1945 victory was celebrated 
by jubilant crowds along the same route. Yonge was the street where churchgoers strolled 
after Sunday services—past shops closed for the Sabbath by a firmly Protestant municipal 
administration—but also where lunch-counters stayed open twenty-four hours to 
accommodate shift workers and late-night revellers. The brightness of the strip contrasted 
sharply with the dark, often deserted cross-streets that intersected it; Yonge’s centrality was 
only emphasized by the lack of any substantial commercial development on east-west 
streets in this part of downtown Toronto. 
To some observers, this wide range of uses symbolized the North American ideal of 
downtown as a site of civic communion, an essentially democratic place where citizens met, 
transacted business, and negotiated difference on terms of equality.26 People referred to 
Yonge as Toronto’s centre, or its beating heart, an idealized place where citizens of all 
classes and backgrounds rubbed shoulders, including the working-class, recent immigrants, 
                                                  
26 See Isenberg, Downtown America, 4-6. 
Image 2: Yonge Street looking north from Queen Street on an unusually crowded summer 
afternoon, August 1929. City of Toronto Archives 16-71-6564. 
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and the suburban housewife; a rare “mingling of the splendid and the shabby,” as one city 
desk columnist put it in 1912. In a city that aspired to big-city status, Yonge was proof of 
success: on its most crowded days, several observers argued, the street was Toronto’s 
“testimony of metropolitanism,” presenting street scenes reminiscent of New York’s Great 
White Way or London’s Strand.27 In the postwar period, the idea that Yonge was not just a 
commercial zone but a vital civic space remained important, serving to justify both 
interventions aimed at protecting and enhancing that function, and a populist politics that 
claimed majority control over the street’s fate. 
Strolling postwar Yonge Street 
A tour of downtown Yonge in the post-1945 era reveals continuities, but also new changes: 
the street refused to stay still. Our stroller begins walking where Toronto—and Yonge 
Street—meet Lake Ontario. After crossing over the industrial in-fill of Toronto’s harbour 
lands and the city’s extensive railway yards, the street emerges into the city proper at Front 
Street. Almost immediately there is a change in atmosphere. Once within the confines of 
the nineteenth century city, which effectively begins north of the railway lines, Yonge is 
much more densely developed, with most buildings constructed right to the edge of their 
lots. The centre of activity is a shopping and entertainment strip approximately twelve 
blocks (1.4 km) long, running from just south of Queen Street to as far north as College 
Street. Commercial development continued north more or less continuously to Bloor Street 
and into the residential suburbs, but the iconic strip—and debates over its future—
effectively ended there. In comparison to nearby University Avenue, downtown Yonge lacks 
stately public buildings, grandeur, or perspective. Instead, its great strength is its human 
scale, allowing a pedestrian to see what is happening on the other side, and cross midblock 
in relative safety.  
Upon arrival at the southern end of the strip, our Yonge Street flâneur’s attention is 
drawn by the impressive, block-sized flagships of the Eaton’s and Simpson’s department 
store chains. Their presence made Yonge and Queen the most trafficked retail crossroads in 
                                                  
27 Brian Bellasis, “Yonge Street,” Globe, Nov. 2, 1912; “Swarming Christmas Crowds Transform Downtown 
Toronto,” Globe, Dec. 21, 1925. 
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the country, with the highest land value per square foot in the downtown core.28 Further 
north, the end of the busiest stretch of the strip is marked from the 1930s by the huge 
footprint of a second Eaton’s store, constructed at the intersection with College Street. As 
elsewhere, major department stores had tremendous influence on downtown, drawing 
consumers to the area and stimulating streetlife with their elaborate window displays, sales, 
and celebrations.29 And while their presence drew smaller retailers to the strip, there could 
be no doubt that these heavyweights dominated the market. In the early 1950s an Eaton’s 
business consultant estimated that as much as 75¢ of every dollar spent by downtown 
shoppers on clothes and household goods went into the coffers of one of the two giants.30 
Yet despite their success, the major department stores were not complacent: in the postwar 
                                                  
28 City of Toronto Planning Board (CTPB), Downtown Toronto: Background Studies for the Plan (Toronto: CTPB, 
1963), 9. 
29 See Donica Belisle, Retail Nation: Department Stores and the Making of Modern Canada (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2011). 
30 “Larry Smith & Co.: Toronto: Preliminary Report, Vol. I, Feb. 17, 1954,” Eaton’s Fonds, Archives of Ontario 
(AO) B381767. 
Image 3: The two major department stores on the west side of Yonge at Queen, late 1960s. At 
left with flags is Simpson’s, and the large red-brick building further north (also hung with flags) 
is Eaton’s. Commercial postcard, Chuckman’s Toronto Collection. 
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era they invested considerable time and money in refining and improving their operations, 
whether through new marketing strategies or modernization of their physical plant.  
Still, there was room for smaller businesses to thrive, and they did. In the 1950s and 
1960s Yonge south of College Street was home to nearly three hundred shops and service 
establishments, by far the largest concentration of shopping in the city.31 These mostly 
small, independent businesses accounted for more than one million square feet of retail 
floor space, twice that of any other retail strip in Toronto, and equivalent to all but the 
largest suburban shopping centres of the period.32 Many were prominent members of the 
Downtown Businessmen’s Association, a voluntary group that was one of the largest 
merchants’ associations in the city and a frequent intervenor in civic affairs.33 In terms of 
offerings, the short block from Dundas Street south to Terauley Street was typical, housing 
in the 1950s three shoe stores, two women’s fashion outlets, an office furnishing store, two 
opticians, two jewellers, and a furrier, all sitting on the long, narrow (15-30 foot) lots that 
defined the first wave of development in Toronto. Above these ground floor uses were 
additional layers of activity: a billiards hall, a private club, a tailor, two photographers, and 
several apartments.34 Postwar these businesses were increasingly oriented towards two 
groups of customers: young people and the considerable number of Torontonians—150,000 
in the early 1960s—who commuted to the expanding office district nearby.   
The street was also busy by night. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
east side of Yonge Street was the city’s principal hub for popular entertainment, with 
theatres and musical halls offering vaudeville, film, and other attractions. Postwar this 
intensified, reaching its peak with the boisterous nightlife and commercialized sex of the 
1970s, described in detail later on. Always on the cutting edge of taste, Yonge played host to 
                                                  
31 Statistics for 1965 & 1966 show 158 retail stores and 138 service establishments on downtown Yonge. 
Drawn from Might’s Greater Toronto City Directory (Toronto: Might’s, 1965) and Richard Baine, A. Lynn 
McMurray, Toronto: An Urban Study (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1973), 47. 
32 Yorkdale, Canada’s largest shopping centre until the late 1970s, boasted just over 1 million square feet of 
retail space at this time. Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board (MTPB), Shopping Centres and Strip Retail 
Areas: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Area, 1969 (Toronto: MTPB, 1970).  
33 The Downtown Businessmen’s Association would later be renamed the Downtown Business Council and the 
Downtown Council. It survives in a very different form today as the Downtown Yonge Business Improvement 
Association. 
34 “Survey map of Yonge Street properties, late 1950s,” Eaton’s Fonds, AO, B381767; Might’s Toronto Directory 
(Toronto: Might’s, 1955). 
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Toronto’s first cocktail lounges in the 1940s, and the city’s burgeoning blues, jazz, and rock 
and roll scenes from the 1950s. Venues like the Edison Hotel, the Colonial Tavern, and the 
Coq d’Or hosted major American musicians on circuit, and also acted as a laboratory for 
home-grown talent, including folk singer Gordon Lightfoot and jazz pianist Cy McLean. By 
the 1960s the area had half a dozen small and large movie theatres—including the famous 
Imperial and Loew’s stacked Elgin and Winter Garden Theatres—with a total capacity of 
more than 5000 spectators. The city’s largest records stores were among a growing list of 
hubs for a youthful consumer and leisure culture that also included blue jeans, posters, and 
pinball arcades. The range of entertainment offered and the expectations of the audience 
had changed since the pre-war years, but Yonge by night was still often celebrated in the 
same terms. In 1969 local rags-to-riches retail and entertainment mogul “Honest” Ed 
Mirvish described the strip: 
People! People! People! Here is Bassel’s restaurant, where you might find 
the mayor sitting next to a truck driver. The bars, go-go parlours, jazz 
combos, arcades, noise. A & A Records and Sam the Record Man. This noisy, 
busy strip, beautiful in its ugliness, contrasting with the stark, cold white 
skyscrapers of University Avenue just a few short blocks to the west.35   
On a typical day, the Yonge Street sidewalk buzzed with people headed to and from 
appointments, shopping trips, and lunch breaks. At night, a corridor of neon signage shone 
on sedate symphony-goers and cruising gangs or car-loads of teenagers. Our downtown 
stroller would note sidewalk businesses and streetlife that had disappeared from the rest of 
the downtown core, but still thrived on the strip. As police across the city took to scout cars 
for their daily patrols, Yonge was one of the last streets in Toronto still patrolled daily and 
nightly by “beat” cops on foot. Street vendors selling hot chestnuts, flowers or candles were 
ubiquitous, especially at Christmas-time and in the summer. Meanwhile, boys as young as 
12 years old, often drawn from the working-class neighbourhoods of the inner core, set up 
portable shoeshine shops—a stool and a polish kit—on the busiest blocks. Postwar 
observers tended to romanticize “Donnie the bootblack” and his companions as 
entrepreneurs, or examples of Yonge’s diverse human landscape; as explored in the second 
section of this study, in the 1970s many Torontonians came to see the shoeshine boy as a 
                                                  
35 “Honest Ed’s Toronto: ‘It’s where the action is’,” Toronto Star, Dec. 13, 1969. 
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powerful symbol of innocence lost.36 Needless to say, all of this activity was seasonal in a 
city where humid summers and frigid, snowy winters could dramatically impact mobility and 
desire to be outdoors.  
Decentralization, decline, and the postwar city 
The most obvious way to experience Yonge Street was on foot, but how to get there? The 
range of transportation options available to our postwar flâneur helps us situate Yonge in 
the changing postwar city. By the 1950s a visit to the strip might still start with a streetcar 
ride—Toronto, unlike most North American cities, continued to invest in its street 
railways—but it was just as likely to involve a trip by subway or car. From 1954 Yonge was 
the site of Toronto’s first subway line, running seven kilometres underneath the street from 
the northern suburbs at Eglinton Avenue to southern edge of downtown at Front Street.37 
                                                  
36 “Donnie the bootblack lets you set the price…,” Toronto Star, May 21, 1969. 
37 “100,000 Take First Ride; Token Machines Run Dry,” Globe and Mail, Mar. 31, 1954; on the development of 
the subway as a metropolitan project, see Jason Young, “Searching for a Better Way: Subway Life and 
Metropolitan Growth in Toronto, 1942-1978,” (PhD Thesis, York History 2012). 
Image 4: The Yonge Street strip (east side, north of Dundas Street) by night, late 1960s.
Theatres, restaurants, and taverns, all advertised in bright neon, predominate. Commercial 
postcard, Chuckman’s Toronto Collection. 
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Meanwhile, at the street’s foot construction began on a lakefront freeway, part of a modern 
roadway network planned by the newly  established Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 
which from 1953 bound Toronto together with surrounding communities in the common 
purpose of planning and managing urban growth.38  
These projects, like the establishment of Metro Toronto, were long-debated policy 
responses to an emerging urban reality: decentralization. In the postwar decades rapid 
suburban development burst the bounds of the densely-built, downtown-oriented 
“streetcar city,” already stretched to the limit by unprecedented levels of immigration and 
population growth.39 As Canada slowly transitioned from depression and war to a 
prosperous consumer society, pent-up demand for housing and growing rates of automobile 
ownership drove rapid decentralization. From the 1940s through the 1960s, while the 
population of the inner core remained virtually unchanged, 1.2 million people—almost two 
additional pre-war Torontos—settled in an outer ring of suburbs that dwarfed the old city in 
scale. Residential subdivisions were followed by new manufacturing and office 
concentrations, and the development of strip and shopping malls: in a matter of a few 
decades, Toronto, like most North American cities, became suburban.40  
The fact of decentralization, and its impact on downtown politics, surface in each of 
the three sections of this thesis. Downtown actors, whether department store executives or 
environmental activists, rightly saw the rise of the suburbs as one of the defining urban 
transformations of the twentieth century. They traced its impact on Yonge Street in 
different ways, adding up sales receipts, measuring pollution levels, and counting 
pedestrians on summer evenings, and they debated their findings in newspapers and other 
public fora. From these investigations emerged a complex and often contradictory body of 
opinion. Some saw opportunity in Toronto’s changing shape, confident that, if the right 
choices were made, Yonge would remain the beating heart of the emerging metropolis. 
Others feared that the flight of people, jobs, and consumer dollars to the suburbs posed an 
                                                  
38 Albert Rose, Governing Metropolitan Toronto: A Social and Political Analysis, 1953-1971 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972) remains the best account of the inception and functions of Metro Toronto. 
39 Edward Relph develops this idea in Toronto: Transformations in a City and its Region (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), esp. 26-44. 
40 The best account of this larger process of suburbanization and its roots is Richard Harris, Creeping 
Conformity: How Canada Became Suburban, 1900-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
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existential threat to downtown life and livelihoods. This ambivalence was part of larger 
trend. Surveying the postwar decades, it would be difficult to find a comparable shopping 
street anywhere in North America that was not singled out for the same combination of 
hope and anxiety. Everywhere, the downtown future seemed up for grabs.41  
In this context of uncertainty, images of urban decline influenced discussions of 
Yonge Street’s future. Many observers began to see changes on the street—including the 
boom in entertainment and youth culture noted by our flâneur—not as continuity, but 
rupture or loss. If in 1908 the closing John Wanless’s beloved store was seen as part of the 
march of progress, by the 1950s and 1960s the demise of similar enterprises seemed to 
many like the death knell for the strip. To individuals attached to the street, changes in 
Yonge’s streetscape and patterns of use provoked anxiety and nostalgia for earlier times. 
And to observers of economic and urban trends, Yonge’s lack of dynamism relative to other 
areas of the city seemed to confirm its decline. The image of Yonge as a dying place, in need 
of artificial resuscitation to survive—“revitalization” was the term most often used—gained 
political currency and was employed to justify a range of improvement agendas.  
This study casts a critical eye on these prognoses of downtown failure, searching for 
their roots both in the realities of postwar change in Toronto, and in the larger social and 
cultural context of the postwar period. Among other factors, it notes the influence of 
demographic change, the city’s increasing ethnic diversity, and the debate over public 
morality and behaviour that defined 1960s and 1970s Canada. Equally important was the 
powerful discourse of urban crisis—and salvation—filtering north across the border from 
the United States.42  
While I take declensionist narratives seriously because of their impact on postwar 
perspectives and politics, I find that they fall short as a framework for understanding 
Yonge’s fate. Many fears for the street’s future proved to be unfounded: on the whole, 
Toronto’s downtown was spared the plummeting land values and loss of commercial activity 
that characterized many urban centres in the United States and, to a lesser extent, 
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42 The classic account of this subject is Robert Beauregard, Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of US Cities 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995). 
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Canada.43 Independent businesses that failed or relocated were soon replaced by national 
or international chains better able to exploit this expensive prime real estate. A continental 
recession in the mid-1970s slowed—but did not halt—downtown redevelopment. Disaster 
never overtook Yonge Street, even if some familiar landmarks disappeared, and others were 
put to new uses. In fact, within a few decades Toronto would be viewed by many North 
American observers as a model of a successful city, a status it still holds today to a certain 
degree. More broadly, this study rejects the assumption that the complexities of urban 
development can be understood through simplistic metaphors of life and death, which 
often allow for just one model of success, and ignore the creativity and human agency 
inherent in the process.44 This is not an account of an arc towards failure arrested by 
revitalization, but a complex story of urban transformation.  
Sources 
Postwar debates over Yonge Street and the future of Toronto’s downtown created a rich 
archive. From the 1950s through the 1970s there was seldom a moment when the city was 
not debating Yonge’s perceived problems and their many possible solutions. Much of what 
was said and done is preserved in documentary sources from the period, including (but by 
no means limited to) newspaper accounts, official reports, business memoranda, and 
citizens’ letters to elected officials. A few numbers give a sense of the size of this archive: 
over three decades I count at least 20 major reports by city staff, citizen groups, planners, 
and businesses; more than 2,000 letters from citizens to the mayor; and approximately 
1,000 newspaper articles, all dealing with the future of Yonge Street. Surrounding these 
documents is a larger collection of memoranda, meeting minutes, and internal reports that 
dwarfs them in size. These and other public and private sources form the core of my 
research. Dealing with the recent past and with a topic that was of significant public 
interest, I have rarely been faced, as many historians are, with major silences in the 
documentary record. In approaching this topic, the challenge has been quite the opposite: 
                                                  
43 Richard White makes a similar point about downtown Toronto in “Urban Renewal Revisited: Toronto, 1950 
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how to listen to a cacophony of voices—some much louder than others—weigh them one 
against another, and bring them into conversation.  
The first and most readily accessible source employed here is the press. My research 
includes a wide reading of over 3,000 articles from Toronto’s three major daily 
newspapers—the Toronto Star, Globe and Mail, and Telegram (reborn in 1971 as the 
Toronto Sun)—as well as dozens more from other major Canadian and, occasionally, 
international newspapers.45 In this study, newspapers are, first of all, used as a source of 
information and detail. Journalists were keen observers of local affairs, including the day-to-
day transaction of municipal business, with privileged access to politicians, bureaucrats, and 
local business elites. This reporting provides the colour that brings past events to life: the 
attitude of a crowd; the mayor’s impromptu comments to the press gallery; images of 
streetlife, building façades, or development plans. When followed over time it creates a 
narrative of the local—with its own particular interpretations, inclusions, and omissions—
that is a useful contrast to the official record. 
The press also features here as an important influence on municipal politics. The 
press both helped shape what people in Toronto thought about a range of issues, and 
created a forum for public discussion, albeit one framed by distinct editorial agendas. 
Despite the challenges posed by changing tastes and broadcast media, the Toronto dailies 
remained widely read throughout the period covered here. To give just one example, a 1966 
Canadian Facts survey of 1000 Torontonians found that most relied on the major papers for 
their local news: half read the Star on a daily basis, and two-thirds either the Telegram or 
Globe and Mail.46 Each paper had a distinct voice: the Globe, “Canada’s national 
newspaper,” was business-oriented but generally socially progressive; the conservative 
Telegram/Sun offered opinionated columnists and populist editorials; the Star, Canada’s 
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46 Canadian Facts, A Study of the Attitudes of Metropolitan Toronto Adults Towards the Proposed Eaton Centre 
(Toronto, 1966). The changing postwar landscape for the press is set out in Royal Commission on Newspapers, 
Report (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1981), 63-85. 
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largest newspaper with a circulation of 300,000-400,000, was staunchly Liberal with a roster 
of respected, nationally syndicated columnists.47 All three took stances on hot-button local 
issues like the sex industry or downtown redevelopment, and endorsed political candidates 
at every election. They also devoted significant space to citizen comment through letters to 
the editor and the more exclusive—typically expert—op-ed. Throughout this study are 
instances in which coverage in the dailies influenced Yonge Street politics. Citizen activists 
were inspired to action by columns they read at breakfast; business and political elites 
sought to use the press to take the temperature of public opinion—and to shape it.48 Where 
possible, I have also sought out community papers, trade journals, and the alternative press, 
finding the latter in particular a rich source of dissenting perspectives. 
Much of this study focuses on municipal decision-making and policy, and here I draw 
on a careful reading of the vast archive produced by Toronto’s two levels of local 
government. A substantial portion was in the public record: planning reports, council 
minutes, records of public consultations. Crucially, a series of access to information requests 
and a research agreement with the City of Toronto opened hundreds of previously 
inaccessible files, including the official correspondence of the mayor of Toronto and 
chairman of Metro Toronto, and the internal files of several units of the City and Metro 
bureaucracy. Generally speaking, these records grew both in quality and quantity 
throughout the period under study. If in the 1940s and 1950s much of city business was 
either transacted informally or the records not kept, by the late 1960s the duty to record 
and preserve was taken much more seriously.  
These files allow me, to a certain extent, to reconstruct how Toronto’s bureaucracy 
thought, how politicians made decisions, and the ways in which both types of civic official 
interacted with an increasingly outspoken public on downtown issues. The discovery of 
hundreds upon hundreds of letters and phone messages to the mayor concerning the state 
of Yonge Street, and of petitions signed by thousands more, was surprising and exciting. 
                                                  
47 In a typical year, 1974, Toronto circulation was as follows: Globe- 141, 330, Star- 403,505, Sun- 101,372. 
Audit Bureau of Circulations, ABC Factbook, 1975/1976 (Toronto: ABC, 1976), 84.  
48 This study does not find a coherent body of public opinion on downtown issues in the press—or elsewhere—
but it does recognize its importance of the concept to the practice of local politics. For an illuminating 
discussion of public opinion and the press see Jeffrey McNairn, The Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and 
Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), esp. 6-13 
and 116-75.  
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Here were voices of Torontonians from across the city, downtown and suburbs, young and 
old; here was an assertive politics of place that needed to be mapped and understood. 
Equally significant was the discovery of Toronto Councillor William Archer’s documentation 
of the history and day-to-day workings of the Yonge Street pedestrian mall, of which he was 
the principal organizer. These records highlighted for me not just the importance, but the 
complexity of municipal governance in a period of urban transformation.  
Finally, several large groups of private records provide insight into the perspectives 
of downtown business and citizen activists. Addressing both the politics and practice 
downtown redevelopment would not have been possible without the extensive archive of 
the T. Eaton Co., one of Toronto’s most important retailers, downtown landowners, and 
corporate citizens. The Eaton’s records are exceptional in that no other Canadian business 
of comparative size, and certainly no private land developer, has opened up its records to 
the public in the same way. Other significant groups of records donated by private 
individuals include the files of environmental activist group Pollution Probe, development 
researchers Downtown Action, and heritage conservationists the Friends of Old City Hall. 
This study also incorporates several oral history interviews conducted to fill in gaps in the 
archival record, including a series of conversations with 1970s Toronto Mayor David 
Crombie. 
This archive has its absences. The files of public figures rarely include the un-minuted 
meetings and phone calls that are so crucial to the day-to-day transaction of city business; 
the Toronto police resolutely refused to release reports or internal communications for the 
period. Many of the small but important players in this story—the Downtown Business 
Council, for example—left behind an incomplete documentary record. However, these gaps 
can be addressed in part through a careful reading of what is there, such as the extensive 
correspondence between police officials and the mayor, or the Downtown Council and 
various city councillors. Other silences are the result of choices made during research. Early 
on, I chose to focus on the powerful. This story turns on public debate and policy 
interventions, and most of the actors in this story are those who wielded the power to 
influence one or both: businesses, media, politicians, bureaucrats, well-organized citizen 
activists. I have tried to include other voices—sex workers, youth—but recognize that the 
extensive oral history work required to do justice to their perspectives is beyond the scope 
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of this study. Equally, echoes of Torontonians’ relationship with their main street are 
present in fiction, film, and other cultural artefacts, but here I only scratch the surface of 
that large and varied body of work.49  
Structure 
This thesis is divided into three main sections, each telling the story of a major project to 
reshape Yonge Street and Toronto’s downtown, interventions that were themselves 
animated by differing images of the street’s present and future. Chronologically, the focus is 
on the 1960s and 1970s, but elements of this story extend back to the 1940s, or forward to 
the 1980s. The first section of this thesis focuses on the Yonge Street pedestrian mall, which 
closed the street to vehicles and opened it to shoppers and strollers for four summers from 
1971 to 1974. Tracing the history of thinking about pedestrians and cars in postwar Toronto, 
I explore how the idea of car-free zones transformed from a neglected planning proposal to 
one of the most widely publicized downtown interventions of the era. Beginning in the 
1960s, the idea was taken up successively by downtown merchants, the youth 
counterculture, and environmental activists, before being placed at the centre of efforts to 
promote downtown Toronto as a “people place.” That imagined future had resonance in an 
era characterized by contestation of the speed and scale of urban development and the 
place of the automobile in the city. Invested with great hopes—for economic revitalization, 
for increased environmental awareness, for a new urban sociability—the Yonge Street mall 
was both popular and controversial. Public debates over its future hinged on the challenges 
of creating and managing a major new public space in the heart of downtown. Much like the 
street it occupied, the mall was widely used and carried multiple, often conflicting identities: 
gathering place, shopping mall, transportation corridor, entertainment zone. The positive 
notion of a people-centred downtown was effectively challenged by portrayals of the mall 
as a public place that had become too public, ending the experiment and leaving an 
ambivalent legacy for pedestrian closures in Toronto.     
                                                  
49 For an excellent essay on Yonge Street on film, see Geoff Pevere, “Flickering City: Toronto on Film until 
2002,” in Pevere et al., Toronto on Film (Toronto: Toronto International Film Festival, 2009). On Yonge and 
Toronto in literature see Amy Lavender-Harris, Imagining Toronto (Toronto: Mansfield Press, 2010). 
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In the public imagination, nothing symbolized Yonge’s need of improvement more 
than its reputation as one of Canada’s most infamous corridors of commercialized vice. In 
the second section, I relate the extraordinary short-term success of the sexual 
entertainment industry on Yonge Street, and examine attempts by citizens and civic officials 
to regulate or eliminate it. The Sin Strip entertainment area gained national celebrity with 
the shocking murder of 12-year-old shoeshine boy Emanuel Jaques in 1977, but the story 
related here is much larger than that single episode. It begins with the street’s reorientation 
towards entertainment in the 1950s and 1960s, both as a response to declining retail 
business and as an attempt to fulfil a future for downtown as “where the action was,” a big-
city scene of bright lights, crowds, and the pursuit of pleasure. Along with larger changes in 
the law and attitudes towards sex, this created the right conditions for the sex shops and 
body rub parlours that appeared by the dozen on downtown Yonge in the 1970s, 
transforming it into a night-time marketplace for sexual services and a playground for 
heterosexual men. What followed were years of debates that brought to the fore questions 
of morality and the regulation of public space, as a citizen-led campaign sought to “clean 
up” Yonge and, drawing on nostalgic images of the downtown past, create what they 
understood as a more democratic, moral future for the street. Toronto authorities, like 
other governments across North America, experimented with a range of regulatory 
interventions, from licensing to police intimidation; meanwhile, sex workers, the operators 
of sex-oriented businesses, and their allies asserted their right to the city through legal 
challenges, lobbying, and day-to-day strategies of resistance.  
The third part of this study explores private and public efforts to plan and implement 
a modern future for Yonge and downtown, with a particular focus on the extensive 
landholdings of retail giant Eaton’s. Beginning in the 1950s, the image of Yonge Street as 
Toronto’s “Fifth Avenue,” launched into a new era of commercial success through 
reconstruction, inspired both business elites and growth-boosting politicians. Civic pride and 
the quest for profits were entangled as civic officials and revitalization experts placed the 
Eaton’s lands at the centre of a modernist renewal project heavily influenced by the 
American example. Yet rebuilding downtown proved to be a complicated business: 
ambitious planning schemes were destabilized by market realities, citizen opposition, and 
changing conceptions of the ideal city. The story of the colossal Eaton Centre project (1956-
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1977) is an account of capitalist creative destruction, one of the largest of the many 
redevelopment projects that would transform the Yonge corridor and downtown. But it is 
also a story of the triumph of community activism, of evolving public-private negotiations, 
and of consolidation and change within corporate Canada. More than any other 
intervention, redevelopment would transform Yonge Street’s form and meanings. 
By way of conclusion, I trace how historical dynamics established in the postwar 
period have continued to shape Yonge Street and downtown through to the present day. 
Massive investment in redevelopment, first for retail and office towers and later for 
university buildings and high-end condominiums, has dramatically transformed block after 
block of the street. Yet amidst this transformation, widespread attachment to Yonge’s 
storied streetscape has led to continued efforts to preserve and celebrate elements of the 
street, whether through documentary film, historical tours, or heritage conservation 
designations. Debates over public morality and behaviour in this busy public space continue 
to erupt periodically, prompting new policing and surveillance interventions aimed at 
securing the street’s value as a shopping and entertainment destination. Much-changed in 
form and character since the 1950s, Yonge remains controversial and contested, a 
microcosm of the successful yet divided city that has grown up around it over the last six 
decades. 
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1. Streets for People: The Yonge Street Pedestrian Mall 
 
On the afternoon of June 3, 1971, Ontario Premier Bill Davis announced the cancellation of 
provincial funding for the Spadina Expressway, effectively ending debate over one of the 
most controversial urban infrastructure projects in Canadian history. The proposed 
expressway would have provided increased access by car to the heart of Toronto’s 
downtown, but at the cost of displacing several vibrant residential neighbourhoods. That 
evening, members of the citizens’ coalition opposed to the project gathered on downtown 
Yonge Street to celebrate their success. Yonge has always been a place to celebrate; but in 
this case it seemed particularly appropriate. Just a few days before, Toronto had with much 
fanfare launched its first downtown pedestrianization scheme, closing three long blocks of 
the street to cars to create a major new public space. For the Stop Spadina activists, whose 
ranks included urbanist Jane Jacobs, this experiment had a powerful symbolic dimension. 
One of the slogans of their campaign—repeated by Bill Davis as he explained his decision to 
the press that afternoon—was that “the streets belong to the people.”1 The Yonge Street 
pedestrian mall, where four lanes of traffic had been replaced by pedestrians, benches, and 
beer gardens, seemed to perfectly embody those words.   
This is the first account of a planning experiment which sought to revitalize 
downtown Yonge Street by reimagining it as a people place. For four years, from 1971 to 
1974, Toronto joined hundreds of other cities in Europe and North America in 
enthusiastically embracing pedestrianization. If the vision of postwar redevelopment and 
urban renewal projects was to replace the older city with something grander, more modern, 
and more profitable, proponents of pedestrianization sought to do just the opposite: to 
create value by protecting and enhancing what was already there. As a result, anti-
expressway campaigners were not the only people who invested the Yonge Street mall with 
their hopes for the urban future. The idea appealed to a range of downtown actors, 
including merchants eager to boost sales, environmentalists opposed to the private car, and 
                                                  
1 “Cabinet decides to halt Spadina,” Globe and Mail, Jun. 4, 1971; “Spadina opponents hold a party in 
pedestrian mall, of course,” Toronto Star, Jun. 4, 1971. The episode is also covered in Claire Hoy, Bill Davis: A 
Biography (Toronto: Methuen, 1985), esp. 87-90. 
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urban reformers who favoured expanding the city’s modest public realm. In this respect, the 
mall was a reflection of a period in which city politics were opening up to a wider range of 
constituents, who brought with them both creative approaches to urban issues and strident 
demands for a voice in decision-making.2     
The Yonge Street mall was popular, but also controversial. This section argues that 
its broad base of political support masked conflicting visions of the street and its future; few 
could agree whether the opening of Yonge’s pavement to pedestrians should create 
economic value, encourage urban sociability, or make a statement about transportation 
planning. Nor was there consensus on how best to manage the new public space it created, 
which as it blurred familiar categories and uses—road and sidewalk, park and thoroughfare, 
shopping and leisure—seemed also to blur or bend the boundaries of acceptable public 
behaviour. The mall was a crowded public space that offered excitement, atmosphere, and 
spectacle to a broad range of Torontonians, and attracted perceived undesirables like 
panhandlers, aggressive entertainment promoters, and long-haired young rowdies. In an 
historical moment characterized by anxiety around the category of youth, the last was 
particularly salient to the debate. Discussion of the mall soon centred as much on the 
appropriate regulatory regime for governing public access and use as on the experiment’s 
economic or civic gifts to the city.3 By 1974 opposition to the mall by citizen activists and law 
enforcement officials had empowered a narrative that cast the street closure as one of 
Yonge Street’s problems, and not a solution. The idea of Yonge as a street for the people 
would have continued resonance for the era’s turbulent politics, but by the late 1970s a 
traffic-free strip was seen as having more negative than positive implications.  
Something fundamental to the ordering of the city was challenged by the 
experiment. Using concepts including “automobility,”4 and “pedestrianism,”5 scholars from 
                                                  
2 On the chaos and creativity of the period see Jon Caulfield, “‘Reform’ as a Chaotic Concept: The Case of 
Toronto,” Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine 17:2 (1988): 107-11. 
3 Sociologist Evelyn Ruppert has argued that public spaces are determined most of all by the regimes that 
regulate their use. “Rights to Public Space: Regulatory Reconfigurations of Liberty,” Urban Geography 27:3 
(2006): 271-92. 
4 A good introduction to the concept of automobility is Mike Featherstone, “Automobilities: An Introduction,” 
Theory, Culture & Society 21:4 (2004): 1–24. 
5 On pedestrianism see Nicolas Blomley, Rights of Passage: Sidewalks and the Regulation of Public Flow (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), esp. 3-4, and “How to Turn a Beggar into a Bus Stop: Law, Traffic, and the ‘Function of 
the Place’,” Urban Studies 44:9 (2007): 1697-1712.  
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a range of disciplines have described how in North America, municipal authorities and the 
law manage public thoroughfares and spaces according to principles of scarcity, flow, and 
separation of uses. Streets are allotted to the car, sidewalks and squares to the pedestrian, 
and the public interest is defined as the orderly and unobstructed movement of both from 
point A to point B. This logic is historically rooted, the product of both technological 
change—the rise of the private automobile looms large—and political and cultural 
developments, including the expansion of the powers of the local state, and the growing 
role of technical expertise in urban governance. While this mode of thinking about urban 
public space integrated well with many of the modernist planning ideas that circulated in 
Toronto and elsewhere from the early to mid-1900s onwards, it was both more pervasive 
and more deeply embedded in institutions than any particular trend in urban planning.6  
The multi-functional, intensely used public space created by the pedestrian malls did 
not easily fit with that logic. Nor was there a readily applicable alternative framework, 
although there were numerous precedents in other North American jurisdictions. The city 
did not possess all of the powers necessary to close Yonge Street or satisfactorily manage 
the resulting space, relying instead on a mixed set of tools that included special provincial 
legislation, informal persuasion, and a sometimes overreaching police presence. More 
broadly, the mall seemed to be a challenge from outside to the authority of those tasked 
with managing the city’s streets and transportation network, including traffic planners and 
engineers, the Public Works Department, and the police. According to their own interests 
and political resources, those actors pushed back. In short, everything that was innovative 
and new about the mall, everything that made it popular, also helped to create serious 
obstacles to the project’s success, and tended to reinforce the status quo as the path of 
least resistance.  
                                                  
6 On cars and pedestrians see especially Stephen Davies, “Reckless Walking Must be Discouraged: The 
Automobile and the Shaping of Urban Canada to 1930,” Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine 18:2 
(1989): 123-38 and Peter Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). On the development of the public interest in the nineteenth century era of 
municipal reform see the essays in John C. Weaver, Shaping the Canadian City: Essays on Urban Politics and 
Policy, 1890-1920 (Toronto: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1977) and Paul Rutherford, ed., 
Saving the Canadian City: The First Phase, 1880-1920 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), and on 
expertise Stephen Bocking, “Constructing Urban Expertise Professional and Political Authority in Toronto, 
1940-1970,” Journal of Urban History 33:1 (2006): 51-76.     
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Most North American pedestrian malls took a similar journey from popularity into 
controversy and eventual obsolescence.7 Their numbers continued to grow until the late 
1970s, but by that point enthusiasm was waning. Cities across the continent complained of 
high vacancy rates and traffic disruption; some were, like Toronto, paralyzed by debates 
over the perceived dangers posed by homeless people, panhandlers, and youth. As private 
investment poured into downtowns, many of these experiments were also vulnerable to 
competition from privately managed, enclosed downtown shopping malls like the Eaton 
Centre.8 Cities experimenting with temporary closures often gave up, and many permanent 
malls were reopened to car traffic.9 In Canada the few 1960s-1970s pedestrian zones that 
have survived to today—Ottawa’s Sparks Street, Vancouver’s Granville transit mall—are 
seldom described as success stories. The image of the pedestrian bringing vitality, culture, 
and security to the heart of the city remains a powerful one in urban theory and planning 
practice in Toronto; but the formula behind successful people places remains elusive.  
Planning for pedestrians downtown  
Compared to other North American cities, Toronto was slow to adopt an urban planning 
system.10 The city had no overarching plan or permanent planning committee until the 
1940s, relying instead on temporary commissions and municipal bylaws to oversee 
development. This ad hoc process was inadequate for the transformative ambitions of post-
Second World War city builders. Toronto’s first comprehensive plans were developed in the 
optimistic, even utopian context of postwar reconstruction, and it shows. From the 1940s 
into the 1960s, the experts responsible for planning the city’s future tended to think big. 
Influenced by the international circulation of modernist planning ideas, they imagined a 
                                                  
7 For overviews of the obstacles faced by other pedestrianization projects in North America and elsewhere see 
Kent Robertson, “The Status of the Pedestrian Mall in American Downtowns,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 26:2 
(December 1990): 250-73 and Pedestrian Malls and Skywalks: Traffic Separation Strategies in American 
Downtowns (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1994), as well as Harvey Rubenstein, Pedestrian Malls, Streetscapes, and 
Urban Spaces (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 1992). 
8 “City pedestrian malls fail to fulfil promise of revitalizing downtown,” Wall Street Journal, Jun. 17, 1987; Kent 
Robertson, “The Status of the Pedestrian Mall in American Downtowns,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 26:2 
(December 1990): 250-73. 
9 Several studies suggest that in the United States only 10-15% of pedestrian malls survived into the 2000s. 
Cole E. Judge, The Experiment of American Pedestrian Malls (Downtown Development Centre, 2013), 4. 
Canada experienced a similar rate of long-term success. Hannah Schostack, City Centre Pedestrian Systems: A 
State of the Art Review (Montréal: Transport Canada, 1978). 
10 Richard White develops this theme in Planning Toronto: The Planners, The Plans, Their Legacies, 1940-80 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), esp. 9-74. 
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process of planned expansion and development that would produce a more coherent, 
better-functioning city. 
That is not to say that ready-made modernist solutions were applied to Toronto’s 
perceived urban problems. This was a pragmatic brand of modernism that developed quite 
differently depending on city forms and political mandates. In the city as a whole, the 
priority was planning for growth. That meant directing and facilitating suburban expansion, 
and connecting the new suburbs to the centre and to one another. The large scale of the 
infrastructure required was a major contributing factor to the creation of the Municipality of 
Metropolitan Toronto, which assumed powers over area-wide planning in 1953. Roads were 
widened, sewers and the water system improved, and new public transit planned. Most 
famously, Metro launched a high-profile series of expressway projects to link city and 
suburbs, of which the proposed Spadina Expressway was just one link, albeit a crucial one.11 
Another was the Gardiner Expressway (completed 1964), an east-west urban corridor 
sprawling across the southern edge of the downtown and crossing Yonge Street near its 
foot. 
Densely-built and used, the core defied any attempt to plan the future from zero. 
Instead, planners envisioned a slow and careful process of redevelopment and 
modernization.12 At crucial junctures, they would intervene with expertise to shape private 
development according to the public interest. The pedestrian played an important role in 
that vision. Downtown foot traffic was the subject of two City of Toronto planning reports, 
The Pedestrian in Downtown Toronto (1959) and On Foot Downtown (1969), and it occupied 
a prominent place in the 1963 Plan for Downtown Toronto.13 
                                                  
11 There is a growing literature on Metro transportation planning. For an overview see White, Planning 
Toronto, 77-138 or Albert Rose, Governing Metropolitan Toronto: A Social and Political Analysis, 1953-1971 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). On expressways see Danielle Robinson, “Modernism at a 
Crossroad: The Spadina Expressway Controversy in Toronto, ca. 1960-1971,” Canadian Historical Review 92:2 
(2011): 295-322; on public transit, Jay Young, “Searching for a Better Way: Subway Life and Metropolitan 
Growth in Toronto, 1942-1978,” (PhD Thesis, York History 2012).  
12 See especially CTPB, The Changing City (Toronto: CTPB, 1959). 
13 City of Toronto Planning Board (CTPB), The Pedestrian in Downtown Toronto (Toronto: CTPB, 1959), Plan for 
Downtown Toronto (Toronto: CTPB, 1963), and City of Toronto (CT), On Foot Downtown (Toronto: 1969) and 
Official Plan for the City of Toronto Planning Area (Toronto: 1970).   
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What explains all of this attention? As a planning concept, building for pedestrians 
appealed because it promised to help address two of the major preoccupations of 
downtown planners: congestion and a lack of public space. It also fit with the growing 
influence of urban design ideas—emphasizing diversity and social functions of city 
environments—in Toronto planning circles in the 1960s. One of the most revolutionary 
aspects of the turn towards urban design (also present in the British “townscape” 
movement of the same period) was the idea that streets were not simply thoroughfares, but 
social spaces integral to the life of the city.14 But most of all, planners were interested in the 
pedestrian because high levels of foot traffic were a reality of downtown life: “However 
people may get to and from the central core of downtown,” they argued, “the area itself 
operates primarily as a pedestrian centre.”15 Inevitably, this was not just a statement of fact, 
but of policy: Toronto planners thought the fact that the downtown was a pedestrian place 
was a good thing, and their interventions were aimed at protecting and consolidating that 
identity.  
Two main concerns shaped how postwar planners and civic administrators viewed 
the pedestrian. The first was efficiency of movement. In essence, they applied the logic and 
methods of transportation planning to the sidewalk. Following guidelines set out by the US-
based Institute of Traffic Engineers, planners divided the pavement into 22-inch “pedestrian 
lanes.” They then used extensive surveys to chart pedestrian volumes, and interpreted the 
results using the familiar engineering metaphors of “flow” and “obstructions.”16 What they 
found confirmed what most people who spent time downtown already knew: the area’s 12-
foot sidewalks were woefully inadequate for the thousands of people that used them. On 
lower Yonge and Bay Streets, pedestrian volumes reached 6000 per hour at peak periods of 
the day. Intersections and subway exits were overcrowded, spilling office-workers and 
shoppers onto the road. Large, densely-developed blocks forced pedestrians to either take 
long detours or improvise shortcuts through lanes. By rationalizing downtown streets and 
                                                  
14 White, Planning Toronto, 271. On the townscape movement, see Cullen, Gordon, Townscape (London: 
Architectural Press, 1961). On urban design, see especially Eric Mumford, Defining Urban Design: CIAM 
Architects and the Formation of a Discipline, 1937-69 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
15 CTPB, Plan for Downtown Toronto, 18. 
16 CTPB, Downtown Toronto: Background Studies for the Plan (Toronto: CTPB, 1963), 112-13; CTPB, Plan for 
Downtown Toronto, 18. 
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eliminating conflict between uses, planners thought they could improve circulation of both 
cars and people. Pedestrianization could be a path to a better functioning, more modern 
downtown.  
There was nothing particularly new about this critique: the city had been discussing 
ways to modernize its narrow streets for decades, mostly to accommodate the demands of 
the automobile. Thoroughfares designed in the nineteenth century for horse-drawn vehicles 
and low population densities were seen as inadequate for the crowds and car traffic of the 
modern city.17 In the early 1900s Toronto council considered several sets of plans for 
downtown that, influenced by the “City Beautiful” movement, called for reshaping the old 
layout with grand boulevards, traffic circles, and diagonal arterial roads.18 And city 
authorities twice considered a scheme for improving both pedestrian and vehicle circulation 
by “arcading” downtown Yonge Street—essentially removing the sidewalk and channelling 
pedestrians through pathways built into the ground floor of buildings. This method was 
considered particularly suitable given Toronto’s cold winters, but foundered amid concerns 
over cost.19 Foreshadowing discussions of the 1970s pedestrian mall, some commentators 
worried about the difficulties of managing these new spaces, since they could attract 
“undesirable characters loafing in the semi-darkness behind the piers and in the 
doorways.”20 
Over time, however, planners became less concerned with efficiency, and 
increasingly preoccupied with improving pedestrian experience. Often the two could not be 
separated: easing congestion would make walking more pleasant, they argued, and 
attractive pedestrian features could reduce the number of cars circulating downtown. 
Nonetheless, in the decade between The Pedestrian in Downtown Toronto (1959) and On 
Foot Downtown (1969), planners demonstrated a growing commitment to viewing the 
pedestrian as more than just another kind of traffic. Instead, they expressed interest in 
pedestrian infrastructure as a way to make downtown “a vital and attractive place to be,” 
                                                  
17 CTPB, The Pedestrian in Downtown Toronto, 1. 
18 On those fascinating plans see James Lemon, “Plans for Early 20th-Century Toronto: Lost in Management,” 
Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine 18: 1 (1989): 11-31. 
19 “Dept. of Works to Committee on Works, May 27, 1947,” CTA, 143179-10. 
20 S.G. Curry, “Yonge Street Improvements,” Construction 21:10 (October 1928), 354.  
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even after office hours and on weekends.21 Aesthetic improvements, places to meet or rest, 
sidewalks that could accommodate window-shopping: planning the urban environment to 
better suit people could have far-reaching effects on how people saw and experienced it. To 
the growing number of planners influenced by urban design, the city had a long way to go. 
In addition to the inconveniences and dangers created by crowds and traffic, there was a 
glaring lack of accessible open space or distinctive features among the parking lots and high-
rises. Pedestrianization was one way of addressing this. It also offered a chance to critique 
the influence of the automobile on downtown streetscapes by suggesting an alternative way 
forward. 
Meeting either of these goals—reducing sidewalk congestion or improving 
pedestrian experience—was a challenge in a part of the city where both street space and 
land were at a premium. In the short term, planners suggested widening sidewalks and 
formalizing mid-block shortcuts into pedestrian pathways. The New City Hall and Civic 
Square project (completed in 1965) gave them a chance to comprehensively plan what they 
hoped would be a hub for above-ground pedestrian paths.22 In the long term, they proposed 
something more ambitious: the complete vertical separation of foot and car traffic. Ideally, 
planners explained, surface vehicles would be diverted into tunnels, creating an urban 
utopia for the pedestrian. In practice, it was clear from the start that for budgetary reasons 
it was foot traffic that would have be buried. Inspired by the apparent success of Montréal’s 
Place Ville-Marie development (1957-1962), a series of tunnels beneath downtown towers 
were designed to provide a safe, climate-controlled environment for pedestrians. By the 
mid-1960s plans for several major downtown development projects included underground 
retail arcades, and it seemed likely that the city could work with developers to connect 
them. This scheme, which would eventually become the PATH network, promised to please 
budget-minded politicians, since at least part of the price of construction—and all of the 
costs of maintenance—would be assumed by the private sector. It was also looked on 
                                                  
21 CT, On Foot Downtown, 9. 
22 CTPB, The Pedestrian in Downtown Toronto, 2-3. 
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approvingly by Metro transportation planners, who saw burying some or all of downtown 
pedestrian traffic as a way to improve the circulation of on-street motor vehicles.23  
By the early 1970s, Toronto had been discussing pedestrian improvements in the 
downtown core for well over a decade. For most of that time, the conversation was limited 
to professional planners. But one of their lower-priority ideas—converting streets into 
pedestrian malls—did gain supporters well beyond planning circles, and in some unlikely 
contexts. By 1970-1971, a range of people supported downtown malls, and the idea was 
poised to become one of the symbols of a transformation of city politics and planning in 
Toronto. 
Pedestrian malls: An international trend 
Planners were well aware that tunnels could not address the core’s lack of open space. Nor 
would they add much to the vitality of the area after business hours. Alongside promotion 
of the nascent underground system, from the late 1950s onwards they intermittently urged 
aboveground street closures in several places around the core. A 1958 redevelopment plan 
for the west side of Yonge between Queen and Dundas emphasized the creation of a new, 
pedestrian-only street behind the shopping strip, lined with small shops and trees.24 The 
Plan for Downtown Toronto suggested experimental closures on Yonge’s retail and 
entertainment strip, and the creation of a permanent pedestrian mall that would include 
elements of the nearby bohemian Village area—very much modelled on New York City’s 
Greenwich Village—on Gerrard Street just west of Yonge.25 Likewise, in Kensington Market, 
a cluster of small food and specialty shops run mostly by European immigrants, planners 
recommended pedestrianization, the construction of new parking facilities, and the 
conversion of its somewhat rundown buildings into standardized market stalls.26  
Little real research seems to have been done on closing Yonge Street at this time. 
But in both cases where a permanent mall was proposed—the Village and Kensington 
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Market—plans were fairly well-developed. Toronto planners, like many locals, were 
enamoured with Kensington Market’s multicultural, “Old World” atmosphere, and the 
Village’s “fascinating” mix of “small shops, tea houses, restaurants, studios and art dealers.” 
Temporary closures in the Village for a community art festival seem to have been 
successful.27 Pedestrianization was viewed as an inexpensive intervention that would 
preserve the distinct characters of the two areas, while improving their generally run-down 
streetscapes. Removing traffic, fixing up building facades, and adding street furniture would 
                                                  
27 “Commissioner to Board of Control, Apr. 23, 1963,” CTA, 314-88-1. 
Image 1.1: For modernist planners, the pedestrianized downtown promised safety, beauty, 
and efficiency. Adapted from City of Toronto Planning Board, The Pedestrian in Downtown 
Toronto (1959). Original image from Victor Gruen’s widely applauded Plan for Fort Worth 
(1955).  
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turn the Village and the Market into “centre[s] of interest” that would attract increased 
numbers of local shoppers and visitors.28  
It would also, planners hoped, provide a measure of protection against encroaching 
development. This was especially urgent in the Village area, where land speculation and the 
expansion of Toronto General Hospital were eating away at the area’s formerly abundant 
low-rise, low-rent building stock.29 In fact, by the time the pedestrian mall plan for the 
Village came under serious review, in 1968, nearly all of the artists and specialty businesses 
that had given the area its charm were gone: many had relocated north to the new 
bohemian enclave of Yorkville.30 In the end, neither of the two plans was implemented, 
although two brand new parking garages were built in Kensington Market in preparation for 
street closure.  
This interest in pedestrian malls was part of a larger international trend. By the 
1960s modern pedestrian streets were already well-established in Western Europe: in 
Germany alone 35 cities had closed central streets to traffic between 1945 and 1960, 
increasing to 60 in 1966 and 370 in 1971.31 There, such schemes were associated with 
postwar reconstruction planning, and in many cases followed pedestrian-friendly medieval 
street patterns. In the United States and Canada interest was growing as well, although the 
context was quite different. In North America, pedestrian malls were above all viewed as a 
way to revitalize or protect declining central business areas, something that was generally 
not a priority in Europe. This would be accomplished by transposing the successful suburban 
shopping mall model—attractive, pedestrian-only areas with ample parking nearby—into 
the heart of the city: in John Teaford’s words, “beat[ing] suburbia at its own game.”32 It is no 
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coincidence that one of the best-known designers of North American pedestrian malls, 
Victor Gruen, was also widely hailed as the father of the modern shopping mall.33  
Gruen’s plans for Kalamazoo (opened in 1959) are typical: a two-block car-free mall 
on a street already lined with shops, with added aesthetic features like benches and trees. 
Costs were shared between local merchants and the city. Rather than the efficient 
modernity of the shopping mall, the whole project had a “Main Street” feel that appealed to 
nostalgia for pre-automotive streetscapes and small town America. Also typical was that, 
due to budgetary constraints, several aspects of the plan that Gruen thought were vital to 
its success—new parking lots and a downtown ring road—were never implemented.34  
Enthusiasm for the idea as a panacea for urban problems was initially very high. A 
Life feature reported that both business and property values in Kalamazoo were “booming” 
thanks to the mall, and the local press went so far as to claim that their "bold auto-ban plan 
could become the salvation of Downtown America."35 In the 1960s, it remained to be seen if 
that was true; but certainly the idea was spreading. It was established enough that in 1969, 
the New York City-based planning publication Downtown Idea Exchange could identify three 
distinct generations of malls.36 By 1970, streets in 30 North American downtowns had been 
pedestrianized; in 1978 there were nearly 100 pedestrian malls in Canada and the US.37 As a 
result, in the 1970s there were plenty of examples for historically conservative Toronto to 
follow in its cautious attempts to remake the downtown.  
Stopping decay? 
Toronto was not faced with the same scale of downtown decline as some other North 
American cities experimenting with street closures. In 1960s Toronto, pedestrian malls were 
seen by planners primarily as a way of maintaining local colour and preserving unique 
neighbourhoods, not as a solution to lowering property values or emptying streets. As a 
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result, compared to the underground tunnel network, they remained a low priority. 
However, they did kindle public interest in a way that subterranean pathways did not. First 
to weigh in on the idea were the owners of small downtown shops. Their support was 
logical, since the pedestrian mall schemes proposed by planners generally stood to benefit 
them the most. Merchants on Yonge Street were the most vocal, pointing to postwar 
changes in shopping patterns and demographics as signs of imminent American-style decay. 
By the early 1960s, decentralization was presenting obvious challenges to the 
business model of Yonge’s small independent retailers. More and more of that most reliable 
consumer unit, the middle-class family, were living further from downtown than ever 
before. Between 1941 and 1966 the core area of Toronto lost 14% of its population—20,000 
people—as households with children were replaced by people living alone or outside of the 
family.38 In the fast-growing suburban fringe, strip retail and the growing number of 
shopping centres were capturing consumer dollars that might otherwise have been spent in 
distant downtown. This was felt most immediately and viscerally by Yonge’s small 
independent businesses, who from the 1940s onwards were losing market share much 
faster than the large department stores.39 Urban experts exhorted downtown merchants to 
modernize and focus on “quality and novelty”; in the larger scheme of things they were 
doing just that, but as much through failure and succession as through adaptation.40 
In a 1963 letter to the Planning Board, owners of more than dozen shops on Yonge 
Street signed on to a letter arguing that revitalizing downtown shopping should be a top 
priority for city planners. “For small independent retailers, the downtown area has become 
a ‘decaying heart city’,” they wrote, going on to cite competition from suburban shopping 
malls and department stores as the main cause. The latter trend, they argued, had been 
exacerbated by completion of the Yonge Street subway, which catered to those businesses 
located directly above its stops at College, Dundas, and Queen Streets.41 This pessimism 
flew in the face of most assessments of Toronto’s prospects. In a recent reassessment of 
urban renewal, historian Richard White has argued that the overall trend in Toronto’s core 
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was one of modest success, not blight or loss.42 Throughout the postwar era, the municipal 
tax assessment continued to rise, albeit more slowly downtown than in the booming 
suburbs. By the early 1960s, the city’s core was in the midst of a redevelopment boom, with 
significant numbers of older buildings being replaced by newer, taller structures, and a 
speculative market had developed in downtown land.43 Most new constructions were office 
buildings, physical evidence of the city’s slow eclipse of Montréal as Canada’s financial and 
business centre.44 Of course, a bullish office market did not guarantee the vitality of 
downtown retail, and was little consolation to merchants forced to close their doors. The 
Board of Trade and planners might agree that the core was “the busy heart of a great city,” 
as the 1963 Plan for Downtown had it, but Yonge Street merchants saw things differently. 
The owners of shoe, clothing, and other specialty shops who signed the letter saw a 
solution to their problems in a pedestrianization experiment along the lines of Ottawa’s 
Sparks Street Mall. Sparks Street, opened as a permanent pedestrian mall in central Ottawa 
in 1967, began as a temporary closure proposed by area merchants with the intention of 
stimulating retail business. In the mid-1960s it was a popular attraction for visitors and 
shoppers, viewed by nearly all observers as a success; as a result it was an important 
influence on other mall experiments in Canada in the 1970s, even after the optimism of its 
initial reception had begun to wane.45 Yonge Street merchants promised to cooperate with 
the city in creating a similar mall, while warning that “(s)hould the city take a wait and see 
attitude, they would be announcing the death sentence for many small merchants on Yonge 
street.”  
City authorities expressed some sympathy for these concerns during a 1963 meeting 
with these frustrated shopowners, although they were also sceptical about the long-term 
viability of small retailers in the downtown core.46 Yonge Street businesspeople continued 
to lobby the City for a pedestrian mall and other measures aimed at revitalizing the retail 
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strip. But as 1960s planners struggled to turn their schemes for transforming the city centre 
into reality, many of the ideas outlined in the Plan for Downtown fell by the wayside. A 
serious study of the tunnel network was in the offing, and pedestrian malls were 
consequently a low priority. This was only reinforced by a warning from the Fire Chief that 
pedestrian malls could impede emergency vehicle access to crowds, and opposition to the 
idea from the Redevelopment Advisory Council (RAC), the group of senior managers from 
major downtown businesses appointed by city council to represent the business perspective 
in the planning process.47 Unlike small Yonge Street merchants, for whom the pedestrian 
mall was the crucial aspect of the plan, the RAC saw it as a distraction from more important 
elements, including their encouragement of large-scale corporate redevelopment.  
Fighting traffic 
Not long after, interest in street closures developed in a very different context. By 1965, 
Toronto’s growing youth counterculture was taking shape in the Yorkville district, just a few 
minutes north and west of downtown Yonge Street. There, as was the case in similar 
enclaves across the continent, rebellion from the mainstream had become a spectator 
sport. On evenings and weekends Yorkville Avenue was crowded with a diverse bunch of 
non-conformists, labelled, among other things, as hippies, greasers, bohemians, and bikers. 
Narrow, two-lane Yorkville Avenue was crowded with motorcycles and cars as people 
flocked there to make—or, increasingly, simply to observe—the scene.48 The growing 
numbers of tourists, gawkers, journalists and social scientists made the area seem at times 
like a drive-through zoo of the North American counterculture.  
Early calls to convert the street into a pedestrian mall—inspired by planners’ 1963 
suggestion for the Gerrard Street bohemian Village—were by 1967 taken up by the more 
politically vocal Yorkville villagers. They seized on pedestrianization as a way to assert their 
ownership of the Village, while protecting its future as a centre for the youth 
counterculture.49 No doubt they were influenced by similar assertions of the right to urban 
                                                  
47 “Fire Chief to Commissioner of Planning, Apr. 9, 1963,” “Lawson to CTPB, Oct. 24, 1963,” CTA, 331365-5. 
More on the RAC in the following section.  
48 “The truth behind the Yorkville arrests,” Toronto Star, Jun. 10, 1965. The definitive account of this era is 
Stuart Henderson, Making the Scene: Yorkville and Hip Toronto in the 1960s (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2011). 
49 Henderson, 165-68. 
45 
 
space occurring in countercultural enclaves across the continent. In San Francisco’s Haight-
Ashbury, for example, Halloween 1966 was marked by a guerrilla theatre piece in which 
hundreds of pedestrians blocked traffic in protest against the gawking car-loads of tourists. 
“These are our streets!” they chanted as the police arrived to break up the demonstration.50 
Across the continent, opposition to the automobile was becoming part of the arsenal of 
countercultural urbanism. It fed, and was nurtured by, calls by countercultural intellectuals 
for a move away from large-scale, environmentally damaging machines and systems, and 
towards “appropriate technologies” on a human scale.51  
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During the summer of 1967 the pattern inaugurated in San Francisco and New York 
played out similarly in Yorkville. Sit-ins and demonstrations in favour of street closures 
became common, leading in one case in August 1967 to a violent mass arrest entirely out of 
proportion to the disturbance caused.52 The issue of the mall soon became a pretext for 
confrontation between the increasingly vocal counterculture and city authorities: a chance 
to chant “love” to police, to occupy city hall, or to level withering criticisms at mainstream 
society. After all, what better symbol of consumer capitalism and suburban conformity was 
there in North America than the private automobile? As in other cities, it had a powerful 
impact but did not last long. Like the larger youth counterculture it was a part of, the 
Yorkville pedestrianization campaign ebbed and flowed with the seasons, becoming an issue 
each summer as crowds in the village swelled, and disappearing from city politics and the 
press in the fall. Yorkville merchants wholeheartedly rejected the mall idea: as one 
spokesperson explained, closure would only be a pretext for “giv[ing] hippies, who had 
given them so much trouble, freedom of the street.”53  
Leave the Car at Home 
Recent research has highlighted the easy movement of ideas—and people—between the 
1960s counterculture and the burgeoning North American environmental movement.54 In 
some cases, environmentalist groups grew directly out of countercultural enclaves and 
networks, as was the case of Greenpeace in Vancouver. In others, it drew on some of the 
same ideas that animated 1960s youth rebellion: a suspicion of technology and progress, a 
renewed interest in simplifying human relations, and a search for truth in the natural world. 
At the very least, by popularizing these ideas the 1960s counterculture helped prepare the 
way for the new environmental consciousness of the 1970s.55  
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Toronto provides an excellent example of this process. Beginning in 1970, as 
Yorkville’s countercultural scene began to ebb and disperse, new champions of the 
pedestrian mall idea emerged among the city’s growing number of anti-pollution activists. 
There was nothing particularly bohemian about the founders of Group Action to Stop 
Pollution (GASP, founded 1967), or student-led group Pollution Probe (founded 1969).56 
Both groups were pragmatic, science-oriented, and interested in playing a part in making 
government policy on pollution. Nonetheless, they picked up the idea of downtown 
pedestrianization directly from Yorkville activists, with whom they shared opposition to 
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unrestricted use of the private automobile and a concern for creating people space in the 
downtown core.  
Another crucial local influence was the Stop Spadina campaign (1961-1971), which 
reached peak visibility in early 1970 with public hearings organized by the Metro 
Transportation Committee. Hundreds of citizen opponents took the opportunity to critique 
the expressway project, and many of them dwelt at length not only its impact on downtown 
neighbourhoods, but on the damaging impact of the car on the city’s fabric and urban 
lives.57 More broadly, anti-pollution campaigners were also inspired by the wider North 
American environmental movement, which in 1970 marked the first Earth Day with teach-
ins, protests, and other events designed to raise awareness of pollution and other issues.58 
In Toronto Earth Day was a quiet affair—members of Pollution Probe had exams—but it 
nonetheless inspired the Toronto group to think bigger in its public education campaigns.59  
At a more immediate level, it was impossible to ignore the impact the automobile 
was having on the fabric of the city. Between 1951 and 1971 nearly a million people were 
added to the population of Metro Toronto, with 95% of net growth occurring in the rapidly 
(sub)urbanizing boroughs surrounding the urban core and its older suburbs. The number of 
automobiles in the city grew even faster, from just over 200,000 to nearly 700,000, or one 
car for every three people.60 The effects of this growth and increased mobility were most 
visible outside of downtown, as regional shopping centres, low-density residential 
subdivisions, and drive-in strip malls redefined urbanity for the automobile age. But the 
private automobile also made its mark in the older city, as tens of thousands of cars 
accumulated in the core each day, adding to longstanding problems of pollution and 
congestion and prompting new uses for downtown space.61 Between the late 1950s and 
1971 automobile storage was the second fastest-growing land use in the core, after offices, 
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with 10,000 new parking spots constructed in just over a decade.62 Transit ridership shrank 
relative to car traffic, and the Toronto Transit Commission began to cut less-trafficked 
streetcar routes in an effort to lower costs and reduce congestion. The traffic jam, the multi-
level parking garage, and the demolition site repurposed as parking lot became typical 
features of the downtown landscape.  
These factors converged to produce GASP and Pollution Probe’s highly publicized, 
but ultimately unsuccessful, “Leave the Car at Home Week” in the summer of 1970. In many 
ways the event was a trial run for the Yonge Street pedestrian malls of the following years. 
The idea was that for a week in July, several downtown streets would be closed to car traffic 
and people encouraged to walk, cycle, or ride public transit to get around. Meanwhile, the 
public space freed up by the closure would be converted into pedestrian malls, featuring 
“trees, music, stage presentations,” anti-pollution information and one-off events like 
bicycle races. Initially the two groups called for three streets—including Yorkville Avenue—
to be closed, but they soon settled on limiting the experiment to the stretch of Bay Street 
running through the financial district.63  
The event’s organizers, including prominent Alderman Tony O’Donohue, made it 
clear that they saw it as an opportunity to educate the public. Volunteers armed with air 
quality and noise monitors would measure how the absence of cars affected the urban 
environment and present the results to the public; commuters would learn about 
alternative transportation options that they could use every day.64 There were larger issues 
at stake, too. Keeping cars out of downtown, one Pollution Probe member suggested, was 
about “working out a new kind of society.” Pedestrianization wasn’t the first step towards 
revolution, as some Yorkville activists may have seen it; but it was a chance to push back 
against “vested interests,” unresponsive local government, and above all the high levels of 
air pollution caused by cars and industry.65 Tony O’Donohue, by no means a radical himself, 
called it simply “the new thinking of the 70’s” to question the unrestricted use of cars 
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downtown.66 He wasn’t alone. In Toronto, and indeed across North America, there were a 
growing number of activist challenges to the car’s dominance of the urban landscape. 
Against the backdrop of widely publicized “freeway revolts” prompted by projects like the 
Spadina Expressway, a wider critique of the car was emerging. Citizen groups in both 
Canadian and American cities banded together to fight for a range of traffic calming or other 
restrictive measures on the grounds of pedestrian safety, noise and air pollution, or simple 
aesthetic disapproval of suburban sprawl.67  
In the end, however, Toronto’s 1970 anti-pollution week was a non-event. Endorsed 
by Toronto Mayor William Dennison and Council, and publicized with large ads in three local 
newspapers, it fizzled amid warnings from transportation officials of traffic jams and transit 
delays and—more importantly— from legal staff that there could be potentially expensive 
consequences to a street closure. As the City Solicitor would later explain in a report to the 
Committee on Public Works, while the Municipal Act allowed the city to make a given street 
a pedestrian way, it did not indemnify it against claims for damages if the closure hurt 
neighbouring businesses.68 If the city wanted to close downtown streets, it would need time 
to seek special legislation from the provincial government, or get area businesses firmly on 
board—or both, as was the case in Ottawa. Pollution Probe and GASP did not express 
interest in a much smaller street closure suggested by the city. In the end, July 12-19, 1970 
remained officially Leave the Car at Home Week, but it was business as usual on Bay Street. 
Mayor Dennison continued to travel to appointments by chauffeur-driven Cadillac, and 
Pollution Probe marshalled its forces to try again the following year.69  
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Planning for (and by) people 
In just over a decade, support for downtown pedestrian malls spread in Toronto, from a 
relatively limited circle of city planners to a range of citizens and groups. It did so on its own 
merits, and because it was an idea that could be moulded to address diverse concerns: 
downtown revitalization, pollution, the creation of public space. But, as Pollution Probe’s 
interest in “working out a new kind of society” suggests, it was also part of a larger cultural 
and political shift. Against the backdrop of the politically charged 1960s and 1970s, politics 
in Toronto were being transformed by a surge in citizen engagement. Initially focused on 
opposing specific planning projects—especially urban renewal schemes like Trefann Court 
(1966-1970) and the Spadina Expressway project (1961-1971)—well-organized and 
informed citizen groups went on to become a major force in city politics.70 The scale of the 
proliferation of community or issue-based civil society organizations in the period is truly 
impressive: a 1974 survey found more than fifty “organized interest groups”—mostly 
residents’ and business associations, but also unions and environmentalists—operating in 
central Toronto, and there were many more in the neighbourhoods to the west, east, and 
north.71 This remaking of city politics was itself a product not just of the time, but of a 
demographic trend of “return to the city” for young, often well-educated urbanites that, 
along with postwar immigration, reversed downtown population decline.72   
This followed a larger North American pattern. From Vancouver to New York, 
postwar planning disputes built up support for a forceful critique of modernist planning as 
undemocratic and overly concerned with growth. In place of a planning system they thought 
catered to business interests and the automobile, citizen urbanists offered a vision of the 
city that emphasized local democracy, preserving communities, and concern for the 
environment.73 This new urbanist paradigm drew on the countercultural challenge to 
                                                  
70 On Trefann Court and related projects see Graham Fraser, Fighting Back: Urban Renewal in Trefann Court 
(Toronto: Hakkert, 1972); John Sewell, The Shape of the City: Toronto Struggles with Modern Planning 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993.  
71 CTPB, Core Area Task Force: Technical Appendix (Toronto: 1974), 224-25. 
72 See David Ley, The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). The population of Toronto’s core neighbourhoods grew from 1966, after 25 years of decline. See 
CTPB, Core Area Task Force: Technical Appendix, 154-62. 
73 One of the best overviews of urban renewal and its discontents is Christopher Klemek, The Transatlantic 
Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). On expressways in Canada see Danielle Robinson, “The Streets Belong to the People”: Expressway 
52 
 
authority, growing environmental consciousness, and more than a decade of planning 
criticism by urbanists like Jane Jacobs and Lewis Mumford.74 These widely read thinkers 
stressed the value for community safety and civic culture of spaces that encouraged 
loitering, strolling, people-watching, and a multiplicity of other everyday uses.75 Their vision 
of small, democratic planning and city streets as a site civic communion found ample 
support in the growing numbers of young, educated professionals who had “rediscovered” 
inner-city neighbourhoods and were eager to engage in shaping their communities’ futures.  
By the early 1970s this critique of planning was widely embraced in Toronto, as 
demonstrated by the growing power of the “reform” caucus—many of whom had cut their 
political teeth in local planning disputes—at City Hall, and to a lesser extent in Metro 
Council. The phrase “planning for people” seemed to be on everyone’s lips; urban observers 
speculated on how to build a city “for people, not things,” often seeing limiting growth, 
redevelopment, and automobile circulation as key components of that vision.76 City 
planners, despite being viewed by some as the bogeymen of the story, were not 
unsympathetic. As I discuss above, by the late 1960s urban design, with its emphasis on 
human-scale environments, was already an important influence in Toronto planning circles. 
Planners were increasingly prepared to question the modernist tenet that expertise could 
create ideal solutions to urban problems; indeed some of them had been doing so for 
years.77 Nor was it new for Torontonians to oppose major infrastructure and construction 
projects, especially when they appeared to threaten the status quo in established 
neighbourhoods. In the postwar city, that trend was confirmed by ongoing debates between 
ratepayers’ associations and authorities over the expropriation of land for the new subway 
system from the 1940s through the 1960s.78 What was really new from the 1960s onwards 
was a growing popular interest in implementing urban design ideas, and the way they began 
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to symbolize the new alternative urbanism. Pedestrianization was naturally at the forefront 
of this.  
Towards a Yonge Street mall 
Despite the failure of 1970’s Leave the Car at Home Week, pedestrian malls stayed in the 
news in Toronto. New York City provided a convenient counter-example for frustrated 
proponents of the idea: in spring and summer 1970 Mayor John Lindsay closed busy Fifth 
Avenue to traffic on several occasions, including Earth Day. Both the Globe and Mail and the 
Toronto Star, papers that had expressed support for a Yorkville mall as early as 1965, drew 
an unflattering comparison between the two cities. The Star wrote that: 
In New York, 15 blocks of fabulous Fifth Ave. are closed to traffic…Steel 
bands suddenly materialize and the exhaust-free air is filled with music. 
People actually talk to strangers. In Toronto… Bay St. is just as congested 
and urgent as usual, the air just as poisonous.79 
Toronto Council seemed convinced that it was time for the city to experiment with 
downtown pedestrian malls. Downtown Alderman Ying Hope visited the temporary Fifth 
Avenue mall and came back with reports of a city transformed. People were “livelier,” the 
atmosphere happier and friendlier, and merchants on the street were doing brisk business. 
The chairman of the public works committee reported a similar experience in Minneapolis, 
where eight downtown blocks had been converted into a pedestrian mall, and expressed 
excitement at the idea of “returning a portion of downtown Toronto to the people.”80 There 
was a sense in council that Toronto could not only match, but improve on the experiences of 
these cities with pedestrianization.  
New voices lent their support to the idea. The architectural profession had been 
deeply implicated in the development of urban design and the new urbanism in the 1960s. 
They too were concerned with limiting the influence of the automobile downtown and with 
designing streets and civic spaces that encouraged a better quality of urban life. In 1970 an 
“Urban Action Committee” of Toronto architects began to lobby in favour of pedestrian 
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malls. The committee chair, Howard Walker, explained that pedestrian infrastructure could 
be a crucial part of “humaniz[ing] the urban environment,” not to mention “reclaim[ing] 
strategic areas from concrete, asphalt, and vehicles.” More controversially, he also argued 
that a temporary mall on Yonge Street could be the first step towards the banning of all 
private vehicles from the core, an idea that had been envisioned by urban critics since at 
least the early 1960s, but never implemented in a North American city.81  
Despite all the talk about people space and pollution that had reinvigorated the mall 
discussion over the past few years, the committee struck by Council to plan Toronto’s first 
mall took a decidedly conservative approach. In this sense it was most shaped by its 
chairman, Alderman William Archer. An alderman since 1958—he was also a lawyer and 
QC—Archer was a centrist who was respected in Council as a consensus-builder. Since 
meeting with Yonge Street constituents in 1963 to discuss a mall, he had been interested in 
implementing one on Yonge. He was also ambitious, and may have seen the pedestrian mall 
project as a stepping-stone to a second mayoral run (he had lost one such run in 1966). 
Archer did not associate support for pedestrian malls with opposition to use of the 
automobile—like the majority of Toronto Council, he supported the Spadina Expressway 
project right to the end. Critical of what he saw as Pollution Probe’s radicalism and lack of 
preparation, he was eager to set his initiative apart from the failure of Leave the Car at 
Home Week. He dedicated his initial efforts to establishing communication with local 
businesses and relevant city authorities. Archer also encouraged branding the experiment 
not as an opportunity to educate the public or an “experiment in pollution control,” but as a 
test of “the feasibility of a pedestrian-oriented street,” which could be made permanent in 
the future.82 The mall project was viewed primarily as a technical problem to be solved: how 
to fit pedestrian space into the existing downtown street pattern, with a minimum of 
disruption to traffic and a maximum of benefit to business?  
In consultation with the city bureaucracy, Council chose three blocks of Yonge, two 
south and one north of Queen Street, for closure during the first week of June, 1971. As 
Archer explained in a mass mailing aimed at rallying support for the project, Yonge was the 
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ideal street for a mall.83 Unlike neighbouring Bay Street, Yonge had a subway line running its 
length, meaning the mall would be easier to access and less disruptive of commuter traffic. 
Furthermore, its theatres and retail stores made it a “lively location” for the experiment. In 
fact, the blocks chosen for the mall included not the busiest stretch—around the 
intersection with Dundas—but the most upscale and economically vital one, dotted with 
established businesses. Like a successful suburban shopping mall, it would be anchored by 
two department stores, Simpson’s and Eaton’s. Merchants further north on Yonge had been 
vocal in support of a mall in 1963, and their section of Yonge had many more entertainment 
and dining options. But that seems to have been counterbalanced in the minds of organizers 
by the growing number of strip shows and adult cinemas on that part of the street. Not only 
would the mall be planned to minimize traffic disruption, but it was determined early on 
that it would be a family affair, with an emphasis on daytime shopping and inoffensive 
entertainment. Again, this reflected Archer’s careful approach: as Toronto’s first official 
experiment in street closures, the 1971 mall could not be perceived as a failure.  
Arterial or pedestrian way? 
One potential obstacle that Archer did not emphasize in his mailouts was the fact that 
Yonge Street was designated an “arterial road,” and so fell under the control of Metro 
Toronto. It was part of a network of nearly 1500 km of such roadways that criss-crossed the 
urban region, mostly following the 1¼ mile grid surveyed by British engineers in the early 
1800s.84 Along with the new expressway network and public transit, they were one of the 
three pillars of Metropolitan transportation planning, which sought to use the latest in 
transportation engineering methods and technologies to increase mobility and ease of 
access across the entire expanding urban region.85 Faced with this Herculean task, Metro 
planners viewed major downtown streets like Yonge very differently from their counterparts 
at the City level. The primary purpose of arterial roads was to disperse expressway traffic 
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throughout the city, while keeping it away from minor residential streets. In the context of 
rapid growth in car ownership and continued suburban demands for access to the core, the 
repaving, straightening, and widening of these arteries occupied a significant portion—
approximately 25% in the 1960s—of Metro’s transportation budget.86 
Yonge was by no means a typical arterial road—in fact it was an excellent example of 
how the pre-automobile urban landscape tended to stubbornly resist modernization. For 
most of its length, and particularly in the downtown core, it was extensively developed with 
commercial uses. Like a number of other downtown Metro roads—Queen Street and 
Dundas Street, for example—it remained persistently narrow, with just 66 feet of right-of-
way in most places.87 Repeated attempts to widen Yonge to improve traffic circulation in the 
first half of the 1900s foundered on the inability of the City of Toronto to compel property 
owners to build with setbacks from the current line. The City of Toronto had mostly 
abandoned plans to widen it in the 1950s, after having more success with University Avenue 
to the west, and Jarvis Street to the east.88 But that did not mean it was exempt from future 
interventions. Although Metro was hesitant to interfere with the City of Toronto’s 
customary control over planning the core, it nonetheless considered Yonge and other 
downtown arterials to be an important part of the city’s commuter infrastructure. All the 
more so if the Crosstown and Spadina Expressways were not completed, something that 
was a distinct possibility by the late 1960s.89  
In 1970, as plans for the 1971 mall were taking shape, Metro proposed to enact a 
bylaw for the widening of downtown Yonge Street by 10 feet on each side through building 
setbacks. This was ostensibly in response to interest by the Toronto Council in widening the 
sidewalks. But Metro also used the opportunity to discuss converting it to a one-way street, 
a measure intended to improve traffic speed and capacity, particularly at intersections. The 
two changes together, Metro’s transportation experts explained in their particular 
vocabulary, meant that  
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Yonge Street will no longer be classed as a street facility offering local access 
to small individual commercial developments along its length, but rather, 
its role will be increasingly oriented towards an arterial function.90 
In other words, Yonge would become the commuter thoroughfare it had always 
resisted becoming. This was a drastically different vision from that of City of Toronto 
planners, and they vigorously opposed the idea. After all, for a decade or more they had 
recognized that Yonge was “primarily a pedestrian way.” According to their measurements, 
on a given day lower Yonge Street carried more pedestrians than cars. Their suggestions to 
improve it all hinged on expanding that role, whether by widening sidewalks or through 
temporary closures. In a letter to Sam Cass, Metro’s Commissioner of Roads and Traffic, 
Toronto’s Chief Planner called the idea of widening unjustified, and argued that by 
destroying the street’s small scale and human character, it would “do more harm than 
good.”91 In the end, the widening bylaw was put on hold, and in March 1971, Metro Council 
gave its approval to the first mall experiment, despite Cass’s prognostications of traffic 
disaster if Yonge were closed.92 However, there was no retreat on Metro’s part from the 
view that Yonge’s best use was as a north-south thoroughfare, and the spectre of the street 
being reshaped for commuter traffic would continue to hang over the mall project.  
A public-private partnership 
Mall organizers saw developing a strong working relationship with Yonge Street 
businesspeople and other citizen groups as crucial to the success of their project. This 
followed the prevailing wisdom in mall planning in North America: that malls should be 
public-private partnerships between local government and interested parties, usually area 
merchants. Reports Toronto Council read on New York City’s temporary malls in 1970 put it 
succinctly:  
The most successful street closing occurs when government works closely 
with a local organization, usually a merchant group, that truly represents 
the area in which the street is closed.93 
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 One of the first actions Archer took, even before the official striking of his committee, was a 
mass mailout that targeted businesses along Yonge Street and citizens who had supported 
Pollution Probe’s Leave the Car at Home Week.94 He asked for the formation of a 
“committee of interested citizens” to help implement the project, envisioning strong 
involvement by local businesses in planning.  
Some responded positively. The operators of a number of Yonge Street businesses—
typically smaller clothing or luxury goods shops that relied on foot traffic—were enthusiastic 
about the idea. Several wrote to Archer expressing support, and once again citing the 
success of Ottawa’s Sparks Street Mall as an example to be followed.95 The Downtown 
Businessmen’s Association (soon to be renamed the Downtown Council) took charge of 
forming a Pedestrian Mall Merchants’ Committee over the winter of 1970-71. A long-time 
advocacy group for downtown businesses, by the early 1970s the Downtown Businessmen’s 
Association was dominated by the owners of small and medium-sized Yonge Street shops 
and entertainment venues, giving it a natural stake in the mall project.96 The Merchants’ 
Committee agreed to organize—and partially fund—entertainment and advertising, and 
work to define a theme for the week-long experiment.97  
But despite the public enthusiasm expressed in previous years for the mall idea, the 
initial response to Archer’s call for involvement was lukewarm. The Pedestrian Mall 
Technical Committee, made up mostly of bureaucrats and tasked with coordinating 
between the various civic departments involved in the project, began work in December 
1970. In contrast, it took local merchants until the end of April 1971, just one month before 
the opening of the mall, to assemble their own committee.98 A public meeting called in 
February 1971 to increase citizen involvement was “very sparsely attended,” with only 60 of 
600 groups, businesses, and individuals contacted attending, including 20 city officials.99 
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Previously interested citizen groups like Pollution Probe did not submit concrete proposals 
for their involvement in the project until late spring 1971.  
This disorganization or lack of interest among community groups played into William 
Archer’s conviction that, in order for the experiment to succeed, it would have to be 
planned on very different lines than the citizen-led Leave the Car at Home Week. Whatever 
the populist rhetoric surrounding the mall, then, most of the organization work was done by 
Archer and the city bureaucracy, whose representatives also occupied seven of nine seats 
on the Pedestrian Mall Operations Committee formed in April to direct the final stages of 
the project.100 An attempt by Rochdale College, the short-lived but famous local 
countercultural enclave and educational institution, to get involved and to coordinate 
further citizen participation, was rebuffed: organizers explained that the suggested music or 
theatre performances would add a “carnival element” that could “destroy the whole 
concept of the mall.”101 This raised the issue of who—what public, exactly—the mall was 
being planned for, and not for the last time.  
The only outright private-sector opponent of the mall was, somewhat surprisingly, 
Simpson’s department store. Occupying the south-west corner of Yonge and Queen Streets, 
Simpson’s seemed to have much to gain from increased foot traffic in the area: its 
neighbour and competitor Eaton’s voiced no objections to the mall. Mimicking the tried and 
tested design of enclosed suburban shopping malls, the 1971 pedestrian mall was planned 
with the two department stores as anchors for shopping traffic. Yet early on Simpson’s 
management wrote to say that they were “unalterably opposed” to the project. They 
refused to send representatives to the Merchants Committee, and only grudgingly accepted 
to create special displays for the mall week. A street closure, they claimed, rather than 
bringing in more shoppers, would actually prevent the significant portion of their regular 
customers who arrived by car from getting to the store and parking lot. This view was based 
on an analysis that put the well-to-do female consumer from the inner suburbs at the heart 
of business success.  Company president Edgar Burton would later argue that 
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The one thing that will turn Yonge St. off as a viable shopping street is if the 
ladies who drive downtown to shop have to face additional traffic 
obstacles…102 
Simpson’s executives were skeptical of organizers’ assurances that the subway and curious 
crowds could make up the shortfall.103  
Provincial support 
These pointed objections from a large and influential downtown business—Simpson’s was 
one of the biggest payers of municipal taxes in the downtown core—highlighted an 
additional legal hurdle facing the mall.104 Under existing Ontario municipal law, closing a 
public thoroughfare was viewed along somewhat the same lines as a government 
expropriation of property. If the closure was shown to have caused financial losses for any 
business or person, the city might be liable for damages.105 In the case of Ottawa’s Sparks 
Street Mall, this had been avoided by a special amendment to the City of Ottawa Act; failing 
something similar in Toronto, special provincial legislation would have to be passed to 
indemnify the city against such damages. Without it, if Simpson’s gloomy predictions about 
the effects of the mall came true, the city might find itself forced to pay the cost—on the 
other hand, if the mall was the success everyone hoped it to be, the issue was moot. City 
authorities were not willing to leave that to chance, and began a lobbying campaign at 
Queen’s Park to have temporary enabling legislation put in place.106  
In spring 1971 the Progressive Conservative government led by Bill Davis was in its 
first year, in the process of establishing itself as the “Big Blue Machine,” the most successful 
of the PC governments that dominated Ontario politics from the Second World War into the 
1980s. The premier’s biographer and others have argued that his cancellation of the Spadina 
Expressway—surely one of the defining events of his early administration—was a calculated 
attempt to rebrand as a “decisive, modern, ecologically-minded leader.”107 Certainly, as 
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scholars of the period recognize, it was the most famous of a series of interventions that 
created an image of an environmentally conscious, socially progressive Davis government: 
the creation of a provincial Ministry of the Environment, action to limit logging and 
pollution, and promises of greatly expanded funding for social housing and public transit.108 
His government’s support for the Yonge Street pedestrian malls should be seen in the same 
light. Enabling legislation was secured after a short debate, with the most contentious issue 
being the proposal to allow alcohol sales on the mall.109 This represented a (very small) 
victory for a government interested in “streets for the people”—and a demonstration of 
how much the Yonge mall experiment depended on provincial approval.  
From street to mall 
Turning four blocks of Yonge Street into Toronto’s first pedestrian mall required more than 
just closure to automobile traffic, even if that was the most visible change. A long list of 
functional and aesthetic modifications went into the creation of a new type of pedestrian 
space: buses were rerouted, traffic signals altered, deliveries rescheduled, and space 
allotted to interested merchants. Extra street-cleaning staff and dozens of traffic police had 
to be scheduled for the week. A design concept was drawn up by city staff, in consultation 
with architects from the Urban Action Committee. It was pragmatic and focused on 
converting the street into inviting public space.  
This reflected both the reality of temporary closure—everything associated with the 
mall would have to be installed literally overnight—and what was considered best practice 
at the time in mall planning. The Yonge mall would resemble what was called a “Minimal 
Mall,” focused on auto-pedestrian separation with minimal functional additions to the 
streetscape.110 The idea, gleaned from research into other malls, that overloading the street 
with entertainment and activities would doom the experiment came up several times in 
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mall planning. Organizers emphasized that the Yonge mall should be not a “carnival,” but 
primarily a “pedestrian way” with its focus on public enjoyment of public space.111  
The design concept’s main feature was the use of more than two hundred planters, 
each holding flowers or a 20-foot sapling tree, to break the street into smaller spaces, and 
shut it off from the sounds and sight of traffic at cross-streets.112 The latter measure was 
necessary because, in the interest of facilitating traffic circulation, only one minor east-west 
street—Temperance Street—was closed. Otherwise, at each intersection mall strollers were 
just a few feet from the flow of cars. The layout of the planters was such that each block 
was divided into half a dozen or more distinct spaces, with few sightlines of more than half a 
block. The new areas created by landscaping were not left empty. Instead, they were nearly 
all programmed around specific leisure activities. Tables and chairs created areas for eating 
and drinking; information and exhibit kiosks offered places to browse; and a series of stages 
hosted daily entertainment programs. They were connected by a winding fire route that 
would—in theory at least—allow access by emergency vehicles to any point on the mall. 
And lining both sides of the mall, of course, were the street’s businesses, many of whom 
had developed special window displays or menus for the event. Overall, as minimal as the 
mall design was, it was also purposeful, seeming to leave little to chance regarding how the 
public space it created would be used.  
Opening Day 
In the week leading up to the mall opening on Sunday, May 30, 1971, the project was 
publicized in all local media outlets, from newspapers to radio, and with subway car ads, 
pamphlets and posters.113 For Yonge Street merchants, of course, the mall was most of all 
an opportunity to boost business. The theme they developed for the experiment was “Live it 
Up Downtown,” and that slogan featured widely in advertising for individual businesses’ 
wares and services. Pamphlets promoting the mall bore images of smiling female dancers in 
leotards and brass bands (entertainment that was in fact planned for opening day). Both 
Eaton’s and (more reluctantly) Simpson’s bought full-page ads promising shoppers fun, 
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fashion, and sales at the mall.114 Press releases from City Hall echoed these encouragements 
to shop, asking Torontonians “[h]ave you ever thought of doing your Christmas shopping at 
the pedestrian mall in June?” But even more, they played up the democratic, “streets for 
people” angle, stressing that the mall was a free public good for the enjoyment of all. 
There [is] no list of charges. There will be no ticket collectors because the 
street is being opened up for people and will be free for all. All credit cards 
accepted…There will be no special briefings for the Press…The judge and 
jury for the success of the mall will be the people of Toronto.115 
By that standard, opening day was a huge success: Torontonians came out in droves. 
Estimates put the number of people strolling Yonge on that Sunday afternoon and evening 
as high as 40,000.116 There was a distinct element of spectacle to the opening, which 
featured parades by two military brass bands, a puppet performance, and a ribbon-cutting 
with plenty of pomp and circumstance, including a war veterans’ guard of honour for the 
local dignitaries wielding the scissors. This was followed by a music program. But perhaps 
more popular was the opportunity—for the first time in post-Prohibition Toronto—to drink 
alcohol legally on the street. Under special licenses facilitated by the mall organizers, two of 
the five restaurants operating on the mall were permitted to serve liquor outdoors; 
provided, of course, that it was accompanied by a square meal.117   
Although they had been mostly left out of mall planning, Pollution Probe still 
managed to make their presence felt on opening day. In fact, they stole the show with a 
bicycle parade organized to coincide with the opening ceremonies. Hundreds of cyclists 
converged downtown at Queen’s Park, before riding—bells-ringing—eight-abreast down 
Yonge Street to the mall, where they parked in a municipal parking lot entirely given over to 
bicycles.118 The parade, which organizers called a “bicycle happening,” was intended both to 
show the practicality of the bicycle as urban transport and put the issue of pollution firmly 
back on the agenda at the mall itself. The organization’s press release contrasted the 
“pollutionless bicycle” with the carbon monoxide and other damaging chemicals produced 
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by the automobile.119 The parade was a very local event, shaped by Pollution Probe’s 
ongoing activism and the special circumstances of the mall; yet it also reflected a growing 
transnational movement to appropriate the bicycle as a tool of resistance to the 
automobile, environmental degradation, and consumer capitalism. In 1971 cycling activists 
claimed city streets not just in Toronto, but in Paris, Philadelphia, and New York.120   
This was one of the first times that the growing number of Torontonians—
environmentalists and others—who used the bicycle for daily transport made their presence 
felt on city streets. Within a few years, the cycling lobby would be institutionalized in the 
form of the Toronto City Cycling Committee, a group of activists and sympathetic city 
councillors who worked from within City Hall for better infrastructure for urban cyclists. 
Among other proposals floated in the mid-1970s was a network of dedicated lanes for 
cyclists on city streets, including downtown Yonge.121 However, in 1971, the cycle parade 
was most of all a chance for Pollution Probe to reinject its critique of pollution into 
discussion of street closures. They continued the effort over the following week, with 
volunteers on the mall offering information about pollution and free breakfasts for bicycle 
commuters.122  
Talk of the town 
As the week-long street closure continued, responses to the mall were positive. Many 
observers felt the experiment was an unqualified success, and a breathless excitement 
about the future of downtown crept into the discussion. Yonge Street businesspeople were 
surveyed extensively, their approval of the experiment being crucial to the success of future 
malls. A report by the Bureau of Municipal Research (BMR), an independent information-  
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Image 1.4:  Day-time strollers crowd the southern portion of the Yonge Street pedestrian 
mall, looking north from near Adelaide Street, June 1972.  In the background, a streetcar 
moves slowly across the intersection with Queen Street. Graham Bezant/Toronto Star. 
Toronto Public Library Baldwin Collection, tspa_0115326f. 
66 
 
gathering body founded in the 1910s and recently reinvigorated by new staff and ideas, 
drew on conversations with 54 of the 56 street-level businesses on the affected blocks of 
Yonge.123 The lines were drawn clearly between a majority—including nearly a totality of 
small retailers, restaurants, and entertainment venues—who approved of the mall, and a 
minority who did not, or were neutral. The former group invested more in mall preparations 
like window displays and extra staff, and nearly unanimously reported increases in foot 
traffic and sales. Many of the latter group—making up around 20% of affected businesses—
were banks and large specialty shops whose products, like furniture or diamonds, did not 
lend themselves to impulse purchases or extended opening hours.  
Notably, their numbers also included Simpson’s department store, whose 
spokespeople, unlike those of rival Eaton’s, claimed to have lost business during the week of 
the mall. Still, all but a handful of businesses surveyed by the BMR and the Downtown 
Council favoured continuing or expanding the street closure in the future.124 One called it 
the “biggest thing to happen to downtown for business,” while several others remarked that 
it was injecting new life into the area by “attracting people who haven’t been downtown for 
[years].”125 The dream of competing with shopping centres for suburban customers, the 
inspiration for earlier merchant requests for a mall, seemed at first glance to be coming 
true. Data are not available for the first mall, but surveys undertaken during a later closure 
recorded that 60% of visitors to Yonge were from outside of the City of Toronto; nearly half 
of that number came from the suburban boroughs of Etobicoke, York, North York, East York, 
and Scarborough. Meanwhile, a 1973 poll in the inner suburb of North Toronto found that, 
of 785 respondents, three in four had visited the mall that summer.126 
If businesses were enthused by increased sales, the public was most attracted by the 
pleasant, even a bit transgressive, experience of strolling at a leisurely pace on a busy 
downtown street. People liked seeing Yonge closed to cars and covered in greenery, even if, 
as William Archer put it, they “had to be encouraged to move off the sidewalks and walk on 
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the pavement.”127 The 220 people surveyed by the Bureau of Municipal Research approved 
nearly unanimously of the mall, its entertainment, and “lively atmosphere.”128 Many 
mentioned that they saw the mall as a pocket of life in the centre of an often-dull city. The 
mall’s focus on providing places to linger, consume, and enjoy was to many a stark contrast 
from downtown Toronto’s usually business-like demeanour. “It’s just like Paris,” exclaimed 
one west-end woman, echoing a comparison made by many visitors struck by the mall’s 
outdoor seating and “European-style” food and liquor service.129  
New spaces, new uses 
As those comments suggest, the Yonge Street pedestrian mall produced not just new public 
spaces, but also new uses for them. Some, like outdoor dining and evening entertainment, 
were planned into the mall design concept and program. Others were more spontaneous. 
Despite the organizers’ suspicion of overly festive, over-planned street closures, the overall 
effect was to create a street with its own particular human ecology—Jane Jacobs’ “ballet of 
the sidewalk” in its most concentrated form. The mall amplified Yonge Street’s famous 
tendency to produce some of the spectacles of downtown life: the fashionable young 
person, the drunk, the excited Friday night crowd, the impromptu street performance. And 
that was part of the attraction for visitors. Whether the organizers liked it or not, the 
“carnival element” they had tried to avoid was there on Yonge from the start.  
Sheer numbers of mall-goers set the background. Tens of thousands of people 
visited Yonge Street each day, arriving in volumes often two or three times higher than the 
busiest rush hour crowds.130 That meant that at peak times—especially evenings—10-
15,000 people were moving through each block of the mall each hour. But as the city 
employees conducting the pedestrian counts pointed out, that did not capture the numbers 
of people who stayed put, accumulating on the mall near the stages and beer gardens. 
These volumes could have been accommodated on a street cleared entirely of obstructions 
(likely less of an attraction to crowds); but on the mall ubiquitous planters, seating areas, 
stages, and other fixtures created choke points for the crowd, leading to what city observers 
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called “excessive jamming.” At the outdoor cafés, lines of people waited patiently for a seat 
and a chance to watch the crowds with a beer in hand. A few observers remarked that being 
pressed together created a new kind of sociability: people talked to strangers, shared tables, 
and were generally in a better mood than usual.131 William Archer, who spent hours 
patrolling and mingling with crowds on the mall every day, talked of looking out at a “sea of 
smiles.”132 
Sights and sounds were dense on the pedestrian mall. There was the entertainment 
program planned by the Yonge Street Merchants’ Committee. Lunch hour and evening 
concerts concentrated mall-goers near the main stage for square-dancing, a steel band, and 
music from various European folk groups aimed at showcasing Toronto’s ethnic diversity.133 
But a range of informal entertainment competed with those organized concerts. Impromptu 
concerts sprung up on street corners, around picnic tables, and in front of the Heintzman 
piano store, where a brightly-painted piano was left on the street for the use of all.134 
Clothing retailers, including both major department stores, put on fashion shows on smaller 
stages and on their storefront sidewalks. The emphasis was on eye-catching displays of the 
female body. Competing for the attention of mall-goers, these shows were often built 
around a limited kind of (legal) strip-tease: observers reported watching models slowly 
remove layers—down to a bikini or lingerie—while boisterous young men in the 
surrounding crowd shouted “Take it off! Take it off!” It is hard not to see in this scene the 
effects of the development, occurring just a few blocks further north on Yonge, of the Sin 
Strip scene described later on in this thesis. Meanwhile, as observer accounts attest, the 
mall itself became a kind of runway, a place for Torontonians to strut their stuff and express 
their personal style in front of a large, appreciative audience.135 
The crowds on Yonge provided an attractive target for street vendors, religious 
proselytizers, and others eager to interact with the public, just as they always did. Flower 
and candle-sellers did brisk business. Groups of Hare Krishna devotees in their distinctive 
robes and topknots slowly paraded up and down the mall, chanting, clashing cymbals, and 
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selling pamphlets. Rochdale College, excluded from the mall committees, nonetheless took 
over part of the mall for a loud, irreverent “convocation ceremony” in which 12 students 
received degrees in front of a crowd of 100 kazoo-playing peers.136 The mall also showed its 
potential as a political stage. The leader of the federal opposition, Conservative Robert 
Stanfield, was led on a tour of the mall by William Archer, pausing for photo opportunities 
with families, fashion models, and a beer at one of the now nationally famous street 
cafés.137 
In short, the mall was everything downtown Yonge Street was—exciting, crowded, 
commercialized and mediatized, eclectic—only more so. Most saw this as a positive thing. 
But there were some concerns that the situation could spiral out of control. A few observers 
noted that “hippies” and “motorcycle types” were moving in on the mall, and one merchant 
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reported higher rates of shoplifting due to an influx of younger customers.138 The mall 
organizers received complaints about the high number of “pedlars and persuaders” 
interfering with people’s enjoyment of the mall. Alderman Archer admitted to being 
exasperated with pleading with proselytizers and vendors: in his report he recommended 
council look into special legislation to control those activities on future malls.139 These 
“control problems,” as organizers labelled them, would become the central issue in debates 
over subsequent malls on Yonge Street. But in June 1971 they were seen as just part of the 
fun of giving over a major downtown street to the people. Or perhaps, echoing the 
treatment given to the Yonge Street entertainment area outside of the mall, they were even 
something to be celebrated, since they seemed to provide proof that “Toronto the dreary” 
was really no more.140 
Carnival Toronto 
Toronto’s first pedestrian mall ended with a whimper in the early hours of Sunday, June 6, 
as midnight revellers (including several city councillors) were gently shooed off Yonge by city 
workers waiting to remove street furniture.141 But the week-long experiment, attended by 
hundreds of thousands of Torontonians and visitors, had created an indelible impression. As 
the Telegram put it, the question had become “not if, but where” the next pedestrian mall 
would be located.142 Within a few days, a petition was circulating calling for further street 
closures, and planning was soon underway for two more week-long summer malls.143  
One complaint that simmered under the surface during the first mall was that it 
wasn’t long enough. In particular, the owners of businesses on Yonge north of Dundas—
some of whom had been asking for a mall since 1963—wanted to share the benefits of the 
project with the tonier southern stretch of Yonge. Particularly concerned with property 
speculation and the mushrooming of sex businesses in dilapidated rental units, they saw a 
mall as a source not just of short-term profits, but also long-term stability for the area. 
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Support—and crucial funding—came from Carnival Toronto, an organization set up a few 
years previously by area restauranteur Arthur Carman, with the mission of providing 
Toronto with its own multi-ethnic “mid-summer Mardi Gras” each year. A mall on Yonge 
between Dundas and Gerrard Streets became the centrepiece of an activity program that 
also included a picnic on the Toronto Island and the crowning of a Carnival King and 
Queen.144 
The Carnival Mall had some marked differences from the first street closure. It was 
organized hastily, with final approval of the plans coming on August 6, just a week before 
the mall was scheduled to open.145 Even with the support of Carnival Toronto, lack of 
funding saw entertainment scaled back from the original (admittedly grandiose) plans for 
four mobile stages, each with their own paid music programme, to one very stationary one, 
in a parking lot, with musicians playing pro bono.146 William Archer agreed to lead planning, 
but not before blasting Yonge Street Strip merchants for their disorganization, and 
presenting them with a laundry list of problems requiring immediate attention. He also 
expressed concerns that a failure to plan properly could be a severe setback to the cause of 
pedestrianization in the city.147 The remaining three weeks of planning took place in an 
atmosphere of resentment and disorganization, particularly in comparison to the process 
that created the first mall. On August 13, delays in setting up the elaborate decorations 
rented by Carnival Toronto—including balloons, spotlights, and overhead canopies—
postponed the opening. Archer swore that “[n]ever again will I get involved with a mall 
organized in such a short time,” even as the head of the mall Merchants’ Committee 
accused him of attempting to “sabotage” the project.148  
Disorganized as it was, the mall still attracted tens of thousands of people each day, 
and was mostly recognized as a success. The “family atmosphere” pursued by Archer with 
the first mall was less apparent: Carnival Toronto was both louder and more crassly 
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commercial. There was much more on-street merchandising, and less free entertainment; 
children’s programmes like puppet shows were replaced by rock and roll concerts; there 
were eight, rather than two, cafés serving liquor; passersby could watch not just fashion 
shows, but also striptease on storefront televisions installed to lure them into burlesque 
shows. The mall blocks included most of the strip’s growing number of adult businesses, and 
several members of the Merchants’ Committee were the operators of venues—like the Coq 
D’Or—that had recently begun to feature topless go-go dancing and other sexualized forms 
of entertainment.149 Observers noted that the crowd was younger than during the earlier 
mall, and panhandlers, hippies, and other undesirables seemed to be out in greater 
numbers. Telegram columnist and curmudgeon McKenzie Porter railed against this aspect of 
the mall, claiming to have seldom seen “such a heavy concentration of the unwashed, the 
inane and the neurotic.” He continued: 
I do not believe that we shall enjoy pedestrian shopping malls in Toronto 
until the hippies fade away, the hicks learn to dress, and the nuts are 
removed to a hospital.150 
Peripheral as he was to the main thrust of commentary—which was positive about the 
Carnival week—Porter set the tone for what would become widespread criticism of these 
perceived “control problems” on the mall. 
A celebration of multiculturalism: the Dragon Mall 
Toronto’s third mall of 1971 was a street festival centred on the city’s Chinese community: 
the Dragon Mall. For nine days in early September it took over two blocks of Elizabeth 
Street, a minor north-south connector in the centre of downtown. Historically, those blocks 
were part of the city’s first Chinatown, an enclave of restaurants, shops, and community 
institutions that was firmly anchored in the downtown fabric by the 1940s.151 But beginning 
in the late 1940s, Chinatown—like the rest of the area called “the Ward”—was transformed 
by private redevelopment and, most of all, expropriation for the new City Hall and Civic 
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Square. By 1970 just two blocks of the old commercial strip remained, and a new Chinatown 
was establishing itself on Spadina Avenue just to the west.  
As with the bohemian Village further north, there was interest among planners and 
other city officials in preserving Chinatown as a “centre of interest” downtown.152 This was 
reinforced by the work of the Save Chinatown Committee, which rallied around community 
leaders in the late 1960s to lobby the city for protection of the area.153 The Dragon Mall was 
the latest in a series of proposals for achieving that goal, and like the Yonge closure was 
seen as a step towards a permanent, pedestrian-led revitalization of the area.154 Similarly, 
again, it was championed at City Hall by a popular and ambitious councillor, Ying Hope. 
There was enmity between the two: in the 1969 municipal election Hope had received more 
votes than Archer in their two-member ward, giving him the position of “senior” councillor 
(and a seat on Metro Toronto Council) despite his relative youth. Archer avoided 
involvement in the Dragon Mall, and later quit (temporarily) the city’s Special Committee for 
Pedestrian Malls when Hope was made a member.155 
The first pedestrian mall of 1971 incorporated that today-familiar trope of Canadian 
street festivals: the ethnic cultural performance. European folk dancing and music drew 
appreciative crowds as part of the entertainment program. Likewise, in 1972 the Yonge 
Street mall featured ethnic theme weeks—Italian, Caribbean, British—designed to entertain 
mallgoers and showcase the city’s diversity.156 But it was the Elizabeth Street Dragon Mall 
that really pioneered the street festival as a spectacle of cultural pluralism in Toronto. It also 
represented an effort by elites in the city’s Chinese community to re-assert their place in a 
rapidly-redeveloping downtown. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, celebration of cultural pluralism was more and more a part 
of daily life and politics in the city. Toronto in 1971 was the main destination for migrants to 
Canada, with a population that was 44%—37% for Metro—foreign-born, as compared to 
15% for the country as a whole.157 In other words, the presence of recent migrants, 
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particularly from southern and eastern Europe, was a fact of life, especially downtown and 
in the city’s west end. Interest in Toronto’s growing diversity was channelled by intercultural 
associations who worked, often with government support, to encourage community and 
nation-building through appreciation of the cultural “gifts” brought by new Canadians.158 
This was given an extra boost by federal initiatives like the Canadian Folk Arts Council 
(established 1964), which marked the centennial of Confederation by organizing one 
hundred local folk festivals showcasing the country’s multicultural heritage.  
In Toronto, the late 1960s saw the founding of new, publicly-funded festivals that 
vastly expanded the audience for “ethnic” entertainment, crafts, and foods. Most popular 
were Caribana, a Caribbean carnival inaugurated in 1967, and Caravan (1969), which saw 
dozens of national pavilions—Estonian, Japanese, Scottish, etc.—set up around the city for 
the curious to visit and check off on festival passports. In the Centennial year, the fading 
imperial connection was also celebrated with a British Week featuring royal visitors, an 
exhibition of British products, and a “ten-feet diameter model of the City [of London] 
animated in light and sound” set up in a tent across the street from City Hall.159    
The Dragon Mall fit into this new wave of interest in consuming spectacles of 
multiculturalism. For a week on Elizabeth Street, Chinese culture, shaped to the perceived 
tastes of Torontonians, was on display. Amid what one world-weary observer called “all the 
regulation mall equipment”—snack stands, trees in planters, street cafés—visitors could 
“savour the true atmosphere of the Orient,” as the promotional pamphlets boasted.160 They 
entered Elizabeth Street through a Chinese-style arch, passing by ornamental fountains and 
telephone booths decorated as pagodas. A series of booths and restaurants offered 
variations on Chinese food for a Euro-Canadian audience, including the chicken chop-suey 
burger and restauranteur Bob Wong’s very successful Chinese hot dog. Other cultural 
amalgams included an Italian folk group playing next to Chinese traditional dancing and a 
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Mongolian barbecue stand. There were demonstrations of calligraphy and watercolour 
printing, a 60-foot papier mâché dragon, and even a rock band called Eastern Express.161  
Paid for exclusively by the Chinese community and local businesses, the Dragon Mall 
was Toronto’s most elaborate street closure yet. There were critics, of course. The Telegram 
complained that the Dragon Mall lacked the nightlife and appeal of the recent Carnival mall. 
And a group representing Chinese students at the University of Toronto claimed that the 
mall presented an “archaic and misleading” idea of Chinese culture, with particular 
reference to the rickshaws dreamt up by Ying Hope as a symbol for the experiment.162 
Overall, however, the Dragon Mall was very popular, with organizers claiming 135,000 
visitors over nine days. Participating shops reported a huge boom in business, and 
fundraising for a Chinese Canadian senior’s home netted $27,000 in donations.163 Less 
measurable, but no less important, was the feeling among members of the Chinese 
community that perhaps—finally—Torontonians were recognizing the value of the 
neighbourhood they had fought to save.  
A city transformed? 
By the end of the summer of 1971, few in Toronto had not been won over by the city’s first 
street festivals. Even before the closing of the first Yonge mall, newspaper editorials were 
speculating that the “[t]he city may never be the same again.”164 To many, the popularity of 
the malls and the novel atmosphere they created downtown seemed to be clear signs that a 
new Toronto was taking shape. This was the kind of planning for people that citizen 
urbanists, municipal reformers and environmentalists had been demanding for years. 
Notable modernist architect John C. Parkin, who took a tour of the mall with reporters, 
thought the mall spelled the end of “Toronto the dreary…the city of corridors without a 
living room” that he had written about in the past.165  
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Those views seemed to be confirmed when, halfway through the mall week, Premier 
Bill Davis announced the effective end of the Spadina Expressway project. Anti-expressway 
campaigners celebrated on the Yonge mall, which seemed to be the positive expression of 
everything they had fought for over the past decade. In the wake of that decision, the mall 
was more frequently described as a “symbol of pedestrian rights” and “the ban-the-car 
movement”—which it was, to some.166 Newspaper columnist Jack McArthur observed that 
with the success of the pedestrian mall and the cancellation of the expressway, the city was 
sending a clear message that it preferred a future as a “people-oriented loveable small 
town” rather than a sprawling monster of an urban region.167 By mid-summer, an 
enraptured Mayor Dennison was calling for further malls, and there was a campaign—led by 
Pollution Probe—to make the Yonge Street experiment permanent.168  
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Something had changed, but who was responsible for the transformation? There was 
much congratulatory back-slapping among the mall organizers, and particularly for “father 
of the mall” William Archer. However, there was also a widely articulated sense that 
responsibility for the mall’s success belonged to all Torontonians. Even if citizen 
participation in planning the mall had in fact been slow to materialize, people had embraced 
the idea once it was implemented, voting with their feet in the tens and hundreds of 
thousands. This idea of the mall as a collaborative planning project and an exercise in 
participatory democracy was captured well in a gesture made by the Toronto Chapter of the 
Ontario Association of Architects in early 1972. That year, the group’s annual design award, 
normally given to an individual architect, was instead awarded to “the citizens of Toronto” 
who “demonstrated their enthusiasm for a more livable city” by flocking to the mall in great 
numbers.169 William Archer and Ying Hope did not shy away from crediting themselves for 
the success of the summer’s malls. But they also encouraged this more populist 
interpretation, which fit well with the growing influence of municipal reform at City Hall.  
Buoyed by this enthusiasm, the city planned longer street closures for the summer of 
1972. Yonge between Gerrard and Albert Streets would be pedestrianized in portions for a 
total of six weeks, and the Dragon Mall would reappear for the same length of time. In 1973, 
under the new council, the mall was extended to three months, taking in the stretch of 
Yonge from Gerrard all the way south to King. A few changes were made to the concept. 
The entertainment program was toned down and dispersed, to avoid overcrowding near the 
stages. Alterations were made to traffic diversions, and several minor side streets were 
partially closed to include them in the mall.170 In other respects, however, things were 
organized much as they were in 1971. Again, permission to close had to be requested from 
Metro Toronto, and indemnity against damages resulting from the closure assured by 
special legislation at Queen’s Park.  
People outside of the city began to take notice of what was apparently a very 
successful pedestrianization scheme. The Yonge mall was profiled in local and regional 
Canadian newspapers, particularly in cities like Vancouver that were conducting their own 
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experiments with pedestrian space.171 Promotional materials emphasized that downtown 
Toronto was both a friendly, people-centric place and a hub for consumption. Brochures 
produced by the Downtown Council for the 1973 mall invited visitors to join them as 
“[n]ature takes over 15 blocks of Yonge Street, Canada’s NUMBER ONE commercial and 
entertainment centre,” converting it into the nostalgically titled “Main Street Canada.”172 
Illustrations from previous years showed crowds of mallgoers circulating and happily 
chatting in sidewalk cafés as one of the city’s iconic streetcars rolled by.  
That image mall fit well into the city’s tourism promotion strategy, which 
overwhelmingly targeted the United States, origin of an estimated 75% of international 
visitors to Toronto in the 1970s.173 In ads and sponsored articles in local newspapers 
Americans were presented with a picture of Toronto as a safer, friendlier, more harmonious 
version of the North American city, without the racial tension and rising crime rates that 
plagued urban areas south of the border.174 The city’s tourist bureau hoped to capitalize on 
the fact that “[p]eople along the border would rather come to Toronto than to any 
American city because it is cleaner and safer.”175 Naturally the Yonge Street mall featured 
high on the list of sights promoted by the group, and a tourist information booth set up on 
Yonge in 1972 and 1973 saw more visitors than any other location in the city. A surveys in 
1974 found that just over one in ten people on the mall was from the United States.176 The 
pedestrian mall was also included, briefly, as a Canadian attraction in federally funded 
tourist promotion materials.177  
Before long, there was a steady trickle of correspondence from communities across 
North America that were, like Toronto, interested in downtown revitalization through 
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pedestrian malls. These ranged from the nearby—Stratford and London, Ontario—to the 
more distant New Westminster, B.C., and Louisville, Kentucky.178 This time, however, in 
contrast to the research conducted in 1970-71, it was Archer and the other organizers who 
were offering advice on subjects like mall design, sales promotion, and parking during the 
street closure.  
On the Canadian scene, in particular, the Yonge Street experiment was held up as an 
example of a successful street closure, alongside the older and more established Sparks 
Street in Ottawa. In the early 1970s, more and more Canadian communities were 
investigating—and in a few cases, building—pedestrian zones. In the wake of its own heated 
political struggle over expressway construction and the goals of urban planning, Vancouver 
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Image 1.7: Merchant group the Downtown Council promoted the pedestrian mall as “Main 
Street Canada,” a safe, people-oriented version of the downtown shopping street. The 
reality of the crowded mall at times conflicted with this image. Downtown Council, Main 
Street Canada (1973), author’s collection.  
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was considering a new downtown plan based around rapid transit and the pedestrianization 
of busy Granville Street.179 Over the next few years Kingston, Halifax, Montréal, Quebec City, 
and numerous smaller municipalities experimented with creating pedestrian-only streets. In 
almost every case, the goal was, as in Toronto, to retain or renew the economic vibrancy of 
a downtown shopping district, coupled with secondary concerns like aesthetics, pollution 
abatement, and the provision of new public space.180  
Control problems 
However, as the closure of Yonge grew in length from one week to something approaching a 
summer-long mall—and moved north to include the entertainment-heavy Gerrard-Dundas 
section of the strip—its image began to lose its lustre. Already, the experience of 1971 
demonstrated the difficulties inherent in regulating the different ways people chose to use 
the public space created by the mall: those problems seemed to multiply as the mall more 
than tripled in length and settled in for twelve weeks at a time. That organizers felt that 
those uses could and should be controlled reflected both the purposeful design of the 
project and its revitalizing goals: bringing life back to Yonge was above all about bringing 
(and keeping) the right kind of people downtown. Officials had a clear idea of what activities 
were encouraged on the mall—relaxation, dining, shopping, strolling, watching 
entertainment—and which potentially disruptive uses were not, including (but not limited 
to) panhandling, vending, street advertising, and religious proselytizing. By 1973, William 
Archer had identified the “control and regulation” of those activities as the highest priority 
item to be addressed if the mall were to continue into the future.181  
Of course, what was deemed a “control problem,” in the city’s parlance, depended 
on the observer. It was rarely clear whether control problems were mostly about specific 
behaviours—selling sunglasses, asking for money—or simply the presence of perceived 
undesirables—prostitutes, long-haired youth—on the mall. Inevitably, other concerns bled 
into the discussion: anxiety about youth rebellion and rowdyism, outrage at the appearance 
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of body rub parlours and strip shows. Still, a picture emerges from press coverage, police 
reports, and other accounts. The Yonge Street pedestrian mall was no hotbed of criminality, 
apart from localized problems with alcohol-fueled rowdyism on Friday and Saturday nights. 
But it was crowded with an eclectic mix of people and uses, forcing a constant negotiation 
and raising questions about the purpose and value of the newly created public space.  
Pamphlets and peddlers 
Yonge Street merchants were a major part of identifying perceived problems. In a 1972 
report sent to city officials and the press, the Downtown Council emphasized that members 
were  
deeply concerned with unwelcome changes taking place on Yonge Street 
during recent months and they believe that the character of our City’s main 
thoroughfare is being transformed in an unfavourable way.182 
As described in the later chapter on Sin Strip, they were not alone in this assessment. Yet as 
the city’s key partner in closing Yonge Street, the Downtown Council had significant 
influence when its comments dealt specifically with the summer pedestrian malls. Some of 
the problems identified in the report, merchants argued, were a direct outgrowth of the 
“lack of proper controls” during street closures. Activities that were profitable during the 
mall were subsequently established year-round. They took specific issue with aggressive 
advertising, proselytizing, and illegal vending. 
Many offenders in the first category were among the growing number of sex 
cinemas, strip shows, and body rub parlours on Yonge. For those businesses the mall 
presented an unmatched opportunity to attract clients, and was a powerful incentive for 
their rapid spread in 1971 and 1972.183 Typically, teenaged boys and unemployed men were 
hired to press pamphlets on passers-by and walk the mall wearing sandwich-board 
advertisements. Female attendants or touts stood in front of the stairways leading up to 
body rub parlours, calling out to men as they walked by. Loudspeakers blared music outside 
of mini cinemas and strip shows, and closed-circuit TVs showed tantalizing glimpses of the 
entertainment offered inside.  
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As operators of businesses like the Playboy Mini Cinema pointed out to the city, in 
the context of intense competition for walk-in traffic on Yonge, this kind of aggressive 
advertising was their primary source of customers.184 It was also one of the most common 
ways that non-customers found out about what was happening behind their typically 
nondescript upstairs windows. Each year during the mall dozens of shocked citizens mailed 
evidence of that discovery—copies of pamphlets featuring suggestive language and the 
nude female form—to William Archer, the mayor, and other civic officials.185 In this way, by 
1973 the mall was swept up in the growing campaign against the sex industry on Yonge 
Street. 
Sex businesses produced and distributed a staggering amount of printed matter; but 
they weren’t the only ones aggressively advertising on the mall. Yonge’s summer crowds 
brought out of the woodwork hundreds of entrepreneurs, evangelists, and would-be 
prophets eager to spread their message or sell their specific product. In addition to the 
often risqué offers made by businesses fronting on Yonge, a stroller making her way up the 
street might receive a copy of the Radical Humanist (“A monthly newspaper on alienation”), 
an ad for an anti-war music festival (“End Canada’s complicity in Vietnam!”), a coupon from 
Italian Canadian sandwich shop San Francesco (“A free offer you can’t refuse”), and an 
invitation to a folk-music night at the Scientology coffee house on Avenue Road (“A night 
especially for people to be themselves”).186 She could discuss enlightenment and salvation 
with shaven-headed Hare Krishna devotees and long-haired Jesus People, or art and 
imperialism with members of the Committee to Strengthen Canadian Culture. Yonge Street 
mall was the busiest, loudest, and most chaotic marketplace in ideas and services on offer in 
straight-laced Toronto.   
From their point of view of established Yonge Street businesspeople, the most 
pressing control problem on the mall was illegal vending. By 1972-73 the Yonge Street mall 
had become one of the most profitable locations in the city for vendors selling everything 
from sunglasses to roasted nuts. Yonge had by far the largest crowds of potential 
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customers, including high numbers of tourists, and a slow pace that encouraged browsing 
and impulse purchases. Some vendors were tacitly tolerated. Shoeshine boys in particular 
were considered an iconic part of Yonge’s streetlife, and treated sympathetically by the 
media and other observers; in 1971 the financial success of 10-year-old “little Jimmy 
Crouse” in shining shoes during the Carnival Mall was used to demonstrate that all 
categories of Torontonian approved of the experiment.187 Others were licensed by the city, 
including dozens of licensed food carts, operated overwhelmingly by Greek Canadians, often 
recent immigrants.  
Most street merchants, however, were unlicensed, whether flower and candle 
sellers, newspaper vendors—including those offering the countercultural rag Guerilla—or 
people selling handicrafts, personalized art, and jewellery. This last category, dubbed 
“capitalists of the counterculture” by a Toronto reporter, specialized in handmade rings, 
pendants, and other crafts and baubles in silver, leather, wood, and bone.188 Setting up 
tables or blankets in empty doorways or the street, they did brisk business without the 
overheads of a conventional shop. This displeased members of the Downtown Council, who 
pointed out that they paid taxes, contributed voluntarily to fund the mall, and yet were 
losing business to vendors who did neither.189 
Mall organizers tried to act on these varied complaints with design changes and 
enforcement. In 1972 and 1973, organizers, and especially William Archer, lobbied police 
and city inspectors to pay more attention to handbills, vending, and panhandling.190 
Beginning in 1972, designated areas of the mall were set aside each year for handicraft 
sellers and street artists, with the intention of corralling them into places where they would 
neither compete with established merchants nor obstruct other uses. Again, this was part of 
an attempt to impose order and purpose on mall space by separating uses through design. 
In press releases, organizers warned that the mall was “a free and easy place for people to 
enjoy themselves,” and that selling crafts and drawing portraits would only be permitted on 
Edward Street and Gould Street, respectively.191 The Edward Street fair became a recurring 
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feature of the mall, with vendors applying for permits to reserve one of a few dozen spaces 
for their wares.  
Yet this only partially addressed the problem, since most vendors were uninterested 
in the application process or being relegated to a specific corner: like buskers and shoeshine 
boys, they wanted to be where the action was. And there proved to be little the city could 
do to move them along. Each summer, the pedestrian mall was established by a bylaw 
passed by Metro Council, and that law set out what activities were permitted on the street 
during the closure.192 Selling on the mall without a license was an infraction against the 
bylaw, and could incur a summons from police or licensing inspectors, and eventually a 
fine.193 But those penalties seldom deterred street merchants, who would begin selling 
again immediately after police left, or, as the exasperated reports of licensing inspectors 
attest, meet enforcement of the bylaw with disdain or even verbal abuse.194 In true anti-
establishment style, vendors of the countercultural paper Guerilla complained of 
harassment when asked by William Archer, and later ordered by police, to stop selling their 
paper on the mall—but they kept on doing so, and suffered no repercussions.195 The mall, it 
turned out, had all the flaws and freedoms of other densely used public spaces—city parks, 
certain sidewalks—during hot city summers.   
Youth, rowdyism, and disorder  
In summer 1972, a 25-year-old man named Jim Davies wrote to the Toronto Star to 
complain: he had been beaten up on Yonge Street in plain view of Saturday night crowds. 
Almost 200 people stood and watched early Sunday morning while I was 
punched and kicked to the pavement in the middle of downtown Toronto. 
Nobody thought of coming to my aid, nobody called a policeman, and 
nobody looked me in the eyes when I walked up to them afterward and 
through bloodied lips asked why they hadn’t helped.196   
A photo of the author’s puffed, bruised face ran beside the letter, which was given a 
prominent place on the editorial page. He went on to complain that “incidents like these 
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occur with disturbing regularity in Metro Toronto [and] every other major North American 
city.” Davies’ was not the only story of violence or disorder on Yonge Street to come out 
that year. By the end of 1973’s twelve-week mall, complaints about misbehaviour had 
combined with those about panhandling and harassment to form a portrait of a 
dysfunctional public space, out of proportion with the relative order of the mall’s day-to-day 
existence. 
The category of youth was under intense scrutiny in postwar North America. 
Historians of the era, and especially the coming of age of the baby boomers in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, have illustrated how the category of “youth” became more than just an 
identifier of age: it was a stance, an ethic, a way of being.197 That meant, in theory, that 
anyone could embrace a youthful worldview. Conversely, to be young was indelibly 
associated with certain ideas and practices, and especially non-conformity and rebellion. 
Youth was the world’s hope, Time magazine’s 1966 “Man of the Year”; but it was also seen 
by many as the culprit behind growing drug use, unsafe city streets, political disengagement, 
and other moral and social ills.198  
This dark side of this ambivalence manifested itself in different ways. One was 
heightened anxiety about the destructive or disruptive potential of groups of youth, and 
especially young men. Whether in the context of 1950s juvenile delinquency or the 1960s 
counterculture, the widespread perception was that, perhaps more than ever before, when 
young people got together, they did things society would rather they didn’t, up to and 
including rioting.199 In the 1960s and early 1970s there seemed to be plenty of incidents in 
the Canadian press that supported this gloomy view: ritualized Victoria Day riots in Hamilton 
(early 1960s), confrontations between pot-smoking young people and police in Vancouver 
(1971), and student demonstrations and campus occupations at Sir George Williams 
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University (1969) and across the country.200 Youth did not always show the deference to 
police authority they had in the past; this was particularly the case as growing numbers of 
middle-class, educated young people were arrested for recreational drug use: in Canada 
arrests for marijuana possession went from 62 in 1964-65 to a staggering 20,179 just a 
decade later.201 Crime rates were rising across the country, reflecting not only those new 
drug charges, but also a spike in violent offenses that many attributed to baby boom 
demographics.202  
In Toronto, concern about youth rebellion and delinquency was localized in a few 
key sites, including suburban fast food restaurants and parking lots, and downtown arcades 
and commercial strips. In the 1960s it was most apparent in the city’s response to the 
bohemian enclave of Yorkville, focus of a debate over the counterculture, drugs, and youth 
alienation that frequently rose to hyperbolic proportions. As historian Stuart Henderson 
relates, by 1965 the Yorkville Village was widely perceived as a foreign territory inhabited by 
a cast of flawed youth archetypes: “toughs,” “bikers,” “rowdies,” and, of course, the 
ubiquitous “hippie.” The police response to drug use, street parties, demonstrations—some 
of them calling for a pedestrian mall—and other public displays was disproportionate, and 
often violent. Undercover and riot police were deployed in force in the Village on summer 
weekends, resulting inevitably in an escalation of tension which, at times, culminated in 
violence and mass arrests.203 Similar patterns were playing out across the country each 
summer, as youth from a range of backgrounds—curious weekenders, teenage runaways, 
students—experimented with rebellion in countercultural enclaves from Vancouver to 
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Halifax. Not just police, but social services and local community organizations rushed to 
investigate and respond to the phenomenon.204 
Under pressure from this near-ceaseless investigation and reporting, and priced out 
of local services by rapid redevelopment, by 1971 the youth counterculture had left 
Yorkville behind. Its critics were forced to confront the fact that it appeared to have spread 
throughout Toronto’s downtown, from taverns on Spadina Avenue to the crowded 
sidewalks of the Yonge Street strip. Somewhat ironically, even as jaded voices within the 
counterculture were decrying Yonge’s crass commercialism—Guerilla called Yonge-Dundas 
Toronto’s “arsehole”—the police and other observers were calling it the new Yorkville; a 
label that brought with a certain cachet, but also the same associations with the drug 
culture, alienation, and police-youth tension that had persistently dogged the Village.205 By 
the winter of 1972-73 concerns over youth delinquency and corruption were a staple part of 
depictions of Yonge Street’s sleazy strip.   
Demographics played a role in this. If in 1951 the age distribution of the population 
of central Toronto aligned closely with that of the larger city, by the 1970s downtown was 
significantly younger. Of course, thanks to the baby boom communities across the country 
were getting younger, but this was different: the core area was distinctive in that there were 
fewer children, but significantly more single 20-34 year-old residents.206 Toronto was also a 
crucial hub for the tens of thousands of young people criss-crossing the country each 
summer for work and pleasure. “Transient youth”—as they were labelled by a prominent 
1969 inquiry—were a diverse group, including students on summer break, job and thrill 
seekers, and, warned police, an unprecedented number of teenage runaways.207 Like urban 
centres across the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Toronto struggled to cope with 
this massive influx of young people, often nonconformist not just in their mobility but in 
their dress and long hair. Transients, many of whom had arrived by hitching rides, required 
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beds, food, jobs information, and medical attention. They naturally gravitated to Yonge 
Street, where a 24-hour information service for youth was quickly set up in a trailer just 
north of Gerrard. Funded by the federal Opportunities for Youth program, the Peoples’ 
Information Service directed transients to nearby hostels and other services, mimicking 
similar initiatives that had sprung up in nearly every city in Canada.208 Those who could not 
find a place with friends or in crowded downtown hostels camped in a series of official and 
unofficial tent cities in the west end and on the University of Toronto campus.209  
Like Yonge itself, the pedestrian malls offered young people a meeting place, made 
attractive by its central location, ample public space, and the lack of barriers—financial or 
other—to entry. This is confirmed both anecdotally by photographs and news reports and 
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by an extensive study of mallgoers in 1974. That summer, planners researching the mall 
surveyed, and recorded the details of, a total of 2043 people strolling the mall at various 
hours of the day. Of that number, nearly half—929—were between 16 and 25 years of age.  
A further 490 were aged 25-35, and only 549 (26%) were over the age of 35.210 In other 
words, in a city where only a third of the population was between 15 and 35 years old, 
nearly three-quarters of mall goers were in that age group.211 The sample may have been 
biased somewhat by the researchers, who were themselves in their 20s, and by the fact that 
slightly more surveys were filled out on the north section of the mall than on the other 
portions. But even accounting for those tendencies, the youthfulness of the crowds on the 
mall is striking.  
In this context both the public and police were attuned to any hint that the Yonge 
Street pedestrian mall was providing an opportunity for youth misbehaviour. Their simple 
presence was often enough. When in July 1973 citizens began to complain that the mall was 
becoming a hangout for hitchhikers and transients, organizers were quick to react. A grassy 
area, according to some frequented by “undesirables”—according to others a “meeting 
place for youth from all across Canada”—was removed from the lower mall, and replaced 
with less hospitable trees.212 William Archer countered criticism of the mall by pointing out 
that it was safe, business was good, and the police were keeping order.213 He did not 
suspect that within a few months the police would become the experiment’s most vocal 
critics.  
An “84-day orgy of lawlessness” 
Early on, the Metro Toronto police adopted a wait-and-see approach to the mall 
experiment. Representatives of the force participated in planning on the mall Technical 
Committee, and sat in meetings of the Operations Committee. Like the Fire Department, 
they raised the issue of emergency vehicle access to the mall; police representatives also 
expressed concern about the number of extra officers—36 in 1971, more in subsequent 
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years—required to manage traffic.214 But they offered no further obstacles to the mall, and 
as the months passed seemed to be cautiously positive.  Meeting informally with Archer and 
other city staff in early 1972, police were confident that they could handle control problems 
that summer by instituting a policy of “rigid law enforcement” during the first week of the 
closure.215 And as late as August of that year, Staff Superintendent Vincent Telford—
responsible for policing in 52 Division, which included Yonge Street—had called the mall 
“strictly a no-problem proposition.”216 However, within a year that attitude had changed, as 
Chief of Police Harold Adamson began to publicly oppose the closure. 
Two objections were at the core of Adamson’s opposition: that the mall increased 
criminal activity downtown, and that it wasted precious police resources. Both were based 
on a long report submitted by Superintendent Telford on policing the 12-week 1973 mall.217 
In that document, Telford’s positive evaluation of earlier malls was nowhere to be seen; 
instead, he highlights the difficulties his officers experienced in doing their job during the 
street closure. The report is fascinating reading, both for the insight it provides into what 
was by far the largest police deployment in Toronto that summer, and for the unique record 
it provides of individual incidents. 
Policing the 1973 mall involved cooperation of several different units within the 
Metro Toronto Police force. During business hours, police presence was assured mainly by 
the 23 officers of 52 Division’s Foot Patrol Unit, one of the last units of its kind in a city 
policed almost entirely by scout car.218 Plainclothes officers were also deployed, although in 
more limited numbers, to focus on offences like pickpocketing and prostitution. According 
to Telford, daytime patrols had “no real problem” maintaining order on the mall, although 
they reported large numbers of “undesirables,” including panhandlers, religious 
proselytizers, musicians and street vendors. Effective that year, the powers that police had 
traditionally used to limit those activities had been curbed. Revisions to the Criminal Code in 
1972 had removed three vagrancy offences: wandering in public without means of support, 
being a common prostitute, and begging. All three were considered unconstitutional 
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because they targeted statuses—prostitute, transient—not behaviours.219 The experience of 
the mall gave proof to warnings earlier that year from police that their hands were tied 
when it came to cleaning up Yonge Street.220 Without status vagrancy offences there was 
little they could do about so-called undesirables, the report explained, apart from issuing 
summonses against unlicensed vendors.  
There were different challenges after dark. Evenings and weekends, Telford argued, 
saw police resources stretched to their limits by drunken, disorderly, and sometimes violent 
crowds. He listed 1074 arrests made on Yonge during the mall; more might have been 
made, he suggests, if crowds had not “obstructed and menaced” officers performing their 
duty. Scout cars were frequently unable to navigate the street and were slow in bringing 
assistance. Telford’s report details fifty-six incidents of confrontation between police and 
mall-goers during the mall’s 1973 run, usually as the result of an attempted arrest for 
assault or intoxication. Some are vivid depictions of the challenges of policing the mall: 
July 13th—11:13 pm. Radio call to assist the P.C. regarding a large fight at 
the Colonial Tavern and a serious stabbing that had taken place during the 
fight. A crowd of between two thousand five hundred and three thousand 
was present, with most of this crowd being hostile towards the police. 
Officers were tripped as they chased suspects; members of the crowd tried 
to take the prisoners from the officers; beer bottles and dirt clumps thrown 
at officers; scout cars blocked by the crowd, and as the cars tried to leave 
the back doors were opened and the prisoners dragged out. Several calls 
for assistance were put out and sixty units attended.221  
These confrontations between crowds and officers, Telford explained, led police to ask for 
reinforcements. The Emergency Task Force—a heavily armed unit set up to deal with armed 
suspects and high-risk situations—was detailed to the mall on Fridays and Saturdays for the 
summer’s duration, logging an average of 140 hours each weekend. Five additional officers 
were added from other divisions. This nearly doubled police deployment on the mall during 
peak times. In total, the force spent 16,570 officer hours on the mall that summer, or 
approximately 200 for each day that it was open. According to Telford, “it was only due to 
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the assignment of additional police personnel to the Mall that we were able to prevent 
major disturbances on weekends, and maintain law and order.”  
Police felt under siege, and on summer nights maintaining order without 
confrontation and the deployment of backup seemed an impossible task. Adamson saw this 
as clear evidence that the street closure “attract[ed] undesirables” and, he thought, created 
crime.222 It also tied down his officers in what he saw as a non-essential duty. As political 
scientist Kenneth Meier points out in his study of the politics of vice, modern urban police 
forces always have more responsibilities than resources, making their enforcement 
strategies selective by necessity.223 In a period of rising crime rates and widespread concern 
about drugs and violent crime, Adamson argued that deploying 20 or more police per day 
on the mall was a waste of time: 52 Division was one of the busiest jurisdictions in the city, 
and both officers there and on the highly specialized Emergency Task Force had better 
things to do. Adamson hammered home the point that policing the mall was expensive, 
explaining that in 1973 the cost to taxpayers was just under $100,000, or around $530,000 
in 2016 dollars. Although this was insignificant in the context of a police budget of nearly 
$80 million, it served to further justify his opposition based on wastage of police resources. 
Following up on more guarded criticism made earlier in the summer, the police chief 
recommended that the mall be shortened in length, or, even better, completely abolished.  
Of course, there were other sides to the story. Adamson did not distinguish between 
the street closure, the presence of so-called undesirables, and criminal acts: to him they 
were just faces of the same problem. But it was unclear just how much of the criminality 
Telford described in his report could be attributed to the mall or its particular street life, and 
how much was a product of other factors. He acknowledged that most of the disturbances 
were centred in the entertainment area, with its ten or more taverns, its strip shows, and 
bright lights. That area  
even without a Mall, attracts more than its fair share of people with little 
to do and who are there for kicks and any type of excitement they can 
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promote. The intersection of Dundas and Yonge Streets has by far the 
heaviest pedestrian traffic in the evening of any location in Toronto.224   
Of the fifty-six police-crowd scenes he lists, only six occurred before 7 pm; more than 
half took place between 12 and 4 am, mostly on Fridays and Saturdays. Furthermore, most 
of the arrests made on Yonge that summer were for minor offences that clearly reflected 
the boozy nightlife then available on Yonge. Half—485—of the arrests were for alcohol 
offences, 183 were for drugs (mostly marijuana) and just a few dozen people were charged 
with assault or other, more serious, crimes. While summer numbers for other, non-mall 
years do not exist, comparing Telford’s arrest figures to overall statistics for Yonge in 1977 
and 1978 suggests that while the mall intensified the situation, it was by no means 
responsible for creating it.225 Yonge Street, car-free or not, had a problem with alcohol and 
rowdyism. That problem was at its most obvious as warm summer weather encouraged 
loitering and lingering long after closing hours.  
Second, the tactics used by police tended in many cases to exacerbate tension 
between officers and mall-goers and in that way create crime, just as surely as Adamson 
believed the mall did. Reading Telford’s report against the grain, it is clear that police were 
responding to personal drug use, groups of inebriated youth, or simply shouting in the 
street with immediate arrests. Other sources confirm that they were also stopping and 
questioning youth indiscriminately on the mall, and at times “warning them off.”226 These 
police actions was perceived by observers and the accused as harassment. When attempts 
were made to argue with police, or observers intervened, police escalated by calling for 
scout cars and other reinforcements, including the Emergency Task Force. In around one-
third of the fifty-six incidents Telford describes in detail, confrontation between crowds and 
police occurred as a direct result of an earlier arrest. For example, 
July 14th—1:30 a.m. A near riot situation developed at Yonge and Dundas 
Streets when [officers] were arresting females on prostitution charges. 
Around three hundred and fifty people shouted anti-police slogans. 
Or, 
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June 27th—11:45 pm. As the result of two men being arrested for robbery 
on Yonge Street a near riot developed. One youth jumped on an officer’s 
back knocking him to the ground, and another officer was attacked by the 
crowd. This situation resulted in the arrest of twelve persons, for Assault 
Police, Obstruct Police, and Cause a Disturbance.  
This is not to blame police for the problems they describe, but to point out that their tactics 
of policing the mall had a hand in creating them. Strict enforcement and escalation were 
sure methods—tried and tested in Yorkville just a few years previously—of creating 
resentment and, potentially, riots.  
But while the media gave Adamson’s criticism of the mall front-page treatment, they 
left little room for opposing opinions. Since the previous winter, Yonge’s sleaze and criminal 
depravity had been making the news as a vocal minority began to mobilize to clean up the 
sex industry. Police depictions of the mall as lawless fit well into this narrative. Following the 
release of Telford’s report—Adamson made it public by incorporating it into a submission to 
the Police Board of Commissioners, and it went from there to council—the Toronto Star 
dramatically referred to the mall as “an 84-day orgy of lawlessness,” and that memorable 
phrase sparked a renewed debate of the merits of the street closure.227 It also gave 
Adamson ammunition in his lobbying of the provincial government—later taken up by the 
Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police—to push for the reinstatement of the vagrancy 
offences removed from the Criminal Code in 1972.228 
An appeal to democracy 
Police statements blasting the mall and growing dissatisfaction among merchants prompted 
a renewed discussion of the future of the project. It turned out that the mall still had its 
defenders. After the Toronto Star published a series of articles and letters critical of the 
mall, some members of the public did rally to its defence. In letters citizens praised the mall 
for its vibrant atmosphere and people-friendly environment. One called Yonge “a carefree 
oasis of trees and flowers, fountains and park benches in the middle of a concrete city”; 
another found it “throbbing” with life. A Toronto architect wrote chastising the Star for its 
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“slanted, biased” take on Yonge, which he thought gave the impression that “people coming 
to the mall would be abused, insulted, robbed, and possibly molested.”229  
As the summer 1973 mall closed, William Archer called criticism by police “grossly 
exaggerated and overplayed,” and pointed out that there had been very few substantiated 
complaints about youth criminality to date. The public favours the mall “four to one,” he 
went on to claim—and then quickly began to prepare a survey which he hoped would prove 
just that.230 The question of just what the public thought of the mall was a crucial one, as 
Archer knew. In an era marked by widespread debate over the goals and practices of urban 
planning, Toronto’s pedestrian malls had been marketed as a project strongly in the public 
interest. Animated by the political climate of the time—increasingly weighted towards 
community-based democracy—they were planning experiments designed for people, by 
people. After all, hadn’t the organizers announced on opening day in 1971 that “[t]he judge 
and jury for the success of the mall will be the people of Toronto”?231 That year, both 
surveys and sheer numbers of mall goers seemed to provide unequivocal approval. But was 
that still the case in 1972 or 1973? As was the case with the citizen’s campaign against the 
sex industry, it was always difficult to evaluate what Torontonians, outside of a vocal few, 
actually thought of the malls.  
This was all the more relevant given that a new council and mayor had taken over in 
1973, bringing with them a mandate for change. Members of council who had been outliers 
in the previous administration suddenly found themselves part of a reformist majority. That 
heterogeneous group was often divided on key questions, but its size gave moderate Mayor 
David Crombie considerable leeway in assembling support for individual policies.232 While it 
would take the new government several years to lay out its vision for the downtown, from 
the start it was clear that priority would be given to keeping the central core “a people 
place,” and curbing the unrestricted use of the automobile downtown.233 The spirit of the 
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anti-Spadina campaigners was firmly entrenched in city government, beginning the 
institutionalization of urban design and community consultation ideas that had been current 
in planning circles for decades.  
This new approach manifested itself in renewed interest in the state of Yonge Street, 
and paths to revitalizing it and the entire downtown core. In late 1972 David Crombie made 
a public appeal for input on the state of Yonge Street, and “what could be done to make it a 
better thoroughfare”: prelude to a highly-publicized campaign to ”clean up” the street. The 
mall was one possible solution, although there was already discussion of whether it was in 
fact making the street worse, rather than improving it. Not long after, there was a push 
within the reform caucus to make a decision about making the mall permanent.234 Moving 
towards a permanently car-free Yonge was always a part of William Archer’s plan, but given 
the unprecedented criticism of the mall that summer, he felt strongly that it was an 
inopportune time to consider the question. His approach continued to be conservative, 
calling for one more, longer, mall in 1974 and further studies before any decision was 
made.235  
On that question and others Archer butted heads with the new, younger city 
council.236 As a result, his ambitious 1973 survey of 1700 “persons, firms, and organizations” 
affected by the mall was never completed. In October he abruptly quit the organizing 
committee (unlike in 1971, this time was for good) citing frustration with council’s 
interference in mall planning.237 In his place, council appointed first-time councillor David 
Smith as mall coordinator. In spring 1974, against the loud objections of William Archer, the 
city hired a group of researchers to conduct a full study of the mall and the possibility of 
making it permanent.238 
Merchants divided 
Meanwhile, downtown merchant group the Downtown Council was also trying to advance 
its own policy on the future of the mall. Like Archer, its pro-mall members were concerned 
                                                  
234 Yonge strip crackdown,” Toronto Sun, Dec. 29, 1972; author’s interview with David Crombie, Feb. 11, 2014. 
235 “Slow and easy on the Yonge mall,” Toronto Star, Aug. 7, 1973. 
236 “Archer sees Bay St trolleys as threat to Yonge St. mall,” Toronto Star, Sep. 25, 1973. 
237 “Archer to City Exec., Oct. 30, 1973,” CTA, 527607-4. 
238 “City oks study of Yonge mall,” Toronto Star, May 16, 1974. 
97 
 
with establishing a base of support, through surveys and votes, that would justify continuing 
the experiment. In the face of indictments of the mall as a factor in Yonge’s deterioration, 
unequivocal support from area merchants was perhaps the only way to ensure that 
outcome. However, they found creating a consensus much more difficult than expected. In 
contrast to the nearly unanimous support (with the notable exception of Simpson’s 
department store) showed by businesses affected by the first 1971 mall, in subsequent 
years interest in the project had flagged. In 1972 a survey by the Council showed that nearly 
one in three (23 of 72) merchants on the extended mall were opposed to continuing the 
experiment, citing competition from vendors, increased shoplifting, and expenses incurred 
for extra staff, decorations, and the voluntary mall levy.239  
Opposition was particularly stubborn on the Dundas-Gerrard strip, where store 
owners complained vigorously about control problems like panhandling. By mid-1973, in 
addition to long-time opponents like Simpson’s department store, there was a distinct anti-
mall lobby within the Council, led by steakhouse owner Harry Barberian. Division within the 
group made for tense meetings, as Barberian and his supporters attempted to rally other 
members against the mall. He too made an appeal to democracy, claiming that the group’s 
executive had “bullied” store owners into supporting the project and calling for a fresh 
survey of Yonge businesses; as proof he went to the press with the results of his own poll, 
which he claimed saw nearly half of 80 respondents against the idea.240 A week later, the 
Council obliged with a questionnaire on which they promised to base their future stance on 
malls. The tone was urgent: “there has been a great deal of controversy surrounding this 
year’s mall,” wrote President Peter Clark, “[w]e cannot state emphatically enough the need 
for your reply.”241   
The results were more negative than expected. Of the 132 businesses who 
responded, 58 (44%) were against future closures. On the entertainment-oriented section of 
the strip, those in favour were slightly in the minority, and it seems, were mostly bars and 
restaurants profiting from the operation of beer gardens and street cafés on the mall. Of 
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course, the results might have been different if the area’s mini-cinis and body rub parlours 
had responded—very few did. In fact, in 1973 the Downtown Council only boasted one 
active member representing the burgeoning sex industry—flamboyant Starvin’ Marvin’s 
owner Arnold Linetsky—and in his characteristic style he opposed anything (including street 
closures) that allowed his smaller competitors to thrive. It was becoming apparent that, in 
1973, the mall did not have the strong mandate among merchants that it could boast just a 
year or two before. This was evident in the increasingly guarded public statements of 
Downtown Council President Peter Clark on the future of the mall. “The concept of a mall is 
fantastic,” he explained, “but it has to be workable…No one wants this to turn into another 
Yorkville.” He went on to suggest that the city buck the trend of the previous three years 
and create a shorter mall on Yonge in 1974.242 
Smoke and traffic 
The original terms for reference for the Yonge Street mall had emphasized that it was an 
experiment in fitting a pedestrian-only street (or streets) into traffic system built around the 
private car.243 In 1970-71 this aspect of the project was much talked about: as I discuss 
earlier, a wide range of people saw malls as a way to challenge the automobile, both 
symbolically by removing them from well-known streets, and practically by making it a bit 
more pleasant to walk around. And anti-pollution activists had been very active in 
promoting the first mall, working hard to have their role in popularizing the idea 
acknowledged. From another perspective, Metro Commissioner of Roads and Traffic Sam 
Cass state that he was prepared to “tolerate” the malls but warned that the result would be 
inefficiencies, snarl-ups, and delays on already overburdened downtown streets.244 Aware 
of the influence of Cass and other transportation officials, William Archer and the mall’s 
Technical Committee devoted untold hours to minimizing the closure’s impact through 
diversions and special regulations.  
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However, in the wake of police and media revelations about the mall’s control 
problems, hardly anyone was talking about cars. In part, this was because discussion of the 
mall was dominated by criticism of the way its public space was used, and this tended to 
obscure other aspects of the experiment. But other factors were at work, too. After making 
considerable efforts to make pollution awareness part of the first 1971 mall, Pollution Probe 
had largely given up on the experiment. While their relations with mall organizers were 
cordial, Archer’s committee were not receptive to their attempts to turn the mall into a 
forum for public education, and had rejected most of their proposals (including plans to 
make a documentary film about the mall) as detracting from the mall’s purpose as a people 
place.245 By 1972 Pollution Probe was also changing as an organization. In just a few years it 
had expanded from a small, student-led core to a group with twenty-five paid staff 
members, and largely renounced its previous focus on attention-grabbing public events and 
street theatre in favour of research and policy formulation.246  
In the absence of Toronto’s most important anti-pollution group, there was still 
interest in the relationship between the mall and the growing problem of automobile 
pollution. In 1972 researchers from the Ontario Ministry of the Environment measured 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) levels on Yonge both during and after the street closure. They 
pointed out that the mall seem to provide a very local sort of pollution abatement, 
something that Pollution Probe had predicted when it proposed Leave the Car at Home 
Week in 1970. Pollution levels that averaged an acceptable 5-7 parts per million during the 
mall increased dramatically when traffic was allowed back on the street, exceeding safe 
levels set by the province nearly half of the time.247 More extensive readings taken the 
following summer found averages of well over 40ppm, prompting the authors to conclude 
that “it was undesirable to spend more than two hours walking or working” on downtown 
streets like Yonge—except, of course, during the pedestrian mall.248 But while the press 
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reported on their findings, unlike in 1970-71 the conversation was not tied to a larger 
narrative about pedestrians, cars, and the fight against pollution.249  
The political context of transportation planning had changed, as well. Premier Bill 
Davis’ 1971 decision to cancel the Spadina Expressway and stop provincial funding of future 
expressway projects left Metro Toronto’s regional transportation plan in tatters. Supporters 
of the Spadina route at Metro had claimed that it would reduce congestion, increase 
pedestrian safety, and even abate pollution downtown.250 In one stroke, that important link 
was lost. Perhaps more importantly, Davis’ announcement and the bitter fight that 
preceded it destroyed Metro’s previously strong mandate for comprehensive planning, 
already weakened by the resistance of Toronto politicians and planners to arterial road 
widenings and other interventions in the central city. In its place transportation planners 
were left to reconcile what they described in a 1973 report—tellingly called Transportation 
Alternatives—as two “incompatible aspirations”: for stability and restrictions on the 
automobile in the central city, and for increased mobility by car in the suburban 
boroughs.251 New studies would have to be undertaken, new plans drawn up; in the 
meantime, Roads and Traffic Commissioner Sam Cass admitted that he and colleagues were 
left confused and uncertain about the future, not just on individual questions like the 
viability of pedestrian malls, but on the fundamental goals they should be working towards: 
“At this moment, we don’t know in what direction we’re heading.”252   
This helps to explain Cass’ virtual silence in the mall debate, even as other officials, 
including the Chief of Police, spoke their opinions forcefully and argued in the interests of 
their department. Studies of the effects of the mall on peak hour circulation were 
undertaken at the city and Metro levels, finding (unsurprisingly) that traffic redirected onto 
neighbouring arterials—especially Bay Street—put them well over capacity and made travel 
times slower for commuters.253 But without a clear plan it was difficult to take a stance on 
the project from a transportation perspective. Roads and Traffic staff warned the public 
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periodically of “chaotic traffic jams” due to the mall, and suggested that it was one thing to 
close Yonge during the summer, but quite another to consider doing it year-round. But they 
offered little in the way of sustained criticism, and—for a few years at least—made no 
attempt to raise the issue of widening Yonge into a proper traffic arterial.254  
That did not prevent others from weighing in on the traffic issue. A number of 
individual citizens—including taxi or delivery drivers—wrote to the city or newspapers 
explaining that the mall disrupted their usual driving habits downtown.255 Socially 
conservative Scarborough politician and Toronto Transportation Commission Chairman Karl 
Mallette also criticized the mall. While Yonge had been specifically chosen for the mall 
because it had a subway line and no major aboveground transit links, closing it to cars did 
force the diversion of two bus routes, and increased traffic on neighbouring streets. As a 
result, TTC officials argued after 1973’s mall, bus service was “continually disrupted”; 
Mallette would imply that this represented putting the interests of a few mallgoers ahead of 
the many commuters who relied on the service.256  
The enclosed city 
In the background to all of this public debate over street closures, other types of pedestrian 
accommodation were encountering much less scrutiny. By fits and starts, since the late 
1960s plans for vertical separation of traffic were being implemented in the downtown core, 
much along the lines suggested by the 1969 On Foot Downtown report.257 South of the 
commercial strip in the emerging Financial District, Toronto’s development boom was 
creating an underground city, composed of below-grade retail plazas under towers, linked 
to the subway and one another by artificially lit corridors. That system of pathways—
confusingly often called the “pedestrian mall system”—promised to address many of the 
concerns of city planners for efficient movement of pedestrians, providing direct movement 
to and from major destinations without interference from snow, rain, or traffic. They were 
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equally attractive from a budgetary perspective, since the system was mostly built and 
maintained by private interests. 
The broom of reform was intended to sweep away the nascent underground system 
when the municipal government changed in 1972. Tunnels underneath towers seemed to 
embody an older, efficiency-oriented style of planning, and to directly contradict ideas 
about public space and urban vitality held by reformers. The shift towards urban design 
favoured spaces that were heterogeneous, naturally appealing, and interconnected. This 
explained sympathy for older-style retail areas like the Yonge Street strip, which 
concentrated uses and people in a way newer urban landscapes did not. In contrast, a 1973 
report on downtown transportation argued that 
Underground pedestrian malls in Toronto have been designed in a way that 
completely isolates people from the surface. Contact with streetscape and 
climatic conditions above ground has been lost and geographical 
orientation becomes next to impossible…Almost every one of them prides 
itself in the same array of retail outlets [laid out] in exactly the same way 
wherever they are located.258 
In other words, they embodied many of the same problems as dull modernist buildings 
across the city, and especially suburban shopping malls. The goals behind the closing of 
Yonge Street—the creation of new civic space, preservation of commercial diversity—
seemed unrealizable in the underground mode.  
Yet whatever the objections within the new urbanism to the idea of a tunnel system, 
its growth was not halted in 1973. Because of the need to honour pre-existing agreements, 
the city continued to participate in tunnel-building between new developments, giving a 
financial incentive to expand the system at a crucial time. The result was a series of mostly 
unplanned spaces that were publicly accessible but privately owned and managed. Citizens’ 
right to use them was contingent on individual access agreements and their perceived 
suitability; workers on their lunch break were of course treated differently from transients 
seeking escape from the cold.259 But at this early stage, little attention was paid to the 
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channelling of pedestrian traffic into these new environments, apart from a few journalists 
who speculated whether it was worth trading “crowded sidewalks, congested streets, soot 
in your eyes and the endless traffic cacophony” for an “antiseptic,” muzak-filled 
underworld.260 Even as attempts to build on-street pedestrian space faltered, the enclosed 
city continued to expand.  
The end of an experiment  
In June 1974, Mayor Crombie announced, somewhat dramatically, that the fate of the 
Yonge Street pedestrian mall would be decided that year.261 He was right. That year’s 
temporary closure, originally intended to last from June to early September, was beset with 
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problems from the start. There seemed to be a growing consensus that giving Yonge Street 
back to the people was more trouble than it was worth.  
The pace of development was partly responsible for this verdict. Over the winter of 
1973-74 the demolition of several blocks of buildings on the west side of Yonge, slated for 
inclusion in the Eaton Centre retail and office complex, began. For months—indeed until 
early 1977—this section of the street would be faced on one side by construction hoardings 
rather than viable businesses able to participate in the mall. Many of the merchants located 
on this section of the street had shut their doors as early as 1970 or 1971, and so had not 
participated in earlier malls. Still, the tear-down created a dramatic gap in the mall’s 
coherence as a Main Street corridor, while in the scale of transformation seeming to 
embody a threat to its future viability.    
Crime and disorder remained the dominant themes in discussion of the mall. Critics 
within the police force mobilized statistics to argue that in 1974 the closure was another 
pointless near-riot, an impression the media made little attempt to dispel. Officers in 52 
Division and the Morality Squad claimed that “the mall has increased our arrests in 
everything—drunks, prostitutes, and drugs,” and drew unequivocal links between the 
closure and the increasingly notorious problems of Sin Strip.262 Perhaps most harmful to the 
mall’s image was a York County grand jury report that described it as “a blot on Toronto…a 
crime centre for drug pushing, prostitution, and a miriad [sic] of other illegal activities.” It 
went on to recommend that the mall be permanently discontinued. Grand juries, no longer 
in operation in Canada, deliberate in secret. But it is clear from the report and memoranda 
written by the police board that in this case, the jurors— who also called generally for stiff 
custodial sentences for drug traffickers—relied almost entirely on testimony from police to 
come to its verdict.263 That those recommendations bore no legal weight, and that the 
grand jury was a practically obsolete institution did not make the indictment any less 
damning in the press. “This mall has become a nightmare” wrote the Globe and Mail in 
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response to the verdict, and within a week the Toronto Star had begun to refer to the 
project in the past tense.264  
However, it was not the mall’s perceived control problems that cut it short in 1974, 
but a different issue entirely: a transit strike. In early August negotiations between Metro 
and the TTC union broke down over wage increases, precipitating a strike that halted buses, 
streetcars, and subways across the city for the first time in decades.265 Beginning on August 
12, the more than half a million Torontonians who depended on the system to get to work 
quickly changed their mode of transport. Many walked, others pedalled—bicycle shops 
reported record sales—but the majority drove, jamming the streets with cars and pushing 
up downtown pollution levels. Three days later Toronto Council voted nearly unanimously to 
remove the mall furnishings and planters and re-open the street to cars. William Archer 
thought this was a mistake, playing into the hands of the mall’s critics; in fact, a few 
councillors opposed to the mall tried to use the opportunity to pass a (quickly defeated) 
motion banning any future such experiments. Coordinator David Smith, on the other hand, 
saw an early closure as a way to prevent the public from blaming the mall for traffic 
congestion downtown.266 In fact council’s decision to return Yonge to normality merely 
made official what was already taking place: in an attempt to avoid rush hour traffic jams on 
surrounding streets, cars were edging their way onto Yonge and using its narrow fire route 
as a shortcut.267 
Liability and provincial power 
One final intervention sealed the fate of car-free summers on Yonge Street. For four years, 
Toronto had been creating temporary malls based on yearly enabling legislation from the 
provincial government. Each year, the Davis government had passed a bill indemnifying 
Metro and Toronto against any claim of damages resulting from the closure of Yonge and 
other thoroughfares. This was not simply a formality. Just a few years earlier, Ontario’s 
Expropriations Act had been amended, strengthening the ability of citizens to claim 
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compensation for actions taken by government.268 Crucially, the 1968-69 amendments 
included a clause that clearly formulated—for the first time—the idea of “injurious 
affection”: that claims for personal or business compensation could be made even when no 
property was actually expropriated, such as when roads or streets were closed. Early on in 
mall planning, both Toronto and Metro legal staff gave opinions warning of the importance 
of that clause for pedestrian mall planning.269 
If in 1971 exemption from liability was a precaution, within a few years it was viewed 
by mall organizers as essential. A growing number of merchants directly affected by the 
closure were claiming losses of business attributed to the mall; after summer 1972, for 
example, one third of merchants reported that sales were worse than usual during the 
closure.270 In a few cases, there was a real threat of legal action. From early on, Simpson’s 
department store—one of the largest employers and taxpayers in the city—had been 
opposed, claiming lost business due to difficulties accessing its parking facilities. And in 1972 
celebrated music venue the Edison Hotel complained that the entrance to the hotel bar was 
masked by city planters, and that as a consequence they were losing walk-in business. 
Communicating through their lawyers, the hotel management warned that they would seek 
damages if the planters were not removed.271 As much as organizers tried, it was impossible 
to close and landscape the street without the possibility of claims of “injurious affection,” 
spurious or not. 
The danger of liability was also brought home by ongoing conflict over 
pedestrianization in New York City. In 1970, the vice-chairman of Simpson’s wrote to the 
city warning them of the potential legal consequences of pedestrian malls. He enclosed a 
clipping from the New York Times describing backlash from area businesses to Mayor 
Lindsay’s temporary closures of Fifth Avenue—the unspoken implication was that Simpson’s 
could organize similar opposition.272 A few years later, legal staff directed the city’s 
attention to a legal action recently launched in New York City. Lindsay’s temporary 
closures—this time of Madison Avenue, with a view towards a future permanent mall—had 
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once again brought vocal protests by merchants. More than one hundred retailers on and 
around Madison Avenue had brought suit against the city, claiming that Lindsay’s 
experiments in pedestrianizing the street were transforming it into “a commercial disaster 
area.”273  
By 1973-74, the city’s position was that the mall could not function without 
indemnity against damages. In correspondence with the province, Mayor Crombie warned 
that lack of such legislation “could open a Pandora’s box”:  
a few merchants who for a variety of reasons have opposed the mall might 
seize on the opportunity afforded them [to] harass the City with lengthy 
litigation. Unfortunately, the possibility of a series of such lawsuits would 
probably amount to the demise of the mall.274 
This was not a problem so long as the Davis government supported the mall. For the first 
three years of the project, the province had supplied the annual enabling legislation. 
Questions had been raised in the legislature, however, about Ontario’s ongoing role in the 
experiment. Why, asked a member of the opposition, was the province “exercising the 
powers of a municipal council” with its annual bill, instead of empowering Toronto and 
Metro to manage the legalities of the project itself?275 Closing Yonge was a municipal 
decision, and the municipality should bear any consequences.  
In fact the Davis government was coming around to the same viewpoint. Early in 
1973, in a personal letter to William Archer, the premier expressed his “interest in the 
success of this project,” suggesting that permanent mall legislation was the best way 
forward. But that draft legislation, which included indemnity against damages, was shelved 
at Archer’s behest; citing the recent legal challenge in New York, he argued that the city was 
“not quite ready” for permanent mall legislation.276 Additionally, he wanted time to prepare 
appropriate provisions for dealing with some of the control problems—especially 
pamphleteering—experienced on the mall during the past two summers. However, by early 
1974 the province’s stance had changed: it would no longer provide the city with indemnity 
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against damages, or give the city powers to limit the distribution of handbills on the mall. 
According to the minister responsible for intergovernmental affairs, John White, this was a 
cabinet decision based not on any objection to the mall, but on concern that “Metropolitan 
Council should assume total responsibility for its actions,” and that “a municipality should 
not be empowered to interfere with freedom of speech.”277 Following a flurry of 
correspondence and meetings, the province agreed to pass an enabling bill for that year’s 
mall—forcing a late opening—but warned that it was the last.  
Toronto politicians favouring the mall felt betrayed by the province’s decision. Of 
course, the legal basis for denying the provision controlling handbills was strong: as Metro 
Chairman Paul Godfrey noted, there were “serious constitutional issues” with the bylaw.278 
In late 1973 the Deputy Attorney General of Ontario reported to the cabinet that while the 
province could theoretically empower the city to restrict distribution of printed material, 
application of that power would be almost impossible given precedents protecting freedom 
of expression in a range of areas: religious, political, intellectual, news.279 Similar attempts 
by municipalities to interfere with the selling or distribution of newspapers and other 
printed materials—for example, Vancouver Mayor Tom Campbell’s crusade against 
countercultural newspaper the Georgia Straight—had been quashed by courts in recent 
years.280 But in the case of indemnity against damages, the case was murkier. On the one 
hand, it seemed somewhat undemocratic to exempt a municipality from a law—the 
Expropriation Act—recently redesigned to strengthen citizen power in the face of 
government action. Both Oakville and Niagara Falls, eager to establish their own malls, had 
been recently denied similar legislation.281 Yet there were precedents: the establishment of 
Ottawa’s Sparks Street mall in 1965 had included a provision of indemnity, and more 
recently so had the Village of Wasaga Beach Act (1972). 
Several factors seem to have influenced the Davis cabinet’s withdrawal of support 
for the Yonge Street mall. Earlier debates over the project had raised the question of local 
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responsibility and autonomy, a constant theme in 1970s provincial-municipal relations, as it 
is today.282 By early 1974, in addition to striking down attempts to control handbills or other 
literature on the mall, cabinet seemed to be moving away from support for continuing the 
closures on that basis.283 More broadly, however, it is also worth remembering the example 
of the Spadina Expressway. In 1971 the newly elected Davis acted unilaterally to cancel the 
project, effectively ignoring its approval by local government. That was a bold statement not 
just about planning priorities—people over cars—but also about responsiveness to the large 
section of the public actively protesting the freeway. Certainly it was widely seen at the 
time, as it is now, as “a victory for citizen participation,” with a bit of political calculation—
the security of Tory seats in central Toronto—thrown in.284 Davis’ refusal of legislation for 
the Yonge Street pedestrian mall certainly did not make headlines in the same way, but was 
likely influenced by the same attention to public opinion and future electoral fortunes. If 
early on it made sense to offer what the province considered a legal exception for Toronto’s 
wildly popular mall, once it was a subject of controversy overt provincial involvement was 
simply bad politics.  
A permanent mall? 
At the end of August 1974, the Toronto Star published a series of letters on the Yonge Street 
mall, now two weeks gone. Several pointed out—somewhat sarcastically—that while Yonge 
was once again open to cars, that change had hardly been an instant solution to the 
problems ascribed to the closure. 
Noise, youngsters bumming around, drunks, prostitution, the drug scene, 
the handing out of pamphlets…the mall enlarged these problems but 
certainly did not create them.285 
In fact, 1974 was only the beginning of the city’s attempts to come to grips with what an 
increasing number of people saw as the transformation of Yonge Street into Toronto’s own 
sleazy “Times Square.”286 Over the next few years it became clear just how complex a 
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process that was, one in which the pedestrian streets of 1971 to 1974 played only a small 
part. The mall was not the source of downtown Toronto’s problems—but nor, the last four 
years of experimentation seemed to have demonstrated, was it the solution.   
Over the next few years, discussion of downtown pedestrian malls continued. 
Increasingly, the conversation about making Yonge more pedestrian-friendly focused on 
permanent improvements, integrated into the new plan for the core area being developed 
for the city. But without the daily drama and conflicting interests that characterized the 
experimental summer malls, the subject did not capture the public interest in the same way. 
Nor did it lead to any concrete action, despite a range of city officials’ commitment to the 
idea.  
In November 1974 the City People, a group of young planners hired to research the 
project and the possibility of a permanent mall submitted their final report.287 Ranging over 
issues from policing to legislation, the document is the most detailed study of the Yonge 
Street pedestrian malls. Although there was little in it that was truly new, it was effective in 
setting a framework for discussion because it combined, for the first time, arguments for 
and against the mall, and studies to back them up, in a single, readable package. The 
authors urged the city to create a permanent mall on Yonge, citing downtown’s high levels 
of pollution and “acute shortage of open space,” and the threat posed to street-level retail 
on Yonge from competition and rising land values. A mall, they argued, remains the only 
financially viable way to both create open space and “strengthen and preserve Yonge 
Street’s unique ‘Main Street’ retail character.”288 Like others before them they attempted to 
ground their conclusions in an appeal to public opinion: a survey of 2000 mallgoers—with an 
88% approval rate—was used to demonstrate popular support, and the 78% of merchants 
who approved of the “concept of a mall” to show future potential.289  
The City People report really said nothing new; in fact, in its arguments for the mall, 
it echoed what planners and citizen urbanists had been saying about pedestrianization for 
nearly a decade. The crucial difference between the mid-1970s and 1963—when the Plan 
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for Downtown Toronto first introduced the idea of a mall on Yonge—was that the ideas 
animating their report were now the accepted wisdom at City Hall. That the core should be 
people-friendly, that public space should be a key consideration, and that pedestrian 
infrastructure was a path to both those ends: these concepts were no longer at the fringe of 
planning in Toronto, but its very centre. That had been made clear in the first few months of 
1973, when the newly elected city council appointed a citizen task force to work on 
downtown congestion issues. Quickly, the Core Area Task Force acquired a broad mandate 
to make recommendations not just on transportation, but on land use, environmental 
issues, and a range of other subjects.290 Composed of citizen groups (many allied to the 
reform movement), chaired by a reform councillor—Colin Vaughan—and able to direct the 
resources of the Toronto planning department, the task force became the main inspiration 
for a new Central Area Plan (1976) that brought reformist ideas about city building to the 
heart of planning in the city.291    
The Core Area Task Force presented the city with a patchwork of pedestrian-friendly 
ideas, ranging from wider pavement allowances to the installation of moving sidewalks 
connecting the core and the waterfront. Surprisingly, its members had little to say about 
pedestrian malls—perhaps because the discussion was already happening at the highest 
levels—but what they did say was positive.292 In that context, the City People’s proposal for 
a permanent mall on Yonge seemed to come at the perfect time, despite ambivalence 
engendered by the temporary closures. Even in 1974, city officials concerned with 
improving Yonge were inclined to think that the summer malls were not a failure; rather, 
they were improperly implemented, and with the right changes to approach and technique 
could be made to work. In fact, some still thought Yonge could be the site of “the most 
attractive and best administered mall in the country.”293  
What would that ideal permanent mall look like? The bulk of suggested changes 
were in two areas: legislation/enforcement and design. In the case of the former, nothing 
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truly innovative was proposed: the problems of provincial legislation and the dubious 
legality of prohibitions on panhandling and leafletting remained. The City People further 
suggested that the Metro Police form a special “mall patrol unit” of officers trained to 
operate on foot. Their main design idea was to divide the permanent mall into two sections, 
north and south, with the section between Gerrard and Dundas being a “semi-mall,” with a 
traffic lane open in each direction. This was very much in keeping with the changing 
practices of mall planning in North America: by the mid-1970s many cities were concerned 
that pedestrian areas were isolated from surrounding streets or inaccessible by public 
transit. In order to mediate those concerns, malls were hybridized to include one or two 
lanes of traffic or transit.294 In the case of the Yonge Street strip the concern was less about 
circulation, and more about control: a steady but slow flow of traffic would prevent build-up 
of crowds and give police vehicles easier access to the area. South of Dundas to Wellington, 
the street would resemble the full closures of previous summers: pedestrian-only with east-
west crossings open to traffic. The closure would be implemented incrementally, beginning 
with the southernmost stretch, in effect following the pattern set by William Archer in 
1971.295 
Whatever the appeal of these ideas to politicians and city officials, the Downtown 
Council did not seem convinced. They expressed exasperation with the city’s lack of 
coordination and wavering commitment to not just consulting with, but actually listening to, 
Yonge merchants, in their view the most important stakeholder in discussion of the street’s 
future. In a scathing deputation to council and, later, a more measured official submission, 
the Downtown Council made it clear that its stance on pedestrian closures had not changed. 
While smaller malls on side streets could be considered, they thought a new closure of 
Yonge Street would add to their problems. Their first priority, they explained, was the long-
discussed clean-up of the sex industry, and that a mall was only possible “[i]f and when 
Yonge Street’s problems are ironed out.”296  
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That comment proved prescient. In spring 1975, after reading the City People report 
and official responses to it, Toronto Council established a Yonge Corridor Improvement 
Committee, composed of merchants, citizen groups, and city representatives, with a broad 
mandate to create plans to improve and revitalize the street. In its expansive terms of 
reference it resembled nothing so much as a miniature Core Area Task Force dedicated to 
one thoroughfare.297 The committee’s well-intentioned efforts to build consensus for street 
improvements continually foundered. Members discussed a range of ideas, including plans 
for the closure of tiny east-west Dundas Square to create a permanent marketplace for 
street vendors.298 But there was internal dissent: it took some time to convince merchant 
representatives that the committee was not in fact dedicated to convincing them to accept 
a permanent Yonge Street mall.299 More broadly, everything the committee did was 
overshadowed or side-tracked by the larger issues being debated in reference to Yonge, and 
in particular the sex industry and the Eaton Centre development, by then rapidly nearing 
completion.  
Conclusion 
For a few years, the idea of pedestrian malls promised to transform Yonge Street, and 
Toronto’s downtown. In the 1950s and 1960s they were a second-tier planning idea, 
endorsed in principle but rarely given attention by a development-oriented city 
government. But in the context of growing popular interest in fighting pollution and 
planning centred on people—not cars—the persistent calls of small businesses on Yonge for 
a public revitalization effort were heeded, and channeled into a bold experiment in opening 
the street to pedestrians. In the context of citizen opposition to the Spadina Expressway, 
and growing support for the municipal reform movement, the mall came to symbolize a 
positive vision of the city many wanted Toronto to be: a “people place,” a better version of 
the faltering or fallen downtowns of cities like Detroit, Buffalo, or even New York. It was also 
seen as a path to revitalizing and preserving Yonge Street’s dense, early twentieth-century 
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retail streetscape, threatened by redevelopment, rising rents, and growing competition 
from suburban shopping.   
After the success of the first mall in 1971, the project expanded, closing the street to 
cars for longer periods each year, and growing to include not just the respectable shopping 
area near Queen, but the entertainment-oriented (and increasingly disreputable) section of 
Yonge from Dundas to Gerrard. The mall became a fixture of downtown life, providing both 
Toronto residents and visitors with a new kind of public space, space that was used both in 
familiar and new ways. Mallgoers were treated to a spectacle that included all the 
possibilities and problems of downtown life, from the mundane to the bizarre, as well as the 
concerted attempts by area merchants to demonstrate and inspire pride in the street 
through entertainment. Torontonians voted with their feet in favour of the experiment, 
filling the street with crowds and reinforcing the unpredictable, somewhat transgressive 
atmosphere of the whole project. People supported the mall for a range of sometimes 
conflicting reasons: because it was good for business, provided new public space for all to 
use, was exciting, brought families back downtown. Many observers were certain its 
appearance marked a watershed in the city’s development. 
The Yonge Street mall promised to help the city’s increasingly suburban population 
rediscover the joys of shopping and strolling Main Street. In that respect, it was part of a 
larger wave of interest in revitalization through pedestrian space occurring in cities across 
the continent. Other urban centres, particularly in Canada, paid close attention to the 
fortunes of the Yonge Street mall. Yet while the mall was successful at bringing people 
downtown—Yonge rarely lacked crowds, with or without the mall—organizers proved 
unable to control just what version of “downtown” they experienced. Carefully design 
treatments aimed at producing a safe, “free and easy,” or family atmosphere on the mall 
met resistance from the wide variety of people and uses that populated the space. Young 
people, whether locals or transients, found it a cheap and exciting place to meet, investing 
the space with a youthful, sometimes rebellious, feel. Street vendors, panhandlers, 
evangelists, and prostitutes saw the street’s crowds as a unique opportunity to do business.  
From 1972 onwards the mall was increasingly caught up in discussions of sex 
industry on Yonge Street. Body rub parlours, adult cinemas, and strip shows all benefited 
from the concentration of potential customers on the mall; they also fed opposition to the 
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scheme. Perhaps more damning was the assertion by police in 1973 that the mall was an 
“orgy of lawlessness,” where officers were barely able to contain youth rowdyism and 
disorder. Rising crime rates and societal anxiety surrounding the category of youth made the 
teenagers and twenty-somethings attracted to Yonge seem a further threat to its character. 
This was heightened given that the mall coincided with the summer season, when warm 
temperatures and a break from school encouraged hitchhiking and gathering and lingering 
in public spaces. People began to ask if the pedestrian mall was helping the street—or 
hastening its decline. 
By 1974 enthusiasm for the experiment had waned. The Yonge pedestrian mall no 
longer seemed so much a symbol of the promise of the future as a reminder of the 
problems of the present. The citizen urbanists and reformers who had supported it early on 
now found themselves in power at City Hall, and were channelling their energies towards 
larger issues, including community planning and controls on private development. Malls 
were seen as an important concept—and a component of their new vision of downtown—
but not a practical means of transforming the city. With provincial support withdrawn and 
Yonge Street merchants increasingly discontent with the scheme, temporary closures were 
halted. The idea of a permanent pedestrian street, very much in line with the new planning 
philosophy taking shape in Toronto, continued to be discussed, but without any real hope of 
implementation.  
This was in some ways predictable. In the 1960s and 1970s city after city in North 
America, from Fresno to Montréal, had placed isolated pedestrian zones in the heart of their 
cities. Victor Gruen, widely referred to as the “father of the pedestrian mall,” had warned as 
early as 1964 that 
Introducing one pedestrian mall into a city core area without taking the 
necessary steps to improve circulation and provide automobile storage 
space, only serves to multiply [downtown] troubles instead of eliminating 
them.300 
Cities that shut traffic out of downtown streets without changing the larger traffic system all 
shared this risk. Modernist to the core, Gruen believed that pedestrian zones could only 
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thrive in the context of a comprehensively planned city centre. That kind of planning 
opportunity was rare. Certainly it was never a possibility in fiscally conservative, densely 
developed Toronto, either in the heady days of modernist planning or the years of municipal 
reform; nor was it an option in most North American cities. This placed North American 
pedestrian malls in a vulnerable position, as isolated pockets of pedestrian-only space in 
street grids dominated by the automobile.  
The temporary malls that opened Yonge to foot traffic from 1971-74 did not lead to 
a permanent closure, but they certainly had an impact on the city. First, much like the 
Spadina Expressway debates, they put into stark relief the differing priorities that Toronto 
and Metro Toronto had for the core. Metro, speaking on behalf of the wider urban region, 
believed that Yonge Street should play the role of arterial thoroughfare, part of a larger, 
rationalized grid of streets that would provide crucial support to the expressway system. 
This was all the more important in the wake of the cancellation of the Spadina route into 
downtown. Meanwhile, Toronto saw the core primarily as a place for people, and 
considered its first priority when dealing with Yonge the preservation of its character as a 
Main Street shopping area. That was particularly clear after the 1972 election of a majority-
reform government; but the same vision of downtown is apparent in planning circles 
throughout the 1960s.  
Intergovernmental relations affected the experiment in another way. In Canada 
cities lack constitutional standing, relying instead on provincial law for their limited powers. 
This became particularly clear in the debates over both the Spadina Expressway and the 
pedestrian mall, as the province in each case bypassed both levels of municipal government 
to make its own judgement as to what was in the public interest. In a way, those two 
provincial interventions bookend Toronto’s ambitious pedestrianization experiment. Of 
course, in both cases it was easier for the province to act without offending democratic 
sensibilities when Metro and Toronto were unable to speak with a unified voice.  
Second, the summer malls brought new attention to Yonge Street, both positive and 
negative. The attraction of a car-free summer stroll precipitated a rediscovery of the street 
by the Toronto public, a number of whom normally visited the downtown core only 
occasionally. Many loved the experience, and found both the street and the mall attractions 
they could be proud of. Others expressed shock and dismay at what they saw as the 
117 
 
advanced state of Yonge’s problems, including most notably commercialized sex, and the 
undesirable clientele it seemed to attract. This was picked up in the press, and became an 
important issue in the 1972 municipal election. As the next section of this thesis describes, 
the mall was a key factor in making the condition of Yonge Street one of the most talked 
about issues in Toronto by 1973.   
Finally, the pedestrian malls reaffirmed the city’s desire for public space, and its 
appreciation of small-scale disruption of normally rigidly separated streets. People enjoyed 
the Yonge Street mall, and even as criticism mounted continued to flock there in large 
numbers. The most successful aspects of the experiment began to be duplicated across the 
city: if in 1971 there were only two outdoor cafés serving beer in the city—both on the 
mall—by 1974 there were 60 across Metro.301 Meanwhile street closures, hardly ever 
attempted on major streets before the 1970s, slowly started to become a typical feature of 
Toronto summers, as the mall concept was put into action in neighbourhoods across the city 
by business improvement associations, residents’ groups, and ethnic cultural organizations. 
In the 2010s, there are more than 300 such closures for parades and community events 
each year, and on most summer weekends multiple miniature malls attract the same dense 
crowds as Yonge Street did four decades ago. If after 1974 Toronto could no longer come to 
the mall, to a certain extent, the mall still came to Toronto.  
  
                                                  
301 “Outdoor drinking and dining spots blossom in warm summer sun,” Toronto Star, Jun. 29, 1974. 
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2. Toronto the Good?: Vice and Virtue on the Yonge Street Strip 
 
I take a walk along Yonge Street 
Good times are bought and sold 
̶ “Long, long time to get old,” Ian Tyson (1970) 
 
Toronto’s summer pedestrianization experiments focused public attention as never before 
on Yonge Street’s entertainment scene, once again in evolution to keep pace with changing 
tastes and economic circumstances. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the stretch of 
Yonge Street between Gerrard and Dundas became the epicentre of Toronto’s booming sex 
industry. In response to liberalizing sexual mores, the availability of high-traffic rental 
spaces, and consumer demand, entrepreneurs selling sex in a variety of forms set up shop in 
the area. By 1972 adult bookstores, peep shows, strip clubs and body rub parlours dotted 
block after block of Yonge. The area, already well-known for its bright lights, became 
nationally (in)famous for its public embrace of commercial sexual entertainment. Observers 
coined a new name for it, building on the old: Sin Strip. Musicians, filmmakers, and poets 
used it as a backdrop for hard luck stories and explorations of inner-city life. Meanwhile, in 
response to citizen activism and concerns about urban decay, Toronto politicians labelled 
Sin Strip a problem area and attempted to mobilize political support to clean up or renew 
the area. 
This chapter traces the short but widely publicized life of Sin Strip, a product of 
1960s permissiveness and Toronto’s development boom that disappeared amid a wave of 
conservative reaction in the late 1970s. Through journalistic accounts, the comments of 
prominent citizens, and their own personal experience of the street, Torontonians quickly 
came to love (or love to hate) Sin Strip. By 1972 ongoing discussions about the future of 
Toronto’s downtown inevitably featured comment on the state of Yonge, whether it 
merited being cleaned up, and why. Over the next four years Torontonians debated what 
should—or could—be done about the perceived problem. Citizens mobilized through 
churches, communities, and as individuals to pressure the city to act. Their activism on the 
issue was just part of a larger conservative reaction to the loosening of laws and public 
attitudes towards sex, alcohol, and other perceived vices: they felt the liberal 1960s had 
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gone too far. Sin Strip provided a place where these more abstract concerns about social 
change could be localized and rooted in place. Despite the fact that the criminal law was a 
federal responsibility, opponents of the sex industry targeted the municipal government 
because they saw it as both more accessible and more responsive to citizen activism.  
Others were critical of proposals to regulate the sex industry, questioning whether 
the authorities had a right to legislate morality and asserting their right to a free market in 
sexual entertainment. In an era when citizen participation and local democracy were 
considered cornerstones of the new municipal politics, both opponents and defenders of Sin 
Strip deployed notions of democratic good and citizens’ rights to bolster their arguments. In 
newspapers and letters to elected officials, these two groups of citizen activists raised 
important questions about public morality, censorship vs. liberty of expression, and the role 
of local government. They also affirmed the special importance of Yonge—Toronto’s Main 
Street—to their understandings of the city. Both sides saw downtown Yonge as one of 
Toronto’s most important public spaces, with a key role to play in its identity and future.  
Starting in 1973, a consensus began to build both in Toronto and Metro Toronto 
Council that something had to be done about Sin Strip. A group of enterprising pro-clean-up 
politicians at both levels of government began to look for policy tools they could use to 
regulate the sex industry, and tried to further rally public opinion to their side. Body rub 
parlours—which many saw simply as fronts for prostitution—were singled out as the first 
targets of any clean-up campaign. From the start, the goals of containing or eliminating 
commercialized sex and revitalizing the neighbourhood were tightly bound together: 
shutting down Sin Strip was seen as a necessary condition of arresting downtown decline.  
But the powers of both the city and metropolitan government were limited, and the 
police consistently argued that they lacked the resources and judicial support to act 
effectively. In this context, the various solutions proposed to the Yonge Street “problem” 
were largely ineffective. This would change in the summer of 1977, as two significant 
events—the publication of a city report attacking the sex industry and the highly-publicized 
murder of 12-year-old shoeshine boy Emanuel Jaques—created massive public support for 
action. Proponents of a clean-up took advantage of the opportunity to orchestrate a large-
scale crackdown on Yonge that drove many of its sex shops out of business. By the end of 
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1977, they were declaring a victory on Yonge, and already planning the next steps in an 
ambitious revitalization plan.  
This is the first history of Sin Strip. While the issue inspired massive media coverage 
and analysis at the time, scholars have written almost nothing about it since.1 A 1981 MA 
thesis by Yvonne Ng describes how media, notably the Toronto Star and Toronto Sun, turned 
Yonge Street’s burgeoning sex industry into spectacle with exposés, lurid photos, and 
outraged editorials.2 This contributed, she argues, to a wave of moral panic that swept 
Toronto following the murder of Emanuel Jaques in 1977. Public outrage was harnessed to 
crack down on the area’s sex workers and shops; it also provided support for a larger 
nationwide campaign against pornography. This understanding is echoed in the work of 
scholar of prostitution Deborah Brock.3 Since it originated in the 1970s, the theory of moral 
panic has often been used to understand the anxieties surrounding youth culture, 
prostitution and perceived sexual deviance, or drug use.4 In an episode of moral panic, 
public concern about a perceived social problem becomes disproportionate through the 
intervention of “moral entrepreneurs,” interest groups and the media, often resulting in a 
repressive response from the state.  
Aspects of this account help us understand what happened on Yonge Street in the 
1970s. But there is more to the story. In this chapter I draw on a wide range of sources to 
recreate the debates surrounding Sin Strip in the 1970s and track how they influenced 
government policy. Like Ng and Brock, I underline the influential role played by the media in 
the debate. And the story of Sin Strip features no shortage of would-be moral entrepreneurs 
or incidents of disproportionate state response to the perceived problem. But focusing on 
the language of moral condemnation often applied to the sex industry, and supposing a 
                                                  
1 See for example Robert Miles, “Mean Streets: The wages of sin is backlash,” Maclean’s, Sep. 5, 1977. 
Numerous other citations follow in the text. 
2 Yvonne Chi-Ying Ng, “Ideology, Media, and Moral Panics: An Analysis of the Jaques Murder” (Criminology 
Masters Thesis, University of Toronto, 1981).  
3 Deborah Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble: Prostitution as a Social Problem (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998), esp. 25-43. 
4 The concept was first explored in detail in Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (London: MacGibbon 
and Kee, 1971). For more recent examples of its application to Canadian history see Catherine Carstairs, Jailed 
for Possession: Illegal Drug Use, Regulation, and Power in Canada, 1920-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2006), ch. 1.    
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direct link from that rhetoric to state repression, ignores both the nuances and 
contradictions of public debate, and the complexities of the operation of the local state.  
It also risks de-historicizing the episode by removing it from its spatial context. The 
Yonge Street strip was one of the most significant public spaces in Toronto in the 1970s, 
both through the multiple ways it was used by a broad cross-section of the population, and 
by its ubiquity in the arts and representations of the city’s identity. Throughout this chapter 
I stress the special symbolic value of the area, a factor that made the debate over the sex 
industry about much more than moral concerns. It was also about the management of 
public space and its different uses, in a place where any change was viewed as impacting 
not just the street, but the city as a whole. As such, Yonge Street was a space which was 
both subject to powerful behavioural norms and the ideal place to perform transgression of 
them. There is much to be gained by looking at Yonge in its context as a key site in the 
downtown of a changing metropolis; equally, study of this single site allows us to better 
understand the city growing and changing around it in the 1970s. The rise of the suburbs, 
the development boom, the sexual revolution, social conservatism, reformist municipal 
politics, and fear of urban decay; all of these larger themes are present in the four or five 
block microcosm of the Yonge Street strip.  
Sin Strip was an intensely local problem, anchored to a specific and well-known 
place. But it was also inevitably influenced by larger national and cultural issues. It appeared 
and operated in the legal grey area created by the new attitudes towards sex and sexual 
expression that developed in North America in the 1950s and 1960s, on a downtown 
commercial strip that was slowly being transformed by downtown redevelopment. The 
same patterns were at work in Vancouver’s gentrifying West End and on Montreal’s iconic 
rue Saint-Catherine.5 Citizens’ responses to Yonge were shaped by their understandings of 
larger urban issues. To some the area’s excitement and action identified Toronto as a great 
North American city. For others, the sex industry was harbinger of urban decay, crime, or 
Americanization, just the latest in a series of victories for the “permissive society” that were 
unravelling the social fabric. Both opponents and defenders of Sin Strip justified their 
                                                  
5 See Daniel Francis, Red Light Neon: A History of Vancouver’s Sex Trade (Vancouver: Subway Books, 2006) and 
Danielle Lacasse, La prostitution feminine à Montréal, 1945-70 (Montreal: Boréal, 1994).   
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opinions with appeals to democracy, their right to enjoy or use public space, and the central 
place of Yonge Street to Toronto’s identity. Similar discussions were happening across 
Canada, as municipal authorities under pressure from local residents attempted to use their 
limited powers to fill in perceived gaps created by the recent loosening of the Criminal 
Code.6 Throughout North America, in fact, cities from Winnipeg to New York were grappling 
with their own “erogenous zones,” and their efforts would serve as reference points for 
people in Toronto.7  
Toronto the Good?  
There has been a market for sex in Toronto since its earliest days as a city. That fact became 
an issue of public concern during the social purity campaigns of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, as reformers and their critics investigated and debated the issue 
of prostitution in the city.8 In 1898, social observer C.S. Clark wrote an ironic commentary 
on local social mores entitled Toronto the Good, playing on the city’s recently acquired 
nickname. In that book, Clark observed that the city—which then had a population of 
200,000—had dozens of “houses of ill-fame” where men could discreetly pay for sex.9 He 
described streetwalkers as a regular feature of downtown street life: 
At nights any time after eight o’clock in the summer, and from seven in the 
winter these girls pass up and down Yonge street and along Queen west … 
[and] make themselves conspicuous.10 
In 1915, Toronto followed the lead of cities like New York in empowering a commission to 
take a full survey of immorality in the city. Its report identified, among other problems, a 
burgeoning number of massage parlours offering “abominable and unspeakable” services, 
                                                  
6 Deborah Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble: Prostitution as a Social Problem (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998) explores the late 1970s and early 1980s construction of prostitution as a social problem 
across Canada. See also Francis on Vancouver. 
7 I am indebted to James Clapp for the term. Clapp, “‘X’ Marks the Spot: The Problem of the Erogenous Zone in 
the American City,” Revue française d’études américaines, 36 (1988), 225-34. 
8 See Carolyn Strange, Toronto’s Girl Problem: The Perils and Pleasures of the City, 1880-1930 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995). 
9 C.S. Clark, Toronto the Good: The Queen City of Canada as it is (Montreal: Toronto Publishing Company, 
1898), 86-92. 
10 Ibid., 134. 
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which, as Alan Hunt has observed, may have been coded language for oral sex.11 
Meanwhile, even as increasing censorship controls made seeing erotic or explicit films 
nearly impossible, sex guides and pornographic images circulated discreetly at all levels of 
society.12 And from the 1930s onwards striptease and burlesque were a minor but well-
known part of Toronto’s live entertainment scene. Men lined up in the evening to see both 
local and touring dancers perform theatrical numbers at venues like the Casino Theatre on 
Queen Street, the Lux on College, and Spadina’s Victory Burlesque.13 
There was something fundamentally different about Yonge Street in the 1960s and 
1970s, however. The postwar sex industry was both larger in scale and much bolder in tone 
than anything that had existed previously. Rather than keeping to back streets and hotel 
bars, there it was concentrated on just a few blocks for everyone to see. Bright neon and 
signage advertised “Topless girls,” “Sex aids,” or “Nude massages.” Touts patrolled the 
sidewalk in front of strip clubs, and women sat in the doorways of body rub parlours calling 
out to prospective clients. There was little that authorities could do to limit this activity, and 
Yonge’s sex entrepreneurs knew it.    
Sexual revolution 
Toronto was by no means the only place where this was happening. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
sex-related businesses were proliferating in cities across North America. Rather than 
consciously avoiding the attention of the public (and the authorities) as they had since at 
least the early 1900s, they were instead opening up in downtown areas where foot traffic 
and visibility were highest. Perhaps the most famous was the area around Times Square and 
Forty-Second Street in New York—sometimes referred to as “the Dangerous Deuce”—but 
cities from San Francisco to Montreal also had their own districts where locals and visitors 
                                                  
11 Toronto Social Survey Commission, Report of the Social Survey Commission (Toronto: Carswell, 1915), 17; 
Alan Hunt, “Measuring Morals: The Beginnings of the Social Survey Movement in Canada, 1913-1917,” Social 
History/Histoire sociale, 35:69 (2002), 188n62. 
12 The Ontario Theatres and Cinematographs Act (1911) established a board of censors and set strict controls 
on the exhibition of films in the province.  
13 Deborah Clipperton, “Work, Sex, or Theatre? A Brief History of Toronto Strippers and Sex Work Identity,” 
Emily van der Meulen, Elya Durisin, Victoria Love, eds., Selling Sex: Experience, Advocacy, and Research on Sex 
Work in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 30-31. 
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could see “the sexual revolution writ large on the urban landscape,” often in unmistakeable 
neon signage.14    
As the term “sexual revolution” suggests, this was a period in which sexual values 
were in flux.15 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, if not earlier, a social 
consensus had developed in North America that placed the monogamous, heterosexual 
marriage—preferably with children—at the centre of gender relations and society. The law, 
social convention, and religion all acted to confirm the idea that deviations from this norm 
were immoral, dangerous, and, in the case of homosexuality, criminal. In the 1960s and 
1970s this consensus, always crumbling at the edges, fell apart. In its quest for self-
fulfilment and liberation, the baby boom generation—and women in particular—rejected 
the assumption of premarital chastity and domesticity, and to a certain extent the stigma 
attached to sexual expression. Men and women could still marry, and did in great numbers; 
but they wanted to do so on their own terms, and women wanted above all to control 
when—and if—they had children. Naturally, sexual liberation was closely tied to the political 
struggles for women’s, and later, gay rights.  
Not just young people, but society at large re-evaluated its attitude towards sexual 
expression. There was a growing public awareness that reading or watching pornography 
was not necessarily harmful; in fact it could be just another expression of a healthy sexual 
appetite. Between 1965 and 1975, legal controls on pornography in both Canada and the 
United States relaxed as judges applied this new community standard to individual cases.16 
Explicit materials—especially gay pornography—continued to be seized, but overall, 
prosecution for obscenity became more difficult and hence rarer. This was certainly the case 
in Ontario at the time that Sin Strip began to develop on Yonge Street. Likewise, the law on 
prostitution and homosexuality changed, although not to the same extent. In 1968 and 1972 
amendments to the Canadian Criminal Code decriminalized homosexual acts (between two 
adults in private, at least) and removed the offence of being a “common prostitute or night 
                                                  
14 Josh Sides, “Excavating the Postwar Sex District in San Francisco,” Journal of Urban History, 32:3 (2006), 356. 
15 One of the best guides to the complex issue of the sexual revolution is Beth Bailey, in Sex in the Heartland 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1999). For Canada see Doug Owram, Born at the Right Time: A History of the 
Baby Boom Generation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), esp. 248-79.  
16 See Christopher Nowlin, Judging Obscenity: A Critical History of Expert Evidence (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2003), esp. 47-132, and Dany Lacombe, Blue Politics: Pornography and the Law in the Age of 
Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 21-25. 
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walker,” otherwise known as Vagrancy C.17 All of these changes occurred in the context of a 
national discussion about sexual morality, censorship, and freedom of expression that took 
shape in every type of media and nearly every community.18 
As both attitudes towards sex and the laws regulating it changed, demand for adult 
entertainment and sex-related products increased. Shops selling sexual aids and promoting 
healthy sexual experimentation popped up in big-city neighbourhoods, and “dirty” books 
and magazines began to appear in both specialty shops and more unexpected places, like 
bookstores and supermarket shelves. In the context of the 1960s counterculture, there was 
something chic or hip about pornography, often precisely because it was transgressive. The 
nude female form became a staple of countercultural iconography, and from there spread 
into more mainstream media. Explicit sexuality was almost non-existent in the popular 
culture of the 1950s (although it was often implicit), but by the early 1970s it was 
everywhere. Older publications like Playboy (1953) became both more popular and more 
explicit as they competed with new offerings, from Penthouse (1969) to smaller, niche 
publications. In Canada, sales of adult magazines more than tripled over ten years, from 3.5 
million in 1965 to more than 13 million in 1975.19 Along with this new print subculture came 
a new model of masculinity: the Playboy bachelor, defined by his lack of attachments and 
appreciation of the finer things in life, including the guiltless pursuit of sexual pleasure. It 
was an ideal to be aspired to, more than an actual lifestyle. Consuming commercialized sex, 
in its various forms, was to some men an enticing liberation from the constraints of being 
identified primarily as a breadwinner or husband.20   
                                                  
17 On the limits of decriminalization of homosexuality in this period, see Tom Hooper, “‘More Than Two Is a 
Crowd’: Mononormativity and Gross Indecency in the Criminal Code, 1981-82,” Journal of Canadian Studies, 
48:1 (winter 2014). On vagrancy see Prashan Ranasinghe, “Reconceptualizing Vagrancy and Reconstructing the 
Vagrant: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Criminal Law Reform in Canada, 1953-1972,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 48 
(2010), 55-94.  
18 This sense of a period of vigorous debate over sex  is captured well in an episode of CBC’s Take 30 entitled 
“What is Smut?”, aired January 15, 1971 and available in the CBC online archives at 
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/discover/programs/t/take-30/what-is-smut.html.  
19 Lance W. Roberts, Rodney A. Clifton,  Barry Ferguson, Karen Kampen, Simon Langlois, eds., Recent Social 
Trends in Canada, 1960-2000 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 520.  
20 See Elizabeth Fraterrigo, Playboy and the Making of the Good Life in America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
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Both performance and film followed the trend. Topless dancing spread from San 
Francisco and other leading-edge cities to regional bars and small towns across the 
continent.21 Popular theatre productions like Hair brought full-frontal onstage nudity into 
the mainstream, first in New York (1968) and later on tour in Toronto (1969) and elsewhere. 
Meanwhile, both hard-core (depicting sex acts) and soft-core pornographic movies gained 
wider acceptance with higher production values, more coherent stories, and appeals to 
counterculture cool. The explicit film Deep Throat was one of the top fifty grossing films in 
the United States for nearly two years after its 1972 release, and was even reviewed in Time 
magazine, imparting the stamp of middle-class respectability.22 In Canada film censorship 
controls were generally stricter, but nonetheless, soft-core and (heavily) edited hard-core 
movies were available in theatrical release in major cities by the early 1970s. Young people, 
women, and curious older couples—people who would never have dreamt of joining the 
                                                  
21 See Sides, 355.  
22 Carolyn Bronstein, Battling Pornography: The American Feminist Anti-Pornography Movement, 1976-1986 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 63.  
Image 2.1: The east side of the Yonge Street entertainment strip by night, circa 1970-1972. 
City of Toronto Archives, 1465-312-49. 
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“raincoat brigade” in the past—were now flocking to see what one influential critic called 
“porno chic”.23  
Sin Strip 
With this confluence of changing sexual values, loosening legal strictures, and porno chic, 
the Yonge Street strip’s new orientation towards sex made sense, both culturally and 
economically. In the 1950s and 1960s the area was on the leading edge of entertainment in 
the city, well-known for its music scene, numerous movie theatres, and cosmopolitan 
cocktail lounges and bars. In this context, adult entertainment was just the latest in a series 
of innovations designed to keep both locals and visitors coming back on weekends and 
evenings. In fact, a number of the new sex-related businesses in the area were conversions 
that had been around in other forms for decades. In becoming Sin Strip, Yonge was in many 
ways just adapting itself to the times, as it always had.  
One of the first changes visible on the street was the conversion of a number of 
Yonge’s movie houses into “grindhouse” cinemas, showing cheap action, erotic, or 
exploitation movies continuously from the morning until late at night. Two of the best-
known were the Rio and the larger Biltmore, both located on Yonge between Dundas and 
College. Built to serve the streetcar city as destinations for popular entertainment, both 
were by the 1960s struggling to attract audiences in the face of newer, more modern 
competition in the neighbourhoods and suburbs. Their changeover was part of a North 
American trend of downtown movie theatres adapting to new competition through 
specialization.24 From the mid-1960s onwards, instead of offering more expensive new 
releases, they appealed to a younger crowd by “grinding out” niche films all day. For a few 
dollars, moviegoers could see a range of B-movies, second-run Hollywood films and soft-
core flicks: for example a double bill featuring Catch-22 and The Sweet Sins of Sexy Susan. 
Since they were open all day, these theatres were also a cheap and convenient way for 
people with nothing to do or nowhere to go to get inside for a few hours. Low prices meant 
little was spent on repairs; when the Toronto Sun noted that the Rio had an 18-inch hole in 
                                                  
23 Ralph Blumenthal, “Porno chic: “Hard-core” grows fashionable—and very profitable,” New York Times 
Magazine, Jan. 21, 1973.   
24 See Paul Moore, “Movie palaces on Canadian downtown main streets: Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver,” 
Urban History Review, 32:2 (2004), 3-20.  
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the screen and a section of the seating roped off for fear of a collapsing roof, it was 
describing a general trend of declining theatre interiors.25  
It was a small step from B-movies and erotica to further specialization. The strip’s 
first entirely adult cinema, Cinema 2000, opened in 1969 at Yonge just north of Dundas. It 
advertised itself as “North America’s first commercial video-tape cinema,” and used 
gimmicks like free showings of sex movies to gain publicity and test the boundaries of 
Canada’s weakening obscenity laws.26 Within a few years Cinema 2000 was joined by 
several others, and by the mid-1970s there were nine sex cinemas on Yonge.27 Each 
marketed itself in its own way. Eros One advertised “super erotic movies in exciting 
skinemascope,” while 21st Century Love Cinema, taking a more family-friendly angle, 
promised that “if our sex educational films do not improve your love life, enjoyment, and 
happiness in marriage we will refund your admission in full.”28 Along with Cinema 2000, 21st 
Century was one of the largest theatres, with a capacity of over 100 patrons. Smaller 
operations often had second or third-floor walk-up locations. One of these “mini-cinis”—the 
Pussy Cat—is described in the terse 1971 report of an Ontario Theatres Branch Inspector:  
Cini located on second floor [above] J.J.’s Discount Magazine Store. 
Admission price is $2 per adult—no tickets are issued. Seating for 29. 8mm 
operation with music from a tape player. Screen 40 by 60 inches.29 
On an even smaller scale, there were peep show booths. At the back of arcades and 
bookstores operators set up cubicles where patrons could enjoy sex movies in privacy. 
Typically these booths had a bench, a locking door, and a slot through which patrons could 
feed coins to keep the film rolling. A quarter bought a few minutes of time. Unlike the 
theatre-style sex cinemas, where enjoyment was partly derived from the transgressive act 
of watching sex with strangers, in these cubicles men had an intensely private experience. 
They closed the door, chose a genre and a film, and masturbated alone. The protocol at 
                                                  
25 Toronto Sun, Feb. 28, 1980. 
26 “Hundreds clamor to see nude film free,” Toronto Star, Mar. 4, 1970, “‘Vixen’ videotapes are seized by 
Toronto police,” Boxoffice, Mar. 2, 1970.  
27 “Morality Bureau to Metro Licensing Commission, July 7, 1975,” CTA, 103157-2. 
28 “Thrills for the have-nots at the Yonge Street sex cinemas,” Globe and Mail, Jan. 20, 1973; “21st Century Ad,” 
Toronto Sun, Feb. 21, 1973. 
29“Memo to Chief Inspector re: Pussy Cat”, AO, RG 56-9 B247549. 
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peep shows was—with some exceptions discussed later on—to tacitly ignore the existence 
of other customers.30   
All of these venues, small and large, promised that a $2 or $3 ticket (or the 
equivalent in quarters) would give patrons access to full, “totally uncensored adult films;” in 
practice this was true some, but not all, of the time. Until 1975, they were able to 
circumvent the Ontario Board of Censors by using uncut small-format 8-mm film or 
videotapes. But the threat of obscenity charges often led them to self-censor, cutting out 
sex acts and male nudity from their films. This sometimes meant that popular European or 
American releases shown in Toronto ran to half of their original length, losing any 
semblance of plot in the process. In the words of one reporter during a visit to the strip, on 
                                                  
30 Laurence Senelick, “Private Parts in Public Places,” in William R. Taylor, ed., Inventing Times Square: 
Commerce and Culture at the Crossroads of the World (New York: Russell Sage, 1991), 341.  
Image 2.2: Places of amusement. Funland arcade, on Yonge just north of Dundas Street, offers 
pinball and video games downstairs, and adult movies upstairs, 1973. Ron Bull/Toronto Star. 
Toronto Public Library Baldwin Collection, tspa_0115313f. 
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any given night offerings included “everything from feature-length skin flicks to grainy, slot-
machine teasers.”31  
Below or next door to these theatres, shops like Times Square Books and 2 by 4 
Poster Shop sold pornographic materials alongside souvenirs, postcards, niche art books and 
the latest paperbacks. Often adult magazines, movies and prints were displayed in a 
separate back room or upstairs section marked “Adults Only.” Peep show booths rounded 
out the possibilities. Like the sex cinemas, these businesses were on the front lines of the 
battle over the application of obscenity law. Frequent targets of raids by the Morality Squad 
until at least 1972, they revelled in the countercultural cachet that this gave them.32 An ad 
placed by four Yonge Street bookstores in alternative newspaper Guerilla stated simply “If 
you don’t want the Morality Squad reading over your shoulder, don’t browse in these 
bookstores.” In 1970, one shop sardonically offered a $1,000 prize for the best essay 
answering the question “Why Toronto does not need a Morality Squad.”33  
Another venerable Yonge Street institution, the tavern, adapted itself to stay 
relevant, switching over from more refined libations like cocktails to draft beer, and offering 
new entertainments aimed at a younger crowd. The female go-go dancer was a staple of 
rock and roll shows by the mid-1960s. At venues like Friar’s Tavern and the Coq d’Or, local 
and visiting bands were flanked by attractive young women dancing on two-by-two-foot 
raised platforms. The idea of go-go was so ubiquitous that even Eaton’s department store 
advertised women’s clothes with the exhortation to “Twist to the go-go rhythm!”34 Within a 
year or two dancers on Yonge were wearing shorts and pasties, and by 1969 they were 
often naked from the waist up. “Topless” became the buzzword of businesses up and down 
the strip as they competed against each other to lure in foot traffic. Bars like the Zanzibar 
Tavern advertised music performances, psychedelic light shows and continuous topless 
dancing, from noon until late at night.   
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Meanwhile, several strip clubs opened up promising full nudity, although they were 
initially limited by the Morality Squad’s insistence that dancers wear G-strings. Profits were 
also restricted by their inability to get liquor licenses until provincial law changed in 1973. 
Still, at places like Starvin’ Marvin’s, which opened in 1971, theatrical nudity was much 
easier to stage than it had been just a few years before. Burlesque dancers in the 1950s and 
1960s had been forced to follow a bewildering list of rules set by police and management to 
avoid obscenity charges. Those at the venerable Victory Burlesque on Spadina Avenue 
included wearing pasties and full underwear, not communicating with the audience, and not 
bumping props, lying down, or making “any body movements that in the eyes of the public 
would simulate an act of intercourse.”35 Few of these rules were being enforced by the 
1970s, making the strip scene on Yonge largely self-regulating. This meant the possibility of 
higher profits for owners, and to a lesser extent for dancers, who could expect to be paid 
more for performances. But it also led to pressure on dancers to be more and more explicit, 
to use props, and to encourage audience participation—some felt this was putting them in 
danger and ruining the profession.36 
“Look but don’t touch” was the mantra in strip clubs. But another type of business 
encouraged contact between employees and patrons—the body rub parlour. First appearing 
in 1971-2, these generally small, second- and third-floor operations became the most 
ubiquitous (and infamous) sex shops on Yonge. By 1974 police had documented 31 of them 
on Yonge, although they were opening, closing, and changing hands constantly.37 All 
promoted an endless number of variations on the massage, given by topless or nude 
attendants: body shampoos, saunas, body painting, and striptease, as well as more esoteric 
services like taxi-dances (slow-dancing with a nude partner) or photography. Prices started 
at $10-15 for a half-hour massage, and went up quickly with the addition of each service. 
For example, a reverse rub (giving a massage to an attendant) might cost $35.38 Typically, 
customers came in from the street to a reception area where they could look over the 
                                                  
35 Quoted by Robert Fulford, “Crisis at the Victory Burlesk,” in W.E. Mann, ed., The Underside of Toronto 
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employees before accompanying one into a series of small private rooms containing 
massage tables, a sofa for a private striptease, or a tub.39  
Advertising for body rub parlours sometimes promoted their health benefits—one 
studio, Caesar’s Palace, boasted a fitness room—but more often used coded language to 
suggest that patrons might be able to have more than a massage. This included allusions to 
the exotic—at the Sultan’s Retreat, the attendants were referred to as the “harem”—and 
phrases like “total massage,” “complete privacy,” and “come with me” that hinted at sexual 
services.40 This is not to say that all massage parlours offered so-called “extras,” to clients. 
But many did, depending on the attendant, the hour, whether they knew the customer, and 
how much was paid. Publicly, operators crudely claimed that they offered “the sizzle 
without the steak.”41 But in fact all of them drummed up business by trading on the 
suggestion that anything was possible in their private rooms. 
Since a large proportion of attendants’ earnings were from tips—they normally paid 
“the house” around $20 per client—there was a strong financial incentive to give extras 
built into the business itself.42 Women who were willing to masturbate clients or (more 
rarely) provide other sexual services could make a great deal of money, in a safe 
environment where they had a measure of control over the transaction.43 This was a 
different power dynamic from sex transactions that occurred in bars, hotels, or on the 
street. Of course there could be pressure from management or clients to go further. One 
1970s parlour attendant interviewed by prostitution scholar Deborah Brock describes her 
transition to offering sexual services: 
I worked in a massage parlour for quite a while before I would even give a 
hand job. I would work either topless or nude. I’d give a massage and make 
terrific commissions … [I] thought that I was earning my money quite 
                                                  
39 Dutiful Morality Squad officers provided detailed sketches of a typical Yonge St. body rub. “Schematic 
Drawing of Mr. Arnold’s, 1977” CTA, 47331-3.  
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41 “Body rub parlor owner gets $4,143 in first week,” Toronto Star, Nov. 13, 1974.  
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honestly. But I would always get grabbed. You get a harder time if you don’t 
do extras … It was a few years later before I started screwing. I thought, 
what the hell?44 
Most sex workers on Yonge operated within the structure of these body rub 
parlours, or else solicited clients in bars and strip clubs. Some worked directly on the street, 
but this seems to have been rare outside of the summer and special events like the Yonge 
Street Pedestrian Mall. During those periods, street prostitution spiked as sex workers were 
                                                  
44 Quoted in Deborah Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble: Prostitution as a Social Problem (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1998), 14.  
Image 2.3: Two body-rub attendants solicit business outside 
of their parlour on Yonge. Nude massages are advertised at 
$15. Photo by street photographer Citatus, mid-1970s.  
134 
 
drawn to the area from as far away as Detroit and Buffalo. In 1974 morality police claimed 
publicly that as many as half of female prostitutes in the city were American, a descriptor 
that in this context underlined their status as unwelcome interlopers, and further associated 
the Strip with American-style urban decline.45 Ford Drugs, located next door to Zanzibar 
Tavern, was a well-known spot for johns to meet prostitutes. It operated a 24-hour snack 
counter that catered to sex workers and late night revellers, and did a brisk business in sex 
industry essentials—nylons, condoms, cigarettes, nail polish—throughout the day.46 
Meanwhile, in some peep shows near Yonge and Dundas, male sex workers waited near the 
private cubicles for clients. By leaving the door to his private cubicle open, a man could 
signal that he was interested in sex.47 Generally, however, men selling sex to other men did 
not frequent Sin Strip. They congregated further north near Yonge and Wellesley Streets, 
where the city’s few gay bars—including the famous St. Charles Tavern—were clustered.  
Sex work, real estate, and profit 
Yonge’s sex-related businesses can be viewed as a transitional use for the street’s older 
building stock, one that did not require extensive improvement by owners and left open the 
possibility of resale for demolition and redevelopment. By the late 1960s the construction of 
the Yonge Street subway line and nearby land assemblies for projects like the Toronto Eaton 
Centre (discussed in the final section of this thesis) had dramatically increased the 
speculative value of property on lower Yonge Street. According to realtor A. E. Lepage, in 
1970 only the financial district had higher commercial land values; many key parcels of land 
had by that point increased several times in value over the past decade.48 Despite a 
significant market correction across the city in the mid-1970s, the overall picture on Yonge 
Street was very positive. Land was bought and sold based on the dual assumptions that it 
would yield high rental income and could be sold at significant profit. The prospect of sale 
for demolition and inclusion in the next major redevelopment project provided landlords 
with a disincentive to maintaining or improving their buildings, and made them wary of 
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47 Toronto City Council Special Committee on Places of Amusement, Report and Recommendations (Toronto: 
City of Toronto, 1977), 55-56.   
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renting to more stable, capital-intensive businesses. Additionally, there were a range of 
spaces on offer. By the early to mid-1970s rents as high as $35 per square foot—on par with 
prestige shopping developments like the Eaton Centre, under construction next door—were 
being charged for the best ground floor locations on the strip. Upper floor locations, 
formerly offices or apartments, were considerably cheaper at around $5 per square foot, 
making them ideal for body rub and sex cinema operations.49  
The fact that sex-related businesses continued to open on Yonge from 1970 through 
1977, even when they were being offered short leases on poorly-maintained, high-rent 
spaces, strongly suggests that they were a good proposition. Operators benefited from the 
high level of foot traffic on the Strip, and particularly its capacity to attract the tourist and 
convention trade. There was nowhere better in Toronto for commercialized sex to thrive. 
This is confirmed by the boasts of Yonge’s sex entrepreneurs, even when one allows for a 
certain level of exaggeration. The services they offered were usually priced well above non-
sexual equivalents: for example adult fiction and magazines often retailed for $3 or more, at 
a time when the latest Maclean’s magazine cost only 35 cents. This contributed to 
impressive receipts. In 1972 the manager of Starvin’ Marvin’s claimed that the strip club 
averaged 2,800 customers per week, while the owner of 21st Century Love Cinema reported 
grossing $200,000 yearly (just over $1 million in 2016 dollars). A few years later, the owner 
of a popular body rub parlour claimed a similar income level in a submission to the city.50  
Of course, most of the work that kept Sin Strip humming along wasn’t being done by 
the owners of these businesses, but by their employees. Some, including clerks in 
bookstores, theatre ushers, or security in bars and body rub parlours, were men. Teenage 
boys were hired to hand out coupons and leaflets on the street. But, in an industry built 
around the appeal of “Girls! Girls! Girls!” it was women’s labour that really mattered. Their 
nakedness and the arousal or satisfaction they might provide to the customer were central 
to every sex-related business. And it was their bodies that featured prominently in neon and 
print advertisements. Sin Strip was designed, like other sex districts across North America, 
as a playground for heterosexual men, where they paid to see, and sometimes touch 
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women’s bodies. On Yonge, the Playboy lifestyle could be not just read about, but lived—
however briefly—if the price was right. 
There were a few exceptions to this gendered division between female workers and 
male customers. Bars with topless dancers and grindhouse cinemas were part of the larger 
entertainment scene that attracted men, women, and couples to Yonge. And when theatres 
like Cinema 2000 screen popular or controversial films—usually to make a statement about 
censorship—there was a mixed audience there to take part in the transgressive fun.51 But as 
much as porno chic broadened the appeal of the explicit, on a daily basis the area’s more 
mundane pleasures were designed for and enjoyed almost solely by straight men. The new 
leniency towards explicit entertainment did not generally extend to the male body or 
depictions of gay or lesbian sex, still considered obscene by police and the courts.52 And 
there was little to appeal to female diners at the Drawing Room, where businessmen from 
the nearby financial district lunched on weekdays served by topless waitresses.53  
Sin Strip was a collection of gendered spaces where straight men and their desires 
had free reign. Adult bookstores posted signs reading “Men Only” in their adult sections, 
and, as one clerk described, female customers were as rare as “women in a men’s 
washroom.”54 Despite the assertions of operators to the contrary, journalists who visited 
peep shows or sex cinemas on an average day describe the audience as entirely composed 
of men.55 Needless to say, the clientele of body rub parlours was exclusively male, although 
they were a varied bunch: regulars and out-of-towners, professionals and labourers, 
students and over-60s.56 The strip was located just blocks away from the city’s main hotels 
and convention facilities, meaning that many of the men who patronized its businesses 
were one-time customers in town for a weekend business event or meeting. 
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The action is on Yonge 
By around 1969 it was clear that Yonge was changing. Torontonians were curious about the 
street’s new entertainment scene. Was the sex district just harmless fun? Or a blight on the 
city? A series of interventions by journalists, politicians, and local merchants ensured that by 
late 1972 the state of downtown Yonge Street was an issue of intense public interest.  
As always, Torontonians had an appetite for stories about Yonge, and over the next 
few years journalistic exposés in every major local paper gave readers first-hand accounts of 
nights spent on Sin Strip. Their tone was generally positive, celebrating the quirky and 
carnivalesque aspects of the area. A front page article in the Star in 1969 urged readers to 
check out the “Saturday night action” on Yonge, where “hordes of people swarm up and 
down the street through a carnival atmosphere of neon and noise.”57 A 1970 feature in the 
Telegram’s weekly magazine called the area “the Times Square of Canada, the busiest, 
noisiest, gaudiest street in our history and a magnet for money.”58 The reference to Times 
Square, of course, referred not to the sanitized tourist mecca of today, but to the gritty, 
frankly sexual entertainment district that was famous across the continent in the 1960s and 
1970s.   
For readers unfamiliar with the area, they were careful to explain just what and 
where the entertainment district was, something that would no longer be necessary a few 
years later, when the campaign against the sex industry was underway. Then the intrepid 
reporter took the reader through a tour of the Yonge strip and its various offerings. This 
included—and usually highlighted—the area’s adult attractions: a strip show at the 
Zanzibar, a visit to the 18+ section at Times Square Books, and a few minutes feeding 
quarters into a peep show booth. But it also meant seeing live music, talking to street 
vendors, and visiting a discount store. In one writer’s words, “the strip has a pastime to suit 
every preference,” and there is a sense in these articles that the sex industry is just one part 
(albeit a major one) of Yonge’s eclectic downtown scene.59 Some found little charm in the 
dancing or adult movies they paid to see, or in the strange characters they met lurking on 
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Yonge. Crotchety music critic Jack Batten mused that sex was just a cover for a lack of 
talent: Yonge Street bars were using topless go-go dancers to distract attention from 
mediocre musical performances.60 However, the overall tone of these early journalistic 
forays into Sin Strip night life was open-minded curiosity. 
That changed in 1972, as events attracted public attention to Sin Strip and triggered 
the first calls for something to be done about its rapid development. As discussed in the first 
section of this thesis, the Yonge Street pedestrian malls of the early 1970s were both 
popular and controversial. Tens of thousands of Torontonians came down to Yonge daily to 
shop, stroll the pedestrianized street, watch outdoor entertainment, and visit its sidewalk 
cafés and beer gardens. Early on, the press proclaimed the scheme “a miracle,” and asked 
when the city would have the courage to make it permanent.61 Nonetheless, there were 
some dissenting voices, especially after the mall moved north to include the Sin Strip area in 
August of 1971. Citizens and the press complained that the area’s unsavoury characters, 
commercialized sex, and rowdy crowds had ruined the family atmosphere of the mall.62  
Several prominent Torontonians questioned the direction the street was going in, 
and asked that the city look into entirely revamping the area. This reflected a larger 
conversation about development and revitalization that had been going on in Toronto since 
the 1940s. As land values rose and the city’s population grew, a number of politicians, 
businesspeople, and developers considered Yonge’s low-rise, early twentieth-century built 
landscape antiquated and a poor use of space. Following the completion of the New City 
Hall building and public square just west of Yonge in 1965, and as plans for a massive super-
block development on the Eaton’s lands between Dundas and Queen took shape, they 
proposed that other areas of Yonge be torn down and rebuilt along more modern lines. 
Respected journalist and CBC executive Knowlton Nash stated frankly that the city should 
“get rid of that honky-tonk trash heap masquerading as downtown Yonge St.” and replace it 
with something more imaginative and befitting of a major city.63 Former Mayor Phillips 
considered Yonge Street’s current uses a waste of valuable property. He envisioned a 
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massive redevelopment program by private enterprise that would turn the area into “the 
Fifth Ave. of Canada,” rather than its Times Square.64   
It makes sense then, that the state of Yonge Street became an election issue in the 
1972 Toronto mayoral race. Over the course of a few months, it moved from the political 
margins into the mainstream. The idea of a “clean-up” on Yonge was first raised by fringe 
candidate Don Andrews, one of the founders of the extreme right-wing, anti-immigration 
group the Western Guard. From the start of the race, Andrews made getting rid of “the 
pornographers and sexual deviates” on Yonge one of the main planks of his platform, along 
with cracking down on that other den of iniquity, Rochdale College.65 While Andrews was 
never a serious contender for mayor, through his speeches and pamphlets the idea entered 
the campaign as an issue for debate—albeit a minor one—and was picked up by other 
candidates. In November, Ward 2 councillor Tony O’Donohue, then considered a front-
runner for the mayoralty, added stopping the deterioration of Yonge to his law-and-order, 
family-oriented agenda. He argued for forming a committee of local merchants and citizens 
to investigate the sex industry on Yonge and possible actions that could be taken.66 Clearly, 
both men believed that Toronto voters wanted to see the powers of the municipal 
government used to confront the rise of the sex industry on Sin Strip. Centrist reform 
candidate David Crombie, who won the post of mayor after a close race, also made 
statements supporting some kind of a clean-up.   
One final intervention, this time by area merchants, brought Yonge firmly onto the 
agenda of the incoming municipal government and stimulated debate in the city’s 
newspapers. In early December 1972 the business group the Downtown Council sent a 
report entitled Problems of Downtown Yonge Street to the newly elected government and 
the press.67 The report put into writing ideas that had been percolating among small Yonge 
Street businesspeople for the past few years. As they watched the development of Sin Strip, 
and heard of grandiose plans for the redevelopment of the area, small merchants were 
concerned that they would be squeezed out of existence.  
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Many of their concerns centred on the expansion of the sex industry on Yonge, and 
specifically the “mushrooming of mini-theatres and topless massage parlours” that had 
occurred over the past few years. According to the report, these sex-related businesses 
were simply bad neighbours. They accepted short-term leases, changed hands frequently, 
and seldom did anything to maintain the buildings they rented. This was contributing to the 
general decline of the quality of Yonge’s commercial space. It was also providing income to 
absentee owners who, the Council argued, were buying up Yonge Street properties in 
speculation of further redevelopment in the near future. Peep shows and body rubs 
attracted only a niche clientele, while their very presence in the area drove off regular 
customers from neighbouring businesses, as well as “citizens and visitors who simply want 
to enjoy a stroll on Toronto’s main street.” The report took aim in particular at the 
“aggressive promotion” of sex services through handbills, street signage, and the use of 
loudspeakers, arguing that tighter controls on advertising had to be put in place.  
Image 2.4: Flyers and coupons advertising sexual services, and in particular nude body rubs, 
were ubiquitous on Yonge Street. This ad was mailed to the mayor by its recipient, a downtown 
office worker, in 1973. City of Toronto Archives, 1512-565. 
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The concern of the Downtown Council for the health of Yonge Street’s small 
merchants was natural, since their active membership was dominated by business owners 
from the area. In 1972, ten of twelve members of the group executive owned businesses on 
Yonge, including Vice-President Sam Sniderman of Sam the Record Man, and the operator of 
Le Coq D’Or Tavern at Yonge and Dundas.68 These businesspeople were careful to 
distinguish between their own “established businesses,” that obeyed municipal regulations 
and paid taxes on time, and the less community-minded mini-cinis and body rubs that were 
popping up all around them. This allowed established entertainment venues like Le Coq 
D’Or—which regularly featured topless dancers—to separate themselves from the new 
arrivals. 
Yonge Street has always been colourful and entertainment-oriented and we 
have no quarrel with that particular image. However, we are seriously 
concerned with the direction that is being taken by some of the newly-
added colour and entertainment.    
The report strongly urged a ban on handbills and loudspeakers, and firmer enforcement of 
public health, sanitary, and building code regulations in the area. It framed merchants’ 
objections to the sex industry in economic terms–in other words, in terms of how it affected 
the viability of the strip as a shopping destination. That was, and would remain, the chief 
concern of downtown merchants. But the report also made a nod to civic pride, insisting 
that more was at stake than a few blocks of businesses. Because Yonge is the city’s main 
street and one of the first places seen by visitors, the problems described in the report “if 
they remain unchecked, can and will detract from the reputation Toronto now enjoys” as a 
big North American city without big city problems.  
Problems of Downtown Yonge Street received general approval in the press, with 
some reservations. A Toronto Star editorial agreed that “the Yonge St. ‘strip’ is a tawdry 
place, contemptible to people of sensibility.” But it was also so safe, the paper argued, “that 
unescorted women can walk there at midnight without fear”—a far cry from the dangers of 
New York’s Times Square. The editorial went on to warn that efforts to clean the street up 
must be moderated by respect for differing tastes and moral standards. While noise and 
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handbills might require new municipal regulations, the city should be cautious in looking for 
stronger weapons to use against sex-oriented businesses. Above all,  
no wholesale suppression should be invoked to bring the street in line with 
middle-class tastes and values: we still live in a democracy, and tolerance is 
a necessary element of it.69  
This concern for balancing tolerance with moral standards anticipated the demands of the 
next phase of opposition to Sin Strip: the citizens’ campaign to clean up the sex industry.  
Citizens mobilize 
In this way, through journalist exposés, the experience of the Yonge pedestrian malls, and 
the statements of prominent Torontonians, the idea that downtown Yonge Street was 
changing—and by many accounts for the worse—became rooted in the public imagination. 
On the heels of the Downtown Council’s report, a citizens’ campaign against Sin Strip was 
organized. Inspired by moral concerns, civic pride, and fears of downtown decline, 
Torontonians mobilized to demand that the newly elected municipal government act to 
contain or eliminate the commercialized sex on Yonge. This gave continued life to 
discussions about the future of the area, while raising important questions about public and 
private morality, right to public space, and censorship.   
The citizens’ campaign was initially sparked by comments made by newly elected 
Mayor David Crombie. Associated with nearby Ryerson Polytechnical Institute since the 
early 1960s, Crombie knew the area well and was sympathetic to the concerns of the 
Downtown Council. He also recognized that the issue of the state of Toronto’s most iconic 
street was an important one for Torontonians.70 Here was a chance for the mayor, who had 
run on a platform of consensus-building and community involvement in government, to put 
his political philosophy to the test.71 Soon after his election Crombie agreed to organize a 
meeting between downtown merchants and his executive. And during one of his first radio 
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interviews he expressed interest in taking action to help solve the problems described by 
established Yonge Street merchants.72  
Populist, contrarian tabloid the Toronto Sun saw an opportunity in Crombie’s interest 
in the issue. Established in 1971, the Sun sold itself as an independent voice for the average 
working citizen, and soon succeeded in capturing a fifth of Toronto newspaper readers.73 A 
week before the new mayor took office, the paper printed a front-page feature on Sin 
Strip.74 It included the usual profiles of the operators of sex cinemas and strip clubs, and a 
laudatory article on one area landlord who refused to rent his storefronts to body rub 
parlours “at any price.” There was also a short message from the mayor, asking 
Torontonians to write him about “the present state of the Strip and what could be done to 
make it a better thoroughfare.” Crombie hoped, through reaching out to the public, to rally 
support for the Downtown Council’s recommendations.75 Meanwhile, the Sun knew that a 
clean-up of downtown Yonge would appeal to its largely conservative readership, and 
actively pushed the issue. A week later, in a luncheon speech to the Lions Club, Crombie 
reiterated his intention to clean up Sin Strip, while warning that it was a complicated issue 
that balanced “free expression versus public welfare.”76  
That speech and the mayor’s call for public input inspired a stream of letters from 
Sun readers: 68 arrived in Crombie’s office by the end of the first week of his mayoralty. But 
this became a torrent in mid-January 1973, as two developments pushed the issue further 
into the spotlight. First, a number of Metro Toronto churches began to mobilize to call for a 
crackdown on the Yonge Street strip. Second, letters and editorials published in all three 
Toronto newspapers in January took widely different stances on what to do about Yonge 
Street, prolonging and enlarging the discussion. By the end of March, the mayor had heard 
from more than a thousand concerned citizens, including 343 personal letters, 300 form 
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letters, and dozens of small petitions. In the era before e-mail and online petitions, this was 
a significant public outcry: as Crombie wrote in response to one letter, “In the whole history 
of the mayor’s office there has never been so much mail.”77 Preserved in the mayor’s files, 
these letters provide a unique chance to understand how and why Torontonians mobilized 
against Sin Strip. Along with letters to the editor, newspaper editorials, and the public 
statements of prominent Torontonians, they influenced the opinions of decision-makers in 
government and shaped the contours of a lively public debate that would last for several 
years. 
The people who wrote to the mayor about Yonge Street during the winter of 1972-
73 were a varied group.78 Geographically, most lived throughout the city of Toronto in its 
pre-megacity boundaries. But more than a hundred also wrote from North York, 
Scarborough, and other municipalities that made up Metro Toronto, and from communities 
even further away, including Mississauga, Brampton, and even Kitchener. A few even wrote 
from places as far afield as San Francisco, Cleveland, or Vancouver. This dispersion drives 
home the point that people living across the greater Toronto area felt a sense of ownership 
of Toronto’s downtown. For some living in neighbouring cities it was commuting downtown 
for work that established the connection; others mentioned that they had grown up in 
Toronto or had lived in the city in the past. But many simply felt that Yonge Street, where 
they shopped, strolled, and went out—if only occasionally—was their downtown as much as 
it was anyone else’s. In one woman’s words, “Despite the Mississauga address, I consider 
Toronto as my city.”79 Because people like her felt they had an interest in the area’s future, 
it was only natural for them to call upon the Mayor of Toronto to act, even though they 
lived outside of the jurisdiction of his administration. 
Several Toronto neighbourhoods were particularly active, in different ways. One was 
North Toronto around Eglinton and Yonge, which produced the highest number of personal 
letters, form letters, and petition signatures. Socio-economically the area was solidly 
middle-class, with a lower proportion of non-English-speaking immigrants and higher 
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income level than most other Toronto neighbourhoods. It had a history of vocal 
participation in city politics, including a successful lobbying campaign just a few years prior 
to minimize the impact of the construction of the Yonge subway extension on local homes 
and green spaces.80 It was also where Crombie lived and the ward he had represented as 
alderman from 1970-72. Residents knew the mayor, sometimes personally, and expected 
him to respond.  
Another cluster of concerned citizens was closer to Yonge, in the Sherbourne and 
Wellesley apartment zone, a world away socio-economically from North Toronto. In that 
lower-income, densely populated area, dozens of residents in several buildings signed form 
letters to the mayor that were distributed by local church members. They wrote 
comparatively fewer personal letters, suggesting that while they were supportive of the 
campaign, they were both less personally engaged and less comfortable setting their own 
thoughts to paper than the residents of North Toronto. Across the city, other geographic 
clusters appeared as churches organized their congregants and campaigners went door to 
door to rally support. For example, the Centennial United Church on Dovercourt Road was 
the epicentre for a petition that acquired 43 signatures, the vast majority of whom lived 
within a few blocks of the church itself. 
Citizens did not always include personal information in their letters. But a few 
patterns still emerge. First, where it is possible to verify, women outnumbered men by 
around fifty percent. Married adults outnumbered single people: many signed letters as 
husband and wife, or mentioned that they wrote out of concern for their children. The style 
of some letters clearly indicated that their author was university-educated and used to 
expressing themselves in writing; others wrote with difficulty, crossing out words and 
committing grammatical errors and spelling mistakes. Only a few identified themselves as 
students or as young people. A number wrote on business stationery, or otherwise 
mentioned that they were professionals or small business owners. But overall, it was much 
more common for letter-writers to identify themselves primarily as taxpayers, “Christians,” 
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parents, or simply “concerned citizens.” As I explore below, the content of their letters 
reflected the different identities they adopted when writing to the powers-that-be. 
A street for all the people 
“The present condition of the Yonge Street Strip is a downright disgrace,” opened one man’s 
letter to the mayor.81 Like so many others who took the time to write, W.M. from North 
Toronto thought that downtown Yonge was being ruined by the rapid expansion of the sex 
industry. 
Day by day [the strip] is becoming filled with sex shops, pornographic 
literature mills, body rub houses and skin-flick palaces. It has become 
exceedingly seedy and the noise from street loudspeakers grates upon the 
ear…Quite frankly I’m inclined to avoid walking along Yonge Street between 
College and Queen Streets unless I absolutely have to.  
Of the 343 personal letters about Yonge that the mayor received during the winter 
of 1972-73, 286 expressed similar negative sentiments about Sin Strip. They often repeated 
the phrases used in the mayor’s statements, or otherwise informed him that it was reading 
the Sun’s feature on the sex industry that had motivated them to write. They told Crombie 
in no uncertain terms that they considered Yonge to be “awful,” “deplorable,” and even “an 
open sewer running down the middle of the city.”82 Overwhelmingly, they interpreted 
Crombie’s interest in public input about Yonge as proof that he agreed with them. After all, 
hadn’t the mayor called Sin Strip a “growing cancer” in his speech to the Lions Club? That he 
had hemmed and hawed about due process and self-regulation mattered little, and many 
offered their support to any attempt made by the new administration to clean up the area.  
Citizens’ substantive complaints centred on the street’s body rub parlours, strip 
clubs, adult bookstores, and sex cinemas. Most opponents of Sin Strip had not been inside 
any of these businesses. There were a few notable exceptions. A man named W.W., who 
wrote to the mayor from the Salvation Army men’s hostel on Sherbourne Street, explained 
that he had “spent considerable time walking up and down both sides of Yonge St,” and had 
been into a number of sex-oriented businesses.83 He enclosed a ticket stub for entry to a 
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night club, a description of the strip show he saw, and a list of 21 businesses on Yonge that 
he thought should be shut down. But apart from W.W. and a few other citizens—all male—
letter-writers wrote from the sidewalk, so to speak, basing their knowledge of what went on 
inside on newspaper accounts and their own assumptions.  
As a result, most letters focused on the day-to-day, street-level aspects of sex-
related businesses. There was some concern for the deterioration of the area’s built 
environment. The Downtown Council had warned in its report on Yonge Street 
entertainment that short-term tenants were doing little to maintain the older, low-rise 
buildings in which they had set up shop. They also pointed out the rising amount of litter on 
the street. Citizens’ letters to the mayor echoed these complaints, drawing attention to the 
lack of garbage bins in the area, to the shabby state of many buildings, and to the 
streetscape’s desperate need for a face-lift.  
More often, writers focused on the experience of visiting Yonge. They argued that 
the strip had acquired a non-stop, carnival “Midway” atmosphere—and unlike reporters 
writing about the area a few years earlier, they did not consider this a positive thing.84 These 
were people who expressed no desire to visit a body rub parlour or strip club, and instead 
saw Yonge as a place to shop, dine out, or see a film. But, they argued, the invasion of the 
area’s sidewalks by promotions and spill-over from sex businesses threatened their 
enjoyment of those activities. Some complained about the loudspeakers and televisions 
used to advertise strip clubs, sex cinemas, or other services. For example, one young women 
described as “revolting” the “small crowds of men cackling and passing ridiculous 
comments, huddled around the outdoor television sets outside the strip joints on Yonge,” 
where they could watch poor-quality live feeds from the stage show.85 Others focused on 
the touts or body rub attendants who solicited passers-by to enter their establishments, and 
on the teenagers hired by sex businesses to pass out handbills.86  
All of this, letter-writers argued, had made walking down Yonge Street unpleasant—
if not dangerous—for the average citizen. People stated that while they had formerly 
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enjoyed spending time on Yonge, that was no longer the case. Gone were the good old days 
of the 1950s and 1960s when “the shops were interesting, the street was quiet and the 
sidewalks were clean.”87 Instead, writers reported shock and disgust. They often situated 
their feelings and opinions about Yonge in narratives where the conditions on the street 
took them by surprise. One woman wrote that   
it has been some time since I was downtown, but Saturday the opportunity 
availed itself. I did not find the walk along the “Strip” the pleasure it once 
was. I found signs of nudes on the sidewalk advertising “skin” shows (much 
to the embarrassment of my 12 year old son) and loudspeakers blaring 
music in most store doorways much to my aural discomfort.88 
Another, a downtown businessman, related the following story in January:    
My wife and family met me downtown for a dinner out and to look at the 
Christmas windows. [They] were subjected to aggressive advertising and 
were handed handouts advertising the strip joints and were subjected to 
the blaring loudspeakers advertising their wares. Following this we decided 
not to take our family downtown on Yonge St in the future.89 
These anecdotes served to emphasize the authors’ current outrage about Yonge, and the 
contrast they saw between its past and present states. Something had gone wrong, they 
argued, when the average Torontonian could not enjoy the city’s main street on a Saturday 
afternoon. 
In this way, an appeal for the democratic use of public space ran through the winter 
1972-73 debates about Yonge. People argued that Toronto’s downtown was for the 
enjoyment of all. Nowhere was this truer than on Yonge, the street that defined the city’s 
downtown core. An eloquent letter printed in the Toronto Star asked, “To whom does 
Yonge St. belong?”  
In recent years we have come to think of it as a street that belongs to all of 
the people. It was a street upon which people of all ages, walks and life were 
given to promenading…All of this is threatened with a major change in 
which the storefronts along Yonge St. are turning into a few types of 
enterprises catering only to certain groups of people.90 
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Others took up this idea in their letters to the mayor. Describing themselves as speaking for 
the “average citizen”—even the “silent majority”—they claimed a right to use and enjoy 
Yonge Street. Their use of the second term is telling. Popularized by Richard Nixon during his 
first term in the presidency, the “silent majority” referred to the great mass of Americans 
whose common-sense conservative voices were too often drowned out by a radical few. 
Clearly, some Torontonians saw themselves in this populist attack on political activism and 
the permissive society which became a conservative trope in the 1970s and 1980s. Why, 
they asked, should the tastes of a fringe minority take precedence over those of everyone 
else? In their view, that was exactly what had happened on Sin Strip. “Give us back our 
downtown,” one woman asked Crombie, adding that the majority of Torontonians did not 
share the interests of Yonge’s clientele, and “we resent the imposition of their ways on 
ours.”91 Later, this argument would be deployed as a rebuttal to calls for freedom of 
expression, a common-sense response to a good principle taken too far.   
“Perverts, hippies, crumbs and creeps of all kinds” 
Who was this fringe minority taking over the downtown? Many citizens considered the men 
and women who frequented downtown Yonge members of a broad social category of 
undesirables. Like Rochdale College and Yorkville before it, the strip area was seen as 
geographical locus for many of the bad habits and delinquent behaviours associated with 
youth and sexual liberation.92 Added to that were the ranks of sex workers and their regular 
customers, who were seen by conservatives as desperate, sad, or maladjusted men.93 Some 
citizens included homosexuals in their list of sexual deviants, prefiguring the homophobia 
that would engulf Sin Strip in 1977. E.H., a young woman living in Forest Hill, wrote in her 
letter to David Crombie that  
[s]cum breeds scum, dirt draws the worms…The pornography and junk 
shops draw perverts, hippies, crumbs and creeps of all kinds and around 
Wellesley Street–queers (I think you know what I mean).”94 
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Toronto Star columnist Henry Morgan put it more eloquently: “Public pornography attracts 
what some might call a ‘low’ element, more rightfully called criminals.”95 A letter in the 
Catholic Register similarly warned that Yonge’s offerings were responsible for an increase in 
“muggings, purse snatching, rape and robbery.”96 In the anything-goes atmosphere 
encouraged on Yonge, conservative Torontonians believed, criminals could find both safety 
in numbers, and plenty of easy marks.  
Some women saw Sin Strip focus on the nude female form and sale of sex as an 
incitement to sexual violence. Exposure to pornography, they argued, over-excited men 
while encouraging them to view women as sex objects. This could lead to some men acting 
out their unfulfilled fantasies, stirred up by a strip show or sex film, on strangers. S.P. from 
Scarborough wrote that she had “yet to see the woman’s side presented in this male-
dominated issue”. Sexual entertainment, she believed, created serious danger for women 
visiting the downtown alone:  
The end result of this mass stimuli usually takes place elsewhere, in a quiet 
park or dark street. How often have we read of women being attacked on 
their way home at night? Rape and allied crimes are increasing, according 
to the Police.97 
Certainly this view was encouraged by the harassment or catcalls experienced by some 
women who visited downtown Yonge alone. M.N., a female employee of a large downtown 
insurance company who walked on Yonge Street daily, wrote that:   
I have found that the street has changed drastically in the past 2 years. At 
one time I could comfortably window shop on my lunch hour without fear 
of being accosted or offended in any manner. This is no longer the case.98 
Another recalled the shock and embarrassment of being mistaken for a prostitute while 
walking on the strip at night. A woman who described herself as “22, attractive,” wrote that 
during her last visit to Yonge and Dundas to see a film, she had been propositioned while 
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waiting for the bus home, forcing her to take a taxi. As a result, she was “unable to feel 
relaxed on the main street…of the city of my birth.”99  
Women like these three typically did not identify in their letters as feminists, and 
expressed little solidarity for the women who worked on Sin Strip. Nonetheless, they saw 
the issue in gendered terms. One wrote angrily denouncing the hypocrisy of men who 
visited places like Starvin’ Marvin’s, while their wives were at home raising their children: “it 
seems whatever the ‘men’ want these days they get, imagine how a lot of women feel, 
exploited to the very end.”100 In their characterization of the sex industry as being 
fundamentally about men exploiting women for their pleasure, these women anticipated 
the powerful feminist critique of pornography that would become hegemonic in Canada 
during the 1980s.101  
Dozens wrote identifying themselves as parents, often listing the ages of their 
children and arguing that they were particularly vulnerable to being corrupted by Sin Strip 
and the clientele it attracted. They pointed out that the strip businesses that were 
particularly attractive to young people were located chock-a-block with sex businesses. 
Record shops like Sam the Record Man and A & A Records attracted hundreds of teenagers 
on the weekends and after school. And then there were the arcades, some of which offered 
separate areas with peep shows, and they were widely reputed to be places where youth 
were offered drugs or recruited for sex work. Indeed, police statements associated the 
presence of pinball machines with increased rates of crime and advised the City to restrict 
their use.102 Parents of children who attended school near downtown Yonge were 
particularly active. The nearest public school was 1.5 km away, but two private Catholic 
schools were located much closer to Yonge. In early February St. Michael’s Choir School, just 
a block south-east of Yonge and Dundas, sent a letter home to parents asking for them to 
support the anti-Sin Strip campaign, and this prompted a number to write to the city. One 
father wrote of his two children that “twice daily they are exposed to this strip and also to 
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the bums and perverts that automatically hang around such places.”103 A concerned mother 
asked  
What is the point of trying to instil some sense of moral well-being into 
one’s children when constantly having to walk down Yonge Street makes 
them think that “body rubs with exotic oils by topless beauties” is the 
norm?104 
More pragmatically, a grade six student at the Choir School wrote the mayor stating it was 
“rather annoying not to be able to go to your favourite snack-bar (the back exit leads to a 
strip-house).”105   
Big city problems 
Looming behind this concern over danger on Yonge was a strong cultural association 
between downtown urban areas and crime in 1970s North America. By the mid-1960s social 
scientists, legislators, and the media in the United States had identified an “urban crisis” at 
work in their inner cities, characterized by unemployment, decaying streetscapes, increasing 
racial segregation, and a rising crime rate.106 While Canada was spared many of the worst 
aspects of this phenomenon, it nonetheless had a noticeable influence on how Canadians 
thought about criminality and the city. Their concerns were exacerbated both by evidence 
that the crime rate was rising sharply—it would continue to do so in nearly all categories 
until the early 1980s—and by media sensationalism.107 The Toronto Sun regularly ran lurid 
features warning that Toronto could go the way of hollowed-out, dangerous American cities 
like Detroit. And in late 1973 the front page of the Toronto Star headlines read that a crime 
rise was “sure as taxes” in the New Year.108 
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This had a powerful effect on how people thought about Yonge Street’s apparent 
descent into criminality. Newspapers published editorials and letters asking whether “Yonge 
Street is degenerating into another Times Square-Broadway area?”109 More than sixty 
people who wrote the mayor asked similar questions, making anxious comparisons to the 
crime-ridden downtowns of cities New York, Buffalo, San Francisco, and Detroit. Several 
enclosed newspaper articles they had read about Times Square or San Francisco’s 
Tenderloin.110 There was a sense that Canadians had an opportunity to avoid, or learn from, 
the mistakes made by these larger cities in letting crime and urban decay take hold. After 
all, Toronto was different. Even amid the anti-Sin Strip furor, editorialists boasted that it was 
still “the safest big city in North America,” and even the “most civilized.”111 American 
sources generally agreed. Just a year later, Harper’s magazine dubbed it “the city that 
works”; American tourism to Toronto grew quickly during the early 1970s.112  
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Letter-writers echoed this civic pride. “The citizens of Toronto are justifiably proud of 
their city,” began one of the most widely distributed form letters against Sin Strip. “Despite 
the considerable growth of the last decade the city has remained reasonably clean and free 
from crime”.113 Others pointed to the city’s avoidance of American-style social conflict, and 
to the politeness and basic decency of its citizens. However, they argued, those qualities 
were being put in jeopardy by Sin Strip. There was a subtle anti-Americanism behind these 
sentiments, and indeed a few citizens who wrote the mayor stated that they viewed the sex 
industry as an American import, “an insidious thing that has been creeping in steadily [from] 
without the country.”114 It didn’t help that several Sin Strip businesses were owned by 
American transplants—including one of the first body rub parlours, Relaxation Plus—or that 
others, like Times Square Books, traded on their American content to attract customers.  
A society in decline 
The sense that Yonge’s current state posed a moral and physical danger found its most 
strident support among religious Torontonians. A substantial minority, mobilizing through 
Toronto-area churches, understood the appearance of the sex industry in the heart of 
Toronto as part of a larger decline in moral standards in Canada. These self-identified “God-
fearing citizens” and “concerned Christians” launched a campaign within a campaign, 
accounting for nearly half of the communications sent to Mayor Crombie that winter.  
To religious opponents of Sin Strip, the sex industry presented both a spiritual and a 
temporal danger. Obscenity was a sin in and of itself. But it was also inseparable from a host 
of other perceived social problems, including, but not limited to, homosexuality, violent 
crime, drug use, alcoholism, and laziness. Like social conservatives across North America, 
Toronto’s concerned Christians viewed the battle against pornography holistically, as just 
one front in a war for the preservation of a society built around Judeo-Christian values. Any 
concession on one issue risked opening the gate to the others. In this way, commercialized 
sex could be seen, in the words of Sun columnist and former Mayor of East York True 
Davidson, as a “poison being openly purveyed [to] the body politic,” that would weaken 
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already fragmenting moral standards and lead the most vulnerable to crime.115 Increases in 
drug arrests, loosening liquor laws, and even the slovenly sartorial standards of the day’s 
youth could all be deployed as evidence that this was a generalized trend.  
In both Canada and the United States, this religious critique of obscenity and sexual 
liberation was an important—although rarely decisive—social force during the liberal 1960s 
and 1970s. Its ferocity was only increased by the general sense among social conservatives 
that they were an embattled minority in a society changing far too rapidly for its own good. 
The “liberal element,” wrote one citizen from Don Mills to the mayor, has “had full sway for 
about ten years now and we’ve only gone downhill.”116 This sense that liberal values had 
gone too far helped drive what some scholars have called the “conservative sixties”, 
foreshadowing the resurgence of social conservatism in both Canadian and American 
politics during the following decades.117 It also fuelled a surge in the popularity of 
evangelical Christianity, even as mainline Christian churches were losing congregants at an 
alarming rate. This was most evident in the United States, where Newsweek would declare 
1976 “the Year of the Evangelicals,” but the effects were also evident north of the border.118   
The religious mobilization against Sin Strip began soon after the mayor’s public 
appeal for input in the Sun. During the first week of January 1973, members of the Christian 
and Missionary Alliance, a network of ten evangelical Toronto churches, began a campaign 
that they hoped would bring out “tens of thousands of people” in support of a Yonge Street 
clean-up.119 Congregants in Alliance churches were asked to write the mayor with their 
feelings on the issue; meanwhile, one minister wrote to dozens of churches across the city 
asking for them to organize similar drives. Their letter urged like-minded individuals to write 
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to the mayor, providing his address as well as three simple rules: “1. The more letters, the 
more influence. 2. avoid using unfounded statements. 3. be concise.”120 
Over the next three months twenty-one Toronto Protestant churches heeded this 
call to action. On successive Sundays in January, ministers preached sermons against Sin 
Strip. At the Jarvis Street Baptist Church, one of Toronto’s most venerable evangelical 
congregations, Pastor H.C. Slade railed against Yonge’s moral decadence in a sermon 
entitled “Toronto’s Sin-Lane To Ruin.”121 Making allusions to the desolation made of 
Jerusalem by the Babylonians, he described an investigative walk down the nearby strip 
made in the company of two policemen: 
There are at least eleven places which you can call nothing but “Vice Joints,” 
“Dens of Iniquity,” “Hell Holes,” and “Soul Traps,” designed by the Devil to 
bring to ruin the minds and lives of our young people…The operators of 
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these vile and debased places are trafficking in the characters and souls of 
humans for one thing only; that is, money. 
Slade went on to describe this situation as an “opportunity for Christian service,” which he 
considered to include fighting body rub handbills with gospel tracts, demonstrating in front 
of sex cinemas, and lobbying the municipal government to crack down on the sex industry.   
Following these sermons, congregations organized according to their size. A letter of 
support to the mayor from the west end Japanese United Church bore 80 signatures; 
meanwhile, a women’s bible circle at Parkdale Baptist Church wrote representing fifteen 
voices.122 Many churches distributed a form letter provided by the Christian and Missionary 
Alliance to their members to sign and mail themselves. In a few different forms, nearly 300 
of these letters found their way to the mayor’s office over the next few months. Some were 
printed on church stationary, or even copied out by hand; all conveyed the same “moral 
point of view” on Yonge: “The continuation of this pornography and immorality in our city is 
going to bring an unprecedented moral decadence and rise in crime which I do not want 
associated with Toronto.”123 Meanwhile, some Christian opponents of the sex industry took 
to the streets to send their message. They included both the bearded young men of 
Christian service group Emmaus who paraded in sackcloth to protest Toronto’s “worldly 
ways,” and the smartly dressed men and women of the International Family Association, 
who marched up and down the strip holding a banner reading “Pornography must go.”124 
The right to choose 
Meanwhile, Crombie’s comments about Yonge began to draw a critical response. Although 
they were slower to mobilize, a number of Torontonians were prepared to defend Sin Strip’s 
existence. Only five percent of letter-writers—just over forty people—were against a clean-
up campaign on Yonge. They sent no form letters, and organized no petition drives. Instead 
they appealed to the mayor on the basis of individual freedoms. Responsible adults had the 
right to patronize Sin Strip, just as the proprietors of sex businesses had the right to offer 
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what the public wanted. W.C., a man living in the west end, spoke for most of these 
concerned citizens when he wrote:  
May I point out that in a democracy one has freedom of choice...I believe in 
the right of each mature person choosing for himself what he wishes or 
does not wish to read and see.125 
Writers like W.C. saw danger in the prospect of the municipal government attempting to 
regulate entertainment on the basis of morality, even when they did not personally approve 
of Sin Strip. Picking and choosing what people could do for fun smacked of dictatorship, they 
argued, and was well beyond the mandate of the municipal government.  
A number took a more personal approach, arguing that their own enjoyment of the 
area would be diminished if the sex industry was cleaned up. To these citizens, like those 
who considered the sex industry a blight, Yonge was important, but for different reasons. 
They saw the street’s current incarnation as one of the few colourful, exciting areas in what 
was otherwise a dull city. A young, single man named C.K. described the strip’s colour and 
sleaze as evidence that Toronto was becoming a major metropolitan cultural centre. His 
whole social life revolved around Yonge, he said, and it was one of few places where 
Toronto the Good was able to burst out of its traditional conservatism.  
Surely you remember the Toronto of ten years ago – conservative, dull, 
oppressive, out of tune with the people’s fiddle...my attitude towards the 
trends on Yonge Street is one of qualified elation.126  
A woman living close to Yonge stated that she and her husband chose to live in the 
downtown core for its excitement, and asked 
Have you ever walked down Yonge St. in the summer, or on the weekends? 
Obviously not! It is packed with people from the suburbs who do not have 
our area’s character and colour. Yonge St. has become another meeting 
place for the people.127 
In this view of the city, Toronto’s downtown was its cultural heart, providing the life and 
excitement that its humdrum suburbs could not. In some people’s view, the anti-Sin Strip 
agitation was a classic example of the conservative suburbs trying to assert their will over 
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the whole city. “Imagine for a moment, all Toronto as bland as [its] suburban areas—a big 
city needs its Strip,” explained one man. He went on to argue that the majority of 
Torontonians liked Yonge just the way it was, urging the mayor not to listen to the “moral 
righteousness” of a well-organized minority.128  
One or two men who wrote took a very different approach, identifying themselves 
as regular customers of Yonge’s strip clubs, adult bookstores, and body rub parlours. They 
described these businesses as a natural outlet for desire, patronized “not by sexual deviants, 
but by the average guy who may be spending the night downtown with his buddies or by 
visiting businessmen who may want to let their hair down a bit.”129 Rejecting being labelled 
as perverts or crumbs, they defied the mayor to find anything wrong with their moral 
character.  
The debate was joined in public as well, as several prominent Torontonians spoke up 
against the mayor’s comments and what they saw as the ensuing moral crusade. One 
outspoken public figure was Barry Callaghan, a professor and author known for his work on 
the literary journal Exile. In a series of remarks printed in the Toronto Star, Callaghan 
complained that Crombie was “making cheap-shot moral appeals” on the Yonge issue, and 
speculated whether Toronto had “voted in an Allan Lamport in bellbottoms.”130 Five years 
earlier, as a city councillor, ex-mayor Lamport had led a campaign to label Yorkville’s hip 
youth a “social disease.”131 Days later, acclaimed writer Pierre Berton took a similar stance, 
calling Crombie’s idea “stupid” during a chance meeting that was reported on the front page 
of Toronto newspapers.132 Berton was a well-known advocate for freedom of expression 
who had publicly denounced film censorship and police harassment of Rochdale College 
over the past two years.133 He would reiterate his view in radio and television interviews 
over the next few weeks.   
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The two writer’s comments—and the responses they provoked—injected a new 
element into the debate. Some approved of their stance. At an open forum at Holy Trinity 
Anglican Church, just steps from the Strip, Crombie was criticized for starting the whole 
debate, and opening the door to a moral crusade.134 Others were hostile to the writers’ 
intervention. Several journalists questioned why Berton and Callaghan’s views were being 
given so much media attention. Others criticized them as elites, injecting a populist, anti-
elitist tone into the debate. Globe and Mail writer Bruce West put down the “Great Ones” as 
knee-jerk liberals who were out of touch with society.135 A day later, an editorial in the Sun 
mused: 
Funny how the Mayor’s “clean-up” promise affected different people. The 
average person seemed to approve – but the intellectuals, the city’s 
beautiful people, reacted shrilly and indignantly. To them Crombie’s 
“campaign” smacked of censorship and was a threat to basic freedoms. 
Pshaw!136 
The back-and-forth between the two writers and newspapers inspired dozens of 
people to write the mayor—more than fifty mentioned it in their letters. They strongly 
identified with the “average person” described by the Sun, and with the characterization of 
the two writers as precious know-it-alls. “Please do not allow yourself to be intimidated by 
the likes of Pierre Berton,” wrote one citizen from Scarborough.137 “The majority will 
applaud you if you stand up to the Poo-Bahs,” wrote a Toronto couple, taking up the label 
applied to Berton and Callaghan by Bruce West.138 Numerous letters pointed out that 
Berton lived in Kleinberg, north of Toronto, and that his tune would change pretty quickly if 
he spent more time in the city. In response to the two writers’ rejection of censorship and 
assertion of individual liberties, conservative opponents of Sin Strip retorted that they had 
rights, too: the right not to be harassed, the right to enjoy public space, and the right to 
safety in the downtown core. In one woman’s words,   
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Pierre Burton [sic] quibbles about civil rights but we have some civil rights 
too, and one of them surely is to be able to shop on our favourite street 
with our children, without having our senses assailed by filth.139 
 
What kind of clean-up? 
The size and ferocity of the citizens’ campaign against the strip surprised nearly everyone, 
including Mayor Crombie. At the height of the campaign, in mid- to late January, his staff 
were overwhelmed by the task of sorting and responding to the letters he received. Early 
letters received fulsome personal responses, but within a few weeks those had mostly been 
replaced by form letters. Crombie went to great efforts to clarify his position on the issue in 
the press. But he also continued to solicit public input. During a call-in show on local 
multicultural radio station CHIN FM, the mayor answered questions about his intentions. His 
comments, he said, had been misinterpreted, both by critics like Pierre Berton who claimed 
he was exceeding his brief, and the hundreds of citizens who saw his interest in the issue as 
a call to arms. He explained that he had no desire to legislate morality, just to clean up the 
public aspects of the street, including lewd advertising and noise pollution. If the merchants 
could do it themselves without city intervention, all the better.140 Like the Downtown 
Council, the mayor distinguished between the area’s established entertainment venues and 
the newer businesses whose sole source of revenues was sex entertainment. 
A number of those who were calling for a clean-up agreed with the mayor. They 
considered banning street advertising, loudspeakers, and closed-circuit TVs a good 
compromise between improving the street and protecting freedom of expression. “Mayor 
Crombie is right in wanting to tone down Yonge,” wrote one citizen to the Toronto Star; 
however, he added that “no rational urbanite” would ask that Sin Strip be entirely 
removed.141 “Most of Toronto’s citizens don’t give a tinker’s dam (sic) about what goes on 
behind closed doors on Yonge Street,” exclaimed another, “what they object to is being 
subjected to the importuning of shills.”142 Others argued that while the sex industry should 
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be tolerated, it had no place on the city’s main street. Several dozen people suggested 
relocating the body rub parlours and strip clubs to somewhere outside of the commercial 
district—their ideas included the waterfront, the suburbs, and (in one case) Pierre Berton’s 
home town of Kleinberg.143 
“Strip joints, massage parlors and book stores advertising ‘adult movies’ and selling 
pornographic literature must be closed!”, stormed one minister in a letter to the mayor.144 
Alongside those citizens concerned with balancing competing rights, there were many who 
considered Sin Strip’s sex entrepreneurs to have no rights at all. In particular, religious 
opponents of Sin Strip were much less disposed to consider relocating the sex industry or 
simply limiting its ability to harass passers-by. They considered the Yonge clean-up to be 
fundamentally about the moral health of Canadian society, and saw any concession to the 
sex industry to be a foot in the door for other problems. No distinction was made between 
topless go-go dancers and body rub parlours. Writers like the C.’s, a couple from Rexdale, 
called on the mayor to “eradicate this cancer now, before it spreads,” and asked for police 
powers to be used to lock up the Strip’s purveyors of filth.145 They thought the mayor was 
missing the point with his focus on external advertising. A citizen living in the Regent Park 
area asked:  
How can we possibly expect to cure this social malignancy if we do not get 
to the root cause of it which is certainly on the inside of these buildings – 
the outside is mere window dressing!146 
Seeing Crombie’s early statements about the issue—as they were reported in the media—as 
very much in tune with this objective, many claimed that they were disappointed by his 
“reversal.” They perceived the mayor’s attempts to clarify his statements as backing down 
in the face of liberal opinion. “Did Pierre Berton’s slap on the wrist have anything to do with 
it?” asked one man.147 Reiterating their support for a crackdown, they pleaded with the 
mayor to do what was right on Yonge. 
 
                                                  
143 See for example, “A.B. to Crombie, Jan. 13, 1973,” CTA, P041796-1. 
144 “J.M. to Crombie, Dec. 29, 1972,” CTA, P041796-1. 
145 “C.’s to Crombie, Feb. 11, 1973,” CTA, 527607-6. 
146 “L.B. to Crombie, Jan. 15, 1973,” CTA, P041796-2. 
147 “Disappointed in Crombie’s reversal on the Yonge St. issue: Torontonian,” Toronto Star, Jan. 24, 1973. 
163 
 
Local, city, and metropolitan solutions 
The wide-ranging action demanded by opponents of Sin Strip did not come in 1973, for 
several reasons. First, public commentary on the issue was loud, but divided. Torontonians 
had made it clear to all concerned that the issue of the sex industry on Yonge Street was 
important to them. Local merchants and a vocal minority of citizens strongly supported 
action of some type by local government. But there was also very public criticism of the 
mayor’s plans. Despite anti-Strip campaigners’ efforts to define their stance as that of the 
average citizen or the silent majority, David Crombie and other city leaders were not 
convinced that they represented most Torontonians. The mayor would later express 
disappointment that there was not “broad public support” for a clean-up campaign in 
1973.148 A deputation from the Downtown Council felt rebuffed when it met with Mayor 
Crombie’s Executive Committee at the end of January and was told that any action was 
being postponed until a full report on the legal tools available was received from the city 
solicitor.149 Clearly, the City of Toronto was going to take time to develop a considered 
policy on Yonge. In the meantime, Crombie encouraged local businesspeople to find 
solutions among themselves. 
 Second, there was the question of distribution of powers among the city’s different 
levels of government. Since 1953 Toronto and surrounding suburbs had been bound 
together in the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto.150 Metro’s council and executive had 
taken up many of the powers that had formerly belonged to its member communities, 
including policing, licensing, and planning. In David Crombie’s words, while the mayor of 
Toronto maintained immense symbolic power—this was in part what had prompted so 
many citizens to choose to write to him—the City’s capacity to take unilateral action was 
essentially limited to controlling land uses.151 Even with the support Crombie was eventually 
able to gain from Toronto City Council, it seemed more and more that any meaningful 
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action on Sin Strip would have to come from Metro Toronto. Metro, for its part, would likely 
have to turn to the province for the necessary legislation. 
In this way, over the next few years, until early 1977, the police, local merchants, 
and three levels of government searched for the appropriate tools for solving what many 
perceived to be the problem of downtown Yonge Street. A vocal minority continued to press 
the mayor for action—between the spring of 1973 and 1977 he received hundreds more 
letters from citizens. One new actor in the campaign was the Toronto Council of Women, 
the local branch of the largest and oldest women’s organization in Canada. With support 
from affiliates across Ontario, the Toronto group launched a petition drive that gathered 
8,500 signatures on a letter calling for more regulation of body rub parlours and sex 
cinemas. Meanwhile, the Toronto police declared in April that they had found proof that 
American organized crime was gaining a foothold on Yonge, attracted by the estimated $10 
million that was earned yearly on Sin Strip.152 And the press continued to run lurid exposés 
of the sex industry, and while keeping the debate raging by soliciting public input. “Sordid or 
folksy, city’s Yonge St. divides opinion,” stated one Toronto Star headline.153 By 1975, the 
sordid side was getting decidedly more attention. 
Policing priorities 
Many citizens who wrote the mayor pointed to the police as the best weapon to be used on 
Yonge. But, as hinted at earlier, policing was not the panacea they thought it could be. 
Faced with limited resources and growing responsibilities, and convinced that Yonge’s sex 
industry was not a threat to public safety, the Toronto Police—with the notable exception of 
the Morality Squad—limited their activities on Yonge to “showing the flag” and maintaining 
order. In doing so, they effectively sanctioned the existence of Sin Strip, just as police in 
decades past had created de facto red light districts across the continent through a policy of 
“toleration and control.”154 For this reason, many of the attempts by other authorities to act 
on Yonge were explicitly designed to make up for what they saw as a gap in police 
enforcement of the criminal law.  
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The downtown Yonge strip had a heavy police presence compared to other areas of 
Toronto. Downtown Yonge Street ran through the centre of 52 Division, one of the smallest 
but busiest police precincts in Toronto. The area typically accounted for a large percentage 
of the city’s prostitution, narcotics, and public drunkenness offences. For example, in 1973, 
more than 600 prostitution arrests were made in 52 Division, accounting for 39% of the 
city’s total. The percentages for drugs and liquor offences were 24% and 34%, 
respectively.155 However, in terms of non-vice offences—assault, murder, rape, robbery—in 
the early 1970s it was no different from other downtown divisions.  
Unlike most other police districts in Toronto, 52 Division still maintained a foot patrol 
unit, with a strength of 33 officers in 1973. As a result, Yonge between Queen and Bloor was 
visiting daily by cops “on the beat,” as well as the scout cars that had replaced that older 
style of policing nearly everywhere else in the city. At certain times—evenings and 
weekends, and during the summer pedestrian malls—plainclothes officers and even the 
emergency task force were also deployed on the strip.156 The main goal of this day-to-day 
police presence in the area was the maintenance of public order. Apart from moments of 
disorder during the pedestrian mall summers, by almost all accounts it was successful in this 
aim.  
Policing commercialized sex was a separate matter. Since the 1880s, the boundaries 
of acceptable entertainment in Toronto had been patrolled by the Morality Department of 
the Toronto Police. Established in 1886, the department’s original mandate was to police 
“cruelty to women, children, and animals, desecration of the Sabbath, indecent exposure, 
and, of course, unlicensed drinking dens.”157 Gambling, prostitution, and obscene literature 
were soon added to its remit. Alongside investigating those offences, over the next few 
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decades the Morality Department would develop into what historian Greg Marquis has 
describe as a “key social service” in the City of Toronto.158 The department’s officers used 
their public authority to mediate and solve domestic conflicts outside of the courts, 
including thousands of cases of domestic abuse each year. With the development of other 
social services from the 1930s onwards, this function was removed from the Morality 
Department’s purview; however the department’s officers maintained a proprietary 
attitude towards public morality in the city, and continued to see themselves as its best 
arbiters. 
By the late 1960s the Morality Bureau was still a significant force within the larger 
Metropolitan Toronto Police Department. It employed 39 officers and possessed six cars, 
making it the one of the largest special units within the larger police force of over 3,000 
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officers.159 Its formal responsibilities included the regulation of obscenity, prostitution, 
drugs, gambling, and other urban vices. They were extremely active in the Yonge Street 
entertainment area. Bookstores, bars, theatres, and other places of business could count on 
weekly visits to gauge whether the entertainment and materials offered were acceptable or 
obscene. Reports made by morality officers reveal that they kept tabs on the opening and 
closing of businesses, on the prices charged for peep shows or massages, and on possible 
breaches of the law. Adult bookstores were provided with lists of unacceptable materials, 
and threatened with raids and obscenity charges if they did not pull them from their 
shelves.160 The bureau’s head from 1969, Inspector John Wilson, aggressively positioned 
himself as Toronto’s chief censor, pursuing charges against several area bookstores and 
even overruling the Ontario Board of Censors to ban further showings of bizarre and not 
particularly explicit erotic comedy Can Hieronymous Merkin Ever Forget Mercy Humppe and 
Find True Happiness? (1969).161 
Yet despite its tough stance on obscenity, the Morality Squad proved unable to do 
more than limit certain aspects of Sin Strip. As described earlier in this chapter, the end of 
the 1960s and the early 1970s were characterized by reform of the Criminal Code of Canada 
and ongoing debates over obscenity and prostitution laws. Community standards were in 
flux, and this new permissiveness soon trickled down to the enforcement level. By 1972 this 
could be felt at the level of enforcement on Yonge. Strip shows were largely self-regulating, 
and both sex cinemas and adult bookstores were pushing the limits of what they could 
display to customers in court. Morality officers continued to seize books and films and make 
arrests, but they were much less confident in securing convictions than before.162  
Body rub parlours presented a different problem. Police were well aware that many 
of Yonge’s growing number of massage joints offered sexual “extras” to customers; six 
Morality Squad officers seem to have been detailed to the specific duty of investigating 
body rubs.163 But acquiring evidence of this was difficult. Officers on routine visits had to get 
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past warning buzzers, peepholes, and other measures put in place by operators to slow 
them down.164 And police in plainclothes were instructed by superiors not to disrobe during 
visits, which hampered their ability to operate undercover.165 A 1977 police report summed 
up the difficulties officers investigating body rub parlours faced from the start: 
The female attendants will not discuss services until a $20.00 fee has been 
paid and the customer is in the session room. The customer is asked to strip, 
and in some cases, take a shower. He also has to produce identification and 
the attendant will check through his wallet. If she is satisfied the customer 
is not a police officer, she will then discuss ‘extras’ (offers of sex).166 
The alternative was to launch full-scale raids of parlours, which occurred infrequently 
throughout the 1970s. But this required the devotion of significant manpower resources—
six to eight officers per raid—and as a result was a costly way to lay charges that might carry 
as little as a fine of a few hundred dollars for those convicted. The legal question of whether 
parlours were private or public places was still open, which had bearing on whether bawdy 
house charges could stick.167 Police reports indicate that in 1976, for example, officers 
operating on Yonge laid 43 charges for keeping a bawdy house, 20 for being an inmate of a 
bawdy house and 43 for showing obscene films. Only a few meaningful convictions resulted, 
however: most of the accused received small fines, suspended sentences, or probation.168  
The story of public sex work was in some ways similar. Since the replacement of the 
vagrancy provision of the criminal code with a “soliciting” offence in 1972, police lost their 
primary weapon in regulating prostitution in public places.169 By 1977, Metro Police Chief 
Harold Adamson was arguing that his force was “powerless” to stop street prostitution. He 
claimed that this situation—like that of panhandling on Yonge—would only change with the 
return of vagrancy legislation.170 This was somewhat exaggerated. The difficulties of 
securing convictions on the new offence of soliciting were very real, especially after 1974, 
when Ontario courts began to ask for proof that prostitutes had annoyed or harassed a 
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prospective customer. But Toronto police continued to devote considerable resources to 
policing street prostitution, using a near-constant uniformed police presence and frequent 
arrests to discourage the trade. This was visible on Yonge and even more noticeable in the 
area east of Sin Strip, between Church and Sherbourne Streets, where the highest 
concentration of sex workers was. In one typical year beginning in mid-1976, the police laid 
893 soliciting and 297 loitering charges in the two areas.171 According to police statistics, 
only 30% resulted in a conviction, and those that did were typically punished with a $100 
fine. The experience of being questioned, arrested, and released by the police became an 
unavoidable part of street sex work and acted to limit its scope.    
It is important to remember, as Kenneth Meier points out in his study of the politics 
of vice, that police always have more responsibilities than resources.172 At a time when 
public concern over violent crime, the drug problem, and even street prostitution was high, 
it makes sense that pursuing relatively more difficult charges against Sin Strip businesses 
was a lower priority for the Toronto police. Obscene and sexual activities on Yonge were 
taking place indoors, and offering little in the way of danger to the general public. Janis Cole, 
who observed and filmed the day-to-day life of body rub parlours on Yonge in the mid-
1970s, recalls that the police visited parlours regularly, but only to determine that there 
were no difficult customers or problems spilling out onto the street.173 This relatively cordial 
relationship with sex business employees fits well with the force’s prioritization of 
maintaining order and safety over launching relatively unproductive investigations of the 
sex industry. Of course, if new legal tools became available or massive political pressure 
were brought to bear, that could quickly change.  
Self-regulation 
While police complained that their hands were tied, one of the first interventions to result 
from the clean-up campaign came from Yonge Street merchants. Following a meeting with 
the mayor and his executive in early January 1973, the Downtown Council decided to try to 
put his suggestion of “self-regulation” into action. In an open letter delivered to area shops, 
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they asked operators to tone down their sidewalk displays, cut down on noise, and stop 
passing out the handbills that were offending shoppers and clogging the area’s gutters.174 
They met with some success, at least on the issue of noise pollution. By April they were able 
to boast in their newsletter that 23 out of 29 offenders had removed their sidewalk 
loudspeakers. A list of those unwilling to cooperate had been passed along to the city. Citing 
the numerous deputations they had made to the municipal government, they asked “who 
has done the most effective thing concerning the Yonge Street problem? The Yonge Street 
merchants themselves!!” Just a page later, however, this congratulatory tone was absent as 
the Council acknowledged that Yonge still had a handbill problem.175 
In fact, the issue of advertising was one of the first on which the owners of Sin Strip 
businesses decided to state their own case. On the heels of their letter to area merchants, a 
lawyer representing two area massage parlours wrote the Downtown Council to present his 
clients’ point of view. He challenged the idea that body rub handbills and loudspeakers were 
creating an unpleasant atmosphere, and criticized the Council as unrepresentative.176 He 
also made the point that handbills were necessary to the functioning of his clients’ 
businesses, since all three major Toronto papers had recently either rejected or imposed 
limits on advertising sex-related businesses in their pages. In the case of the Sun, that 
decision had been made just ten days prior. Prior to launching a crusade against Yonge, the 
tabloid had printed an entire page of ads for sex businesses—mostly on Yonge—in each 
issue. But in its “clean up Yonge” editorial of January 16, the paper (somewhat self-
righteously) announced a change of policy.177  
The Downtown Council’s campaign against sidewalk advertising managed to take 
some loudspeakers off the street, and it prompted at least one Sin Strip business owner—
Arnold Linetsky, of Starvin’ Marvin’s burlesque—to join the group. Sex businesses refused to 
stop distributing handbills, however, although a few of them decided to make a nod to civic 
responsibility and add messages like “Keep Toronto clean and beautiful. Please do not litter” 
to the margins of their handbills.178 But overall it failed to do much to answer established 
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merchants’ concerns. Their lobbying continued—by spring 1973 the Council had sent 
deputations not just to the mayor and his executive, but to the city’s Urban Renewal, 
Housing, Fire and Legislation Committee, and Metro Toronto’s Police and Licensing 
Commissions. And beginning in late 1973 both the City of Toronto and Metro began to look 
seriously at their options for regulating Sin Strip.  
Zoning for (and against) sex 
At the city level, it became clear that there were only a few policy measures available. This 
was clearly outlined in a 1974 report made to the mayor by the City’s Commissioner of 
Development on the Sin Strip issue.179 The report mentioned a number of avenues that his 
department had investigated, stretching to the limits (and beyond) of the city’s powers. All 
attempted to use the City’s power over land uses as a proxy for regulating undesirable 
businesses; all but one turned out to be blind alleys. The first possible approach was 
historical preservation. At the time, the Province of Ontario was developing legislation that 
would eventually become the Ontario Heritage Act (1975). Among other things this 
legislation would allow the city to designate streetscapes like Yonge’s for architectural 
preservation. However, the author cautioned, this would likely act only to prevent 
conversion of facades and visible deterioration of historic strip buildings. A second approach 
was to use a bylaw to designate Yonge as a special “Redevelopment Area,” under the 
Ontario Planning Act, which would allow the city, in theory, to expropriate and resell area 
buildings for private development. This was an extreme measure, and had been 
controversial each of the three times it had been used over the past two decades. For an 
administration elected on a platform of slowing the development boom, it was a non-
starter. 
The only policy that was seriously considered by the City that year was the last: 
zoning. The report suggested that the city’s zoning bylaw could be amended to restrict body 
rub parlours to certain types of commercial districts. This meant they would need special 
permission to open up in areas, like Yonge, that were close to residential development. In 
this way their spread could be limited, and they could eventually be dispersed from Yonge 
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into peripheral commercial districts. Parallels were drawn to the way other “noxious uses”, 
such as polluting industrial plants, had been confined to specific zones and kept out 
proximity to residential neighbourhoods. Since its beginnings, zoning law has been an 
important tool used by municipal authorities to shape the development of neighbourhoods 
and bar certain activities from occurring in them. In the 1970s, amid a resurgence of 
community politics in Toronto and other Canadian cities, it was among other things a 
weapon used to maintain the integrity—and property values—of gentrifying downtown 
neighbourhoods where single-family homes were still the norm.180  
Other actors within the city endorsed the zoning approach, and suggested that it 
also be applied to other sex-related businesses. Alderman Reid Scott, a member of the 
mayor’s Executive Committee, led the initiative. In January 1974, and again in October, the 
issue came up for debate in Toronto City Council. At the second meeting members heard a 
report from the Planning Board suggesting that “massive use prohibitions throughout the 
City except within a limited ‘exempt’ area, may form an effective answer [to] the spread of 
pornographic uses.”181 They also heard from several councillors and residents’ associations 
who suggested that body rub parlours were beginning to open up outside of the Yonge 
Street area, threatening a city-wide problem.   
In recommending the use of zoning to combat Sin Strip, city officials and politicians 
cited the example of two other cities. Both Boston and Detroit had attempted to regulate 
commercialized sex through the use of zoning ordinances, although their methods and 
intent were quite different. In Detroit, a 1972 “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance” passed by City 
Council dictated that no new sex business could open within a thousand feet of an existing 
one, and those that did required permission from a majority of residents living nearby. A 
few years later, a major court victory would permit the city to apply this regulation to 
already-established sex businesses. The result was dispersal of a formerly concentrated red-
light district. In Boston, the approach was exactly the opposite. City authorities designated a 
two-block area in the downtown already dotted with sex businesses as an “adult 
entertainment zone,” and encouraged new peep shows, massage parlours and strip clubs to 
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open there. The area, referred to as the “Combat Zone,” became infamous nation-wide, and 
by 1976 was widely condemned after a rise in the crime rate and the sensationalized 
murder of a Harvard football player in the area.182 As the idea of a zoning change came to 
Toronto Council in fall of 1974, this was in the future. During that meeting and in later 
discussions Boston, and subsequently Detroit, were held up as examples that the city might 
be able to learn from.183  
Council’s response was to vote nearly unanimously to declare intent to change the 
city’s zoning bylaw. Within a year, they hoped, the law could be changed and the first step 
towards breaking up Sin Strip accomplished. Yet two major obstacles appeared that 
hampered both the creation of zoning amendment and any implementation. First, defining 
what types of businesses were banned was complicated. The old categories of “places of 
amusement” and “commercial clubs” would have to be redefined much more precisely than 
before. A balance needed to be struck between zoning out sex businesses and not 
restricting other, similar uses, including therapeutic massage parlours, first-run cinemas, 
pool halls, and arcades. That took time to develop. Second, the idea of an “exempt area” 
struck many as the first step towards a legal red-light district. There was never public 
agreement as to whether this was a good idea, or if so, where it would be located. Some 
would later suggest the largely-undeveloped eastern waterfront, or the area around King 
and Parliament Streets; others the Toronto Island.184 In the end, no councillor was willing to 
consider the prospect of a Toronto Combat Zone opening in their ward. Finally, and perhaps 
most crucially, even with a new zoning bylaw in place—which finally occurred in September 
1977—unlike Detroit, the city did not possess the power to force existing businesses to 
conform. In other words, short of new powers being granted to the city by the province, 
existing sex businesses would be unaffected by the law.185  
While a zoning bylaw was being formulated and re-formulated, the city tried a 
different tack: an inspections blitz. This tactic was a way to “show the flag,” and 
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demonstrate that the authorities were concerned about a specific type of business; it also 
offered a chance to use strict bylaw enforcement to impede the functioning of those 
businesses.186 On Yonge, the city targeted body rub parlours, which were considered the 
least stable type of business in the area and the most likely to be in violation of city 
regulations. In August 1974 the Commissioner of Development called a meeting with 
representatives from the Fire, Health, Buildings, and Development Departments.187 Using a 
list of sex businesses obtained from the police Morality Department, those departments 
carried out a series of inspections of Sin Strip body rubs that saw thirty-two properties 
visited by four inspectors (one from each department) in just a few days. Unsurprisingly, 
they found violations of city codes: defective electrical systems, dirty washrooms, even 
“animal excreta” on a staircase landing.188 Inspectors noted that a number of upstairs body 
rub parlours seem to have been using the flat roofs behind their operations to store 
garbage, sometimes up to 20 bags. One written order was issued by municipal staff, and 
dozens of minor violations dealt with through oral instructions. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the city had shown its willingness to use its powers—albeit limited—to make life 
difficult for Sin Strip businesspeople.  
Licensing 
In this context, it seemed like any significant legislative action on Sin Strip would have to 
come from the metropolitan level of government. Parallel to the City of Toronto’s 
investigation into zoning, Metro Toronto began to look at its own powers. In part this was 
triggered by the persistent lobbying of the Downtown Council. But there were other factors. 
Mayor Crombie and the City of Toronto’s concern for the issue had a significant impact. In 
1973 Toronto members still occupied 12 of 32 council seats, and 5 of 11 spots on the 
influential executive led by Chairman Paul Godfrey. When they had the support of at least 
one of the larger boroughs, they could play a decisive role in decision-making, avoiding the 
suburbs-city divide that plagued Metro on issues like transportation.189 On the issue of 
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regulating sex businesses, that support came first from conservative North York Mayor Mel 
Lastman. For Lastman and other suburban leaders, downtown Yonge was Toronto’s 
problem. But body rub parlours, which had begun to open up not just on the downtown 
strip, but further up Yonge, on Eglinton Avenue, and on other major thoroughfares, were 
everyone’s problem. Inspired by complaints from his constituents, in summer 1973 Lastman 
in his typically flamboyant style “declared war” on the estimated 20 massage businesses 
that had opened in North York over the past year.190 Other borough politicians would soon 
follow suit, making one important aspect of the perceived Sin Strip problem—the body 
rubs—a truly metropolitan issue.   
By focusing on body rub parlours, Metro Council both headed off many concerns 
about censorship and managed to unite both suburban and city politicians. By late 1973 
there was a broad consensus in Council that Metro should use its powers as a municipality 
to regulate or even ban body rubs within its bounds. There were only a few dissenters, 
downtown councillors like John Sewell and Karl Jaffary who saw the issue as a distraction 
from more important issues like housing. Yet, like the City of Toronto, Metro found itself 
hampered by its relatively limited legislative and enforcement capability. Still very much a 
creature of the province—like all Canadian cities—the statutes that defined the limits of 
Metro’s powers could only be altered by the Ontario Government. As a result, the first stage 
of Metro’s campaign against body rubs was to petition William Davis’ Progressive 
Conservative government at Queen’s Park. A November report by the Metro Solicitor 
outlined several different amendments that could be proposed to the province. 
At first, their attempts were rebuffed. At an animated meeting in December, Metro 
Council voted to ask the province for the power to prohibit body rub parlours, except for 
those offering medical or therapeutic treatment, entirely.191 That would require changes to 
the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act that the province—although not Metro’s legal 
advisors—thought went well beyond its legal authority. In effect, the Attorney-General 
viewed Metro’s proposed ban as a thinly-veiled attempt to legislate morality. “It is common 
knowledge that the purpose of this general prohibition of otherwise lawful activity is to 
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suppress the use of body rub parlour facilities for immoral purposes,” he wrote in a legal 
opinion relayed to Metro Council in May.192 But, he went on to argue, the suppression of 
immoral activity is clearly the province of the criminal law, and so under federal jurisdiction.  
Undaunted, Metro returned just two months later with a new rationale and end goal 
for legislation. Instead of banning body rubs, they would license them, just as they did 
dozens of other regulated businesses, including taxi cabs, fishmongers, chimney repairmen, 
and bakeries. And the law would not be enacted for reasons of morality, but to ensure 
health and safety standards and protect legitimate massage parlours. Those were real 
concerns to some. In particular, since the beginnings of the erotic massage business in 
Toronto, registered massage therapists had complained that their reputation was being 
tarnished by the new arrivals. “Topless body rub studios are extremely opposite to 
professional health studios,” wrote the owner of a downtown health studio to the mayor in 
early 1973.193 He went on to plead for politicians and the media to visit his studio to see for 
themselves. Interviewed by the Toronto Star, the director of the Ontario College of Massage 
speculated on the possible side-effects of an untrained massage: “A girl rubbing against the 
direction of the blood flow—we know this has happened in those places—can cause 
varicose veins,” he warned.194 And there were doubtless customers who had complained of 
the lack of cleanliness in body rub parlours, many of which were set up in cramped, badly 
renovated upstairs spaces. But the real purpose behind Metro’s proposal seems to have 
been to drive body rub parlours out of business by creating a licensing that was so strict as 
to make their continued operation unprofitable.  
The province deliberated for a year on Metro’s request for power over “licensing, 
regulating, governing and inspecting massage parlours,” through changes to the Municipal 
Act that governed city powers across the province.195 Then, in early June 1975, Premier 
Davis called a meeting with city politicians, at which he announced that the government 
would push the necessary legislation through the House by the end of the month. He 
explained to the press that he saw the amendment as part of a bigger campaign against the 
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problem of permissiveness, an issue on which people “expected the government to show 
some leadership.”196 Davis may have made the snap decision to grant Metro’s request as 
part of a larger strategy aimed at heading off defeat in a fall election. As one journalist 
noted somewhat cynically at the time, the premier’s new war on permissiveness was a 
worthwhile distraction from inflation, pollution, and the other larger economic and social 
problems voters blamed on his administration.197 The Yonge Street issue was being revived 
in the Toronto press in 1975, and was a natural choice for Davis to prove his law-and-order 
credentials. A series of articles that spring and summer in the Toronto Star explored the ins 
and outs of life on the strip, and generally concluded that the area was rotten to the core.198 
With a circulation of over 400,000, the Star was the city’s largest daily and a powerful 
influence on local politics. Moreover, after the Local Council of Women’s spring petition, 
there seemed to be new life in the anti-Sin Strip campaign. Following the premier’s 
announcement, David Crombie optimistically predicted to journalists that the Yonge Street 
strip would be cleaned up within a year under the new bylaw.199  
The body rub amendment to the Municipal Act passed on July 8, 1975, and Metro 
Toronto moved quickly to use the new powers it granted them. Within a month a 
committee composed of police, health, planning and licensing officials had prepared the 
first draft of a licensing bylaw. On the basis of expedience, Chairman Paul Godfrey and the 
drafting committee argued against holding public meetings to discuss the law.200 Instead, it 
was discussed twice in Metro committees before being enacted on August 26th. Bylaw 137-
75 was 24 pages long, and full of complicated provisions that would drastically limit the way 
body rub parlours conducted their business.201 Two conditions were particularly significant. 
First, the law stipulated significant fees for owning and operating a body rub: $3,000 in total 
per year, with $50 in additional fees to be paid by each attendant. This was well in excess of 
the license fees paid by registered masseurs ($15) or other legitimate professions. Second, it 
limited the number of licenses to be granted to 25, although there were perhaps 100 body 
                                                  
196 “Davis to let Metro license body rubs by the end of June,” Toronto Star, Jun. 10, 1975. 
197 “Politics and pornography: The Yonge Street clean-up,” Globe and Mail, July 5, 1975. 
198 See for example, “The Strip: a peek behind the neon signs,” Toronto Star, May 10, 1975, “Rotten fruit on the 
money tree,” Toronto Star, July 2, 1975. 
199 “Crombie sees Yonge strip clean in year,” Toronto Star, Jun. 11, 1975. 
200 “Godfrey memo re: licensing, Aug. 12, 1975,” CTA, 47331-3. 
201 Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, Bylaw 137-75 (1975). 
178 
 
rubs active in Metro at the time, a third of which were on Yonge. Other important sections 
required parlours to strictly limit advertising, close by 1 am, clean common areas regularly, 
and remove locking doors and other hindrances to entry, a measure that would make it 
easier for police and inspectors to visit unannounced. Persons working in a parlour were 
also liable to medical examination “at any time,” which presumably included testing for 
sexually transmitted infections. The strict terms of the bylaw were meant to be a penalty in 
and of themselves; but violation also meant financial penalties, and the possibility that the 
business would lose its license or face an injunction forcing it to close.  
This draconian law—the Globe and Mail called it “Mr. Godfrey’s War Measures 
Act”—attracted criticism almost immediately.202 Parlours were given 60 days to apply for a 
license, and a total of 21 did during that time.203 But two obstacles soon appeared to 
implementing the bylaw. The first was a problem of definition. Rather than applying for 
costly licenses, many operators decided it would be easier to change slightly the name and 
nature of their business. After all, the key attraction of the body rub for male customers had 
never been the massage: it was the prospect of having a private encounter with an 
attractive, nude woman, with the possibility of sexual satisfaction. That situation could—and 
did—occur under other circumstances. So in mid-1975 a number of body rub parlours 
closed, only to re-open as nude encounter parlours, photography studios, or other similar 
businesses. This problem had been predicted by both some Toronto politicians and Metro 
legal staff. Toronto (and Metro) Councillor John Sewell had called the bylaw ineffective 
because it failed to make allowance for just such a tactic. He illustrated his point by wearing 
a t-shirt that read “License nude ping-pong” to Metro Council meetings.204 Metro counsel 
George Rust D’Eye was also aware of the problem, and wrote to the province asking them to 
consider a broader amendment to the Municipal Act to give the city more leeway in the 
future.205 He had also begun to look into ways of licensing all types of sex entertainment 
businesses as “places of amusement.” 
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The second obstacle to implementation was a legal challenge launched by Sin Strip 
businessmen themselves. Arnold Linetsky, owner or operator of several Sin Strip 
businesses—including Starvin’ Marvin’s and body rub parlour Mr. Arnold’s—was the central 
figure in their campaign. He was also one of the best known of Toronto’s sex industry 
entrepreneurs. When journalists writing about Sin Strip wanted an insider’s perspective, 
they often turned to Linetsky, who never failed to provide a colourful quote or common-
sense defence of the industry. In August 1975 he led a challenge to the new bylaw, 
describing himself as president of the Yonge St. Adult Entertainment Association and 
claiming to represent ten Sin Strip businesses. Even before Metro’s bylaw was drafted, he 
vowed to fight it in court on their behalf. “I don’t care if they try to knock out some of the 
small, sleazy operations,” he explained, “but with the kind of money I make, they won’t 
legislate me out of business.”206 Linetsky would elaborate on the Association’s stance during 
a deputation to Metro’s Legislation and Licensing Committee to protest the new law.207 
Much like members of the Downtown Council, he attempted to present sex merchants as 
legitimate businessmen with a stake in good relations with the community and government. 
Linetsky explained that he and his colleagues were not opposed in principle to regulation, 
since that would help drive “fly by night” operations out of the business. But they objected 
to thirteen different aspects of the law that they saw as “punitive” and intended at driving 
“legitimate law-abiding businessmen out of business”. These included the high fees and 
limited number of licenses, restrictions on tips and paying in advance, and mandatory 
closing at 1 am.  
The Association’s criticisms had little influence on the final form of the bylaw, 
leading Linetsky to launch a court challenge in September 1975 seeking to quash it as 
discriminatory and in bad faith. In particular, he argued that since his business took in 30% 
of its income between 1 and 8 am, the law’s stipulated closing hour of 1 am amounted to a 
knowing prohibition on his type of business.208 Over the next few months he would continue 
to argue his case, despite ongoing personal legal troubles stemming from a conviction on 
obscenity charges.209 There was a strong element of self-promotion in Linetsky’s campaign 
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against the bylaw. Not long after announced his legal challenge, he suggested confidentially 
to Metro staff that if he and other established businesses were given preferential 
treatment, he would postpone or withdraw his appeal.210 And he revelled in the temporary 
celebrity that the case gave him. In an unexpected turn of events, he and another Yonge 
Street businessman—Peter Budd, of Funland Arcade—would challenge two reform 
councillors for their seats in downtown Ward 6 in the 1976 elections. Neither came close, 
but both ran credible campaigns that emphasized common-sense conservatism—although 
not moral regulation—downtown growth, and, most of all, kicking out the “socialist, 
idealist” reform caucus.211 That they had the resources to run spoke to the success of their 
businesses; that they chose the reformers as their targets underlined how the issue of a 
Yonge clean-up refused to split along conservative/progressive lines. It had been first raised 
by a (centrist) reform Mayor and trumpeted by a conservative daily, and was now being 
pushed by suburban conservatives and downtown progressives in equal measure. 
Linetsky was not the first person to challenge the right of Canadian municipalities to 
regulate sex in their downtowns. Earlier that year, the city of Prince George had been 
chastened in a BC court for denying a man named Joseph Payne a business license on the 
grounds that his sex boutique would harm the town’s “moral welfare.” Payne’s victory was 
doubtless an inspiration for Linetsky’s legal advisors.212 While Linetsky’s appeal was 
eventually unsuccessful, as the case made its way to the Supreme Court of Ontario all 
attempts to prosecute businesses for violating the body rub bylaw were blocked. The more 
than 25 cases prepared by Metro staff under the law could not be brought to trial until 
Linetsky’s challenge was resolved. 
Tragedy and crackdown, 1977 
By 1977 Sin Strip had inspired a flurry of reports, memoranda, and meetings from the media 
and three levels of government, but very little in the way of concrete action. The police 
continued to operate as a regulatory force on the strip, but their primary concern remained 
maintaining order. Support for a clean-up had grown among city politicians since the 
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citizens’ mobilization of 1973, but both Toronto and Metro had found it difficult to find the 
right tools for controlling or regulating the sex industry. It seemed that each time they 
returned to the issue with a new approach, their momentum was dissipated by legal 
challenges, slow intergovernmental communication, and lack of resources. Meanwhile, Sin 
Strip managed to thrive. In April the Eaton Centre shopping mall—touted by many as a 
major step towards revitalizing Yonge Street—opened its doors at the south end of the 
entertainment strip. But its presence had had no discernible effect on neighbouring porn 
theatres and peep shows, and body rub parlours dotted streets in every Metro suburb from 
Etobicoke to Scarborough. However, the situation would change drastically during spring 
and summer of 1977. 
In March 1977 two developments improved the city’s enforcement options on 
Yonge. First, the challenge brought by the Yonge St. Adult Entertainment Association to 
Metro’s body rub licensing bylaw was finally withdrawn. It had stalled prosecutions under 
the law for eighteen months, creating a backlog of cases and giving Sin Strip parlours ample 
time to rebrand as nude encounter parlours. A few had applied for licenses—and five were 
issued after somewhat theatrical hearings in front of the Licensing Commission—but most 
sex businesses ignored the law. In late March, the first prosecutions under the bylaw began 
to proceed, leading to nine convictions for “body rub owner – no license” in provincial 
courts over the next four months.213  
Second, Metro Council began to work on legislation that would broaden the range of 
businesses subject to the body rub licensing regime. Under a new bylaw passed that month, 
licenses would be required not just for massage parlours, but for all “places of amusement 
offering nude services.”214 Pending provincial approval, this would give Metro the ability to 
regulate nude photography studios, nude encounter parlours, nude dancing studios, and 
any and all other variations on the theme. Legal staff were also looking into ways that the 
bylaw could be used as a basis for “injunctive relief” against Sin Strip businesses. This 
meant, essentially, asking courts for orders that would prevent sex shops that had been 
convicted from reopening their doors. Metro’s lawyers were unsure if this tactic could work; 
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but it if did, it would give them a new way to interfere with the income of Sin Strip business 
owners. Most importantly, public support for a Yonge clean-up increased dramatically 
during the summer of 1977. By August events had brought new constituencies into the 
campaign against Sin Strip, and strengthened the resolve of those who had been involved in 
the campaign since the winter of 1972.   
The Places of Amusement report 
The return of Sin Strip to centre stage in municipal politics—where it had been briefly in 
both 1973 and 1975—began with the publication of a scathing report on the sex industry by 
three Toronto councillors. Reform councillors Susan Fish, Allan Sparrow, and Pat Sheppard 
were asked by council earlier that year to investigate Yonge, and recommend initiatives that 
could be taken by all levels of government to “regulate the location, size, method of 
operation, concentration, advertising, ownership, and operators” of sex shops and 
arcades.215 While their mandate was criticized by some—the Toronto Star called it a “useless 
look into other cities’ porn”—their final report was widely publicized and presented the case 
against Sin Strip in its most comprehensive form to date.216 It was also striking proof that 
the powerful reform group in city politics, initially sceptical of Crombie’s calls for a clean-up 
in 1973, was firmly in favour of municipal action on Yonge. 
“Effectively, nude service establishments are public nuisances,” the authors 
explained in the introduction, “and the tenor of this report is to treat them that way.” The 
main thrust of the report was to characterize Sin Strip as a problem, not of morals, but of 
downtown decline. Yonge’s sex shops, they argued, were “the catalysts to the degeneration 
of Yonge Street and surrounding neighbourhoods,” a problem that “if left unchecked, could 
permanently damage this City.” The massage parlours, sex cinemas, and arcades on Yonge 
were entrenched on Yonge, and had brought with them crime, physical decay, and other 
serious impediments to public enjoyment of the downtown. In this view they echoed the 
Downtown Council and the many Torontonians who had written the mayor complaining 
that the sex shops had taken Yonge away from the people.  
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There were some new elements to their analysis, however. Much like the anti-
development activists I describe in the third section of the thesis, the authors of the report 
saw the first task of opponents of the sex industry to be uncovering in detail the patterns of 
ownership, methods, and practices that made them successful. Citing data retrieved from 
assessment rolls and other sources, the three councillors identified a small group of 
landlords, owners and operators as the root of the problem. These men and women—
mostly men—ran sex businesses strictly for profit, often as investment properties, and 
without any thought for the health or future of the neighbourhood. The key players on Sin 
Strip included Arnold Linetsky—who owned or operated two strip clubs and three massage 
parlours through four different companies—and the Martin family, who ran 21st Century 
Cinema and three massage parlours. Using a tactic of naming and shaming, the report 
identified more than fifty proprietors of sex shops on Yonge by name and address. 
The authors emphasized how the various Strip businesses reinforced one another, 
and were increasingly integrated into common networks of ownership that made them hard 
to dislodge. This interconnection also helped them to manufacture a market for their 
services through cross-promotion. For example, peep shows were installed at the back of 
arcades, and body rub parlours solicited customers in sex shops and adult bookstores. In 
this way, the authors argued, nearly every business on the entertainment strip facilitated 
prostitution. If it didn’t happen onsite, it would occur upstairs or next door in another 
associated business. The report also asserted that not only was much of the money being 
earned on Yonge going to absentee owners, but those owners were directly connected to 
more serious crime. Included in an appendix was a letter from Ontario Provincial Police 
Commissioner H.H. Graham in which he stated that “the profits from body rub parlours, 
prostitution, etc. were being used to finance more serious types of crime, such as the 
distribution of drugs.” Members of the “principal organized crime family in Buffalo” had ties 
to the Strip, and, the authors speculated, the area was “ripe for further exploitation.” 
This narrative of American “invasion” of Toronto’s downtown had, of course, 
surfaced before. The Morality Squad had long argued that sojourning female American 
prostitutes were encouraging the growth of the Sin Strip scene. Citizens frequently 
associated Yonge’s sex district with American influence, something that certain businesses—
Times Square Books, for example—played up to through advertising strategies and displays 
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of flags or other paraphernalia. Unconfirmed accusations of mafia involvement in the 
profitable sexual entertainment scene served to further identify it as something “foreign” to 
Toronto, not just morally but literally. In a time of rising nationalism and concern for the 
American urban model this could be powerful ammunition. 
The solutions proposed by Fish, Sparrow and Sheppard were familiar to anyone who 
had followed Toronto and Metro’s halting attempts to regulate Yonge since 1973. As David 
Crombie explained during our conversation, the report didn’t say anything new, but instead 
put together a broad range of existing ideas and plans into one coherent text.217 The 
councillors recommended that Toronto’s zoning law should be reinforced to limit the spread 
of sex businesses and pinball arcades, Metro’s licensing bylaw should be tightened up and 
consistently prosecuted, and that the province and federal government should investigate 
the area’s links to organized crime. It called out the province for dragging its feet on 
enabling Metro’s latest requests for legislative powers and the authority to request 
injunctions. From the police it asked for stricter enforcement of existing laws against sex-
related businesses and street prostitution, including weekly inspections of businesses and 
an end to police fraternization with prostitutes.    
The media picked up on the report’s uncompromising tone and copious research, 
and generally agreed with its conclusions. The Sun re-launched its anti-Sin Strip campaign, 
using the same populist tone that it had employed in 1973 to rail against civil libertarians: 
A reason why Toronto is getting the reputation of being one of North 
America’s most wide-open, anything-goes, porn-prone cities, is the lobby 
that feels any form of censorship or control is only a step removed from gas 
ovens and concentration camps...The asses. If good literature and fine art 
can ennoble—surely pornography and smut can debase!218 
Right alongside it, this time around, was the Toronto Star, which over the next few months 
became a powerful advocate for a Sin Strip crackdown. In a series of articles the paper 
reprinted large chunks of the report, bookended by editorials that called the Strip “a blight 
on Toronto” and declared that it was “time to clean up Yonge St.”219 Only the Globe and 
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Mail was cautious, as it had been since the beginning of the Sin Strip debates, arguing that 
the report was alarmist and recommended action well beyond the scope of the situation. 
“City Council and other levels of government are really being asked to take up arms, moral 
arms, against the character of a neighbourhood…We don’t like the approach.”220  
The owners of Sin Strip businesses were critical of the report. Arnold Linetsky called 
the idea that Yonge was run by organized crime “ridiculous,” adding that the barriers to 
entry into the business were so low that no one needed that kind of backing.221 A few weeks 
after its release, the litigious Linetsky would bring launch a suit against the authors of the 
report for defamation of character, asking for an astronomical $250,000 in damages.222 
Another sex merchant interviewed by the Sun argued that the problems on Yonge were 
really the fault of just a few “bad apples”. Meanwhile, arcade owner Peter Budd retained 
counsel to express his anger at having his reputation smeared by the report. In a long 
submission to the city his lawyer protested the report’s “innuendo and misrepresentations,” 
including the assertion that his businesses were linked to body rub parlours simply because 
they shared the same building.223 By that criteria, he argued, A & A Records and Swiss Chalet 
were equally guilty. But this criticism of the report did little to stop the building of 
momentum behind increased city action on Yonge. 
Letters supporting the report’s recommendations of “fast and comprehensive” 
legislative action began to pour into the mayor’s office. Since 1973, apart from the massive 
petition collected by the Council of Women, the mayor had received perhaps 300 letters on 
the subject. Suddenly, in June and July more than 400 letters and phone calls poured in. 
Once again, the vast majority were in favour of a clean-up. Some of those who wrote were 
familiar from the campaign of 1973, including the Salvation Army and anti-pornography 
campaigners like the North Toronto-based Canadians for Decency. But new constituencies 
began to mobilize that had given the issue little attention in previous years. One was the 
Confederation of Resident and Ratepayer Organizations (CORRA), an umbrella association 
that represented dozens of middle-class neighbourhood groups in Toronto and had been 
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influential in keeping moderate reform councillors in power. The support for the report of 
residents’ groups like CORRA or the North Jarvis Community Association—representing a 
densely populated neighbourhood just east of Yonge—sent a clear signal that the clean-up 
campaign was engaging a larger constituency than in the past.224  
Building on what Councillor Pat Sheppard called the “impetus” created by his report 
and this public outcry, in early July David Crombie and Toronto councillors met with the 
Attorney-General to discuss ways of “fast-tracking” prosecutions of Yonge Street sex-
businesses within the provincial courts and pushing the idea of injunctive relief.225 The next 
day, the police established a task force to coordinate enforcement on Yonge, bringing 
officers from 52 Division and the Morality Bureau under the same command for the first 
time.226 A committee was also set up by Toronto Council—with Crombie as chairman—to 
implement the report’s recommendations. “We can’t wait forever for the other levels of 
government to act,” Crombie told journalists, explaining using court-ordered injunctions to 
“padlock” sex shops might be the “bold stroke” needed to clean up Sin Strip. A few days 
later he publicly criticized Premier Davis for ignoring the city’s request for powers to deal 
with the “yawning cesspool on Yonge.”227 As his rhetoric became more and more dramatic, 
a few Toronto citizens responded with concern. One wrote to the Star that Crombie’s 
approach “smacks of totalitarian dictatorship,” adding that that kind of thinking by public 
officials was a greater danger to society than selling sex.228 But their voices were 
outnumbered in June and July by pages of letters from Torontonians who were “appalled” 
by the state of Yonge, and demanded action along the lines of the report.229 Momentum for 
a clean-up was growing. 
The shoeshine boy 
Just days later in that hot summer, Toronto was rocked by a tragedy that seemed to confirm 
the worst fears of opponents of Sin Strip. In New York City “Son of Sam” killer David 
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Berkowitz had killed again on July 31; and now Toronto had its own gruesome, senseless 
killing to contend with. On August 1, police found the body of 12-year old Portuguese-born 
shoeshine boy Emanuel Jaques on the roof of Yonge Street massage parlour Charlie’s   
Angels. Missing for four days, Jaques had been lured away from his stand with the promise 
of extra cash, before being raped and murdered by four area men. Three of them were 
casual employees of the body rub parlour, performing odd jobs for operator Joe Martin Jr. in 
exchange for rooms in the building. They were arrested the same day the body was 
discovered—one gave himself up at 51 Division—and their gruesome crime was front-page 
news across Canada. The Toronto Star and Sun provided daily coverage of the story for a 
week, interviewing the boy’s grieving family and citizens who expressed outrage at his 
senseless death. The Sun’s editorial on the crime—“Sin Strip Victim”—set the tone for 
media coverage. It called Jaques “a victim of Yonge St.,” and called for the city to “purge it 
of at least some of the porn, smut, sin.”230    
Torontonians were shocked by the crime, by the youth of its victim and the 
perceived depravity of his killers. This was not the first time a child had been abducted, 
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 Image 2.8: A shoeshine boy (not Manuel Jaques) plying his trade on Yonge’s sidewalks, 
summer 1972. By street photographer Charles Dobie. 
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assaulted, and killed in downtown Toronto.231 But for those who had followed the debates 
about Yonge’s changing character, there was a powerful symbolism to Jaques’ death. The 
street’s shoeshine boys, who set up shop on the Yonge Street strip each year in warm 
weather, were an iconic part of its image. The sex industry, it seemed, had destroyed not 
just a young, innocent life, but one of the most visible aspects of the Strip’s storied 
reputation as “a people place,” and Toronto’s “main street.” From the first reports of 
Jaques’ death, his murder was inextricably associated with the larger decline of the area, 
and the perceived failure of all levels of government to do something to clean up the area. 
Some saw parallels to the murder spree of New York killer “Son of Sam,” who had been 
terrorizing New York City since the previous year. As a result, public outcry was fierce. The 
day after the boy’s body was discovered, staff at the mayor’s office scrambled to record 
messages from the more than 200 people who telephoned to voice their opinions on the 
issue. Secretaries summarized their reactions for the mayor: 
Outrage at tragedy which many feel could have been prevented…grief for 
the loss of a young child…anger at why the gov’ts haven’t taken action 
before this.232 
Callers blamed Jaques’ parents for allowing him to work alone on Yonge, and the area’s sex 
businesses for creating an atmosphere moral decay; but most of all they blamed the city and 
the police for dragging their heels on the clean-up. Stacks of letters followed, dwarfing even 
the 1972-73 campaign in number. Within a few weeks more than eight hundred people had 
personally written the mayor on the issue, and over 3000 had signed petitions calling for Sin 
Strip to be cleaned up. Many of their arguments were familiar from the citizens’ campaign 
of 1972-73, which had in many ways set the tone for the clean-up debate. But there were 
some important differences.  
The 1977 mobilization against the sex industry touched individuals and communities 
that had not taken part in earlier efforts. As with the reaction to the Places of Amusement 
report, religious conservatives and well-organized North Toronto citizens took advantage of 
the resurgence in interest to reiterate their positions. Many of their letters and calls had the 
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added element of rage at the city for dragging its heels. “The Yonge St. Strip was supposed 
to be cleaned up four years ago,” wrote one angry man. “You + I are as guilty of murdering 
that little twelve year old child, as the sick animals who were allowed to carry out that 
dreadful deed,” wrote a woman from Mississauga who had followed the issue for years.233 
There was often a note of triumphalism or “I told you so” to their letters. One woman, a 
hairdresser from North Toronto, wrote that she had spoken personally to the mayor in 1974 
about the issue, and “As events have proved I was correct.” Attached to her letter calling for 
an end to “continuing debates” and a beginning of action, she attached the signatures of 30 
of her clients who felt the same way.234 As in earlier years, women—and especially 
mothers—represented an important percentage of those who wrote or called; during the 
first week, they accounted for 70% of all communications. Many began their comments like 
Mrs. D. Clarke, who wrote in the Star that as mother of a 13-year old son she felt she shared 
Mrs. Jaques’ grief.235 Even Tony O’Donohue, who had championed a clean-up in his 
unsuccessful mayoral campaign in 1972, returned to the debate. He wrote angrily in the 
Toronto Star that Toronto’s new title should be “City of Shame.” “When will the slumbering 
majority wake up and clean up our whole system?” he asked.236 
But for many others, Emanuel Jaques’ murder was a rallying cry to engage in a 
debate that, for whatever reason, they had not been a part of before that summer. Personal 
and community connections to the Jaques family mobilized several new constituencies. 
Children familiar with the Jaques family circulated a petition that bore nothing but a messily 
scrawled “YONGE ST. SIN STRIP” at the top. Dozens of the family’s neighbours in working-
class Regent Park, a housing project a few minutes east of the strip, signed on to the letter 
before delivering it by hand to City Hall; 75 of them would later rally in front of City Hall to 
demand action.237 A woman who worked at Wendy’s Hamburgers at Yonge and Dundas 
explained what a blow the crime had been to the community of workers on that section of 
Yonge, where Emanuel and his friends were well-known. She stated that 
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Anybody who has anything to do with the corner of Yonge and Dundas (that 
is, lives there, works there or just hangs around there) loved that little boy 
and is heartbroken…Nobody smiles, and the past few days have been spent 
with people crying and walking around with red eyes…So many people have 
been promising for so long to do something about that “Sin Strip.” But now 
it’s too late.238  
Meanwhile, Toronto’s Portuguese Canadians took the tragedy especially to heart. As 
historian Gilberto Fernandes explores in a recent article, the death of Emanuel Jaques was a 
pivotal moment in the “political maturation” of Canada’s largest Portuguese community. It 
galvanized thousands who did not normally engage in politics to speak their minds, and 
forced politicians at all three levels of government to recognize the community’s electoral 
potential.239 Thousands of dollars were raised for the Jaques family in just a few weeks 
through grassroots fundraising campaigns. Members organized a massive public funeral for 
the boy, drawing 4,000 mourners to the west end neighbourhood that was the centre of 
Portuguese Toronto. A few days later, a crowd estimated at 15,000 persons—many carrying 
banners and signs in Portuguese—rallied in front of City Hall and Queen’s Park to express 
their anger. Community organizer José Rafael addressed the crowd, who responded to his 
speech with angry calls for justice. The people at the rally refused to leave Queen’s Park 
until addressed by a member of the government, forcing acting Mayor Arthur Eggleton to 
frantically search the legislature for someone willing to speak to them. The provincial 
secretary for resource development was cheered when he emerged to promise that the 
government was looking into the matter.240 Community members also visited the mayor in 
his office, called, or wrote him.  
Elements of the city’s Greek and Italian communities also expressed their solidarity 
with the stance of Toronto’s Portuguese. It seemed that Jaques’ death had touched a nerve 
among recent immigrants who felt discomfort with the “permissive society”—to use the 
words of the Italian Canadian Congress’ local delegate—but had hesitated to speak out 
about the issue previously.241 A number of letters received by the mayor were written in 
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Italian or Portuguese, testimony to the urgent need that these communities felt to speak 
out, even when they could not be confident of having their opinions understood.  
There was an angry, even violent new tone to the anti-Sin Strip campaign following 
Emanuel Jaques’ death. Some of those who mobilized called for the death penalty for the 
four men accused of his murder: demonstrators at the City Hall rally carried effigies of his 
killers, and signs depicting them hanging from a gallows.242 One man who identified as an 
Italian immigrant and the father of four told the mayor that if he were Jaques’ father, he 
would murder all four men himself. The day after the body was found, another man 
telephoned both David Crombie and Metro Toronto staff, threatening that if nothing was 
done about Yonge he would solve the problem himself by detonating bombs on the Yonge 
Street strip.243 This kind of visceral, emotional response to the murder is captured well in 
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Toronto writer Anthony De Sa’s Kicking the Sky, a fictionalized account of the summer of 
1977 from the perspective of the city’s Portuguese community. The adults in his story see 
Jaques’ death as a betrayal of their immigrant dreams. “We clean their houses. We mind 
their children,” asks an angry member of the Portuguese community. “For what? For this? 
For them to do this to one of our children? This is not why we came.” Meanwhile, children 
of Emanuel’s age see their freedom to roam around the city limited by their frightened 
parents.244  
This anger and fear also translated into homophobia. In the wake of the tragedy, the 
adolescent protagonist of De Sa’s book watches teenagers from his neighbourhood set out 
for downtown to beat up paneleiros—“faggots”—in the Yonge area. In fact, at the time of 
the Jaques’ killing the city’s gay community struggled to fight back against assertions that 
they were somehow responsible for the crime. Newspapers identified at least one of Jaques’ 
accused killers as gay, and publicized that he had turned to a local gay rights activist, George 
Hislop, for advice before turning himself in to the police. Police and the media persistently 
described the boy’s death as the result of a “homosexual orgy”, or as a “homosexual 
murder,” further strengthening the links drawn by some between his death and Toronto’s 
gay community.245  
For some Torontonians, those tenuous links were enough to inspire calls for the re-
criminalization of homosexuality and a crackdown on gay clubs and social spaces. Gay 
organizations spoke out, explaining that members of their community were as shocked as 
other Torontonians by the slaying, and arguing that “the gay community cannot be held 
responsible for some of its members just as all heterosexuals cannot be held responsible for 
the actions of some.”246 Nonetheless the association persisted. The Jaques case was one of 
several incidents that contributed to police and public hostility to Toronto’s gay community 
in the late 1970s, and served to justify the massive raids on bathhouses—an important 
queer social space—conducted by the police in the late 1970s and early 1980s.247 Another 
was the ill-timed publication—just a few months after Jaques’ death—in gay community 
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newspaper the Body Politic of an article entitled “Men loving boys loving men.”248 The text 
was widely perceived as an apology for paedophilia, prompting a series of attacks in the Sun 
as well as police raids of the newspaper’s offices.   
Not just Toronto’s gay community, but the operators and employees of Sin Strip 
businesses were wary of the effects of the crime on their public image. The normally 
outspoken Arnold Linetsky was mostly silent; instead it was the Martin family, owners of the 
body rub parlour where Jaques’ body was found, who pushed back against calls for a 
crackdown. Family spokespeople expressed regret, but in the same breath warned that the 
crime could destroy the businesses they had built up over seven years on Yonge. Journalists 
revelled in the insensitivity of Joe Martin Jr. and Sr., and their comments comparing their 
loss of business to the Jaques family’s loss of a son were widely reported.249 
A political opportunity 
This massive outpouring of support and outrage came at a crucial time for pro-clean-up 
politicians like Crombie and Godfrey. Where there had previously been public criticism of 
the new methods they had devised for regulating Sin Strip, there now to be seemed to be 
widespread approval. Coming as it did in the midst of their attempts to reignite a clean-up 
campaign, Emanuel Jaques’ death was a political opportunity that neither Toronto nor 
Metro would miss.250 One of David Crombie’s principal advisors explained that he had been 
waiting for months for an incident that would broaden public support on the issue: 
Ironically, we didn’t have to develop one. The murder accomplished that. 
Three weeks ago Crombie was a fascist for trying to clean up the street: now 
he’s ineffectual for not doing it sooner.251 
The issue gave opponents of the sex industry support to deploy the legal tools they 
had been developing over the past four years, as well as valuable political leverage in their 
lobbying campaign at Queen’s Park. Just a week before the crime David Crombie had 
complained to journalists that the province was dragging its feet on providing support for 
the city’s plans. Now William Davis’ government was on the defensive, as critics asked why 
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he and Attorney-General Roy McMurtry had done so little to respond to Toronto politicians’ 
concerns. A spokesperson for the province admitted to reporters a few days after the 
murder that the Davis government had been “taking it on the chin” over the issue, before 
attempting to shift the blame for the situation onto the shoulders of Toronto and Metro.252 
Indeed, following Jaques’ murder, all levels of government were eager to prove that they 
had been active in the fight against Sin Strip well before the crime. Metro staff did their best 
in reports to the chairman to “refute the allegation that [they] were guilty of delay.”253   
This rush to demonstrate engagement with the issue meant additional resources 
were available at all levels. Both Toronto and Metro moved quickly to exploit this situation, 
putting into action many of the tactics and legislative tools they had developed over the 
past four years to regulate the sex industry. The crucial difference from previous attempts 
was that, in August 1977, public pressure ensured extensive provincial and police 
cooperation with their efforts. This turned the imperfect policy tools put together by 
Toronto and Metro into a formidable arsenal. Suddenly police and city staff were willing to 
devote extensive man-hours to raiding and inspecting Yonge Street businesses, and the 
province was prepared to reserve a special court and prosecutor to process the resulting 
cases. Charges under Metro’s licensing bylaw or the criminal code could be brought quickly 
to trial, and upon conviction business owners served with injunctions to prevent their re-
opening. The law would be applied strictly, and repeatedly, until Sin Strip’s sex shops were 
forced to close their doors.  
The direction taken by this crackdown demonstrated once and for all the real 
purpose of the body rub and places of amusement licensing measures taken by Metro. They 
were not meant to regulate health and safety at those businesses, but to provide pretexts to 
shut them down. In the bellicose words of Metro Chairman Godfrey, the clean-up meant 
“the beginning of an end for the sex industry that has scarred the face of a great city.”254 He 
exaggerated somewhat, but it was clear that municipal government action was intended to 
do more than apply licensing standards. Over the next month police and city inspectors 
launched a blitz of raids and surprise inspections that meant most Sin Strip businesses were 
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harassed on a daily basis. The scale was much larger than during previous periods of 
heightened enforcement. Unsurprisingly, body rub and nude encounter parlours were once 
again singled out for extra attention.  
Rigorous enforcement 
Police were the most active city agency during this crackdown. The Chief of Police, reporting 
on his force’s work on Yonge, countered the criticism that “it took the murder of a twelve 
year old boy to make the force take action” by arguing that his force had been employing a 
“rigorous enforcement policy” for months.255 There was some truth in this. Even before 
establishing a joint 52 Division-Morality Bureau task force to deal with the entertainment 
strip a month earlier, the police had already begun intensifying raiding area businesses to 
lay prostitution and obscenity charges. Between 1972 and the end of 1977, even as the 
numbers of street prostitution arrests increased, the force laid a total of only 43 prostitution 
charges on workers and operators of Yonge Street sex businesses.256 But their rate of 
enforcement increased dramatically in 1977. During the first six months of that year, 74 
arrests were made, and 144 charges laid. In July alone, under the new unified task force, 
there were 62 arrests and 120 charges laid. In August, after the news of Jaques’ death, 107 
arrests and 182 charges, mostly for prostitution offences but also for obscenity and drugs 
offences. In this context, the August crackdown was just an intensification of the recent 
trend of the police taking a harder line on selling sex on Yonge. Some elements were new, 
however: following Jaques’ death, it seems that police increased the attention they paid to 
minors congregating on the strip. Patrols in the area were increased, and hundreds of 
teenagers were questioned and warned by police. Police paid particular attention to boys 
seen near or in the company of “suspected homosexuals,” a practice that underlines the 
extent to which the Jaques killing was interpreted as homosexual predation within the 
force.257 Overall, in the wake of the murder the Toronto police were more active on Yonge 
Street than they had been at any time since the Second World War.  
                                                  
255 “Chief to Metropolitan Board of Commissioners of Police, Sep. 8, 1977,” CTA, 47331-1. 
256 Statistics drawn from several police reports, with attempts to avoid discrepancies by cross-verification. 
“Inspector Stirling to Sparrow re: places of amusement, Apr. 27, 1977,” “Acting Inspector Shaw to Rust D’Eye, 
Sep. 8, 1977,” “Chief to Metropolitan Board of Commissioners of Police, Sep. 8, 1977,” CTA, 47331-1. 
257 “Chief to Metropolitan Board of Commissioners of Police, Sep. 8, 1977,” CTA, 47331-1. 
196 
 
Other city staff also contributed to the harassment of Yonge Street body rub parlours 
and other sex shops. Both Toronto and Metro mobilized city inspectors to look for various 
bylaw infractions and evidence of prostitution so that charges could be laid for violating 
Metro’s licensing bylaws.258 Fire Department officials carried out 18 inspections in the first 
week after Jaques’ death, and by August 19th the Toronto Medical Officer of Health reported 
that his staff had inspected 21 massage parlours, and found 66 infractions, from lack of a 
first-aid kit to unsanitary floors. But the most effective effort was that of the 20 licensing 
inspectors detailed by Metro to go over Yonge with a fine-toothed comb. They both 
accompanied police on raids—visiting 33 businesses and helping lay a total of 54 charges in 
August—and visited massage parlours undercover to find evidence of prostitution and 
violation of the licensing bylaw. Unlike police, these inspectors were not immediately 
recognizable by their haircuts or familiar faces, and were not barred from removing their 
clothing in the course of inspections. Over the next few months staff would conduct over 
two hundred inspections of Sin Strip businesses.259  
Rigorous enforcement had an immediate effect on Sin Strip. Both police and 
inspectors knew that the arrests or complaints they made might not result in significant 
penalties for the accused; but their repeated visits had a powerful deterrent effect. Within 
four days, Charlie’s Angels massage parlour was closed, its vandalized door padlocked and 
its signs removed. By August 15th five others had shut their doors voluntarily. A lawyer who 
worked with sex industry businessmen explained that the city’s crackdown, including “daily 
raids” of their premises, had made it impossible to stay open.260 There were fewer 
customers, and after multiple arrests and the threat of fines, female employees were wary 
of showing up for work. Crucially, not just employees but operators and owners were also 
facing legal action. Approximately half of the prostitution and bylaw infraction charges were 
laid on the men who ran Yonge’s sex industry, and not only the women who worked for 
them. Better organized than their employees and able to hire counsel, some responded. A 
                                                  
258 Inspection statistics draw from “Charges laid as a result of Police-MLC Co-operation, Aug 25, 1977,” “Chief 
to Crombie, Aug 10, 1977,” and “Medical officer of health to Crombie, Aug 19, 1977,” CTA, 47331-1. 
259 “Yonge St. Implementation Committee interim report, Oct. 28, 1977,” CTA, 47331-2. 
260 “Body rub shops give in to raids and close down,” Toronto Star, Aug. 15, 1977. 
197 
 
lawyer acting for the Martin family condemned the brutal methods used by police during 
their raids. He complained that Morality officers—several were mentioned by name—were 
entering these premises refusing, despite requests, to identify themselves 
or to produce search warrants. On several such occasions, these officers 
have broken down doors and terrorized the occupants of these 
establishments…such police activity is common place in a “police state” but 
should not be condoned in this locality.261 
Joe Martin Sr.—who himself faced fifteen bawdy-house charges from police raids—
continued to lead an erratic defence of Yonge’s body rubs and sex cinemas. At a press 
conference two weeks into the crackdown, he accused Toronto politicians and police of “a 
political conspiracy against the adult entertainment industry,” and of using the pretext of 
regulation to harass businesses like his out of existence. He threatened that if the 
persecution continued, he would publish a list of names of politicians who had used the 
sexual services offered at his shops.262  
That list was not forthcoming, and Martin’s protests did little to halt the wave of 
closings on Yonge. To follow up on evidence acquired by police and inspectors, Metro hired 
a special prosecutor, Morris Manning, a prominent former member of the Ontario Attorney-
General’s staff. Through cooperation with the province, a special courtroom at Old City Hall 
and a judge were reserved to hear the cases he prepared. Manning announced that he was 
ready to use any and all tools available to shut down Sin Strip sex shops. It would prove 
difficult to successfully prosecute their operators. The 93 cases he launched for violation of 
Metro’s licensing bylaw resulted in nothing more severe than a $1,000 fine.263 Attempts to 
use the largely untested 1943 provincial Disorderly Houses Act, which gave judges the 
power to shut convicted bawdy houses, did not in most cases survive the scrutiny of the 
courts. Requests for injunctions against the owners of sex shops were more successful; and 
the overall effect of Manning’s repeated court actions, bluster, and promises of future legal 
proceedings was undeniable. By the end of October, out of the forty sex-related businesses 
that were operating on Yonge in July, only four were still in operation. Thirteen were closed 
by injunctions, and two under the Disorderly Houses Act; but many others closed voluntarily 
                                                  
261 “B.S. to Chief of Police, Aug. 4, 1977,” CTA, P043017-8. 
262 “Will expose politicians, Strip operators says,” Globe and Mail, Aug. 19, 1977. 
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to avoid harassment and comply with work orders issued by various city departments. Most 
would not re-open.264  
Conclusion 
It was striking, in comparison to 1973 or 1975, how few people were willing to publicly 
defend Sin Strip’s right to exist in summer and fall 1977. A number of citizens wrote the 
mayor or newspapers in opposition to the calls for the reinstatement of the death penalty 
that peppered citizen protests in August. And some commentators, including the Globe and 
Mail, questioned whether Metro’s obsession with using all legislation available—even 
probably “unconstitutional” statutes like the Disorderly Houses Act—was going too far in its 
quest for a clean-up.265 But defenders of civil liberties were largely silent in the weeks and 
months following Emanuel Jaques’ killing, and very few were willing to critique the 
crackdown on Strip sex shops itself.  
That situation would change in late 1977 and early 1978, as city politicians—and 
particularly Metro Chairman Paul Godfrey—attempted to broaden the terms of their war 
against the sex industry. Buoyed by early success, Godfrey and other Metro Council 
members began to push for a larger anti-prostitution, anti-pornography campaign. Among 
their suggestions, endorsed by Ontario’s Attorney-General and the chief of police, was the 
reinstatement of the vagrancy offence as a weapon against street soliciting.266 One of the 
first to speak out against the idea, somewhat ironically, was Allan Sparrow, one of the 
authors of the Places of Amusement report published in June. Sparrow, like many 
downtown politicians, was wary of seeing the campaign to clean up Yonge degenerate into a 
kind of “moral crusade.” He denounced Godfrey’s call for further police powers, 
foreshadowing the downtown-suburb split that would characterize Metro Toronto’s 
response to prostitution over the next decade.267  
Whatever claims by authorities to the contrary, it did take the murder of a 12-year-
old boy to launch the clean-up of Yonge that some citizens had been demanding since 1972. 
                                                  
264 “Yonge St. Implementation Committee interim report, Oct. 28, 1977,” CTA, 47331-2. 
265 See for example “Padlock on Yonge Street,” Globe and Mail, Sep. 1, 1977. 
266 “Ontario may ask for federal help to stop vagrancy on Strip,” Toronto Star, Aug. 11, 1977. 
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The publicity given to the Places of Amusement report just six weeks earlier also had an 
important impact. The tools that Metro and Toronto had developed over five years to tackle 
the issue only proved adequate in conjunction with a massive display of force by police and 
city inspectors, and the fast-tracking of court proceedings by the province. Without those 
added factors, the proposed clean-up would not have been as successful or complete. And 
indeed previous attempts, in 1973 and 1975, had been met with police scepticism and a 
visible lack of cooperation from the province. The massive growth of public support for 
action on Sin Strip in August 1977 was a political opportunity for clean-up proponents like 
David Crombie and Paul Godfrey, and they took it. Advocates of a strong stance on the sex 
industry in other cities did likewise: in Daniel Francis’ history of prostitution in Vancouver, 
he records how Emanuel Jaques’ murder was used to exhort police and politicians to crack 
down on strip clubs, massage parlours, and on-street prostitution, lest a similar murder 
occur there.268   
That fall, some in Toronto warned that the dramatic changes achieved on Yonge over 
the past few months might be temporary. Urban affairs columnist David Lewis Stein asked 
what was next. “Will the people come back?” he wondered, warning that it was harder to 
rebuild than to destroy. Politicians, he explained, 
figure they look good making thundering speeches about the evils of 
commercial sex and the prostitution industry. And after they’ve finished 
orating, they go back to sleep.269 
In a report to council, Toronto’s Yonge Street Implementation Committee expressed similar 
concerns about the durability of current changes on the street. 
Only through highly concentrated efforts by the City Departments, the 
Police Department and the Licensing Commission were most of these 
temporary closures achieved. In the Committee’s view, existing legislation 
does not guarantee that there will not be a renaissance of these uses on 
Yonge Street or in other parts of the City.270 
The committee went on to make a series of recommendations aimed at stopping the 
sex industry from returning, and at shaping the long-term growth of downtown Yonge 
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Street in a positive direction. In a sense, they were right: some aspects of the sex industry 
did return, including a few peep shows, and the following years would see continued public 
concern over street prostitution in the area. But in the larger view, something had changed 
definitively on downtown Yonge Street. Sin Strip had been driven out of business, leaving 
behind vacant storefronts and re-launching public debate over the future of downtown 
Yonge. What would replace entertainment and vice as the area’s defining characteristics?  
Citizen campaigners, members of the press, and a number of political figures 
devoted tremendous effort between 1973 and 1977 to orchestrating a clean-up of 
downtown Yonge Street. And while they were successful in asserting their own view of what 
was and was not acceptable in that important public space, in the larger city they had little 
success in checking the growth of commercialized sex. The sex industry did not disappear 
from Toronto with the crackdown on Sin Strip. The closure of Yonge’s sex businesses likely 
increased the number of women in the downtown core who were forced to turn to street 
prostitution for income. Over the next decade, the downtown area east of Yonge—soon 
referred to as “the Track”—became a focal point for debates over how to police 
prostitution. The main themes of the Yonge debates were taken up again: citizens, and 
especially local residents, called for stricter enforcement, the police complained their hands 
were tied by the weakened criminal law, and politicians on both sides of the discussion 
argued that larger principles were at stake. One new factor was the mobilization of sex 
workers themselves as a lobby group that would influence the discussion. Immediately in 
the wake of the crackdown on indoor sex work on Yonge, women from the industry began 
to organize in groups like BEAVER (Better End All Vicious Erotic Repression) to call for the 
legitimization and decriminalization of the sale of sex.271 
On the metropolitan scale, the body rub business was only temporarily affected by 
the crackdown. Within a few years parlours were popping up again in North York, Etobicoke, 
and indeed nearly everywhere except Yonge. Local reaction was fierce, at times: for 
example, in 1979 a parlour that attempted to open near Yonge and Eglinton was destroyed 
by arson after a vigorous residents’ campaign.272 But, ironically, Metro’s licensing regime, 
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devised to eliminate body rubs, would provide a framework—and later a degree of legal 
protection—for their eventual expansion through the city. Four decades later, 25 body rubs 
are licensed to provide sexual services, and dozens more do so under the pretext of holistic 
therapy licenses. In retrospect, by the late 1970s Toronto had proven that it was willing to 
tolerate the sex industry—just not on its main street.  
This suggests a larger point that can be made about the public debate on vice on 
Yonge Street. It was as much about a specific place and its meaning for Torontonians as it 
was about the sex industry. Talk about the latter tended to narrow in scope from 1975 
onwards, and became more than anything about “how” and “when” will Toronto clean up 
Yonge, rather than “why” and “to what ends.” The larger questions about the issue that 
cropped up in the late 1960s and early 1970s—questions about censorship, the place of sex 
workers in society, and where the massive market for sexual services came from—tended to 
be displaced as politicians and media tried to mobilize support. Certainly they were not 
answered. But people’s engagement with the significance of Yonge continued, and from 
that perspective the Sin Strip debate was expansive and wide-ranging. Starting from the 
basic premise that the street was a public good, people employed a variety of identities and 
arguments in an attempt to shape its future. Toronto’s attempts to tackled Sin Strip tell us a 
great deal about the functioning of the sex industry, citizen activism, and local government; 
but they also give us insight into the different ideas about downtown, Yonge Street, and 
public space that set the boundaries for the debate. 
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3. “A New Heart for Old Toronto”: Building the Toronto Eaton Centre 
 
 
In spring 1945, as the war in Europe drew to a close, Torontonians turned to Eaton’s 
department store to see what the future held for their city. Over the course of a month, 
67,000 people visited the fourth floor of the company’s elegant College Street location, 
where, well above the hustle and bustle of Yonge Street, the “City for Tomorrow” was on 
display.1 In advertising that effortlessly blended the vocabularies of retail marketing and 
urban planning, visitors were promised a glimpse of  
The Toronto of the future…planned as a whole instead of a random-growing 
mass…with proper housing adequately spaced…Green Belt Parks…rapid 
transit system, super-highways, and widened streets…a Toronto 
transformed from deterioration into modern comfort and convenience!2 
Entering through a decorative gateway, visitors toured a series of models, photographs, and 
diagrams based on the ambitious plans of the Toronto Transit Commission and the city’s 
new Planning Board. Highlights included a fifteen-foot bird’s-eye view relief map of the 
proposed Yonge Street subway route, and carefully constructed models of several 
“redevelopment areas” showing older, unplanned structures replaced by orderly apartment 
blocks, parks, and other modern amenities.3 This was conservative Toronto’s version of 
“Futurama,” the urban utopia conjured up by General Motors at the 1939 World’s Fair in 
New York, in which civic progress was identified strongly with the harnessing of modern 
technology for public benefit. Much of what was presented was never tried, let alone 
constructed; still, under the lights of Eaton’s retail palace, the future looked bright.  
In the heady atmosphere of postwar reconstruction, Eaton’s became invested in 
Toronto’s civic affairs and the future of downtown to an extent difficult to imagine for any 
retailer today. The City for Tomorrow of 1945 was followed by exhibitions celebrating the 
new subway line’s completion (1954) and the design competition for a new city hall and 
                                                  
1 “City for Tomorrow attendance, n.d. Apr. 1945,” AO, Eaton’s Fonds, B294488, “1943-1945 Store Attractions.” 
I am indebted to Lizabeth Cohen, “Buying into Downtown Revival: The Centrality of Retail to Postwar Urban 
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civic square (1958). Eaton’s executives, like those of competitor Simpson’s, served in key 
roles on the 1960s Redevelopment Advisory Council, a “brain trust” formed by the city to 
inform planning and encourage new downtown construction. But by far the most significant 
of the company’s interventions was the Toronto Eaton Centre, an office and retail complex 
centred on its extensive landholdings around the intersection of Yonge and Queen Streets.4 
First discussed in the mid-1950s, the Centre’s planning and construction would stretch 
across two decades, involving the company and the civic administration in a complicated 
and changing relationship. Similar stories were playing out in Vancouver, Montréal, and 
cities across the country as an unmatched urban land bank made Eaton’s a major player in 
land development nation-wide. In the American context, historian Lizabeth Cohen has called 
for more research into the role of major retailers in downtown redevelopment and urban 
renewal: this is a case study that, I would argue, speaks to just how productive that line of 
investigation can be.5  
This section places Yonge Street and the Eaton Centre at the heart of postwar 
debates over the rebuilding of downtown Toronto. If interventions like pedestrianization 
and clean-up campaigns aimed to save or improve downtown, proponents of 
redevelopment sought to replace it. Their vision for Toronto’s commercial centre and the 
aging residential areas that surrounded it was one of creative destruction to eliminate 
obsolete structures and activities and usher in prosperity and modernity.6 State of the art 
urban forms would both house and symbolize the city’s economic success. In a way, this was 
nothing new: modern construction techniques and volatile property markets had been 
shaping the city’s densely-built core for decades.7 What was different, especially from the 
early 1960s onwards, was the speed and scale of change, and the unprecedented extent to 
which municipal government became invested in encouraging and regulating this urban 
                                                  
4 This is the first detailed narrative of the Centre’s history. Existing accounts are short, and mostly focus either 
on architecture or the political debates of 1966 and 1972. See Eberhard Zeidler, Building Cities Life: An 
Autobiography in Architecture, Volume 1 (Toronto: Dundurn, 2013), 167-87 and John Sewell, The Shape of the 
City: Toronto Struggles with Modern Planning (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 139-45. 
5 Cohen, “Buying into Downtown Revival.” 
6 See Max Page, The Creative Destruction of Manhattan, 1900-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999). 
7 On late nineteenth and early twentieth-century redevelopment see Gunter Gad, Deryck Holdsworth, 
“Corporate Capitalism and the Emergence of the High-Rise Office Building,” Urban Geography 8:3 (May-June 
1987): 212-231 and Christopher Armstrong, Making Toronto Modern: Architecture and Design, 1895-1975 
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transformation. Downtown Toronto’s postwar renovation is a story not just of capital 
transforming the city, but also of attempts to define and impose the public interest on that 
process.  
Eaton’s, as a powerful landowner, corporate citizen, and lynchpin of Yonge Street 
retail, played a crucial role in this drive to modernize. The Eaton Centre originated both in 
the company’s considerable retail ambitions and in the efforts of the municipal 
administration to promote redevelopment as a path to increased tax revenue, social 
wellbeing, and the achievement of modernist planning goals. It was a profit-oriented 
endeavour that became a vehicle for civic goals and virtues, and for a time seemed to 
exemplify the idea of private-public partnership for urban progress. Much of what follows 
focuses on that vision. But as the idea of partnership lost its lustre, the project took on other 
meanings: a refinement of the urban shopping mall, the final blow for old Yonge Street, a 
battleground between citizen activists and the emerging “corporate city.”8 Throughout, the 
Centre’s scale and unique location—straddling the city’s retail and government districts, and 
including several major historic properties—made it one of the most contested commercial 
developments in Toronto, and perhaps Canadian, history. It played a significant role in 
carving out a political space for architectural preservation and anti-development activism in 
Toronto; political fortunes in at least two municipal elections were made, or broken, by 
public attitudes towards the project.  
After nearly two decades of planning and negotiation, the first phase of the Toronto 
Eaton Centre opened in 1977. The result was a dramatic restructuring of downtown space 
that would continue throughout the following decades. Streets were closed, acre after acre 
of older buildings demolished; patterns of life and work were erased or reconfigured. On the 
busiest stretch of Yonge Street, four blocks of small shops, offices, and services were 
replaced by an enclosed shopping, office, and entertainment megastructure under 
centralized corporate control. The latest in construction technologies and design were used 
to encourage pedestrian traffic to abandon Yonge’s scruffy, crowded sidewalks for the 
Centre’s bright, climate-controlled central arcade, which like all shopping malls mimicked an 
idealized Main Street space. Just as its planning and construction were shaped by the 
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interaction of municipal, citizen, and corporate objectives, the urban spaces of the Centre 
were at once popular, accessible, and intensely regulated, blurring the lines between public 
and private in the interest of increased market share.9 The Eaton Centre, and projects like it, 
literally remade the downtown. 
In both the United States and Britain, the postwar redevelopment of the central 
business district has a rich and growing historiography.10 In contrast, relatively little has 
been written about the rebuilding of Canadian downtowns in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
or the relationships between private and public actors that brought it about.11 Yet by any 
account, during those decades medium to large-sized Canadian cities were transformed, as 
office buildings, urban shopping malls and institutional complexes replaced the older 
streetscape. This changed how urban centres functioned, who worked, shopped, or lived in 
them, the role they played in the economy. It also altered their look, juxtaposing brick, 
wood, and stone with glass, concrete, and steel and fostering a “vertical expansion of 
downtown” that has been, along with the spread of suburbia, one of the defining features 
of twentieth-century North American urbanism.12 No Canadian city was affected more by 
                                                  
9 Contemporary observers were rightly concerned by this development, and wrote about it. See for example 
“Death of a main drag,” Globe and Mail, Mar. 10, 1979. Lizabeth Cohen has written about the impacts of the 
“commercialization of public space” entailed in similar mall developments for political and civic life. Cohen, 
“From town center to shopping center: The reconfiguration of community marketplaces in postwar America,” 
American Historical Review 101:4 (1996): 1068.  
10 For recent overviews of work on the US, much of it connected to urban renewal policies, see Eric Avila and 
Mark H. Rose, “Race, Culture, Politics, and Urban Renewal,” Journal of Urban History 35:3 (March 2009): 335-
47 and Samuel Zipp, “The Roots and Routes of Urban Renewal,” Journal of Urban History 39:3 (May 2013): 
366-91, and Alison Isenberg, Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004). On postindustrial redevelopment see Tracy Neumann, Remaking the Rust 
Belt: The Postindustrial Transformation of North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
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1970,” Journal of British Studies 48 (2010): 849-69; Peter Shapely, “Civic pride and redevelopment in the post-
war British city,” Urban History 39:2 (May 2012): 310-28; and Otto Saumarez-Smith, “Central government and 
town-centre redevelopment in Britain, 1959-1966,” Historical Journal 58:1 (2015): 217-44.  
11 There are exceptions from an earlier period of interest in the development process, including Robert Collier, 
Contemporary Cathedrals: Large-Scale Developments in Canadian Cities (Montréal: Harvest House, 1975), 
James Lorimer, The Developers, Donald Gutstein, Vancouver Ltd. (Toronto: Lorimer & Co., 1975). More recently 
see Don Nerbas “William Zeckendorf, Place Ville-Marie, and the Making of Modern Montreal," Urban History 
Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine 43:2 (2015): 5-25,  and Richard White, “Urban Renewal Revisited: Toronto, 
1950 to 1970,” Canadian Historical Review 97:1 (spring 2016): 1-33, RhodriI Windsor Liscombe, “A study in 
Modern(ist) urbanism: planning Vancouver, 1945-1965,” Urban History 38:1 (2011): 124-49, and Robert Lewis 
and Paul Hess, “Refashioning urban space in postwar Toronto: the Wood-Wellesley redevelopment area, 
1952–1957,” Planning Perspectives 31 (2016): 563-84. 
12 Gunter Gad, Deryck Holdsworth, “Corporate Capitalism and the Emergence of the High-Rise Office Building,” 
Urban Geography 8:3 (May-June 1987): 212-231.   
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this change than Toronto, which emerged from the period as the country’s business and 
commercial centre, with its largest concentrations of corporate headquarters, white collar 
jobs, and financial transactions, all housed in a substantially rebuilt downtown.13  
To what extent did this process parallel or differ from what was happening 
elsewhere in the world? Recent scholarship on postwar urbanism has highlighted its 
foundations in a transnational dialogue on renewal and rebuilding.14 The Toronto Eaton 
Centre was just one of many dramatic interventions to remake the urban landscape in the 
postwar decades. Like other urban mega-projects of the era, the Eaton Centre was shaped 
by capital and urban expertise working across national borders, in accordance with 
international ideas and practices. Particularly influential was a shifting roster of American 
and European professionals with extensive experience in downtown redevelopment 
projects in the United States, including shopping mall pioneer Victor Gruen, modernist 
tower-builders Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, and real estate speculator William 
Zeckendorf. Much of what these consultants saw in Toronto fit with their previous 
experience: downtown interests concerned by suburban competition, a civic administration 
eager to promote growth, retail and office construction at the heart of a redevelopment 
strategy.15 Yet if the ideas were mostly imported, their application was strongly contingent 
on circumstances specific to Toronto and Canada. Growth partnerships between business 
and politicians, celebrated as the driver behind American efforts at downtown rebuilding, 
proved to be elusive and fraught with complications.16 In what follows, local factors—broad-
based citizen engagement, Eaton’s concern for its position as a corporate citizen, the 
complexity of Yonge’s ownership patterns and built landscape—would play the decisive 
role.  
                                                  
13 Gunter Gad, “Downtown Montreal and Toronto: Distinct Places with Much in Common,” Canadian Journal of 
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15 On the pivotal role of retail in the rebuilding of American downtowns, see Lizabeth Cohen, “Buying into 
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16 See Tracy Neumann, Remaking the Rust Belt: The Postindustrial Transformation of North America 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 45-73. 
207 
 
Eaton’s: A local and national institution 
The department store occupies an important place in the histories of business, 
consumption, gender, and labour in Canada.17 From the 1890s through to the 1940s, 
companies like Eaton’s, Simpson’s, and Dupuis Frères became the country’s largest retailers, 
dominating markets through chains of centrally located stores and impressive mail-order 
operations. As elsewhere in the world, they played an important role in developing new 
patterns of work and consumption that affected a wide cross-section of the country’s 
growing urban population. In this chapter I consider the department store—and specifically 
Eaton’s—in another light: as an actor wielding considerable power in urban development. 
While narratives of the company’s rise and fall abound, comparatively little attention has 
been paid to this aspect of its operations.18 
Established in 1869, Eaton’s made the intersection of Yonge and Queen Streets into 
the heart of Toronto’s retail district. As its business expanded, competing retailers like 
Simpson’s and Woolworth’s were drawn to the vicinity, forming Yonge’s backbone as the 
city’s pre-eminent commercial strip. By 1900 Eaton’s, marketed as “Canada’s Greatest 
Store,” provided more than 300,000 square feet of retail space devoted to goods ranging 
from clothing to bicycles to paintings. The company employed thousands, and with yearly 
sales of $5 million was one of the busiest department stores in North America.19 Eaton 
himself was hailed as Canada’s pre-eminent merchant prince, and when he died in 1907 the 
Globe speculated that “[t]here is hardly a name in Canada [with] the possible exception of 
the Prime Minister, so well known to the people at large as that of Mr. Timothy Eaton.”20 
Taking advantage of urbanization and economies of scale, in the 1920s Eaton’s rapidly 
expanded its operations, buying out smaller competitors and acquiring or building branch 
                                                  
17 The literature on department stores is vast. The best overview for Canada is Donica Belisle, Retail Nation: 
Department Stores and the Making of Modern Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).  
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stores across the country. Control of the company remained in the hands of the Eaton 
family; privately held T. Eaton Co. had no shareholders to consult or placate. 
By this point, Timothy Eaton’s self-promotion was mostly true: the largest retailer in 
Canada and one of the largest in the world, at the beginning of the Great Depression his 
company employed 25,000 workers and took in seven percent of the country’s retail 
spending. Eaton’s ubiquitous catalogues and advertising projected a vision of progress and 
material comfort that resonated with many Canadians. As historian of consumption Donica 
Belisle observes, the company worked hard to weave itself into both local communities and 
larger national narratives of progress.21 In Toronto, the company was a commercial 
                                                  
21 Belisle, Retail Nation, 52-4. 
Image 3.1: This map from a 1910 Visitor’s Guide and Map of the City produced by Eaton’s 
shows the company’s landholdings in red. Note both their central location and the map’s 
portrayal of Eaton’s—and Yonge—as the heart of the city. Streetcar lines in red indicated the 
means most people used to reach the store. Toronto Public Library Baldwin Collection, 
917.13541 V309. 
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institution. The Eaton family was firmly entrenched in Toronto’s elite, their influence 
extending beyond the company and its thousands of employees through philanthropy, 
political connections, and the Methodist faith. In Toronto Eaton’s was perhaps best-known 
for its artful window displays and the yearly Santa Claus Parade, which wound its way 
through downtown Toronto to finish in front of the Eaton’s store. Somewhere between a 
Christmas pageant and a circus, the parade was Canada’s foremost commercial spectacle, 
watched by thousands of sidewalk spectators, and followed by many more across the 
country.22  
A downtown landowner 
Commercial success accelerated accumulation of a land empire in downtown Toronto. The 
company began to acquire property in blocks adjoining its store to the north and north-
west, constructing stables and a mail-order building.23 By the mid-1920s Eaton’s department 
store occupied all but a small portion of its block, and stood eight storeys, with an 
impressive windowed frontage along Yonge Street. Nine more buildings had been added to 
the company land bank, including garages, two imposing factories producing clothing and 
other goods, and an annex with additional floor space for the overcrowded store. Befitting 
the company’s retail position, this was the largest collection of private holdings in the 
downtown commercial core. It would soon expand further, as the company set its sights on 
building a larger and more impressive flagship store one kilometre north at the intersection 
of College and Yonge Streets.  
Plans for the Eaton’s College Street store embodied the near-boundless optimism 
that had accompanied decades of expansion; as such, they are a direct antecedent of the 
Eaton Centre.24 The site was a nine-acre parcel of land on the west side of Yonge south of 
College Street, quietly assembled by the company in the years prior to the First World War. 
Negotiations with the City began as early as 1916; however, plans for the actual project 
                                                  
22 Steve Penfold, “The Eaton’s Santa Claus Parade and the Making of a Metropolitan Spectacle, 1905–1982,” 
Social History/Histoire sociale 87 (May 2011): 1-28. 
23 The gradual growth of Eaton’s property in the vicinity is outlined in sketches prepared for the company in 
1966. “Expansion: Eaton Centre Ltd., Jan., 1966,” CTA, 148530-16. 
24 On the project see Mark Osbaldeston, Unbuilt Toronto: The History of the City That Might Have Been 
(Toronto: Dundurn, 2008), 158-63 and Allen Kopytek, Eaton’s, 229-50. 
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were not released until 1928.25 They called for a seven-storey art deco inspired department 
store building that would dwarf any other in Canada—“the last word in modern building,” 
according to the Globe. The company negotiated a land exchange with the city that saw the 
closing of Buchanan Street to create what was perhaps Toronto’s first “superblock” 
development. In exchange for the transfer of land it offered concessions to the city’s 
program of street improvement, including land allowances to widen Yonge and other 
surrounding streets and straighten out several complicated intersections. A more ambitious 
plan, which included a thirty-two storey skyscraper perched on top of the store, was quietly 
shelved amid the financial shock of the depression.26 A few chunks of property acquired 
during the company’s land assembly were sold off, including notably the site of Maple Leaf 
Gardens, Toronto’s “cathedral of hockey,” built in 1931. Others were held by the company 
for future sale, or in some cases used to finance corporate expansion through the issue of 
tens of millions of dollars in mortgage-backed bonds.27 Property ownership would remain a 
central component of Eaton’s business, but its larger ambitions to reshape the downtown 
core were deferred.  
Rebuilding the city 
The postwar period would create new opportunities. Scholars of mid-twentieth-century 
urbanism have identified a trans-Atlantic “ethic of city rebuilding” that had an important 
impact on cities across North America, Europe, and beyond.28 During the 1940s and 1950s a 
broad consensus emerged that bold planning initiatives were needed to solve longstanding 
problems of the modern industrial city, including slum housing, congested streets, and lack 
of open space. To that list was soon added the subject of this section, the modernization of 
the central business district to counteract the increasing suburban dispersal of people, 
commerce, and work. Advocates of urban transformation were aided by new construction 
                                                  
25 “Big Departmental to be All-Canadian,” Globe, Nov. 16, 1916. 
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technologies, the expertise of the planning profession, and an interventionist postwar state; 
also by the very real desire of many citizens to live in better, cleaner, more comfortable 
circumstances than they had during fifteen years of depression and war.29 For most 
Canadians that dream would be deferred until the 1950s, when economic growth allowed 
them to begin to take part in the postwar prosperity already enjoyed in the United States.30 
In Toronto as elsewhere, urban utopias abounded in these years, whether the City 
Planning Board’s 1943 Master Plan or the reports of the citizen-led Toronto Reconstruction 
                                                  
29 In Canada, rebuilding cities was inextricable from the formation of the welfare state. See Peter McInnis, 
“Planning Prosperity: Canadians Debate Postwar Reconstruction”, in Greg Donaghy, ed., Uncertain Horizons: 
Canadians and Their World in 1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 
1997), 231-59 and Douglas Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian intellectuals and the state, 1900-
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University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
Image 3.2: Visitor Betty Schondelmeyer examines a model apartment building at 
the City for Tomorrow exhibit at Eaton’s College Street, March 1945. Toronto Star. 
Toronto Public Library Baldwin Collection, tspa_0111439f.  
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Council and its successors.31 What was lacking was a clear path to realizing them. The City 
had historically been both fiscally conservative and skeptical—perhaps even hostile—to 
grand ideas and interference in the disposition of private property through the market. In 
the early 1900s a series of City Beautiful-inspired plans, including new boulevards, 
monuments, and public spaces, had been quietly “lost in management.”32 The widening of 
Yonge Street, discussed by the City of Toronto since the 1920s, was continually blocked by 
the scale of the property expropriations needed to put it into effect.33 This trend seemed to 
continue with the unceremonious shelving of many of the proposals presented in the City 
for To-morrow exhibition, with the notable exception of underground rapid transit, paid for 
by the Toronto Transit Commission from its wartime surplus. Yet by the early 1950s 
attitudes were clearly changing. Suburban expansion was proceeding at such a pace that a 
new and more dynamic layer of government, the municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, was 
required to provide infrastructure and regulate the subdivision of new neighbourhoods.34 At 
the same time, a consensus was beginning to develop in Toronto that modernization of the 
older city was of prime importance to the city’s future. 
The terms “redevelopment” and “renewal,” used almost interchangeably, entered 
into the city’s lexicon around this time, imported from the United States.35 Perhaps the best-
known urban legislation in postwar North America was Title I of the United States Housing 
Act, which allowed for significant federal funding for “slum clearance and urban 
redevelopment,” after 1954 referred to as “urban renewal.”36 By the mid-1950s this 
program had financed dozens of major rebuilding projects across the United States, with 
federal funds providing the glue for partnerships between local government and business 
                                                  
31 On the former see Richard White, Planning Toronto (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016), 
27-58, on the latter two groups Kevin Brushett, “‘People and Government Travelling Together’: Community 
Organization, Urban Planning and the Politics of Post-War Reconstruction in Toronto, 1943–1953," Urban 
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32 James Lemon, “Plans for Early 20th-Century Toronto: Lost in Management,” Urban History Review/Revue 
d’histoire urbaine 18:1 (1989), 11-31. 
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34 Albert Rose, Governing Metropolitan Toronto: A Social and Political Analysis, 1953-1971 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972). 
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interests. Many of the areas affected were home to functioning communities, inhabited 
predominately by lower-income, often black, Americans. Their clearance to build 
expressways, office towers, and new housing meant not just the renewal of the aging city, 
but a reorganization of race and poverty in urban space, both reinforcing old disparities and 
helping forge new solidarities. The bulldozer—and its citizen opponents—became one of 
the most evocative and enduring symbols of this era in urban policy.37  
Canadians watched with keen interest. In Toronto, social reformers and city 
authorities had long been concerned with the cramped, unhealthy living conditions they had 
identified in inner-city neighbourhoods like St. John’s Ward and Cabbagetown, widely 
referred to as slums.38 In 1934, at the height of the Depression, a provincial report identified 
poor housing conditions as the most pressing social problem facing Toronto, envisioning a 
bold process of environmental renewal:  
as we evacuate those factories and hovels, we must raze them and bury the 
distressing memory of them in fine central parks and recreation 
centres…devoted to the physical and mental improvement of our people.39  
After the war, rehousing the poor remained a pressing concern—indeed the pressing 
concern for many social critics—and efforts to do so became integral to discussions of 
postwar social reconstruction.40 Among Canadian cities, Toronto would lead the way in slum 
clearance and the construction of public housing with Regent Park (1947-57), the nation’s 
first large-scale public housing development and at 1289 apartment units its largest.41  
                                                  
37 One early and influential critique of renewal was Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis 
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Economic concerns were also fundamental. To the voices of advocates of public 
health and access to housing were added those of the considerable number of local 
politicians whose felt it was their duty to maintain a healthy municipal tax base. Canada’s 
municipal system leaves cities almost entirely dependent on property taxes for their budget. 
In the 1950s Toronto received approximately 80% of its revenue through commercial and 
residential taxes; Metro Toronto received substantial provincial grants for infrastructure and 
education, but taxes still accounted for more than half of its operating budget throughout 
the period.42 As a result, the drive to increase the pool of taxable property—more politically 
palatable than raising the rates—in order to fund new projects or simply service debt, was 
never far from the minds of civic officials. This was nothing new, and had in fact been one of 
the bedrocks of municipal government in a city whose political culture combined periodic 
interventionism with populist fiscal conservatism.43 However, as the rapid redevelopment of 
the Toronto suburbs drew investment capital away from the central city, this priority was 
put into sharp relief. 
From the 1940s forward, the pursuit of an expanded assessment became more 
scientific than ever. After fifteen years of near-inertia, the City’s expenditures were growing, 
roughly doubling between 1945 and 1953 and again between 1953 and 1961. This new 
interventionism, which included expenditures on renewal projects, was predicated on a 
dynamic tax base. Toronto’s first Official Plan (1949) mapped a broad swathe of the older 
city where most buildings were old and their condition considered poor. The key idea 
operating here was one of “best and most economic use of land” a judgement made based 
on a series of calculations that included contrasting services provided by the City against 
taxes paid, and the assessed value of buildings against the value of the land they sat on.44 
Here what was considered was not the current, but the potential tax value of the property. 
From that perspective, uneconomic uses were a kind of tax avoidance, and a breach of the 
social contract of municipal government. In the mid-1950s, the City’s newly constituted 
                                                  
42 City of Toronto, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Finance (Toronto: various years) and Metro Toronto, 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Finance (Toronto: various years). 
43 Harold Kaplan, Reform, Planning, and City Politics: Montreal, Winnipeg, Toronto (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1982), 604-46. 
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Planning Department conducted a comprehensive condition survey of the older city, as part 
of the preparations for a new urban renewal study, the first in Toronto to use that term. 
They established that eight percent of the city’s residential stock required replacement, and 
a further 40% some other improvement. On retail strips and in the downtown core, their 
careful surveys of block after block of commercial buildings discovered a great many in 
“poor” or “fair” condition.45 Most municipal politicians would agree that it was the City’s 
duty to encourage the redevelopment of these lands—the question was how to do so.  
For a time, the establishment of a Canadian urban renewal program, funded through 
the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) from 1948, offered the promise of 
financial backing for the replacement or improvement of these huge tracts of uneconomic 
buildings. However, as a recent reassessment of the period argues, federally funded urban 
renewal would have only a small impact on the urban landscape in Toronto.46 A modest 
$225 million in urban renewal funding was disbursed through the CMHC between 1948 and 
1973, of which Toronto received a share of $18 million.47 Even supplemented by funding 
from other levels of government—most of the cost of Regent Park was assumed by the 
City—that did not approach the value of private building permits issued in the city in any 
single year during the period. New housing, including an increasing number of apartment 
blocks, was going up, but it was mostly being built by private initiative.48  
Private-public redevelopment 
Advocates of renewal knew this, and some found the limits placed of federal funding 
frustrating. In 1956, the Toronto Star lauded the urban transformations taking place in the 
United States, contrasting them with Toronto’s own rebuilding efforts:    
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While Toronto frets and wonders where the money is to come from, 
American cities have for seven years been doing something about 
“downtown blight”—that seemingly inevitable disease of modern city life 
which produces slums, gives motorists ulcers, and sends shopkeepers out 
into the suburbs. From the “high-riser” apartment projects of New York to 
the multi-lane expressways of Los Angeles, some 297 projects are currently 
underway in 195 centres to redevelop blighted areas.49 
But while they hoped for more expansive federal interventions, most in Toronto accepted 
the general premise that rebuilding could never be a case of the state going it alone—and 
perhaps that was best. Instead, they saw the future in forming public-private relationships 
between public authorities and land developers. “Private enterprise,” stated the City’s 1956 
renewal report, would be “the City’s partner in building new neighbourhoods for good living 
and creating commercial and industrial areas of a high standard.”50 By necessity, that model 
would apply most of all to the central business district, where there was little chance of 
federal support for commercial renewal projects.51 The idea that private capital and the 
public interest could be aligned to create a modern downtown would become a powerful 
motivating force in 1950s and 1960s Toronto.    
The City’s first efforts at establishing private-public partnerships failed. A 1952 bylaw 
championed by pro-development councillors designated two pockets of downtown—the 
larger included three blocks near the intersection of Yonge and College—as “redevelopment 
areas.”52 This allowed the City to employ powers under provincial planning law to 
expropriate the commercial and residential properties within these areas for resale to 
private developers, a practice already common in Title I renewal in the United States. 
Interestingly, an Eaton’s subsidiary, International Realty, seems to have been involved in the 
selection of the larger of the two pockets—Wood-Wellesley—where it had extensive 
landholdings it wished to see developed. Previously, expropriation powers had been 
employed sparingly, chiefly for public projects like infrastructure or public housing; this was 
the first case in postwar Toronto, and likely Canada, in which they were proposed to directly 
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facilitate a private venture.53 What is most fascinating about the 1952 bylaw and later 
experiments with redevelopment areas is that they firmly established redevelopment as a 
public goal that could be achieved by facilitating private profit.  
But while Eaton’s proxies and other pro-redevelopment actors succeeded in lobbying 
for the redevelopment area designation, the business of actually fostering development 
there proved much more complicated. First, local residents considered it a violation of their 
property rights, and were quick to point out that theirs was not a “blighted” area requiring 
renovation. Their cause as property owners was taken up by a growing number of politicians 
skeptical of City interference in development, including Councillor William Dennison, who 
lived locally. Second, while there had been initial interest in the idea, private land 
developers proved wary of entering into an agreement on the terms offered by the City. In 
1957 the designation would be rescinded, leaving behind a great deal of paperwork, but 
only a few smaller-scale developments that likely would have happened with or without the 
City’s controversial intervention. This early dispute, along with the expropriation of housing 
for Regent Park, set a pattern for Toronto politics over the next two decades. Pro-growth 
politicians generally held the mayoralty and the balance of power; however, they were 
vigorously opposed by councillors who denounced their collusion with business and lack of 
respect for the common taxpayer. This conservative localist tendency—one scholar calls it 
“neo-populist”—could not be ignored, particularly at election time, when all councillors 
were vulnerable to the charge of placing city-level concerns ahead of those of their 
constituents.54 
Downtown’s new centre 
However, the short-term failure of the City’s first forays into partnership did not dim its 
hopes of modernization. In another crucial pocket of downtown, the civic administration 
hoped to lead by example. Although seldom described in those terms, Toronto’s New City 
Hall and Civic Square (1940s-1965) project had all the hallmarks of a major urban renewal 
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project in the American style: large-scale expropriation of private property; a radical 
modernist simplification of form; huge cost overruns.55 It envisioned fulfilling longstanding 
plans to replace the city’s monumental but cramped 1899 City Hall at Queen and Bay Streets 
with newer, larger premises just to the west, as well as a significant new public square. The 
site chosen for the project encompassed around five blocks—thirteen acres—of the 
densely-built St. John’s Ward, for decades one of Toronto’s main immigrant receiving areas 
and the home to its small but successful Chinatown.56 By 1949 most of the land for the 
project had been assembled using municipal powers of expropriation, at a cost of several 
million dollars to the City. Plans for a civic square had been approved in the same 1947 
plebiscite as that other great Toronto rebuilding project, the first phase of Regent Park; 
however, it would take nearly a decade before the city hall portion of the plan was securely 
funded with a budget of $18 million. In the end, the civic complex and related projects 
would cost the City well over $60 million, making it one of the largest public redevelopment 
projects undertaken in postwar Canada.57  
Newly elected Mayor Nathan Phillips played an important role in making the project 
a reality. Phillips, first elected Mayor of Toronto in 1954 after 28 years in council, was a 
lawyer and long-time Progressive Conservative who incarnated the dynamism and faith in 
progress of the dominant faction of postwar Toronto politicians. In 1953 he campaigned on 
a vigorously pro-development platform, promising not just a rapid start on Civic Square, but 
also to expand urban renewal, public transit, and low-cost housing.58 That he was Jewish 
and commanded substantial support in the city’s slowly diversifying northern and western 
districts played no small role in his becoming the city’s first non-Protestant Mayor, or, as he 
liked to style himself, “Mayor of all the people.”59 Once in office, Phillips would make the 
modernization and transformation of the downtown one of his main priorities, beginning 
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with the years of negotiation and consensus-building required to begin construction on New 
City Hall.  
The abandonment of an old, cramped “Victorian pile”—as one editorialist dubbed 
it—in favour of a modern new civic complex was always intended to do more than solve 
problems of space and logistics.60 To civic boosters like Phillips, rapidly-growing Toronto had 
a bright future ahead of it, and it was only fitting that it should possess public buildings that 
incarnated that dynamism. As a symbol of progress, the New City Hall was without equal in 
the postwar city. Numerous commentators, both then and since, have seen the project as 
Toronto’s coming of age, or a marker of its entry into the ranks of the world’s great cities.61 
More pragmatically, this massive public investment in downtown was also intended as an 
example. In the wake of the project’s funding in 1956, and the selection of Finnish architect 
Viljo Revell’s distinctive two-towered plan in the 1958 design competition, hopes were high 
that private investors would follow the city’s lead with large-scale, ambitious 
redevelopment of the surrounding area. Just as the replacement of deteriorating inner-city 
housing with apartment towers and open spaces symbolized residential urban renewal, the 
New City Hall project would symbolize the redevelopment of the commercial core. From its 
conception, New City Hall was intended, as Mayor Phillips put it, to “spark redevelopment in 
a manner and to an extent which is today difficult to conceive.”62 Even before it began 
construction in the early 1960s, great hopes were pinned on the project as the catalyst for a 
downtown transformation.  
All future planning for the downtown core would have to take the civic centre 
development into account. That imperative was quickly felt in the city’s rebuilding efforts, 
which reached out south and west of the New City Hall site. Despite a growing sense that 
Wood-Wellesley had been a failure, in 1958 the commercial block immediately south of the 
future Civic Square was designated a redevelopment area.63 The concern was to replace “a  
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Image 3.3: Toronto’s New and Old City Halls, 1966. The Eaton’s Queen Street store 
is in the bottom right corner. Boris Spremo/Toronto Star. Toronto Public Library 
Baldwin Collection, tspa_0111382f. 
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motley assortment of stores, restaurants, hotels and theatres, many housed in old 
buildings,” with something more fitting as a counterpoint to the new civic buildings, an 
intervention suggested to the city by the jury adjudicating the architectural competition for 
the New City Hall.64 While the owners and operators of those businesses vigorously opposed 
expropriation, their fate seemed sealed given the tremendous political momentum behind 
the civic redevelopment project.65 In fact it would take more than a decade to redevelop the 
block into a mixed hotel-commercial complex, at great expense to the City.  
Project Viking 
It was in the midst of the Civic Square project that the City began to investigate a 
redevelopment partnership with Eaton’s. Here planning staff, rather than pro-development 
politicians, took the lead. By 1956 they were considering the west side of Yonge from 
College to Queen Street as another possible redevelopment area, both because of its aging, 
mostly low-rise streetscape and its excellent rapid transit links, including east-west streetcar 
lines and three stations on the new Yonge subway line. Furthermore, unlike other stretches 
of the street, including the east side, one landowner controlled more than half of the private 
property within the area’s bounds: Eaton’s. With their characteristic attention to detail, 
planners prepared land use, assessment value, and building condition plans for the area, 
and began to sketch out renewal plans.66  
Particular attention was paid to the area bounded by Dundas, Queen, Bay and Yonge 
Streets. Measuring 23 acres in area, it was divided into six irregular city blocks. The red brick 
1899 City Hall occupied the entire south-west square, the main Eaton’s store most of the 
south-east. In the centre, the largest block tightly ringed Trinity Square and historic Holy 
Trinity Church (1847). All told, the area was divided into approximately 100 individual lots of 
land, occupied by buildings varying in size from 12-storey Eaton’s factories to narrow, 20 by 
100-foot storefronts just a few storeys tall.67 The latter were clustered mainly along Yonge 
and stretches of Bay Street, and serviced by unmaintained mid-block lanes. The small to 
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mid-sized businesses that occupied them included shoe shops, barbers, jewellery stores, 
and a tea room—all, planners argued, uses ““generally inappropriate for the very heart of 
the city.”68  
This densely-built and varied landscape was in many ways typical of the unplanned, 
lot-by-lot construction that characterized prewar urban development in Toronto. But to 
focus solely on goings-on at ground level is to miss the distinctive way of seeing behind the 
whole business of renewal. In their redevelopment studies, planners mapped and measured 
to make cityscapes and patterns of life within them legible.69 In the case of the six blocks in 
the Bay-Yonge-Dundas-Queen rectangle, ownership—invisible from street level—was the 
key criteria. Of the 23 acres under study, ten were occupied by Eaton’s various services, 
storage facilities, and administrative buildings. The city controlled a further eight acres—Old 
City Hall and internal streets—meaning that before any efforts at assembly, three-quarters 
of this vast area were already under the control of parties (presumably) amenable to 
participating in redevelopment. From that perspective, this was a landscape ripe for 
intervention.  
Director of Planning Matthew Lawson was enthusiastic about the possibilities 
presented for a major redevelopment of downtown retail. In a letter to the head of Eaton’s 
property department, W.D. Byam, he explained the how the scheme could fit into the larger 
planning objectives for the core, and the advantages provided by the company’s vast real 
estate portfolio. 
[W]e in this office believe that the erection of a downtown shopping core 
would be of enormous advantage to Toronto. The present centre was built 
on a layout which does not lend itself to present-day needs, whereas a new 
one could be both efficient and attractive…Where Toronto is almost unique 
is that without undergoing extensive wartime destruction or major 
upheaval, it is in a position to achieve this objective.70  
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Image 3.4: Yonge Street and the Eaton’s lands. Outlined lots belonged to the company by the 
1950s. Old City Hall is at the bottom left, the Eaton store at the bottom right, Holy Trinity 
Church in its square in the centre. Note the dense, narrow lots that make up most of the area 
and the wide variety of businesses, especially on Yonge. Adapted from Nirenstein's National 
Realty Map Co., Business Section of Toronto, 1956. University of Toronto Map & Data Library.
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 One of the chief allures of the project was its sheer scale: thinking big was a crucial 
component of mid-century modernist planning and architecture.71 Another was location. 
Lawson also made it clear that the importance of the Eaton’s lands was increased by the 
maturing plans for new civic buildings just to the west. In a later memorandum he would 
elaborate on the idea of a downtown divided into quadrants, intersecting at the “new 
fulcrum of downtown activities” created by the civic square.72 In that geography, the Eaton’s 
lands are the core of the north-east, or retail quadrant. When redeveloped, he emphasized, 
they should be “complementary in design” to the Civic Square to the west, forming part of a 
perimeter of prestige buildings around the new construction.  
In preparation for meetings with Eaton’s representatives, planning staff sketched out 
several redevelopment plans.73 In their earliest versions they are rough and unfinished, but 
suggest that planners envisioned the redevelopment of the Eaton’s lands in parallel with 
other projects, including a renewal scheme just to the north called Cathay Square. That plan 
would have seen the city’s old Chinatown—already partially demolished to make way for 
the civic square—reconstituted in a new, comprehensively-planned superblock on the west 
side of Yonge between Gerrard and Dundas Streets.74 By mid-1958, however, a more 
detailed plan had been produced. It now had a name, “Project Viking,” in reference to 
Eaton’s iconic house brand of clothing and appliances.75 It was a radical reimagining of the 
area along modernist lines, a rare example of the kind of comprehensive planning that city 
planners urged (but could seldom practice) in the downtown core.  
Planners were vague as to how the remaining land for the scheme, several acres 
held by multiple private owners, would be acquired. In 1956, Lawson made it clear to 
Eaton’s that there was a possibility of the City using expropriation to prepare the way. But 
over the next two years he backed away from that stance, perhaps as a result of his criticism 
of Wood-Wellesley, the City’s first experiment in putting this planning at the service of 
power private development. During a 1957 meeting he emphasized that “any use of 
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redevelopment powers should be for a previously-determined public purpose,” and should 
not include a commitment to a specific developer.76 By the next year in the Viking plans his 
recommendation was that special powers be avoided entirely in the Bay-Yonge-Queen-
Dundas block; instead land assembly should take place quietly and before any public 
announcement was made that would cause values to rise.77 In that case, the City’s role 
would be to provide planning and design expertise, as well as negotiate the transfer and 
closing of several small internal streets. 
Viking would have been the largest redevelopment project in Toronto’s history. It 
was clearly inspired by developments in the United States and Europe, including the 
postwar British shopping precinct and planner Victor Gruen’s widely discussed 1956 plans 
for central Fort Worth, both of which emphasized pedestrian plazas, retail arcades, and the 
mixing of commercial and recreational or civic spaces.78 The broad outlines of the scheme 
were for a modernist, mixed-use superblock bounded by Bay, Yonge, Dundas, and Queen 
Streets, to be constructed over a space of twenty years. Internal streets would be closed, 
except for a new loop road off Bay Street for deliveries and parking access. On the east side 
of the block, the Eaton’s store would be expanded in stages to reach a size of 1,500,000 
square feet, or five times its original size. In what was the most grandiose aspect of the 
project, the new store would be balanced by four skyscraper office blocks lining Bay Street, 
each twenty-two or more storeys tall and situated in a landscaped courtyard. Interestingly, 
planners’ architectural point of reference for those buildings was the new Imperial Oil office 
tower on St. Clair West (1957), a domino-shaped block built according to plans rejected for 
the New City Hall in 1955. Viking, in other words, would have flanked Revell’s distinctive 
civic buildings with four also-rans.  
In total, the scheme would add nearly three million square feet of office and retail 
space to the core, accounting for a quarter of the total forecast by planners for 1980.79 
Ambitious; but transformative ambition was combined with an obvious concern for 
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preserving or improving existing structures. Historic Old City Hall is excluded from even the 
later stages of the scheme, and the position of Holy Trinity Church is perhaps improved by 
the addition of a pedestrian path running south from Dundas Street that effectively made it 
the heart of the superblock complex. Surprisingly, there is no mention of expropriating the 
existing retail strip on the west side of Yonge Street, meaning that the new Eaton’s store 
would be fronted along its length by (much smaller) competitors. In fact, Viking called for an 
increase in the number of small shops in the area, since the Dundas-Trinity Square 
pedestrian way was conceived of as an outdoor shopping street, much like those later 
proposed for the Gerrard Street Village, Chinatown, and Kensington Market.80 As in Gruen’s 
plans for Fort Worth, cars would be pushed out to the edges of the project, and further 
pedestrian access would be provided by elevated walkways and a footbridge over Bay Street 
to the Civic Square.  
Eaton’s plans its future 
In May 1956 Eaton’s representatives met with Matthew Lawson and University of Toronto 
planning chair Gordon Stephenson to discuss preliminary ideas for the area. Why 
Stephenson was there is a fascinating unknown: a former acolyte of modernist pioneer Le 
Corbusier and Canada’s foremost expert on urban renewal, he may have been invited to 
provide Eaton’s with context or information on the possibilities of government funding for 
the proposal. Certainly his presence, fresh from being hired to conduct Halifax’s urban 
renewal study, would have lent credibility to the whole endeavour.81 At that meeting 
Eaton’s presented a few broad criteria for revising the plans, including information about 
the desired size of its new store, much of which was incorporated into the Viking scheme 
drawn up for 1958.   
Eaton’s gave away little of its own intentions in these meetings, maintaining its 
established tradition of corporate secrecy and centralized decision-making.82 But behind the 
scenes, the company was deeply invested in planning the future of Toronto operations. This 
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stemmed in part from the simple practicality that its downtown physical plant was in poor 
condition. By the mid-1950s, Eaton’s was acutely aware of the state of its main store, parts 
of which were by then more than fifty years old. Loyal shoppers wrote to complain that it 
was cramped and insufficient in space. In 1958 Eaton’s executives noted that local tabloid 
Hush had called the store “shabby” and in need of a facelift; other observers contrasted it 
with Simpson’s more elegant and spacious premises across the street.83 Worse, engineering 
assessments of the complex had pointed out serious structural weaknesses, increasing the 
risk of fire or collapse.84 Other nearby buildings were in similar condition. Even as city 
planners were examining the Eaton’s holdings as a potential redevelopment area, the 
company was already at work concentrating and rationalizing its non-retail operations in 
more modern buildings on less valuable land. To that end, in 1956 it had opened a 
sprawling, 1.1 million square foot warehouse and service complex in the city’s northern 
suburbs.85  
As that move suggested, there was a larger geographic and financial dynamic at 
work. In 1954, the company had commissioned a report on its local operations by influential 
United States redevelopment consultant and mall builder Larry Smith.86 Smith’s research 
highlighted the fact that, since the late 1940s, Eaton’s and other downtown retailers had 
been losing ground to suburban alternatives. The company’s share of sales—20-30% to 
residents of all areas of the city, and approximately half of the department store market—
remained larger in absolute terms than any other single business. But it was shrinking 
quickly relative to shops in plazas and commercial strips in new suburban neighbourhoods. 
That trend could only continue, Smith argued, emphasizing the importance to Eaton’s future 
of carving out a space in this emerging market. But there is no mention in Smith’s report of 
abandoning or closing the traditional downtown stores. In fact, Eaton’s accepted his 
recommendation that suburban development be matched by downtown expansion, and by 
the time Viking was prepared was committed to tearing down and rebuilding the Queen 
Street store at an estimated cost of $15.5 million—very close to the price then being 
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negotiated for New City Hall.87 This faith in the future of downtown would hardly waver 
over the next decade of planning. 
Matthew Lawson encouraged Eaton’s to respond before the completion of the New 
City Hall design competition, perhaps hoping that the project could be featured alongside 
that announcement. Ever cautious, the company explained that while it realized “re-
development of the downtown was highly desirable,” it could not commit until it had 
conducted its own studies.88 The immediate reason seized on by the company’s board was 
the planners’ treatment of their new flagship store. Nowhere else in Canada had Eaton’s (or 
another major department store) considered building a downtown branch that did not face 
onto a major shopping street, was accessed primarily by subway and pedestrian paths, and 
was flanked by small retail shops on two sides. Project Viking was an urban shopping centre 
designed by planners without significant business experience, and it showed. Still, a few 
months later, reconstruction of the main store was put on hold while Eaton’s Head Office 
considered more ambitious schemes.89  
The entrepreneur developer 
No downtown development on the scale of Viking existed in Canada in the 1950s, or would 
for nearly a decade. Still, there was one project—not yet built—that could point the way for 
Eaton’s: Montréal’s Place Ville-Marie. As presented to the public in 1956, it proposed to 
transform a four-acre CNR site in the heart of Montréal into one of North America’s most 
impressive office and shopping complexes, and Canada’s most valuable commercial 
property.90 Completed amid growing nationalist aspirations for Québec modernization, 
Place Ville-Marie was in fact hailed not just locally, but nationally as transformative, a 
symbol of modernity, expert planning, and progress. Municipal administrations across the 
country saw in its apparent success a model for the remaking of their own central cities. 
Even before construction had begun, the development’s signature building—a 42-story 
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cruciform tower set in a wide square—was being deployed in print advertising to symbolize 
modernity and Montréal and Canada’s bright futures.91  
As historian Don Nerbas has argued, Place Ville-Marie was also revolutionary in 
another way: it represented a new paradigm for large-scale real estate development in 
Canada.92 Never before had a project of such magnitude been so deftly financed through 
borrowing, advance rents, and the manufacturing of prestige; value seemingly created out 
of thin air. The man who conceived and drove the process forward, American developer 
William Zeckendorf, was a pioneer in his industry, proposing bold schemes for urban 
renewal in dozens of American cities. Zeckendorf viewed real estate primarily as a financial 
services industry, and his heavily debt-leveraged projects produced impressive results and 
profits, although his publicly traded company, Webb & Knapp, often teetered on the brink 
of bankruptcy.93 Grandiose and highly publicized, the planning and execution of Place Ville-
Marie were watched by investors and pro-growth politicians both domestically and abroad; 
nowhere was this more the case than in Toronto. A long-time competitor in business, 
federal politics, and hockey, Toronto often used the larger but slower growing Québec 
metropolis as a yardstick for measuring its own success. Such was the case in the 1950s and 
1960s, as Montréal Mayor Jean Drapeau was lauded for his deft encouragement of 
downtown redevelopment and other prestige construction projects.94  
In fact, both the City of Toronto and Eaton’s were following Webb & Knapp’s 
expansion to Canada closely. Planners met with Zeckendorf’s representatives on several 
occasions in 1956 to outline their renewal plans for Queen-Bay-College-Yonge, and 
mentioned his company to Eaton’s as a possible partner in developing its downtown 
properties.95 Webb & Knapp’s enthusiasm for the project seems to have inspired city 
planners as they drew up the Viking Plans.96 Meanwhile, by 1958 Eaton’s was in discussions 
with the developer on several projects, including a large suburban mall in Toronto. William 
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Zeckendorf, ever the self-promoter, also dropped hints that he was negotiating a large 
redevelopment project for Toronto’s downtown. This was Viking. Welcomed as a 
conquering hero by the city’s business community, he stated in a speech to developers and 
real estate investors that he “hoped to be doing comparable operations [to Place Ville-
Marie] in Toronto very shortly.”97 However, beyond these vague pronouncements there 
were no signs of action. Growth boosters in Ontario’s capital were left wondering when 
such exciting developments like those taking place in Montréal or even London, Ontario 
would finally come to the centre of their city. The editors of the Globe and Mail likely spoke 
for many when they wrote, referring to Place Ville-Marie, that  
There is something splendid about this scheme, in which all of us as 
Canadian may take pride. But to Toronto people there will be a note of 
regret that we are unable to dream as grandly…Many cities have been 
developing civic centres, but the leadership which produces the reality of 
these things does not seem to exist in Toronto. When will we wake up?98 
 
The Toronto Redevelopment Advisory Council 
Waking the city up to the possibilities of downtown transformation was precisely the goal of 
politicians like Mayor Phillips. He was one of many politicians who felt that public efforts to 
make the core “as attractive as possible for developers” were simply not enough.99 In 1957, 
a motion in Toronto Council observed that while  
the necessity of the redevelopment of some sections of downtown Toronto 
is obvious to all…several attempts by the City Council to encourage 
developers to become interested [in those areas] have not met with 
success.100  
The solution initially proposed was the formation of a “representative citizens’ committee” 
made up of community and business groups—churches, labour, ratepayers’ associations, 
business groups, newspapers—to advise the City on the best ways to foster more successful 
redevelopment. Presumably the committee’s diverse composition would also help create 
political will for public participation in the development process. As originally discussed, 
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then, the Toronto Redevelopment Advisory Council (RAC) would be something of a repeat of 
the citizen groups set up during the 1940s reconstruction push, organizations that had 
foundered in their attempts to build civic consensus for reconstruction plans.101 Or, perhaps, 
it would be another Planning Board, with a particular focus on development. There was 
some interest in this idea, and groups ranging from the Bloor District Business Men to the 
Toronto Real Estate Board wrote to the City to express interest in sending a representative. 
In fact, under the guidance of Nathan Phillips and its first chairman—Simpson’s Vice-
President G. L. Burton—the RAC ended up as something altogether different: a handpicked 
group of business elites with a broad mandate to liaise between private interests and the 
city on nearly any downtown planning or development issue. Or, in the more flowery 
language of its terms of reference, to  
study, recommend action and assist in the progressive renewal of the 
downtown areas of Toronto so that the heart of the Metropolitan area 
develops on an economically sound basis as a handsome efficient business 
and cultural city centre.102  
It was emphasized that the main thrust of this future renewal would come from private 
sector development, and that the role of the RAC was, as one journalist put it, to create “the 
climate in which million-dollar deals can be born.”103 
Rather than the latest in a long line of Toronto citizens’ committees, the RAC was a 
local adaptation of a distinctly American model. Beginning in the 1940s, cities across the 
United States had wasted little time in forming pro-growth partnerships between business 
and political elites to initiate commercial urban renewal.104 In perhaps the best-known 
example, Pittsburgh industrialist Richard Mellon and his Allegheny Conference of business 
leaders worked closely with local Democratic boss David Lawrence to redevelop the city’s 
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core, a process widely described at the time as the “Pittsburgh Renaissance.”105 Phillips 
would later admit that his vision for the RAC was inspired by the example of Pittsburgh’s 
redevelopment, which was mostly driven by state, local, and private capital, rather than by 
recourse to federal Title I renewal funds.106  
The Mayor’s redevelopment “brain trust” was finally assembled in 1959, and its 
announcement was an important component of Phillips’ inaugural address for 1960. The 
RAC’s roster read like a miniature of the Allegheny Conference, and a who’s-who of the 
city’s Anglo-Canadian business elite. Its 15 members were all men, and all top executives 
(none below the rank of vice-president) from a range of major downtown companies, 
including three banks, several trust companies and insurance firms, and Eaton’s department 
store.107 A number, including Burton, had held high-ranking commissions in the Second 
World War. Unsurprisingly, to many this reeked of backroom politics and the old boy 
network. Toronto labour leaders called the RAC “big business gathered together to divide 
the spoils,” while Star columnist Ron Haggart pointed out that nearly any sizeable 
downtown development would involve lands owned by the companies they controlled, 
giving rise to conflicts of interest. There was a push in Council—deftly defeated by the 
Mayor—to create a more representative membership, and so forestall the perception that 
the RAC gave big business special access to City Hall.108   
But special access to City Hall was precisely the point of the RAC. Phillips and Burton 
saw the most-criticized aspects of the group—its exclusiveness and members’ personal 
involvement in downtown business—as its greatest strengths. They were under no illusions 
that it was representative of the body politic, instead seeing RAC members as an elite able 
to simultaneously balance deeply implication in their work with a public-spirited objectivity. 
Its members had a great stake in the city—Burton often remarked that their businesses paid 
60% of downtown taxes—but he believed they could be counted on to serve as private 
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citizens. The group’s meetings would be strictly secret, both to promote efficiency and to 
ensure that potential investors were assured of confidentiality. Burton contrasted this 
model favourably with the broader citizens’ group originally proposed, which he argued 
would not only have lacked knowledge and contacts, but been riven by internal discord and 
the pressures of “special interests” in public meetings.109 As Burton would argue in a 1963 
speech to the Canadian Club, “redevelopment and the future of a city should not be made a 
political football.”110 To the elite, interventionist RAC, petty politics and factionalism were 
brakes on the city’s progress; but the group promised to transcend them in the public 
interest. 
The RAC at work 
The RAC’s efforts to create a climate sympathetic to development were varied. They began 
with a crash course in the latest in redevelopment theory and practice, heavily weighted 
towards the American example. Downtown redevelopment expert Larry Smith (a trusted 
advisor to Eaton’s by this point) was invited to Toronto to speak to members in 1960, and a 
few months later the group toured five American cities—Newark, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Washington, and Pittsburgh—where downtown renewal projects were underway. This was 
the first of several such fact-finding trips organized by the RAC, which saw them welcomed 
by local civic officials and their counterparts in the business community. The RAC was just 
one of dozens of delegations from cities across Canada, the United States, indeed the world 
interested in learning about, and perhaps emulating the dramatic interventions underway in 
postwar American cities.111 Still, Burton and others recognized important differences 
between Toronto and the communities they visited. In 1962 he explained that “we do not 
have generally such vast blighted areas or slums and do not have such difficult racial 
problems”; nor did they have access to the general federal financing that had underwritten 
renewal south of the border. Nonetheless, the group was inspired by what it saw, and 
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particularly by the broad, entrepreneurial role given to business leaders in both planning 
and implementing downtown transformation.112  
The RAC had two major official projects during its first few years of operation. First, it 
played a significant role in shaping the development of the City of Toronto’s first detailed 
area planning study, the Plan for Downtown Toronto (1963).113 That document, with its 
emphasis on gradual redevelopment, pedestrian movement, and functional separation of 
uses owed a great deal to the careful modernism espoused by Matthew Lawson and his 
planning staff. But it also reflected extensive consultation with the RAC, who from 1961 
onwards had provided background studies on downtown business, feedback on rough drafts 
of the plan, and, eventually, input on prioritizing its many recommendations.114 Through its 
participation, the plan became invested with the faith in corporate citizenship and private 
initiative that characterized the RAC and its models in the United States. It outlined a future 
in which business interests—and specifically large corporations headquartered in the city—
would play the determining role in downtown’s transformation. Naturally, in keeping with 
the partnership model developed by City planners, those private efforts would be guided 
and facilitated wherever possible by planning expertise.  
But in addition to cooperating with planners, the RAC also played a part in 
circumventing them. In 1962, the advisory group helped influence the decision by City 
Council to form a division called the Development Department, with a mandate to promote 
and expedite new building projects.115 This would effectively entrench the boosterism 
embodied by the RAC in the city bureaucracy, the next logical step if the group’s formation 
is viewed as an attempt to create a second, more effectively pro-development planning 
apparatus for downtown.116 Planners made poor salesmen, as Project Viking (among others) 
had made abundantly clear, and they were liable to slow projects down in the search for 
concessions to planning objectives. Meanwhile, politicians were felt to lack the professional 
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expertise required to liaise with land developers and their staff on their own terms. 
Supporters of the Development Department like future Mayor Donald Summerville 
envisioned its head as “a super-salesman” expertise who would do everything in his power 
to promote investment.117 Chief among his tasks would be helping to usher specific 
development projects through planning reviews and the complications of zoning—systems 
put in place precisely to slow down and regulate such projects. Their eventual choice, 
Walter Manthorpe, was a planner from Britain, who surprisingly shared common ground 
with Matthew Lawson on many substantive issues.118 But he settled well into his role as 
development facilitator. After five years with the City, Manthorpe would leave his role as 
commissioner to work for development group Meridian, transitioning seamlessly from 
public to private practice thanks to the excellent relationships he build with development 
firms during that time. 
A growth boom 
There was plenty of work for Manthorpe’s Development Department. From the late 1950s 
onwards, the pace of private development in Toronto was quickening. During the decade 
following the 1952 Wood-Wellesley project, 12% of the city was torn down and 
reconstructed, typically to much higher densities. In the downtown core the pace was even 
faster, with fully one-quarter of the building stock redeveloped during this period.119 At the 
southernmost end of the Yonge Street commercial strip, a number of retail and 
entertainment uses were displaced by midrise office construction. Most visibly, in 1955 the 
Victorian Yonge Street Arcade, the city’s only such arcade and home to 20 shops, was 
demolished, and a few years later replaced with a ten-storey office building. In addition to 
the New City Hall, Civic Square, and municipal courthouse, between 1960 and 1965 thirteen 
major office developments were completed, representing 3.5 million square feet of office 
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space.120 This was a significant boost to the City’s redevelopment agenda, on pace to greatly 
exceed planners’ 1959 forecast of 10 million square feet by 1980.121  
These new developments would contribute substantially to the municipal tax base, 
all the more so since Toronto taxed commercial properties at a higher rate than residential. 
But from a planning perspective, they embodied little of the ambitious vision elaborated for 
the core. Most were simple block towers between 10 and 20 storeys tall that sat on 
relatively small lots, lacking the scale, new open space or aesthetic coherence with their 
surroundings envisioned by comprehensive planning projects like New City Hall or Viking. 
These buildings, insofar as they conformed to the increasingly generous zoning laws fought 
for by growth-boosting politicians, were largely outside of the oversight of city planners. 
Given the group’s secretive practices, it is nearly impossible to determine the extent—if 
any—of the RAC’s influence on any of these developments. Still, the overall climate for 
downtown development was extremely optimistic, and there was no end in sight. By 1967 
influential real estate firm A.E. LePage Ltd. was forecasting continued “overwhelming 
growth” and investment in Toronto’s downtown for years to come.122    
There was one notable exception to the pattern of piecemeal development created 
by the boom: the Toronto Dominion Centre, announced to great fanfare in 1964 for the 
superblock bordered by Bay, York, Wellington, and King Streets.123 The new headquarters of 
the Toronto Dominion Bank, built in partnership with developer Fairview, was not the first 
bank tower to grace that corner; but its great size and spare, modernist style—designed by 
internationally renowned architect Mies van der Rohe—set it apart from the surrounding 
city. Plans for the nine-acre site called for a large pedestrian plaza flanked by two sheer 
black, unadorned glass and steel towers 44 and 55 storeys tall. It was Toronto’s answer to 
Place Ville-Marie, and perhaps the first of the city’s “contemporary cathedrals,” widely seen 
as a monument not only to corporate ambition but to civic progress.124 The RAC seems to 
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have been involved from the early stages of planning, through TD Bank President Allan 
Lambert, a founding member. In his memoir, Nathan Phillips argues that the RAC was a 
prime mover in the project’s scaling up from corporate headquarters to complex.125 
Certainly Allan Burton’s championing of the Centre applied a veneer of public purpose to 
the project: in one speech to the Canadian Club in 1963 he hailed it as a model for 
downtown development, thanking Lambert and his partners for their “faith in Toronto’s 
future.” 126 Eaton’s was watching, and hoped for a similar reception for the plans now taking 
shape in its boardrooms. 
Pressure to act 
The long-awaited arrival of significant downtown redevelopment put pressure on Eaton’s to 
make a decision about its downtown lands. The years 1962-64 saw construction finally 
beginning on the New City Hall and Civic Square and the TD Centre site to the south. 
Downtown was visibly transforming, and the window of opportunity offered to the company 
in the 1950s to lead the way on renewal seemed to be closing. In early 1963, the Plan for 
Downtown was published to sustained media attention and speculation over its vision of a 
modern central core.127 Eaton’s head office was privy to its contents well before that date, 
since it participated in the production of the plan through the RAC. Discussing the 
company’s future in Toronto in January 1962, Eaton’s executives agreed that the plan’s 
publication would bring with it “considerable pressure” to announce a redevelopment 
program.128  
They were correct. In addition to its general emphasis on a future shaped privately 
led redevelopment, the plan included specific reference to Eaton’s important place in that 
vision. Its section on the Yonge Street shopping district directed attention to the Eaton’s 
lands, calling on the company to take advantage of what it called “an excellent opportunity 
for redevelopment [of] great public importance,” including shopping and “prestige 
offices.”129 It was one of only a few specific developments mentioned in the document (the 
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TD Centre was another). In this way, the previously confidential Viking plans were becoming 
a part of official City planning policy, if only in outline. Planning head Matthew Lawson 
would later emphasize in media interviews that Eaton’s, along with competitor Simpson’s, 
would be the anchors and prime movers of the modernization of the city’s retail shopping 
district.130 The City would play its part, too, by closing streets and otherwise accommodating 
the necessarily large scale of their projects.  
Pressure was also exerted on the company from other directions. In the summer of 
1962 influential author and television personality Pierre Berton called the state of the 
Eaton’s lands Toronto’s most glaring example of “unfinished business.”131 In a series of 
front-page columns in the Toronto Star he revealed the existence not only of Viking, but of a 
second set of plans for the site, prepared by Webb & Knapp’s house architect, I.M. Pei.  132 In 
his analysis, as long as those plans languished in Eaton’s filing cabinets, so too would 
Toronto’s prospects for downtown revitalization. Few boosters of downtown renewal had 
put their case so eloquently. Included were sketches of tree-lined plazas and impressive 
modernist structures drawn directly from the plans, giving the public its first real glimpse of 
the scale of redevelopment proposed for the site.  
Like many other commentators at the time, Berton hailed Montréal’s Place Ville-
Marie—officially opened in September 1962—as a paragon of modern downtown planning.  
Here is an oasis, seven and one-half acres in size, in a concrete desert—a 
place where pedestrians may stroll about without the confinement of 
narrow streets or the harassment of traffic. Here the elegant shops, smart 
theatres, sidewalk cafes, plazas, promenades, offices, hotel and railways 
stations are all interconnected as part of a single plan... [Place Ville-Marie] 
has demonstrated that you can have comfort, dignity, beauty, and profit all 
at the same time. It is a money-making proposition created by free 
enterprise with an assist from the city…Its secret is simple: three city blocks, 
of which the Place constitutes one-third, are being developed as a single 
unit by a single owner.133 
This glowing assessment of Montréal’s redevelopment success was set in contrast to 
Toronto’s apparent inability to create a coherent future of downtown. And yet, according to 
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Berton, the situation was urgent. Unlike City planners, for whom the 1960s core was “the 
busy heart of a great city,” Berton saw only a “monument to our own greed and 
gutlessness…where every square inch has been made to count for a profitable return—but 
never for human comfort or human dignity.” The only way to reverse the postwar trend of 
downtown “dry rot” and flight to the suburbs, he argued, was through public-spirited 
renewal on the scale of Place Ville-Marie.134 Berton dwelled on Eaton’s hesitancy to commit 
to a scheme, giving readers the impression that a simple “go!” from company head John 
David Eaton would suffice to begin construction. “Seldom,” he wrote, “has the fate of one 
metropolis rested to such a degree on the decisions of a single mercantile enterprise.”135 
The image of the Eaton family holding the keys to the city’s future was a powerful one. 
The Eaton Centre 
Berton’s information was out of date. By 1962, Webb & Knapp was in serious financial 
trouble. Its rapid expansion in the 1950s—major real estate deals, the creation of 
international subsidiaries, an entry into the US hotel business—relied on overly optimistic 
project appraisals and a constant stream of new investments to meet ever-growing 
obligations.136 By 1962, even as Place Ville-Marie neared completion, the company was 
teetering on the edge of insolvency. Other large publicly traded American real estate 
companies were in similar straits. Berton’s applause for Zeckendorf’s Toronto plans came 
months after Webb & Knapp had withdrawn from its development agreement with Eaton’s; 
Zeckendorf would later cite the department store’s lack of vision, but his dire financial 
situation likely played a more important role.137 Negotiations with an alternative partner, 
Canadian Equity & Development, the real estate arm of Canadian industrialist E.P. Taylor’s 
investment empire, also soon soured.138 Heavily committed in profitable—and logistically 
much simpler—suburban projects, Canadian Equity was likely daunted by the cost of land 
assembly, demolition, and construction, estimated by this point to be between $150 million 
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and $200 million. As one Toronto Star reporter would later point out, that was roughly 
equivalent to half of Canada’s contribution to the colossal St. Lawrence Seaway project.139  
Despite these financial setbacks, by 1964 Eaton’s was committed at the highest 
levels to redevelopment. The internal business arguments in favour of some kind of a 
Toronto project had been clear for some time; in fact they had changed little since Larry 
Smith outlined them in the mid-1950s.140 The poor condition of existing buildings, the need 
for additional space to capture a larger downtown customer base, and the efficiencies 
promised by consolidating operations all pointed to new facilities. The company was also 
eager to take part in the city’s development boom, and once again to fulfill its role as 
Toronto’s premier corporate citizen. In August 1964 working titles for the project—Viking, 
Toronto CBD Project—were abandoned in favour of “the Eaton Centre.”141 The name change 
was significant. Attaching the storied Eaton’s brand to the project ensured a certain level of 
notoriety, but also a measure of risk. The company and the Eaton family would be clearly 
identified as the prime movers behind the scheme, and they were to a certain extent staking 
their reputation on the development’s success. This choice of name for the project also 
invited parallels—drawn in the press once the project became public, but likely at this stage 
already discussed in the Eaton’s boardroom—to another powerful mercantile family that 
had made its mark in downtown redevelopment: New York’s Rockefellers. The comparison 
was inevitable, all the more so since the colossal Rockefeller Center (1930-39) was privately 
financed by the family after other major investors pulled out.  
If any additional incentive was needed, it could be found in competition with a 
perennial business rival, Simpson’s. RAC founder G.L. Burton’s company seemed committed 
to doing its part to make downtown modernization a reality, announcing in 1964 the 
construction of a thirty-three story tower facing the Eaton’s site, as well as store 
improvements at a total cost of $20 million.142 Eaton’s responded quickly with a press 
release offering congratulations—and the promise that its own (much more impressive) 
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redevelopment scheme would be made public in due course.143 In fact, by that point a new 
set of architectural plans for the site had been completed by Canadian James A. Murray and 
that doyen of commercial revitalization, Victor Gruen. John David Eaton and the company 
directors had approved moving forward with the Eaton Centre, and a headhunt had begun 
for an experienced project manager. There was even talk of opening the new store in time 
for the company’s centenary in 1969.144 
Growing ambitions 
Eaton’s had still not made a public announcement regarding the Eaton Centre, but every 
indication was that the latest plans developed by Murray and Gruen were even more 
ambitious.145 In 1958 Viking had surprised Eaton’s with its scale; six years later the company 
was considering a development more than three times larger.146 The bulk of the new 
additions were in the form of rentable office space, driven by projections of “general 
bullishness” in the office market into the late 1960s and beyond. Prestige office rentals 
would provide the majority of the project’s income and help drive its completion.147 This 
would require the demolition of nearly the entire superblock bounded by Bay, Yonge, 
Dundas, and Queen, including the patchwork of properties not yet owned by Eaton’s. Also 
included was yet another change of architects, with renowned office tower builders 
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, and Canadian architects and long-time Eaton’s consultants 
Mathers & Haldenby joining the project. 
The man hired to manage this growing army of experts was David Owen, in April 
1965 named Managing Director of Eaton Centre Limited. A protégé of William Zeckendorf 
and major player in the Place Ville-Marie project, Owen was one of a small pool of people in 
Canada with experience of large-scale urban redevelopment. His origins in Vancouver also 
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played a role in the decision, given Eaton’s reputation as a Canadian retailer and the 1960s 
climate of growing economic nationalism.148 Owen’s role was to publicize the project, 
negotiate with government, and coordinate company staff and consultants. One journalist 
likened him to an “executive producer,” and the comparison to a Hollywood film was apt—
in the planning stages, there was something unreal, even fantastical about a project like the 
Eaton Centre.149 The huge sums of money involved, the complexity of the plans, the 
transformative urban agenda attached to them—all of it seemed precarious, too grandiose 
to be true. Confident in his own abilities and in the complex’s role ushering in “the Toronto 
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of the twenty-first century,” Owen brought a cool arrogance to the work of convincing 
Torontonians to share in that vision.150  
Land assembly 
At the same time, the company moved quickly to assemble the remaining land in the Eaton 
Centre block, beginning with the small shoe, fur, and clothing stores on the west side of 
Yonge Street. In mid-1964 Eaton’s purchased for more than $2 million a batch of ten small 
properties through Canadian Equity, happy to act as middleman where it had declined to be 
a development partner.151 Later that year negotiations began to purchase a further 13 lots 
from individual owners for just under $5 million, leaving just a few holdout properties 
outside of company control. All of these transactions took place through a subsidiary 
corporation, Sunjam Ltd.152 Economics dictated that as more information about the Eaton 
Centre became public, and it became clear that an assembly was underway, the price of 
remaining properties would rise steeply. That is exactly what seems to have happened in 
the interval between the two rounds of purchases described above: if 100 feet of low-rise 
retail on Yonge sold for half a million dollars in 1964, by the next year a comparable stretch 
of frontage was selling for $1.7 million. Eaton’s correspondence also suggests that by mid-
1965, the company was competing with speculators—including one major bank—to 
purchase the remaining lots in the assembly. Despite the poor condition of many standing 
buildings, as the assembly proceeded, the prices the company was asked to pay for 
remaining parcels skyrocketed to as high as $100 per square foot, or twice the average price 
paid during the TD Centre assembly just a few years before.153  
Sometime in early 1965, Eaton’s began negotiations with the municipal government 
to purchase Old City Hall.154 At 2.8 acres, the lot it sat on was approximately the size of the 
main department store, making it by far the most substantial piece of the superblock not 
under company control. Many within the civic administration had long viewed the 1899 civic 
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building as an albatross around the City’s neck; the costs of maintaining it were high, and its 
usefulness for other purposes dubious.155 In 1956, during discussions of the first iterations 
of Viking, Mayor Nathan Phillips had personally approached John David Eaton to ask if he 
would consider buying Old City Hall for future redevelopment.156 The Eaton’s head refused, 
and the building was instead sold to Metro Toronto as a court and police administrative 
building. In fact, Metro was also reluctant to take the building over, and it appears Eaton’s 
was reassured over the years that it was still available for purchase and demolition.157 
Metro officials saw the building’s sale and demolition as a chance to use Eaton’s financing to 
meet several of their organizational and planning objectives, including the acquisition of 
modern headquarters for the Metro police and the courts, and the widening and 
straightening of the crooked Bay and Queen intersection.158 The latter measure, discussed 
at various levels of the civic administration since the early 1900s, was a small piece of a 
larger program of widenings aimed at rationalizing downtown traffic patterns.159  
Even at this early stage, it was becoming clear that the transfer of Old City Hall and 
internal streets would be the main point of discussion between the civic administration and 
Eaton’s. Zoning laws dating from the previous decade already allowed for very high 
densities across the downtown core: as the Development Commissioner would later point 
out, there was little to stop Eaton’s from building a series of office buildings—or any other 
commercial use—on its lands, with “virtually no site-planning standards.” However, public 
cooperation was necessary to provide the additional land and interconnections of a 
superblock.160 This gave municipal authorities leverage for public involvement through 
attaching conditions to the sale of this public property. Unlike the assembly of two blocks of 
Yonge Street retail, however, discussion of the sale of one of the largest and oldest publicly-
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owned structures in the city could not be kept secret for long. As early as the winter of 
1963-64 the press had begun to report rumours of Eaton’s interest in the property.161  
Political proxies 
Eaton’s maintained a policy of non-committal silence about the project. Information 
released to the public was tightly managed, and typically channelled through allies within 
the civic administration. These included Metro Chairman William Allen, an ally of the 
redevelopment plans since the early 1960s, Development Commissioner Walter Manthorpe, 
and Mayor Phillip Givens, nicknamed “go-go” Givens for his pro-development efforts.162 
Informal, private meetings between these important public figures and Eaton Centre 
principals were the norm in 1965 and 1966, as was their advising the company on how best 
to satisfy the civic administration’s demands—sometimes before they had been even been 
made. Company records document that David Owen and Eaton’s executives met with 
William Allen or his representative four times over the spring and summer of 1965, each 
time coming closer to a mutually agreeable price for Old City Hall.163 All of this happened 
well before Allen had any mandate to negotiate; he would get that only in September. At 
that point, it was again Allen who briefed the press on a general outline of project, using 
materials supplied by the company’s PR consultants.164 Press coverage of the event 
captured a certain enthusiasm—Givens spoke of “the greatest development that has ever 
taken place”—but provided very little real information about it.165 The Toronto Telegram 
may have put it best: 
Eaton’s are calling their mammoth $250,000,000 downtown 
redevelopment project the T. Eaton Centre. But what it will contain and 
when it will be started is anyone’s guess.166 
On the basis of very little information, Eaton’s concept seemed to have captured the 
imagination of most city politicians, not the least with the estimated $14 million in new 
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taxes that the area would produce yearly once complete. Given that the City of Toronto’s 
1966 tax levy totalled $170 million, this represented an unprecedented contribution for a 
single development project. As one newspaper pundit would later point out, the Centre 
could cut $25 from the tax bill of the average home owner.167 Yet there were critics, 
including respected Toronto Councillor and Board of Control member William Dennison. 
Over thirty years in politics, former Commonwealth Co-operative Federation member 
Dennison was never, in Nathan Phillips’ words, “one of the boys”: rather, he had built his 
reputation on opposition to the pro-growth consensus.168 In 1940s and 1950s debates over 
downtown apartment construction and public housing he argued against expropriation and 
derided the redevelopment process as mostly benefiting speculators. His position on the 
Eaton Centre, long-held but strengthened with an eye for a 1966 mayoral run, was that “Old 
City Hall is not for sale.” Not only did the building have historical value, but its sale 
practically at cost was an embarrassment for a city that had lately wasted millions in cost 
overruns on the Civic Square project. In this he found allies among other neo-populists, 
including the outspoken social conservative East York Reeve True Davidson.169  
Friends of Old City Hall 
Following publication of Eaton’s letter of intent to buy Old City Hall in December 1965, this 
small minority of politicians was joined by other voices. A campaign to save Old City Hall 
from the wrecking ball coalesced around James H. Acland, professor at the University of 
Toronto’s School of Architecture. Alongside him were a slate of eminent public figures that 
included Metro planner Hans Blumenfeld, former Governor-General Vincent Massey, and 
Eric Arthur, elder statesman of Canadian architecture, one of the first group of seven 
appointed to the City planning board and a collaborator on the New City Hall project.170 
Over the next year, the Friends’ campaign would transform the Eaton Centre and the sale of 
Old City Hall into major public issues, carving out a space in the conversation for increased 
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public participation and a politics of urban conservation that would have a major long-term 
impact on the city’s form. 
The “Friends of Old City Hall” received the support of a number of Canadian and 
international architectural or planning organizations.171 Their fight was important enough 
within the profession to merit mention in US journal Architectural Forum in early 1966.172 By 
no means all Canadian architects and planners supported preservation. In February 1966 
Canadian Architect published a special forum section on Old City Hall, and nearly half of a 
dozen contributions urged demolition if the plan for the site was strong enough.173 But the 
Friends’ stance was nonetheless influential, drawing as it did on a sense that Toronto’s 
historic architecture was being indiscriminately destroyed by short-sighted redevelopment. 
Ally Eric Arthur spoke to a growing constituency when he wrote, in 1964, that 
In the march of progress, we have ruthlessly destroyed almost all of our 
older architecture; street names cherished for a hundred years or more 
have been altered to suit the whims of the people on the street, and even 
our most treasured buildings, Fort York, going back to the beginnings of 
British settlement, have recently been threatened because the historic soil 
on which they stood interfered with the curvature of a modern 
expressway.174 
That realization was by no means confined to urban professionals. Over the previous decade 
debates over other structures and sites had fostered a politics of heritage preservation in 
Toronto, as in many other North American and European cities.175 For many heritage-
minded Torontonians, the Old City Hall debate was a continuation of the long fight to save 
the neighbouring University Avenue Armouries (1891), torn down in 1963 to make way for a 
new courthouse. Architects and other experts were just one element of an anti-demolition 
coalition that included retired soldiers, local historical societies, and the United Empire 
Loyalists.176 A similarly diverse group of citizens rallied to the Friends of Old City Hall, 
allowing the group’s spokespeople to claim 600 pledges of support by early 1966.177 Their 
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ranks included a number of self-proclaimed conservatives who would later take part in the 
early 1970s campaign to “clean up” the Yonge Street strip. Conscious of the dangers of 
being labelled as crackpots or a “rent-a-crowd” (in the words of one Globe and Mail 
columnist) Acland and other experts made extra efforts to maintain the group’s identity—
and authority—as “informed professionals and community leaders.”178 They, like Eaton’s, 
would rely heavily on the perceived ability of urban experts to determine the best course for 
the future of the city.179 
In their public statements, letters to the editor, and deputations to council, the 
Friends of Old City Hall and their allies presented their case for the building’s preservation. 
The tone ranged from the professorial to the sentimental, reflecting the diverse coalition 
assembled around the issue. From the architects and planners who acted as public 
spokespeople, much was made of the building’s unique place in architectural history. Under 
the years of grime that obscured its stone façade it was “a national monument,” one of the 
most impressive Victorian buildings in Canada.180 Support for this view was found in an 
appeal to professional authority: Old City Hall was one of only three Canadian buildings 
singled out in the definitive international history of architecture; it was considered one of 
the best existing examples of Romanesque Revival style in North America; the jury in the 
New City Hall competition, all renowned architects, had applauded its “rich design” and 
judged all submissions in relation to it.181  
Some took a different tack, stressing personal and communal attachments to the 
building. “This building has meant more to the life of our City than possibly any other” wrote 
a Scarborough man; others called it a “tangible link to the past,” referencing homecomings 
from war, celebrations of sporting victories, and the way the building dominated views 
north along lower Bay Street. Positioning themselves as taxpayers, voters, and concerned 
Torontonians, these Friends thought a principle, as well as a structure, was at stake. Their 
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concern was that in embracing development and change, the city was losing its formerly 
strong sense of itself: “How can you measure progress if you have nothing of the past to 
compare with the present?” 182 There was often a social conservative streak in this criticism, 
with James Acland and others suggesting at Friends’ meetings that social disorder or 
delinquency were possible consequence of lack of reverence for the past.183 
In place of demolition, the Friends argued, Toronto should find a new public purpose 
for the structure: proposals included everything from an art gallery to an adult education 
centre.184 The Eaton Centre concept was attacked, at times in emotional terms. Charges of 
“philistinism” and “vandalism” were common, but perhaps the most effective critique was 
that it was incomplete, a product of “haste and improvisation” that did not convincingly 
demonstrate a need for the Old City Hall site.185 In December 1965, faced with delegation 
after delegation opposing demolition and questioning Eaton’s seriousness, Metro agreed to 
defer a final decision until its planners had reviewed a more detailed development plan for 
the Eaton Centre.186  
Selling the city of tomorrow 
The March 1966 unveiling of a master plan for the project was Eaton’s chance to regain the 
initiative. Every aspect was planned and stage-managed, down to the choice of location, a 
showroom set up “on the company’s own ground” in the recently purchased Yonge Street 
premises of former competitor Northway’s department store.187 The centrepiece of the 
room was a detailed scale model of the development and surrounding area, completed and 
reassembled on site just days before. Against a backdrop of older, mostly low-rise 
structures—the city of the past, intentionally made non-descript with darker colouring—the 
gleaming white towers of the Eaton Centre, along with New City Hall and the new Simpson’s 
tower, presented a dramatic vision of the city of tomorrow promised two decades before.188 
To a close observer of Yonge Street’s tumultuous redevelopment history, there was a 
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certain irony in the choice of venue. The eight-storey Northway Building was a product of 
the same pre-Depression building boom that had spawned Eaton’s College Street project. 
On the tower’s completion in 1928 it was applauded for its elegant modernity, and 
observers hoped that its construction would begin the physical rehabilitation of Yonge 
Street retail.189 Less than forty years later, however, all signs pointed to it becoming one of 
the first casualties of another, more ambitious wave of revitalization.  
On March 1 the Eaton Centre model, photo montages, and other planning images 
were presented to a standing-room only audience of journalists, provincial and city 
politicians, and senior bureaucrats, accompanied by talks by the project’s principals.190 The 
presentation was broadcast on the CBC, and the press encouraged to photograph Metro 
                                                  
189 “Sinaiticus, The Northway Building, Toronto,” Construction 21:11 (Nov. 1928), 377-82. 
190 “Standing room only for first glimpse of complex,” Globe and Mail, Mar. 2, 1966. 
Image 3.6: City of Toronto and Metro Toronto officials, including future mayor William 
Dennison (with moustache) are shown a scale model of the Eaton Centre by the complex’s 
planners, March 1, 1966. Barry Philp/Toronto Star. Toronto Public Library Baldwin Collection, 
tspa_0109989f. 
251 
 
and City politicians interacting with the model and discussing its attributes with the Centre’s 
planners.191 The resulting photos, published in every major Toronto paper, projected a 
powerful image of collaboration between civic leaders public and private. Later that day the 
Redevelopment Advisory Council was invited to view the model, and over the next few 
weeks private showings were held—sometimes as many as four a day—for groups 
representing every conceivable civil society group or bureaucratic unit in the city, from the 
Board of Trade to the Assessment Department.192  
The plan presented was as ambitious as anticipated, expressing the firm faith in 
progress and comprehensive planning that underlay the entire project.193 Its authority was 
underwritten by the stable of experts employed in its conception. “We have subjected our 
thinking and our objectives for this area,” explained Eaton Centre Vice-President Greg 
Kinnear, “to appraisal by the finest specialists we could find in Canada and outside of 
Canada.”194 The plan envisioned the Bay-Yonge-Dundas-Queen superblock transfigured into 
a “megastructure” integrating every conceivable downtown function: a hotel, convention 
centre, transportation hub, retail mall, and four office/residential towers. It was a city within 
a city, projected to draw 200,000 persons per day to its soaring towers and huge pedestrian 
spaces. Many of the original ingredients from Viking, including the shopping street and 
office towers, were once again present, but magnified. A 69-storey tower would give 
Toronto the tallest building outside of Manhattan, and a five-level enclosed retail centre 
containing 200 specialty retail shops. A total of nearly eleven million square feet of space 
was included, allowing David Owen to boast that the project was three times the size of 
Place Ville-Marie. All of this was promised in two construction phases over fifteen years, at 
an estimated cost of $260 million (approximately $1.8 billion in 2016 dollars). Phase 1 
included Eaton’s new store and an office building on the site of the Old City Hall—beyond 
that the timeline was vague.  
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Urban and commercial objectives 
Just a few months before the unveiling, Eaton’s directors had met to outline the company’s 
internal objectives for the Eaton Centre project.195 The tone was set by the first: “Creation 
of a department store of unrivalled supremacy in Toronto”. The company had clearly 
absorbed and integrated many of the concerns of City planners, and was now comfortable 
using some of the same language; the list is full of concern for issues like design quality, 
pedestrian experience, and stimulus to further redevelopment. But, unsurprisingly given 
Eaton’s long history of business success, each objective was also framed in terms of the 
benefits it offered to the company. Rationalizing traffic patterns, for example, would give 
the Eaton store “prime accessibility” for shoppers arriving by car; pedestrian improvements 
would channel foot traffic from the rest of downtown into the complex’s shops. In its 
unabashed ambitions to make the Eaton Centre “the focal point of Toronto,” the company 
seemed confident that public planning objectives could be profitably adapted to commercial 
ends. 
The tone was different at the March 1 unveiling, which emphasized the plan’s strong 
engagement with the public interest. Again and again the project’s principals emphasized 
that this was a development conceived of with much more than Eaton’s own goals in mind. 
“When you have done business in a community for nearly 100 years,” Kinnear went on,  
you acquire a deep sense of obligation to the people of that community in 
addition to becoming deeply rooted in it. [That] is why we have not confined 
our plans to a retailer’s basic objectives…but extended them to encompass 
the entire 22.5 acres bordering the new City Hall and Nathan Phillips 
Square.196 
Referencing Viking, he positioned the Eaton Centre as “the culmination of eight years of 
planning” to make a contribution to the revitalization of downtown Toronto. The Eaton 
Centre, its planners argued, would rid the core of blight, clearing and replacing 23 acres of 
“underdeveloped, predominately substandard buildings.” That most of those buildings had 
been either erected or left to deteriorate by Eaton’s was not mentioned. Its department 
store and shopping arcade would revitalize Yonge and Queen—and downtown more 
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generally—as the city’s shopping district, pushing back against a decade of suburbanization 
of commerce. Aesthetically it would complement and accentuate New City Hall, and like 
that structure become a “recognizable visual symbol of the city as a whole.”197   
The project would also deliver much needed civic space to Torontonians. “Perhaps 
the greatest gift of the Centre to the city,” argued consulting planner James Murray,  
is the gift of space. Space not empty but lively. Space for the daily tasks of 
the thousands who work or shop. Space for the enjoyment of those who 
stroll or rest or play…[S]pace as a setting for great architecture.198 
With space came life. The Eaton Centre—much like the pedestrian mall experiment a few 
years later—promised to address the concern that Toronto’s downtown was becoming a 
desert outside of working hours: Pierre Berton’s “vast, forbidding prison from which we 
gratefully make our escape at 5 p.m.”199 Compared to previous iterations, the plan’s 
detailed treatment of space and pedestrian movement was one of its most novel aspects. At 
street level, landscaped plazas and courts would set off the larger towers and add to the 
walkable space provided by the new Civic Square. The Eaton’s store would be linked to retail 
tenants by a multi-floor glass-domed gallery recalling a European arcade. Most dramatically, 
the entire complex would be built on a podium—the “Promenade Level”—that allowed 
“horizontal circulation through the entire project” and beyond. This last addition was the 
work of Vincent Ponte, another former Place Ville-Marie collaborator whose vision of the 
“multi-level city centre” was garnering attention across North America.200 He envisioned the 
Eaton Centre as the hub of an underground tunnel network that would bind the core’s 
financial, government, and retail districts into one cohesive whole, ending forever the 
“fragmented city” of small-scale developments so criticized by city planners.201   
One final aspect of the plan was its vision of the Eaton Centre as “the crossroads of 
the transportation system” in Toronto.202 George Barton, one of North America’s most 
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eminent urban transportation consultants, described a development that built seamless 
connections between public transit, roadways, and pedestrian paths. The “gifts” offered by 
this approach, mostly aimed at pleasing Metro transportation planners, included space to 
widen Bay, Queen, and Yonge (a particular bugbear of Metro Roads and Traffic czar Sam 
Cass) by two lanes each, and Dundas by a staggering six lanes, producing a wide boulevard 
across the central core. Also included were a new underground bus terminal, 2700 parking 
spaces, and some kind of accommodation for a future Queen Street subway tunnel. 
Eaton’s underlined that all of these public interest objectives would be fulfilled by 
private initiative. But Toronto was required to make a choice between past and future. Old 
City Hall, whatever its architectural or historical merits, was “the very key to the complex,” 
and must be cleared.203 Its continued presence blocked continuity between the Eaton 
Centre and the growing financial and office district to the south, acting as a physical barrier 
to comprehensive modernization.204 The two areas would have to be joined up, with 
Vincent Ponte’s “hub point” for pedestrian circulation sited within the footprint of the 
existing building. Above ground the entire block was needed for the construction of a 57-
storey office tower.205 There was an aesthetic argument, as well. If the key to the Eaton 
Centre’s coherence and beauty was its “architectural integration” with the new civic 
complex, there too Old City Hall presented an obstacle. It would introduce an element of 
disruption into an otherwise comprehensive plan, and prevent the dramatic modernist 
buildings of the Centre from properly framing Civic Square.   
Could the razing of an historical landmark be offset by drawing other connections to 
the past? The Centre’s planners argued that there was a real “sense of history” in their 
proposals for the development.206 In the weeks before the March 1 presentation Eaton’s 
staff were busy making lists of historical figures and incidents that could possibly be 
associated with the complex. The press kit distributed at the announcement inevitably 
included a handout on Eaton’s nearly 100-year history of business and good corporate 
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citizenship in downtown Toronto.207 Following the lead of Viking, the plan claimed that it 
would preserve and “release the Church of the Holy Trinity from its present environment 
and return it to a setting in which its battlemented turrets may be seen against the sky.” In 
place of a tight cluster of factory and warehouse buildings, the Church would be set in a 
“cloistered garden space”—albeit, as the scale model demonstrated, one hemmed in on 
three sides by skyscrapers.208 In the case of Old City Hall, Eaton’s once again offered the 
compromise hinted at months earlier: the building’s clock tower and the Cenotaph retained, 
surrounded by a new “Tower Square” appropriate for remembrance ceremonies.209 
Reverence for history could, it seemed, be integrated seamlessly into the city of tomorrow. 
Enthusiasm 
Initial response to the March 1 plans was enthusiastic. All three major Toronto newspapers 
featured lavish spreads on the Eaton Centre, beginning with page after page of 
photographs, planning sketches, and fawning prose in the March 1 evening edition of the 
Telegram, a publication in which the Eaton family had long held a financial interest.210 The 
next day, a Toronto Star editorial gave the project its endorsement, arguing that its 
combination of private enterprise and public initiative would create “a new heart for old 
Toronto.” The Globe and Mail was somewhat more reserved, stressing that the City should 
drive a hard bargain for the sale of Old City Hall. But it too endorsed the Centre.211 In a 
period of high newspaper readership, the stances taken by these papers mattered. A later 
poll would find that, among Torontonians interested in the project, the dailies were their 
main source of information: half of a thousand surveyed read the Toronto Star daily, and 
two-thirds either the Telegram or Globe and Mail.212 Ripples of the project announcement 
were felt beyond the local level. Eaton’s used its substantial corporate communications 
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network to distribute press kits and information to media across Canada.213 Beginning with 
a special edition of internal newspaper Eaton News, the company’s redevelopment plan was 
featured in trade and business journals across the continent, often with the assumption its 
fulfilment was a certainty—“Farewell to Hogtown” wrote the Canadian edition of Time just a 
few days after the Centre went public.214  
As that headline suggested, nearly every journalistic account of the master plan 
agreed that its approval by the civic administration was almost certain. City politicians 
present at the briefing were by no means unanimous, but most spoke glowingly of the 
plans, and an on-the-spot survey by the Globe and Mail found two-thirds favoured their 
implementation.215 A number of influential private sector groups also publicly pledged their 
support for the project. A representation to Metro by the Board of Trade called the Eaton 
Centre plan “imaginative,” adding that “its realization will have a decisive influence upon 
patterns of future growth and will contribute in substantial measure [to] ranking Toronto 
among the foremost of the world’s cities.” As expected, the Redevelopment Advisory 
Council was also laudatory, underlining the Centre’s social and civic benefits and urging that 
“no obstacle”—clearly a reference to the pile of bricks at Queen and Bay Streets—“should 
be permitted to forestall it.”216  
Taking advantage of this enthusiasm, Eaton’s allies in both levels of municipal 
government secured agreement to fast-track reports by various departments related to the 
development. Unsurprisingly, nearly all officials asked to comment on the project gave it 
their approval: they considered the sale price of Old City Hall fair, the plans sound, and the 
possibility of integrating the Centre with new transportation improvements exciting.217 The 
Metro Property Commissioner and Eaton Centre principals quietly picked up negotiations 
for the sale of Old City Hall where they had been left off in December.218 Development 
Commissioner Walter Manthorpe spoke optimistically of beginning construction by the 
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summer, if a development agreement could be drawn up in time.219 The 1966 Centre was 
exactly the type of large-scale, privately financed project that the Development Department 
and the Redevelopment Advisory Council had been established to encourage. Few other 
cities, argued Manthorpe, had similar opportunities at such minimal cost to the public 
purse: it was the responsibility of municipal officials to ensure that it was “fully 
exploited.”220 
Within the civic administration, the only note of caution came from Planning 
Commissioner Matthew Lawson, who was opposed to the demolition of Old City Hall. His 
preliminary report on the Centre was by far the most detailed of those shown to city 
politicians—it was also the most critical.221 After summarizing the project’s main features, 
Lawson set out fourteen points that he argued should shape public participation in the 
development. These objectives, endorsed by the City Planning Board, ranged from the 
practical and specific—“direct connections to the subway system” —to the more general—
“The centre must be a place of appeal to the public at large…It should be active night and 
day.” Together, they were Lawson’s answer to the “urban objectives” laid out by Eaton’s 
during the March 1 presentation, as well as a re-assertion of Viking’s more moderate scale, 
greater attention to preserving older structures, and more complex, less monolithic open 
spaces.  
Renewed criticism  
Rather than silencing critics as Eaton’s had hoped, the release of the master plan seemed to 
give them fresh ammunition. James Acland, present at the March 1 unveiling, boasted that 
the Friends of Old City Hall’s campaign was gathering strength.222 A week later, at a public 
meeting sponsored by the Community Planning Association, David Owen was greeted with 
boos and derisory comments from an audience packed with hundreds of Acland’s allies and 
sympathizers.223 Similarly, a public meeting of the Metro Executive on March 22 drew a 
crowd of 250, the vast majority there to express opposition to the sale. Opposition to the 
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development was acquiring a certain countercultural cachet: while ratepayers’ groups and 
professional planners spoke their piece in the council chamber, students from neighbouring 
high schools picketed across the street, waving signs reading, among other things, “Eaton’s 
is culturally bankrupt.”224 Calls to “Save Old City Hall” were now joined by pointed criticism 
of the project, Eaton’s, and its corporate goals.  
Noted local architect George Banz called the complex as “a monstrous thing—a huge 
collection of boxes”; his criticism of the Centre’s monumental, square-edged modernist 
style was soon taken up by others.225 And those aesthetic concerns were seen as 
symptomatic of a larger problem: the Eaton Centre was simply badly planned. Ronald Thom, 
designer of the University of Toronto’s acclaimed modernist Massey College (1963), wrote 
in the Journal of Canadian Studies that the master plan was rushed and incomplete. He 
questioned the placement of its main elements, arguing that it was a kind of “anti-planning” 
to ignore the Centre’s potential to suck the life out of the neighbouring retail area and civic 
square.226 Others pointed out that the idea of a transportation hub, hotel, and convention 
centre near Yonge and Queen was directly counter to recent discussions among Metro and 
City officials about locating those functions near the railway station. Doubts were raised, 
too, about the company’s ability to find tenants for anywhere close to the 6.5 million square 
feet of office space it proposed.227 Was Eaton’s serious with its civic-minded urban 
objectives, or had it simply borrowed liberally from downtown renewal scripts written a 
decade earlier for use in American cities? 
Toronto Star columnist Ron Haggart, a long-established critic of the status quo in 
municipal affairs in Toronto, argued the latter, calling the master plan a collection of 
“magical words and mystical imagery of dreamland cities.”228 There were, he pointed out, 
no guarantees Eaton’s would ever build more than the first phase of the project: in effect, in 
exchange for a heritage building and substantial public lands, Toronto was being offered a 
new Eaton’s department store and an office tower. The end result would be commercial 
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advantage for the retailer, and not much else. Haggart was a respected and influential 
Toronto journalist. Not only were the questions he raised discussed in council meetings and 
newspaper opinion pages, but citizens who wrote to the City on the subject often quoted 
him or, as Mayor Givens said derisively, “scrawled” their messages on clippings of his 
column.229 In subsequent articles, Haggart would continue to examine the project, along the 
way criticizing Eaton’s allies in the civic administration for backroom dealings and their 
unquestioned acceptance of the company’s good intentions. Once again, he argued, 
Toronto’s elected officials had been blinded by promises of tax revenues into considerable 
flexibility of the public interest230  
Talk of a pattern of non-performance in urban development would dog Eaton’s 
throughout 1966. Letters to the editor and old newspaper clippings circulated at council 
meetings describing the company’s grand ambitions for the College Street store.231 Haggart 
and others drew attention to neighbouring Hamilton, where Eaton’s had in 1955 bought a 
city hall similar in style and age to Toronto’s, promising to include the property in a 
substantial expansion of its neighbouring store. Although the building was demolished, 
Eaton’s never followed through on its development plans, citing uncertainty due to a 
federally funded urban renewal scheme then in the works for the area.232 As an internal 
company report later pointed out, Eaton’s had technically not reneged on its agreement; 
still, the Hamilton saga, with its striking similarities to what was unfolding in Toronto, was 
not easily explained away.233  
Negotiations 
The tenor and ferocity of these criticisms naturally shaped negotiations between the 
municipal government and Eaton’s. It was obvious that the sale of Old City Hall might have a 
significant effect on the municipal elections later that year; political fortunes in Toronto had 
been made or broken on similarly emotive issues in the past. Additionally, the points raised 
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by Haggart, the Friends, and the planning professionals who intervened could not easily be 
discounted. In particular, the question of Eaton’s intentions—and its ability to complete the 
project—took on great importance. With the notable exceptions of William Dennison, True 
Davidson, and one or two others, there were few members of either Metro or Toronto 
Councils prepared to defend Old City Hall’s existence at any cost. But most agreed that the 
City must be seen to receive a fair deal from Eaton’s for the property, and that their 
partnership had to be based on some kind of guarantee of construction.234  
With an election looming, it seemed increasingly important for Eaton’s to counter 
the perception that the Eaton Centre pleased politicians, but not ordinary Torontonians. The 
company hired Canadian Facts, the country’s top polling firm, to interview more than one 
thousand Metro residents in their homes, at great expense. The results demonstrated just 
how effective both the project’s publicists and its critics had been in reaching Torontonians. 
Of those interviewed, 91% had heard of the Eaton Centre. However, of all of the facts and 
ideas they associated with the project, the one mentioned most often was “controversy 
over Old City Hall,” ahead even of basic identifiers like “tall buildings” or “shopping mall.”235 
A significant majority—two-thirds of respondents—supported the demolition of Old City 
Hall and fulfillment of the plan as presented in the press. Similar levels of support had been 
noted in a smaller-scale “man on the street” survey conducted by the Telegram months 
before.236 Although its methodology was much more rigorous, the Canadian Facts survey 
suffered from the same bias as the Telegram’s efforts. Interviewees were asked to weigh 
Old City Hall’s loss against the completion of the Eaton Centre; as Ron Haggart so forcefully 
argued in his columns, without guarantees that was hardly the question facing the city’s 
elected officials. Still, for the first time Eaton’s could clearly demonstrate public approval, 
and they made the most of it. Publication of the poll was delayed a month until early June, 
just before a series of important Council meetings. The day after it was released, the 
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Toronto Star reaffirmed its endorsement of the Centre, arguing that there was “no reason to 
tie up the project in further political debate.”237 
The compromise eventually arrived at by Metro, Toronto, and Eaton’s was for the 
company to lease, rather than purchase outright, the Old City Hall site. From the perspective 
of the civic administration, a lease satisfied the significant minority of politicians who had 
attacked previous proposals as too soft on Eaton’s: politicians like Councillor Hugh Bruce, 
who call the previous property exchange proposal “a giveaway” and linked it to other recent 
episodes of fiscal irresponsibility.238 It also spoke to the larger question of guarantees. 
Penalty clauses could be used to ensure that Eaton’s began the development on time, and 
redeveloped not just Old City Hall, but more importantly its run-down warehouse and 
factory buildings further north towards Dundas. This was a proper three-party revitalization 
partnership, politicians argued, in which public objectives would be backed up by force of 
law. In practice, although a number of clear penalties for non-completion were proposed—
forfeiture and escalating rents, among others—the lease proposal that passed Metro 
Council in June 1966 was noticeably watered-down.239 As for Matthew Lawson’s carefully-
formulated fourteen points, only one was effectively addressed in these early talks. Eaton’s 
would reduce the height of its Phase I skyscraper so as to better complement New City Hall; 
but the cost would be the removal of the Old City Hall clock tower and less open space 
surrounding the Cenotaph.240 Perhaps most damning for critics of the whole process, once 
again the details would be left to negotiations occurring well away from the public eye. Ron 
Haggart called Council’s discussion of the lease “less a debate than it was a series of lectures 
on the art of self-justification…The fate of the old city hall was determined long ago.”241 
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Back to zero 
Toronto’s 1966 municipal ballot was not exactly the “Eaton’s election” prognosticated by 
Ron Haggart, but the project did play an important role.242 In his mayoral campaign William 
Dennison used his stance on Old City Hall to define himself as a candidate cautious about 
growth and redevelopment, who considered the preservation of neighbourhoods and tax 
dollars more important than expressways or office towers. This set him apart from his 
opponents, and in particular incumbent Phillip Givens, who continued to champion the 
Centre and endorse “dollar planning,” the evaluation of development proposals based on 
the tax revenues they would bring in.243 Despite not having a single endorsement from a 
Toronto daily—the Globe thought he was out of step with the “dynamic thrust of modern 
Toronto”—Dennison went on to win, bringing to an end a decade defined politically by 
three booster mayors. Flushed with victory, one of his first public pledges was to take a 
harder line in bargaining with Eaton’s over Old City Hall.244 In the short term, it was a serious 
check on pro-redevelopment politics in Toronto.  
Dennison’s election also gave new impetus to the Friends of Old City Hall. The group, 
mostly silent since Metro’s decision to lease the building to Eaton’s, was beginning to change 
tactics. In place of an earlier emphasis on detached, expert opinion, the Friends now placed 
an appeal to democracy at the heart of their campaign. That fall they presented Metro with 
a list of 1368 supporters of their cause. Interestingly, almost half came from the boroughs, 
including a large contingent from middle-class, well-organized residential neighbourhoods in 
North York that would later play an important role in the campaign to clean up Yonge 
Street.245 Similarly, in a letter to members James Acland wrote that  
a continuing dialogue must be maintained between the citizens of Toronto 
and the developers of the Eaton Centre...Only you can save our square from 
being crushed by a badly conceived development scheme.246 
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William Dennison continued to speak to Friends’ meetings in early 1967, raising hopes for 
project opponents by suggesting he wanted to revisit the Old City Hall decision, if public 
opinion was with him.247  
That never proved necessary. On May 18, after several months of media silence, 
Eaton’s abruptly announced that it was cancelling the project. Suddenly not only was Old 
City Hall saved, but the city’s carefully laid redevelopment plans were in shambles. In a long 
letter to both Metro and the City, John David Eaton reiterated his company’s view of the 
project as a gift to Toronto, while tactfully laying the blame for its cancellation at the feet of 
the public and civic officials.  
As we stated when the conceptual plan was presented, we do not presume 
to judge for the citizens of Toronto what they want this city to be. The plan 
which we presented represented our conception – and that of the best 
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advisors we could get – of a revitalized downtown core that would inspire 
and stimulate the growth and redevelopment of our city. 
This was a proposal we submitted to the judgement of the people of 
Toronto…The judgement, while not an outright rejection, does impose 
conditions we cannot meet.248  
This dramatic announcement, naturally, was front-page news, with headlines 
expressing both surprise and disappointment at the decision to cancel the entire project. All 
three Toronto papers emphasized that this was a significant setback to the city’s rebuilding 
agenda. Some asked if the withdrawal of the proposal was not “an Eaton’s bluff” aimed at 
securing a better price for Old City Hall. Hoping that it was, a day later the City of Toronto 
acted on Allen’s suggestion to strike a special committee tasked with getting the Centre 
back on track.249 Meanwhile, in a development bordering on the farcical, William 
Zeckendorf suddenly reappeared on the scene, creditors at his heels, promising to fulfill the 
original intentions of the project if the municipal government was willing to expropriate the 
Eaton’s lands.250 Nothing came of either initiative.  
In the wake of the Centre’s cancellation, many felt that William Dennison’s critical 
stance on the project was to blame. John David Eaton had hinted as much in his letter, and 
the idea was taken up by the press.251 The Telegram lamented that “No other city would 
have piled obstacles in the way of this development…[Dennison and supporters] have set 
Toronto back years.”252 Perhaps the best example of this view was a fall 1967 Toronto Life 
feature that featured a full-page, bucktoothed caricatured of Dennison, whose 
administration it accused of “bungling” the Eaton Centre and other development proposals 
with red tape and lack of foresight.253 Others saw the project’s cancellation as confirmation 
that the Centre had always been too big to be true: it was natural that it would end up in 
the dustbin with the other “dream towers” and pie-in-the-sky modernization schemes.254 
There was some truth to both observations. But more significant were Eaton’s internal 
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concerns about financing shortfalls and its public reputation, which in combination 
effectively doomed the project. 
There is reason to believe that by early 1967 the Eaton Centre’s financing was in 
disarray. By that point, Eaton’s had made significant financial commitments, including more 
than $2 million on planning and consultants’ fees, and around $8 million more on land 
assembly.255 Additional capital came from the issue, in late 1965, of $25 million in mortgage-
backed bonds.256 But that was just a drop in the bucket relative to the project’s estimated 
cost of $250 to 300 million. As a result, between 1965 and early 1967 David Owen and Eaton 
Centre Ltd. spent considerable time selling their project to both prospective tenants and 
partners. But of the 16 international investment groups that showed interest, ranging from 
Metropolitan Life to the Rothschilds, not one produced a tangible offer. Rockefeller Center 
Inc., an early inspiration for the project, thought the Eaton Centre too ambitious for a city of 
Toronto’s size; others were skeptical of the placement of the Eaton’s store or the over-
emphasis on office space.257 These repeated failures to raise new capital, more than any 
other factor, must have raised significant doubts about the project’s viability. Even Phase I, 
which entailed replacing Old City Hall with a prestige office building that could be leveraged 
to offset costs (hence Eaton’s dogged determination to demolish the building), was 
beginning to look less attractive. Over the course of 1966 and into 1967 company 
projections of the income that could be secured with that building dwindled, particularly 
after Metro made the decision to lease, not sell, Old City Hall.258 In February 1967 David 
Owen quietly resigned as manager of the project. 
Significant financial problems may have been overcome, as they had been in the late 
1950s with Place Ville-Marie, but corporate will to do so was not there. Eaton’s restrictions 
on disclosure of information meant that the company presented a face of confidence to the 
public, but behind that veneer was a deep ambivalence about the company’s role as an 
urban developer. A great deal of time was spent measuring the potential for the Centre’s 
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unpopularity to translate into negative impacts on the Eaton’s brand and sales. Executives 
read Canadian Architect, and instructed their staff to investigate the dozens of individuals 
and associations that had made deputations criticizing the Centre. Employees attended and 
reported on meetings of the Friends of Old City Hall, and carefully noted the trickle of letters 
from Eaton’s customers who threatened to take their business elsewhere if Old City Hall was 
torn down.259 “The most important point to bear in mind,” argued a 1966 PR report, 
is the fact that this company is in the retail trade business—not the real 
estate business. It therefore depends on the goodwill of the general 
public—all of it. Eaton’s cannot consider action on any project with which 
its name is associated in isolation from this fact. A land developer may be 
said to have won his point if he has the support of a simple majority of the 
general public or of a municipal council. This is not the case with Eaton’s.260 
A year later, when the decision to cancel the Centre was made, an internal memorandum 
argued that this conflict between the roles of retailer and land developer had placed Eaton’s 
in an “impossible position” that could only be resolved by abandoning one of the two roles. 
The same document expressed skepticism that “any single corporate citizen” could take the 
lead in downtown redevelopment without seriously damaging its reputation.261  
A new development paradigm 
For Eaton’s, the imperative to redevelop was still there. Above and beyond the company’s 
commitment making its mark on downtown Toronto, there were financial considerations. 
By the late 1960s its main store replacement was now a decade overdue; even more 
pressing were the significant carrying charges, in taxes and mortgage payments, of its 
downtown lands, which the company estimated to amount to $5.5 million yearly.262 Under a 
new Chairman—Robert Butler, the first non-Eaton to run the company—Eaton’s made it 
known that it was now searching for developers to purchase its lands and manage 
construction of a project that, in all likelihood, would not include Old City Hall.263 If that 
meant setting aside some of the larger civic goals behind the project, so be it. Where 
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Eaton’s alone had failed, a corporation with deeper pockets and thicker skin, someone able 
to prioritize the financial viability of the project over reputation, might succeed.  
That company was Cadillac Fairview, which by the early 1970s emerged as the 
largest real estate development company in Canada.264 Formed from corporate mergers and 
backed by Cemp Investments, a corporation controlled by Montréal’s Bronfman family, it 
exemplified the new paradigm in urban development then emerging in Canada. With a few 
important exceptions like the inimitable Webb & Knapp, the building and rebuilding of 
Canadian cities in the 1950s and 1960s was mostly the work of small to medium-scale 
entrepreneurs, or businesses, notably banks and insurance companies, building their own 
offices and facilities.265 In contrast, in the 1970s it would be national investment 
corporations run by professional managers that would lead the way. The “buccaneer era,” 
as one southern Ontario developer put it, was over; the growing scale and complexity of 
construction projects, and particularly downtown redevelopment, required resources and 
long-term financial commitments available to only the largest enterprises.266 Vertical 
integration of planning, financing, construction, and property management roles into one 
corporation was the norm in these new enterprises, as was public financing through stock 
offerings. Although Eaton’s was Canada’s largest retailer, its commitments in other spheres 
and the limited confidence it inspired as a land developer meant that it lacked the capacity 
of these new development giants. In retrospect, the company’s efforts to “go it alone” on 
the 1966 Eaton Centre plans belong firmly to an earlier era, in which the corporate citizen 
was found among the ranks of development entrepreneurs.  
The creation of Cadillac Fairview (1973-1975) brought together more than $1 billion 
in real estate assets, as well as three firms—Cadillac, Fairview, and former Eaton partner 
Canadian Equity—that had been behind some of the most successful urban development 
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projects in Canada. Its portfolio included 16,000 residential apartments and 15 major office 
buildings, including Toronto’s celebrated TD Centre complex. But by far the most profitable 
of its investments was a group of 33 shopping centres distributed across the country.267 
Since the mid-1950s, when Eaton’s began to expand beyond its traditional downtown 
locations, suburban shopping centres and plazas had captured an ever-growing fraction of 
Canada’s retail market. In 1956 there were only six shopping malls with more than 30 shops 
in the country; by 1973 there were 101, of which fourteen were owned by Cadillac Fairview, 
by far the industry leader. As in the United States, consumers were drawn to the appeal of 
modern, climate-controlled shopping streets accessible by car, and it was widely recognized 
in the development industry that this popularity made malls “money machines” for those 
who built and managed them.268  
An urban shopping mall 
By the late 1960s North American mall developers and proponents of downtown 
revitalization had been speculating for years about the viability of transplanting the 
incredible success of the suburban shopping mall into downtown.269 Or perhaps back into 
downtown, since the shopping centres of the 1950s and 1960s were themselves modelled 
on an idealized old-style retail strip complete with all of the benefits—and none of the 
inconveniences or dangers—of Main Street. One way to make downtown shopping more 
pleasant was pedestrianization, and that was by 1970 being seriously considered for Yonge; 
another was enclosure. Wellington Square (1960), Canada’s first urban shopping mall, 
converted a former industrial site in central London, Ontario into a 36-store shopping centre 
built around a four-level Eaton’s store.270 By building vertically for density, rather than 
horizontally for sprawl, the massive 50-80 acre footprint of the regional shopping centre 
could be shrunk down to a manageable size, without sacrificing retail space or doing without 
parking. As plans for the new Eaton Centre took shape, urban malls were being planned 
across the United States; closer to home, Fairview was preparing to break ground on the 
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Pacific Centre, a block-sized shopping complex with abutting office tower in the heart of 
downtown Vancouver. The main tenant of that project—and original landowner of the 
parcel, former site of the Hotel Vancouver—was, naturally, Eaton’s.271  
By 1970 Eaton’s had agreed to a similar deal in Toronto. Fairview would buy its lands 
between Dundas and Queen, and take a majority stake in their redevelopment. The 
department store and TD Bank would each be minority partners, with 20 percent shares in 
the project.272 Despite the close business ties between the corporations, negotiations had 
been long and complex, involving more than a dozen early designs produced by both the 
developer and the department store.273 Fairview brought with it a history of mall building 
and a strong preference for the profitability of that particular development form. Its 
planners, including a returning Victor Gruen, recast the project as a refinement of the urban 
shopping mall, moving away from both Viking’s heterogeneous shopping precinct and the 
more monumental civic centre of the 1966 Master Plan. A retail arcade or shopping street 
was a key feature of those earlier plans, but in the new iteration of the Eaton Centre taking 
shape it became indisputably the key feature. One key concession Eaton’s had to make was 
agreeing to move its store away from the corner of Queen and Yonge, where it had faced off 
with Simpson’s department store for more than 70 years.274 Instead, the retailer would be 
located a few hundred metres to the north, at the less prestigious intersection of Dundas 
and Yonge; meanwhile Simpson’s would be integrated into the Centre with a covered 
passageway. For more than a decade, the “dumbbell,” a shopping corridor anchored by two 
major department stores that drew foot traffic along its length, had been the most 
successful shopping centre design in North America, mimicking the earlier success of similar 
Main Street configurations.275 Fairview had no intention of departing from that profitable 
script, even if it meant subordinating a decades-old commercial rivalry (and some measure 
of Eaton’s corporate pride) to good mall planning.   
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Trinity Church 
Initially, this new take on the project seemed to be taking shape in much the same 
circumstances as the first. Downtown, the 1960s development boom was continuing apace. 
Even as residential development in the suburbs dropped dramatically, there were few signs 
of a slowdown in commercial construction downtown; the real estate industry labelled 1969 
the “greatest year in history” for office building in Toronto and record growth seemed 
poised to continue well into the next decade.276 A Development Department bulletin 
boasted of two dozen forthcoming projects that would reshape the core, ranging from the 
very hypothetical redevelopment of 180 acres of railway lands to a cluster of towers and 
mixed-use complexes already dramatically densifying the intersection of Yonge and Bloor.277 
In other ways, too, observers could be forgiven a sense of déjà vu. Once again, in spring 
1970, well before Fairview was prepared to go public with its plans, the resurrected Eaton 
Centre was splashed across the front pages of Toronto newspapers; once again, the 
demolition of an historic structure was deemed essential to the development. This time it 
was Holy Trinity Church.278 
Anglican Trinity Church was built in 1847 as “the Parochial Church of the Poor of 
Toronto,” endowed by an English visitor who found the city’s lack of free (that is, pew rent-
free) churches deplorable.279 A century later, hemmed in by Eaton’s factories and 
warehouses, the same concern for social welfare had given it new life as a provider of 
community services and a meeting place for downtown progressives. By the early 1970s the 
church and its two outbuildings housed a 24-hour distress centre, a community theatre group, 
drop-in services for youth, and a free school. Its 250-strong congregation included two 
aldermen—pedestrian mall coordinator William Archer and historian and heritage advocate 
William Kilbourn—and other members of what one journalist called (perhaps with veiled anti-
elitism) “the cream of Toronto’s articulate, concerned intellectual community, deeply 
involved in many of the City’s issue’s.” Or, in another memorable formulation, 
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Image 3.8: A downtown church. Holy Trinity, looking east towards 
Yonge Street, 1972. The Eaton’s factories loom on the right-hand 
(south) side. Bob Olsen/Toronto Star. Toronto Public Library Baldwin 
Collection, tspa_0110944f. 
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they tend to be the sort of citizens who fly ecology flags on the front porch 
of their houses, and sign anti-Viet Nam war petitions…and play guitars and 
recorders and use the word ‘community’ a lot.280 
Trinity was an early ally to many of the rights-based causes and protest movements 
that would define the politics of the 1960s and 1970s in Toronto, echoing the efforts of 
progressive churches across North American to stay relevant and fulfill their mission of 
serving the social good amid widespread social change.281 With its location just steps from 
Yonge Street, it would become a key site in a network of youth and counterculture-friendly 
alternative social spaces downtown, giving it a rebellious identity that more than once 
threatened it with disestablishment by the Diocese.282 In 1968 it billeted newly arrived 
Vietnam war resisters in its basement; in 1971 hosted fundraisers for the Stop Spadina 
campaign; in 1972 early gay rights advocates the Community Homophile Association of 
Toronto (CHAT) used the church for their first public meeting, dances, and early Pride 
celebrations.283   
Fairview aggressively pursued the Trinity lands, making several purchase offers for 
the church and then its outbuildings, and lobbying Toronto politicians to consider 
expropriating them and several other holdout businesses on Yonge Street.284 Meanwhile, 
Eaton’s public relations staff urged caution. Their report foresaw that encroaching on 
Trinity’s property could be “a rallying point for professional protesters or political 
opportunists or Eaton-baiters,” and suggested that the company earn credit with the public 
by moving its buildings brick by brick to another location.285 This reflected both residual 
anxiety about the retailer’s image since the Old City Hall debacle, and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the Trinity congregation and its allies. Rather than knee-jerk protesters 
or “Eaton-baiters”—the company had viewed the Friends of Old City Hall in a similar light—
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they were a well-organized group of citizens with their own vision of downtown 
redevelopment, and the political influence to secure it a public hearing.   
As the success of the Yonge Street pedestrian mall and the anti-Spadina expressway 
campaign demonstrated, enthusiasm for “planning for people” was high in 1970s Toronto. 
This was vividly expressed in Trinity Church’s response to Fairview’s offer, which came in the 
form of its own redevelopment plans, revealed in early 1971.286 Architect and congregant 
Gerald Robinson envisioned the closure of Trinity Square (then a right of way partially given 
over to parking) and adjoining lanes to create a new pedestrianized public space. Older 
service buildings would be remodelled or moved to create low-rise office and commercial 
buildings, and to allow room for tree-lined promenades connecting the block to surrounding 
streets. It was a modern take on a traditional European church square, as well as a chance 
to make Trinity’s aging premises more functional and financially viable. From a design 
perspective, the project neatly summarized the consensus among many planners and 
urbanists who, influenced by critics like Jane Jacobs and the tenets of urban design, had long 
been searching for ways to open up and humanize the downtown environment. There was 
much that was reminiscent of Viking, which also identified Trinity Square as an oasis of 
public space in the heart of a redeveloped superblock.  
For Trinity’s congregation and leadership, the principal aim of this $2.5-5 million 
development was as much spiritual as corporeal: to use urban expertise to carve out a 
“people place” in a downtown increasingly given over to impersonal development and the 
“hustle” of consumer capitalism.287 Viewed in that light, there were continuities with the 
church’s progressive stances on issues like gay rights, and its reputation as a safe space for 
alternative lifestyles and visions of society. In addition to bringing considerable benefits in 
its own right, church spokespeople saw the new Trinity Square as a protest against projects 
like the Eaton Centre, which  
take a whole city block, clear off all the buildings and people, dig a big hole, 
put all the pedestrians in the hole and call it an underground concourse… 
They want to maximize the return on their commercial investment; we’re 
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trying to create a people place that will bring together a number of human 
values.288  
There were some common threads between this proposal and the earlier campaign 
to save Old City Hall: both had roots in Toronto’s educated elite, and expressed strong 
attachments to built heritage and the history of civic communion it embodied. Both, in 
different ways, took a moral stance on the development process and the urban future. But 
by offering a credible counter-proposal to demolition—something the Friends had struggled 
with—as well as a larger critique of capital’s impact on the city, Trinity went much further 
than earlier opponents of the Eaton Centre. Another crucial difference was that while as 
citizens the Friends of Old City Hall claimed a place in determining the future of that 
municipal building, Holy Trinity based its challenge to Fairview on its right to dispose of 
private property directly controlled by its congregation and the Anglican Church. 
A new politics of development 
Holy Trinity’s counter-proposal was part of a larger shift in the politics of development in 
Toronto. In the older neighbourhoods that surrounded the central business district, 
longstanding opposition to apartment tower construction had been reinvigorated by the 
development boom.289 Between 1951 and 1966 the city’s stock of apartments increased by 
36,000—nearly doubling—while 10,000 houses were torn down and not replaced. Over the 
next five years a further 20,000 apartment units were added in the older city, mostly in 
areas adjoining downtown.290 Meanwhile, a larger wave of apartment construction was 
densifying the new suburbs of Metropolitan Toronto. New residents’ groups were formed 
and old ones strengthened as citizens protested the development industry’s aggressive 
reshaping of their neighbourhoods, which they saw as physically destructive—in that it 
entailed tearing down often well-built older homes to make way for towers—disruptive of 
community, and fundamentally undemocratic. In 1968 around two dozen groups banded 
together to form the Confederation of Residents’ and Ratepayers’ Associations (CORRA) as 
their unified voice at City Hall.291 But most Toronto politicians, while sympathetic when 
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these issues arose in their own wards, did little to address them in any systematic way. Local 
concerns with densification were mostly ignored, or filtered down to city planners, who 
tried to hold tower projects to a higher architectural standard, and, when they were able to, 
mediate between residents and developers.292  
This combination of citizen activism and an apparently unresponsive civic 
administration made development—and its discontents—the most visible and widely 
discussed public issue in early 1970s Toronto. It also created opportunities for a new 
generation of politicians, including future mayors John Sewell and David Crombie, both first 
elected as councillors in 1969, who sought to channel this citizen mobilization into a political 
platform based on planning reform and restrictions on neighbourhood redevelopment.293 A 
few important symbolic victories paved the way for the reformers’ victory in the 1972 
elections. In 1970 the City’s diminished but still unpopular urban renewal program was 
effectively ended, providing, like the cancellation of the Spadina Expressway a year later, a 
powerful (and later much mythologized) example of ordinary people seizing control of the 
planning process.294 Also in 1971, in a move which seemed to perfectly sum up the spirit of 
the moment, a citizen deputation prompted the removal of the Redevelopment Advisory 
Council’s special advisory status at City Hall.295 The group was not disbanded, but by virtue 
of the decision would in future have no more formal right to participate in redevelopment 
issues than any of the dozens of other citizen organizations proliferating across the city. 
Contesting the corporate city  
Inspired by this citizen mobilization and the rise of reform politics, a systemic critique of the 
development industry was taking shape in Toronto. Its proponents were a growing number 
of young journalists, researchers, and activists who saw neighbourhood battles against 
densification as part of a larger struggle for power in the city. Some based their criticism on 
direct experience of community organizing; others used research and observation to 
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present sweeping portraits of how development worked, and who benefited from its often 
staggering profit margins. In late 1971, countercultural newspaper Guerilla set the tone with 
a series of articles on the development industry. The authors explained that they were 
motivated by the  
large-scale opposition of many community organizations which had sprung 
up to stop the razing and rebuilding of their neighbourhoods…[battles] 
fought on a piecemeal basis, and with an inadequate understanding of the 
enemy.296 
In this analysis, the development process was the most visible manifestation of capitalism’s 
unprecedented capacity to transform the environment. The rapid growth of the postwar 
decades had given large development corporations a near-stranglehold on the urban future, 
just as it had strengthened the power of capital throughout Canadian society. Suburban 
sprawl, high-rise apartments, shopping centres, and skyscrapers were all part of what 
journalist James Lorimer would later call the “corporate city,” a profit-oriented urbanism 
that did little to accommodate community or human potential.297 In its social and cultural 
implications, the corporate city bore a strong resemblance to the “system” or “machine” 
that the 1960s counterculture tried so intently to escape or subvert.298  
Contesting the corporate city meant mapping its contours, and linking together to 
stop or moderate its spread. A forerunner in this work was local NGO Pollution Probe’s 
Urban Team, established in 1971 to tackle both the human and environmental 
consequences of urban development.299 Another was the Downtown Action project (1971-
79), established the same year with a federal Opportunities for Youth grant. Inspired by 
both academic urban research methods and the New Left principle of community 
organizing, these organizations worked to inform local groups of the scope of the 
development threat, and to foster communication between them. A key aspect of this 
approach was mining industry data and the public record to track land assemblies and 
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building applications, an approach that both acted as an “early warning system” for 
residents, and helped make public the complicated logistics and business relationships 
behind large-scale development.300 Their work was widely diffused in alternative and 
neighbourhood media, and in dedicated publications like the Urban Team’s monthly Whose 
City?; later, it would be developed in more depth in pioneering Canadian urban research 
journal City Magazine (1974-92). Anti-development tones were struck in the mainstream 
media, too. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, when Ron Haggart seemed a lone voice in 
the wilderness, the early 1970s saw both the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail featuring 
development-skeptic columnists like James Lorimer, David Lewis Stein, and John Sewell. 
Editorial endorsements of the project were much more equivocal than they had been five 
years earlier.301 
This activism could seldom be separated from the drive for political reform, and not 
only because some of its most notable proponents enjoyed success in 1970s city politics. 
Critics of the City’s management of the development boom thought it had fostered a 
political class mainly concerned with cheerleading growth. Much was also made of the 
Development Department’s cozying up to industry executives, and former Commissioner 
Walter Manthorpe’s new role as spokesman for Meridian Developments. In a short, punchy 
book titled Toronto for Sale (1972), David Lewis Stein wrote that elected officials were 
“trip[ping] over each other in their eagerness to please the developers”; John Sewell would 
put it even more bluntly, arguing that “City Hall is in fact controlled by the land 
development industry.”302 These criticisms stung for long-serving politicians like Mayor 
William Dennison, who saw nothing wrong with market-led redevelopment in accordance 
with long-term planning goals. It was in some ways a measure of how much the discussion 
around development had shifted that former people’s champion Dennison would end his 
career in 1972 raging against the interference of citizens’ groups, their localism, and inability 
to see the wider public interest.303  
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Negotiating the public interest 
All of this had important consequences for Fairview’s rethinking of the Eaton Centre. When 
concept plans for a 250-store urban shopping mall—by far the largest in Canada—were 
presented to Council and the public in spring 1971, there was little of the showmanship or 
optimism of 1966.304 Fairview’s spokespeople would try to downplay the broad implications 
of the project, arguing that since it was not asking for rezoning—just the closing and 
transfer of several streets—the civic administration was not dealing with a planning issue, 
but “a question primarily of traffic, with respect to both people and vehicles”; in other 
words, a technical problem not requiring extensive deliberations.305 Despite this assurance, 
the Eaton Centre quickly became the subject of a broad-based negotiation that clearly 
reflected the political uncertainty and citizen mobilization of the time.  
Holy Trinity’s development counter-proposal played a crucial role in this. Not only 
did the church’s congregation challenge the existing Eaton Centre plans, but it did so on the 
firm basis of undisputed property title that stretched back more than a century. Abrogating 
this small but formidable community institution’s rights to determine the future of its own 
property was not something the City could do lightly. While a few politicians speculated 
about using expropriation powers to force Trinity into conformity with Fairview’s plan, it 
soon became obvious that a much more politically palatable solution was to refuse approval 
until the two parties had reached a negotiated compromise.306 That decision would give 
Trinity’s left-leaning, people planning-oriented congregation substantial influence over the 
project; it also served to stall the process of approval by nearly a year, opening it up to other 
voices eager to assert their own interpretation of the public interest.  
Toronto’s increasingly urban design-oriented and outspoken planning department 
did not miss the opportunity.307 Fresh from a battle with Metro Toronto over a proposal to 
convert Yonge Street into a commuter arterial, Chief Planner Dennis Barker expressed 
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strong support for a negotiated settlement between Trinity and Fairview. Barker also made 
public a detailed set of planning objectives for the project area, arguing that it was crucial to 
establish public goals before evaluating the specific merits of the Eaton Centre proposal.308 
In effect, this was a restatement of Matthew Lawson’s comprehensive, but mostly ignored, 
report on the 1966 Centre. It made two principal challenges to Fairview’s urban shopping 
mall: that it be a development with a strong public identity, featuring spaces and design 
elements that would attract Torontonians to the area for reasons other than shopping; and 
that it look west to City Hall and east to Yonge Street, connecting, rather than dividing, 
these two vital areas. Without a rezoning application, planners had no direct role to play in 
shaping its design. Indirectly, however, these objectives and other interventions by Barker 
and downtown planner Tony Coombs would have an important influence on the tenor of 
negotiations between the City and Fairview.309  
There was a public push for more transparency in the City’s handling of the project. 
In summer 1971, the Toronto Citizen, one of several small-circulation publications that 
facilitated communication among oppositional and community groups, lauded Dennis 
Barker for his forward-thinking stance, and promised that unless Council opened up to 
public input on the Eaton Centre, the project would become “the target of a citizen 
campaign on the scale of the Stop Spadina movement.”310 One of Downtown Action’s first 
actions was to hand out leaflets on Yonge Street warning that “Eaton’s is buying our city!”: 
the group urged shoppers to boycott the retailer and make their presence felt at Council 
meetings until the superblock was developed in a responsible, “people-oriented way.”311 
Meanwhile, within Council John Sewell publicly attacked William Dennison and the 
Development Department for repeated private, un-minuted meetings with Fairview.312 It 
was increasingly obvious that the secretive, business-like negotiations and extensive use of 
political proxies that had characterized the first Eaton Centre could not be repeated in this 
                                                  
308 “City’s chief planner supports Church of Holy Trinity in its battle against Eaton complex,” Toronto Star, May 
10, 1971; “Objectives for the area bounded by Dundas, Yonge, Queen and Bay Streets, May 11, 1971,” CTA, 
P043164-10. 
309 For an example of planning objectives migrating into Development Department negotiations with Fairview 
see “Coordination: Eaton-Fairview Project, Apr. 29, 1971,” CTA, P043164-10.  
310 “Make Eaton Centre a real city affair,” Toronto Citizen, July 8, 1971. 
311 “Eaton’s leaflet, summer 1971,” CTA, Downtown Action Fonds, 62-3-12. 
312 “City Clerk to Mayor re: Sewell’s request, Jan. 10, 1971,” CTA, P043164-10, “Clerk to Emslie, Mar. 10, 1972,” 
CTA, 527927-20. 
280 
 
new political climate. By 1972 even the most pro-development members of Council were 
resigned to that fact, and after pressure from CORRA, Pollution Probe, and Sewell agreed to 
hold public hearings on the project.313  
The Centre and the strip 
Engagement with Fairview’s plan turned in large part on its relationship to the Yonge Street 
commercial strip. This was in contrast to 1966, when discussion of the 1966 Centre had 
overwhelmingly focused on Bay Street and Civic Square. Then, the placement of public 
spaces, towers, and underground walkways all emphasized a complex that “faced”—both 
aesthetically and functionally—west and south. For most observers at the time, the fate of 
small Yonge Street businesses was an afterthought. The ethic of downtown redevelopment 
assumed that Toronto’s natural progression would be for older uses to give way to more 
efficient ones; as the Toronto property commissioner stated in a 1966 report on the 
potential impact of the Centre, only those merchants who showed ingenuity and “changed 
with the times” could be assured continuity.314 The views of Yonge Street merchants 
themselves were almost entirely absent from the discussion; media accounts and 
communications with the City suggest that while some thought Eaton’s redevelopment 
plans could revitalize Yonge, others saw no place for themselves in the modern future 
promised by the company.315 
The situation was different the second time around. With the rediscovery of Yonge 
as the locus of the city’s nightlife in the late 1960s, and the early success of summer 
pedestrian malls, more attention than ever before was being devoted to the preservation or 
improvement of the street’s unique concentration of small retail and entertainment. In the 
wake of the first Eaton Centre and amid ongoing battles over street widening, Toronto 
planners had demonstrated a keen interest in Yonge Street, calling for preservation of the 
area’s heterogeneous low-rise landscape, its sociability and character as a “pedestrian 
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outdoor place.”316 This seemed threatened by Fairview’s plans to replace five blocks of 
Yonge—and approximately thirty small businesses—with an indoor shopping corridor lined 
with 250 modern retail units. Early sketches suggested a complex that faced neither west 
nor east, but inwards on itself, leaving the west side of Yonge between Queen and Dundas a 
windowless, blank wall.317 At public meetings in 1972 the Downtown Council—rapidly 
becoming a strong voice for Yonge Street merchants in civic affairs—called for opening the 
mall up to the street by adding storefronts on Yonge, while avoiding interference with plans 
for a permanent pedestrian mall.318  
Compromise in the reform era 
The Eaton Centre had become a public-private project, if not in the way its early planners or 
corporate backers had imagined. Responses to these assertions of the public interest came 
in several forms. In November 1972, after a long and acrimonious debate, Toronto Council 
approved a development agreement of unprecedented size and complexity for the Eaton 
superblock. Over more than 170 pages it bound Fairview, Holy Trinity Church, and Eaton’s to 
a schedule of demolition and construction and a site plan that included strong building 
restrictions and significant public space. A second agreement between Fairview and Trinity 
Church dealt specifically with integration of their two redevelopment projects.319 Securing 
these agreements was, somewhat ironically, the last major political success for William 
Dennison, who had been propelled to office based on his principled stand against the 
original development in 1966. From another perspective, it was also a kind of vindication of 
his and the Friends of Old City Hall’s earlier position, since Toronto was now promised both 
the tax revenue of the Eaton Centre and preservation of that historic structure.  
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In the background was the fall 1972 municipal election, in which the question of how 
to manage the development boom was the principal issue.320 The Eaton Centre agreements 
were signed just six weeks before a reform majority, led by Mayor David Crombie, swept 
into office on a platform of neighbourhood preservation and citizen empowerment. The 
Centre project played a minor but notable role in the campaign, as a citizen coalition that 
included ratepayer lobby group CORRA pushed for a promise from the incoming 
government to halt Fairview’s project, along with several contentious residential tower 
developments approved over the past year.321 Meanwhile, an anti-reform campaign was 
launched by the Urban Development Institute (UDI), a non-profit group that counted among 
its members nearly every major player in the Ontario land development industry.322 In 
pamphlets distributed to apartment residents, press releases, and media interviews, the UDI 
cast ratepayer associations and anti-development activists as unrepresentative “pressure 
groups” whose opposition to densification threatened to halt urban progress and deny tens 
of thousands of people access to housing.323  
Fairview played no role in that clumsy and ultimately unsuccessful campaign. From 
the corporation’s perspective, a development agreement with the City that had seemed 
onerous months earlier was now the main assurance that the project would not be scuttled 
by reform’s rise to power.324 The new Council spent much of 1973 debating the idea of a 
“holding bylaw” that would limit large-scale construction downtown while new planning 
standards were drawn up. As David Crombie explained in a speech to the building industry, 
citizens and the civic administration 
simply must have a say in our rate and style of change. The city’s future has 
to be decided not on the basis of what is most convenient for speculators 
or developers but on the basis of sound planning and what is in the best 
interest of the city’s people.325 
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In keeping with the role of the tower—commercial or residential—as symbol of the 
unregulated development boom, any building over 45 feet in height or 40,000 square feet in 
area would be prohibited without specific permission from Council.326 The law, which would 
prove to be mostly symbolic, was eventually passed in December 1973. By that point a new 
downtown planning review by the reformist Core Area Task Force was underway, and a 
number of other changes were being made to the way housing and development policy 
were handled in Toronto. Most notably, there was a shift in approach to the central core 
that emphasized residential over commercial development: downtown should be not just a 
workplace and shopping area, but a place to live and play.327 Both citizen activists—led by 
David Lewis Stein’s Better Downtown Planning Corporation—and reform politicians 
attempted to force the City to revisit the Eaton Centre plans, whether using the holding 
bylaw or by withholding building permits. Their campaign failed but reinforced for Fairview 
the importance of producing a design that would not only conform to previous agreements 
but forestall further challenges.328 
Toronto’s Galleria 
In this context, and after personal pressure from architect and Bronfman heiress Phyllis 
Lambert (the “P” in Cemp investments, and a major backer of the development), Fairview 
hired Bauhaus-trained architect Eberhard Zeidler to completely redesign the main shopping 
mall. Zeidler, known for his interest in complex, street-inspired spaces and futuristic glass-
and-metal projects like Ontario Place (1971), recalls caution about involvement in a project 
that had “such bad publicity” over the five years. The challenge, as he saw it, was reconciling 
the double imperative of creating a place people wanted to be, and designing a $250 million 
development that satisfied a mall-builder’s standard of profitability. Early brainstorming 
sessions thus included both debates over retail rents per square foot with Fairview 
executives, and discussions of creating people-centred urban space with Zeidler’s friend and 
well-known urbanist social critic Jane Jacobs.329  
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The centrepiece of Eberhard Zeidler’s design was an 800 ft long, 125 ft tall glass-
roofed shopping arcade stretching from Queen Street to the southern edge of a massive 
new Eaton’s store.330 Ziedler claimed that this vast skylit gallery, which would become the 
hallmark of the mall, was inspired by Milan’s Galleria Vittore Emanuele II (1877). Renowned 
in architectural circles for integrating palazzo-like façades with an arching glass roof, the 
Galleria also fascinated early proponents of the Yonge Street pedestrian mall, who saw it as 
a model of a people-oriented shopping street. In fact by the 1970s multiple levels and glass 
roofs were a common feature of prestige shopping malls across North America, including 
Houston’s Galleria and Toronto’s Fairview Mall, both opened in 1970. The Toronto Eaton 
Centre was in that respect a refinement, rather than a major reinterpretation, of a tried-
and-true form. In other ways, the Centre was obviously a place of commerce, albeit an airy 
and well-lit one. It was bracketed by curved-cornered glass and steel office towers thirty 
storeys in height, with the south tower cutting right through the galleria for several floors. In 
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total, the first two phases of the complex incorporated 3.2 million square feet of built space, 
on par with Viking but considerably smaller than the 1966 Centre.  
Eaton’s new flagship, designed mostly by in-house architect E.L. Hankinson, was the 
largest department store in Canada, with a million square feet of shopping over nine 
storeys. Seen from the outside, it seemed to adhere to the company’s postwar predilection 
for boxy, practically windowless stores, although it was flanked north and south by glass 
atriums with plentiful light and street views. Only at ground level, where an arcaded façade 
of window displays faced onto Yonge Street, was there a hint of the stately, street-facing 
department store buildings of the past. However, the interior belied that appearance, with 
an open central court that gave the store a novel sense of grandeur and space.331  
Perhaps the most striking change in plans, besides the shopping gallery, was the 
Centre’s opening up on Trinity Square and Yonge Street. A key tenet of the development 
agreement was that streets closed to build the complex would be replaced by three acres of 
public open space and pedestrian paths; less than in the monumental 1966 design, but 
considerably more than any subsequent plan. For those on foot, Trinity Church effectively 
became the heart of the complex. To avoid Trinity Square’s complete overshadowing by the 
mall, construction surrounding it was stepped back and lowered according to complex 
measurements of height and sunlight that baffled many observers, but would significantly 
improve the quality of the public space when it was completed.332 From the square, Fairview 
was required to build and maintain public rights of way radiating outwards in three 
directions, dividing the superblock into sections and ensuring some level of connectivity 
with surrounding streets. These paths would become more and more important as, over the 
next decades, plans for high-density uses were extended to the western half of the 
superblock. The Yonge Street façade of the mall was fronted by trees, benches, and a series 
of stores that opened both onto the street and the mall. These street-oriented features 
earned Zeidler’s design a more enthusiastic reception than any earlier iteration of the 
Centre, particularly from his fellow architects.  
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Excitement and nostalgia 
After avoiding the spotlight while the Centre’s fate hung in the balance, Eaton’s now 
returned to the public eye to place its stamp of approval on the project. In May 1974, 
corporate newsletter Eaton News trumpeted that “After years of on again, off again 
bargaining it’s finally go,” as Eaton family members and executives dug the first few 
spadesful of earth in what would become the Toronto Eaton Centre.333 In fact it had been 
“go” for nearly six months, since the start of the massive tear-down of Yonge Street 
required to build the first phase of the project. There was little pomp or ceremony as 
workers demolished the former premises of Pollock’s Shoes, the Honey Dew Restaurant, 
and 32 other formerly successful businesses. With a few exceptions, most media attention 
focused on the technical feats required to prepare the area for gleaming modernity: 
reducing block after block of Victorian and early twentieth-century brick buildings to a “sea 
of rubble,” and digging up the foundations of Holy Trinity’s century-old rectory building and 
moving it 47 feet to accommodate the west side of the mall.334 Over the next three years 
Zeidler’s design took shape behind a wall of construction hoardings, culminating in the 
opening of the mammoth new department store, along with the first phase of the galleria, 
in February 1977.  
Eaton’s marked the occasion with corporate fanfare and a resurgence of the 
optimism that had defined earlier versions of the Centre. The opening was a major public 
event, attended by not just the Centre’s corporate planners but dignitaries including the 
mayor and the lieutenant-governor of Ontario. A crowd of thousands packed the mall’s 
huge glass atrium, where they patiently listened to speeches and watched a ribbon-cutting 
ceremony before surging up escalators and through doors to explore Eaton’s and 160 other 
new stores.335 The public was amply primed with information. Press materials naturally 
emphasized the complex’s striking modern design. They echoed older themes like 
downtown revitalization, casting the Centre as the crown jewel in Eaton’s nation-wide 
“comprehensive urban re-development program,” alongside the Pacific Centre and 
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London’s Wellington Square. More novel, however, was the way this corporate publicity 
deftly rebranded the mall as a collaboratively-designed, human-centred place. Press 
releases explained that 
Toronto Eaton Centre combines the ideals of government, religious 
institutions and the people of Toronto in an age when the democratic 
process is extending right down to the drawing boards.336 
Features like the glassed-in galleria and pedestrian rights of way that had essentially been 
forced on the developer were embraced as reflections of its core principles as “a people 
place, a recreation facility” for Torontonians. In one stroke, the Centre’s long history of 
citizen engagement became a positive part of its image, rather than the frustrating obstacle 
it had so often seemed to the project’s corporate planners. 
This bold leap into modern retailing was also an occasion for nostalgia. Both the 
company’s majestic College Street store and its original Queen location would soon shut 
their doors for good, the former sold to a consortium of developers, and the latter to 
Cadillac Fairview for the southward expansion of the shopping mall. In late 1976 journalists 
followed a 3,000 lb bronze statue of company founder Timothy Eaton as it was shunted 
laboriously up Yonge Street to the rotunda of the new store, to fix its paternal gaze on a 
new generation of shoppers and employees. Soon after, the company launched a three-
week closing sale, resurrecting the “Eaton Special,” a pre-subway shuttle bus service 
between the company’s two downtown stores, at the original price of 5¢ a ride.337 Many 
Torontonians responded to these evocations of a bygone era. City official and essayist 
George Heron was prompted to “mourn the loss of an old friend,” the Queen Street store 
where as a child he escaped from the “drabness of the Depression years” by riding 
escalators, staring at window displays, and enjoying ten-cent egg nog milkshakes. A few 
long-time employees—“Old Eatonians”—spoke fondly about working for a company that 
treated them like family, or about the prewar shopping district perpetually bustling with 
life.338 On closing day, Timothy Eaton’s grandsons shook hands and kissed babies as 
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thousands of Torontonians left their stores for the last time, hands full of discounted 
products and mementos like mannequins and merchandising signs.339  
As much it celebrated the past, Eaton’s had its eye on the future—and the bottom 
line. The opening of its new flagship was part of a larger process of streamlining and 
modernization that had a significant impact on the way it did business in Toronto. After 
almost a century of operation, Eaton’s announced the end of its mail-order service in early 
1976. The consequences included not just the end of the iconic Eaton’s catalogue, but the 
loss of 2,000 jobs in the Toronto suburbs, where mail-order operations were based. To that 
number were added around 350 local employees fired during and just after consolidation of 
the two downtown stores and decentralization of merchandizing across the country.340 The 
move to more modern premises in the Eaton Centre was also accompanied by an aggressive 
marketing philosophy more in tune with the retail world of the 1970s. Advertising and 
purchasing patterns moved away from the company tradition of demur, no-frills selling 
based on competitive pricing, and towards a focus on “lifestyles”—young, hip, and urban—
as a way to market higher-priced, more stylish goods. Central to this strategy were longer 
evening hours and new floor areas or “worlds” directly geared to younger shoppers, 
including the “T-Shirt Shop” and the “Attitude Shop”; one advertisement for the latter 
featured female models shaking up the establishment by invading the solemnity of a 
traditional men’s club.341 Hopes were high that cutting the company’s workforce and 
embracing a fashion-oriented profile would make the Dundas and Yonge store into a selling 
machine, “the model for all department stores to be built in the next 20 years.”342   
Death of a main drag?  
Everything about the Centre was bigger and more profitable than Yonge’s existing uses. Just 
eight months after the opening of his new flagship, John Craig Eaton boasted during a 
speech to the Canadian Club that it was a “gamble that paid off.” A 38% rise in downtown 
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sales seemed to vindicate his family’s commitment to keeping their business downtown.343 
By 1980, approximately one million people visited the Centre’s bright, expansive halls each 
week, including growing numbers of visitors that made it a tourist attraction in its own right. 
The complex employed 15,000 people and grossed more than $150 million yearly, excluding 
Eaton’s. Of that amount, a substantial percentage went into Cadillac Fairview’s coffers in 
sales premiums, making it “the most successful mall in Canada” and the “crown jewel” for 
what was now the largest publicly traded development corporation in North America.344  
What, observers asked, was the impact of this success on Yonge? During 
construction, the project’s advocates had described it as a “magnet” that would draw more 
shoppers downtown, and “force out the dreary body rub shops and smutty movie houses 
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that have infested the street.”345 Others, however, had warned that the mall threatened to 
“kill” Yonge by stealing away the foot traffic on which it depended.346 Certainly the Centre 
was transforming shopping in downtown Toronto. The galleria, expanded to 301 stores, had 
more than doubled the number of retail outlets on the Yonge Street strip, substantially 
increasing local competition and changing the profile of the sector.347 While the profile of 
the street remained a mixture of chains and independent businesses, the Centre was 
dominated by the latter; few Yonge Street businesses proved able to make the jump to the 
higher-rent space. The Financial Post remarked that Cadillac Fairview’s tenant list, full of 
national and international brands, was “not so very different from [that] of a large regional 
shopping centre.” Local business associations like the Downtown Council were weakened as 
Centre shops formed their own representative group with a different agenda. To their 
varied if generic shopping opportunities were added two successful pubs open until 1 am, 
and the world’s first “Cineplex” of 18 cinemas, providing clean, modern alternatives to 
Yonge Street’s famous watering holes and independent theatres.348  
Some thought this would spell the definitive end for this already ailing downtown 
strip. That spring, in a speech to the Downtown Council, Alderman Allan Sparrow bluntly 
argued that “the Eaton Centre has contributed to the destruction of Yonge Street,” pulling 
people off the street and making profits at the expense of small operators. A week later, 
Globe and Mail writer Stephen Godfrey stated the case in more detail, questioning whether 
the Eaton family’s vision of a revitalizing project had not backfired. 
[a]s the second section of the Eaton Centre worms its way relentlessly 
towards Queen Street, to be completed by the fall, it’s increasingly clear 
that this retail giant is not the saviour Yonge Street and the downtown core 
was waiting for. It may, in fact, be the critical blow in stilling the very life 
that [the Eatons were] so determined to preserve.349 
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By presenting a dull face to Yonge and luring pedestrians into its carefully-designed 
facsimile of a commercial street, the Centre promised death, not life to Yonge Street. These 
comments prompted a heated back and forth with defenders of the Centre. There seemed 
to be little common ground. Fredrik Eaton pointed out that foot traffic in and out of Dundas 
subway station had more than doubled from 32,000 to 75,000 daily since the new Eaton’s 
store—directly connected by underground tunnel—had opened. But to critics like Godfrey 
that same statistic was proof that the Centre was “draining the street life” by forcing it 
underground. Similar critiques had been levelled at the city’s extensive underground PATH 
system, also seen as over-commercialized, sanitized, and a poor alternative to the vibrant 
public space of the sidewalk and the pedestrian mall. 
A controlled environment 
Some thought those criticizing the Centre’s attractiveness to shoppers were missing the 
point. Downtown Council head David Walsh spoke for established Yonge Street merchants, 
arguing that Yonge’s real problem remained a lack of amenities for pedestrians: “the 
present condition of Yonge Street is not due to the Eaton Centre, but to the lack of positive 
action for streetscape improvements by our government.”350 That perspective was further 
developed by urbanist Jane Jacobs, who saw opportunity, rather than danger, in the 
Centre’s immense popularity.  
When it happens that streets depending on pedestrians serve them so 
meanly and grudgingly as Yonge does now, when we become heedless of 
the importance of bedrock civility in public streets and their public life…then 
a jolt like the one administered to Yonge by the popularity of Eaton Centre 
is useful. Perhaps more than useful—necessary…[T]he Centre’s success is in 
Yonge’s favor, and as a failure it would only further depress Yonge.351  
Was the galleria, as Jacobs argued, a lesson for Toronto in designing public spaces 
people actually wanted to use? It was certainly a pleasant place to be. A 1978 survey of 600 
Yonge Street shoppers suggested a strong preference for factors like convenience, a 
“pleasurable environment,” and a controlled climate, even among those who stated that 
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they also liked on-street retail.352 The Eaton Centre provided all of those things, as well as 
many of the attractions—plants, benches, fountains, entertainment—that were hallmarks of 
the early pedestrian malls. Canada’s most popular shopping centre earned that status by 
replacing Yonge’s outdoor eclecticism with a modern, climate-controlled alternative. But 
was it a public place, or something else altogether?  
Since its postwar beginnings, the North American shopping mall has always been 
plagued by what Eric Tucker has called “an unresolved tension between its public and 
private dimensions.”353 Across the continent, shopping centres acted as de facto social and 
community spaces, particularly in new suburbs which lacked the established shopping 
streets or public squares of older city centres. Yet as much as people gathered in malls, and 
as much as pioneers like Victor Gruen may have intended them as modern successors to the 
agora, it was impossible to escape the fact that they were privately constructed and 
managed with the overall goal of maximizing profit per square foot of retail space.354 Most 
of the time the dual functions of civic and commercial space co-existed, and in fact were 
mutually-reinforcing. But where there was conflict between these two roles mall owners 
were in almost all cases able to assert their legal right to regulate who used their premises, 
and what they did while there.  
In the case of the Eaton Centre, the waters were further muddied by the 
complicated public-private negotiation that had preceded construction. Public access to the 
Centre was one of the key concepts written into the 1972 development agreements, which 
provided for “at least 40,000 square feet of private open space accessible to the public,” as 
well as 24-hour pedestrian rights-of-way to the subway and between Trinity Square and 
Yonge Street.355 The latter passage, because it ran directly through the galleria’s main 
atrium, effectively guaranteed pedestrian access to the entire length of the mall at all hours. 
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While there was initially some concern on Fairview’s part about this—particularly when Holy 
Trinity’s negotiators pushed for an air curtain, rather than conventional doors, at either end 
of the passage—the idea that people would roam the Centre on their way to and from the 
subway and the square gradually became an accepted part of the complex’s function.356 In 
this context, it was natural that many Torontonians thought of the Eaton Centre as public. A 
1980 newspaper column that identified the mall as an important downtown meeting place 
was typical:  
Torontonians wanting to meet a friend downtown used to say, “I’ll meet 
you on the steps of City Hall.” Now, more often than not, they say, “I’ll meet 
you at the fountain in the Eaton Centre.”357 
That impression was only encouraged by a marketing strategy that positioned the 
development as Toronto’s centre, a place that never closed and contained under its roof all 
of the exciting and varied activities associated with downtown life.358  
At the same time, the mall was a controlled, securitized environment managed for 
commercial, not civic, purposes. Cadillac Fairview employed a security staff of 40 that was 
headed by a former staff sergeant in the Toronto police and included other veterans of the 
Canadian military and law enforcement. In keeping with the latest trends in mall security, a 
32-camera electronic surveillance system allowed staff to watch shoppers throughout the 
complex.359 For Eaton Centre management and security, more important than any principle 
of public access was protecting the mall “as a place for people to enjoy” as shoppers, diners, 
or strollers. That meant identifying and excluding undesirable people and uses that harmed 
the mall as a pleasurable environment for consumption. The Centre’s manager would later 
testify to feeling besieged by 
general youth hanging out in the centre with nothing better to do…drunks 
and derelicts who try to use the centre as a place of residence…people 
trying to deal drugs…different groups who espouse a particular philosophy 
                                                  
356 “Becker to congregation, Aug. 6, 1974,” CTA, Downtown Action Fonds, 62-3-12, Zeidler, Building Cities Life: 
An Autobiography in Architecture, Volume I, 176. 
357 “Meet me for lunch by the fountain,” Toronto Star, Aug. 6, 1980. 
358 For example, from 1977 the Centre’s jingle was “Life in the city starts at the Centre.” 
359 “Life in the city: Giant shopping, eating centre,” Toronto Star, Sep. 27, 1980. 
294 
 
or a particular political point who would try to use the centre as their 
forum.360 
In other words, many of the problems already identified by critics of Yonge’s 1960s 
and 1970s decline. Mall security were extremely active in following and excluding these 
populations. By 1980 more than 30,000 people were ejected from the Eaton Centre 
premises each year, many of them youth, many of them black, and most without the 
involvement of the police.361 Through this practice, rights of access and freedom of 
expression were curtailed much more strongly than they were outside at street level. Those 
whose appearance or behaviour made them casualties of this policy were seldom able to 
appeal; a handful of court challenges—including one by Toronto Councillor Jack Layton, 
issued a ticket while leafletting—resulted in individual victories but did little to change the 
policy or the legal basis for exclusion.362 Nor, if responses to the early 1970s pedestrian mall 
were any indication, would many shoppers have wanted a change: the Centre’s security 
regime underwrote the civility that Jane Jacobs attributed to the mall, and which so many 
Torontonians clearly enjoyed.  
Conclusion 
Amid the anxiety and optimism of the postwar era, a broad consensus emerged in Toronto 
in favour of modernizing and rebuilding downtown. While advocates of redevelopment 
differed in approach, most shared a common conviction that both the public interest and 
private profit could be served by replacing the aging cityscape with modern structures and 
more profitable uses. Planners, politicians, business elites, and prominent public 
personalities sought to mobilize government and private resources to create a long-lasting 
urban transformation. But as the preceding account suggests, there was nothing simple or 
straightforward about putting this rebuilding ethic into practice. It was not enough to 
imagine the city of tomorrow in all its comfort, convenience, and prosperity; that future had 
to be built. Faith in progress would be tested by economic realities, intense public scrutiny, 
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and the sheer complexity of the existing urban landscape. Rather than a great urban unifier, 
redevelopment would become a contested, politically fractious process that put the 
differing interests of citizens, business, and the civic administration into sharp relief.  
For more than two decades, Yonge Street and the T. Eaton Co. were central to this 
process. With the development of a modern planning system and a vigorous pro-growth 
politics in Toronto, municipal proponents of redevelopment saw the Eaton properties as a 
unique opportunity to rebuild at scale. In one stroke, the city could eliminate obsolete 
buildings, reinvigorate the Yonge Street shopping core, and create a fitting counterpart to 
the modern government complex taking shape next door. The civic administration and 
Canada’s largest retailer were cast as partners in making a “new heart for old Toronto” on 
Yonge, a complex of towers, arcades, and squares around which an entirely new downtown 
could take shape.363 Eaton’s became invested in this vision, or a version of it, enlisting some 
of North America’s most renowned downtown planners and revitalization experts to devise 
a complex that reconciled civic goals with its own internal business objectives.  
It was almost inevitable that the 1966 Eaton Centre could not live up to the rhetoric 
that accompanied its planning and public presentation. The project’s failure underlined how 
ill-equipped Eaton’s—good corporate citizen or not—was to plan and finance 
redevelopment on such a scale; it also demonstrated the potential influence of well-
organized citizen groups on what had up to that point been a closed, non-consultative 
development process. By the early 1970s the idea of redevelopment as good corporate 
citizenship was almost dead in Toronto. The second Eaton Centre took shape in a context of 
corporate consolidation within the development industry, and the emergence of a new 
politics of development rooted in participatory democracy and protection of urban diversity. 
Citizens, urban experts and politicians contested not just its treatment of historic 
structures—the central focus of criticism of the first Centre—but every facet of its design. 
More broadly, they offered a critique of the corporate power and rapaciousness they saw 
embodied in this megastructure. Development giant Cadillac Fairview, much more adroit 
than Eaton’s at public relations and negotiations, was able to effectively stave off these 
criticisms by significantly altering its design, while still building a commercial development 
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that replaced sidewalk with mall, small businesses with chain outlets, and would prove 
immensely profitable for its investors and shareholders. Yonge would never be the same. 
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Conclusion: Making and Remaking Yonge Street 
 
Through its explorations of people planning and public space; entertainment and moral 
regulation; and redevelopment and corporate ambition, this thesis relates the story of three 
decades of change on Toronto’s Yonge Street commercial strip. It provides a detailed 
historical account of a period when Yonge was at the heart of efforts to reinvent downtown 
to meet the challenges of the modern city. Depending on the observer, those challenges 
included not just rapid decentralization, but changing demographics, the reorientation of 
consumer tastes and habits, and the spread of new ideas about the city. A range of 
downtown actors—including department stores, independent businesses, municipal 
politicians, and citizen activists—invested time, money, and political capital in Yonge’s 
transformation. Conflict and negotiation between their improvement agendas played a 
crucial role in the street’s making and remaking.  
Looking over this process, certain patterns emerge. One main theme of this thesis is 
the important role played by the local state in working out Yonge’s future. In the postwar 
decades, a new municipal regime took shape in Toronto, one that sought to move well 
beyond its established role of service provision—keeping the water flowing and the streets 
clean—to embrace interventionist, long-range planning. This was most obvious at the level 
of the new Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, tasked with planning and connecting the 
expanding suburbs, but the City of Toronto also took on new roles and responsibilities. A 
permanent planning department was established, whose focus was very much on 
downtown; tens of millions of dollars were invested in building a modern City Hall and civic 
square. Beginning with the idea of redevelopment areas and continuing on to private-public 
partnerships—including most notably the Eaton Centre—municipal experts and elected 
officials sought to carve out an unprecedented place for local government in shaping the 
urban future. Early on, many of these efforts were devoted to encouraging downtown 
investment, in an effort to keep up with the dynamic suburbs and secure tax revenues to 
pay for an expanding repertoire of services.  
Even as the prevailing tone of politics changed in the 1960s and 1970s, the basic 
assumption that this kind of state action was necessary never changed. By the early 1970s, 
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in the context of a development boom and a surge in citizen activism, the City’s focus was 
on limiting growth, or at least shaping it in politically acceptable ways. Meanwhile, planners 
and downtown politicians began to explore ways of protecting elements of the city—
including distinctive, older shopping areas like Yonge Street—from becoming casualties of 
modernization. This was the context in which the Yonge Street pedestrian mall and a 
number of other attempts at preservation—some successful, some not—were proposed. At 
the heart of all of these interventions was a belief that, while private capital would be the 
engine of growth, local government had a crucial role to play in shaping and guiding the 
resulting urban change.  
The power of the state was influential in more mundane ways. This study also 
explores how the day-to-day procedural activities of the municipal government—police 
patrols, inspections, enforcement of zoning regulations—played a role in shaping the street. 
Pedestrianization, for example, met a great deal of public support, but also obstruction from 
elements of the municipal bureaucracy that saw it as disruptive of a careful balance of 
established uses. In the end, the Yonge pedestrian mall was undone as much by the City’s 
lack of administrative capacity or internal consensus as by citizen opposition to its 
boisterous or unsafe atmosphere. On the strip, police regulated how the street was used, 
and by whom, each day. High-profile operations, including morality squad raids and drug 
arrests captured the headlines but the daily negotiations of informal policing were equally 
important. In the mid-1970s, even as city officials blustered about the undesirability of the 
sex industry on Yonge, patrol officers were reaching their own pragmatic agreements with 
the operators and employees of body rub parlours. This complicity, of course, had clear 
limits, breaking down overnight when public scrutiny of police and the strip was highest. 
Another theme is people power. In an era of robust civil society engagement, I find 
that debates over Yonge Street played a mobilizing role analogous to fights over 
expressways and tower construction, with the crucial difference that downtown it was not 
homes or communities that were at stake, so much as a vision of what the city could or 
should be. Young community activists, suburban churchgoers, working-class Portuguese 
Canadians—a range of Torontonians—made their first forays into local politics with letters 
to the editor, demonstrations, and deputations on the future of Yonge Street. Many others 
spoke out on these issues as part of a larger process of political mobilization that began with 
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other contested urban issues. As a result, citizen perspectives—wherever they were on the 
political spectrum—had a significant impact on Yonge Street. By no means did citizens 
always lead in downtown transformation; but at the same time they were rarely followers, 
and never bystanders. They were, in the final analysis, a vocal minority with an influence 
well beyond their numbers.  
People power could be reactive and obstructionist—citizens saying “No!”—but it 
could also be creative. The Yonge Street pedestrian mall, as much as it originated in the 
international circulation of planning ideas, was propelled into reality by the engagement of 
a diverse coalition of citizen groups, including small Yonge Street merchants, hip youth, and 
anti-pollution activists. Meanwhile, successive groups of citizens forced their way into 
negotiations between the City and Eaton’s for the sale of Old City Hall, halting the Eaton 
Centre project and changing its design and impact. Equally, ideas of urban citizenship and 
democracy permeated discussions of Yonge Street, often serving to justify, shape, or 
frustrate the various futures people envisioned for it. The image of Yonge, Main Street 
Toronto, as an essentially democratic space, “a street for all the people,” was employed on 
both sides of the debate over Sin Strip, and polls and surveys became key tools as Eaton’s 
and other actors attempted to mobilize or capture public opinion to support their plans for 
transformation.  
The story of Eaton’s brief career as a land developer cuts to the heart of the 
influence of capital on the development of Yonge Street and downtown Toronto. Looking 
over three decades of change on Yonge, it is difficult to overstate the importance of 
business and investment decisions to determining the street’s postwar fate. As much as it 
was conceived of as a public space or thoroughfare, Yonge’s principal function was 
commercial: a marketplace for goods and services second to none in the city, although by 
the 1950s it certainly had its challengers. The marketplace brought the crowds, and the 
crowds created profits. This simple fact motivated the entrepreneurs who shifted the strip’s 
focus to entertainment in the 1940s, or to commercialized sex in the 1970s; it was this 
function that Eaton’s, and later Cadillac Fairview, sought to exploit with the construction of 
a modern shopping complex. Postwar, if the City set the parameters for urban development, 
and citizens sought to limit its excesses or democratize it, the principal source of dynamism 
remained private investment and the capitalist urban process.  
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This becomes clearer when we hone in on a single project. Even before its 
completion, the Eaton Centre had a far-reaching impact on Yonge. In part this was material. 
By the 1960s the Centre and other redevelopment proposals had vastly increased real 
estate speculation on the strip. Properties changed hands frequently and new value was 
created seemingly from thin air as Eaton’s and its competitors snapped up Yonge Street 
properties. This shift in ownership patterns helped create a pool of commercial buildings 
that were essentially held in stasis, without renovation or improvement, in anticipation of 
sale for redevelopment: these proved to be well-suited for short-term use as sex cinemas 
and body rub parlours. For its construction the Centre required the demolition of block after 
block of older buildings, further reducing the pool of premises suitable to viable 
independent businesses.  
As the third section of this thesis relates, in a way the Eaton Centre also cornered the 
market in ideas. Its long and fractious planning process gave the Centre’s architects ample 
time to address critiques, and also to capture what seemed best in the creative downtown 
politics of the time, and incorporate—or co-opt—it into their design. Once built, the Centre 
not only duplicated many of the functions of the historic strip’s businesses—retail, cinema, 
dining—but it also appeared to offer a better, more controlled version of the street itself. 
Like the Yonge Street pedestrian malls of the early 1970s, the Centre’s multi-level shopping 
concourse was free to enter: it included people-friendly benches and fountains, and 
entertainment ranging from fashion shows and music. Unlike the public malls it was 
privately managed and secured with a state-of-the-art security system aimed at keeping 
undesirable users—including the young people who flocked to Yonge in summer—at bay. 
The Eaton Centre was the perfect embodiment of the commercial success many had hoped 
the pedestrian malls would bring downtown, but with only a nod to the public objectives 
and hopes for the urban future that a broad public invested in the experiment.  
Finally, the street emerges in this account as an actor in its own right. Downtown 
Yonge’s aging built landscape, its diversity, its essential unruliness inspired the improvement 
agendas explored here—but they also frustrated them. Change always proved to be more 
difficult than imagined, less controllable, more chaotic. Interventions were adjusted to 
circumstances, and actions had unintended consequences. Modernist hopes for aesthetic 
and functional coherence were long frustrated by the street’s small lots and complex 
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pattern of property ownership; the final shape of the Eaton Centre complex, hugging Holy 
Trinity Church and Square and wrapping around the hulking mass of Old City Hall, is a 
testimony to this. Plans to widen the street, or to remove traffic from it entirely, were 
complicated by the delicate balance of uses that had developed on pavement and sidewalk 
over a century of crowds and commerce. And visions of a moral “clean sweep” of the sex 
industry, while powerful in motivating legal action, proved to be more destructive than 
restorative. In this study of contested urban space, Yonge Street emerges as the changing 
product of layers of ideas, networks, and different forms of power, and in that respect a 
microcosm of the inherent complexity and instability of the modern city.1  
The street today 
This thesis introduced Yonge Street to the reader with a short flâneur’s tour on foot. A 
similar trip down its sidewalks today reveals much that is new, but also continuities, as 
patterns from the past resurface to shape the street’s transformation. If in the postwar 
decades Yonge emerged from the industrial landscape of Toronto’s harbour, in the 2010s its 
beginnings are both more refined and more self-conscious. Its foot at the lakeshore is now 
marked by a brass plaque declaring it the “longest street in the world,” a legacy of its 
conflation with provincial Highway 11 and the flurry of imaginative promotion and 
celebration that accompanied the 180th anniversary in 1975. Surrounding that marker is a 
landscape in transition, acre after acre of land now being repurposed for residential and 
commercial development. Proponents of Pier 27 and other projects slated for this section of 
the street imagine a “minicity” that is a far cry from the parking lots and industry that made 
this an unprepossessing start for our tour in the 1950s.2 
North of these newly inhabited spaces the tour takes our stroller underneath two 
major metropolitan infrastructure projects dating from the postwar era. First is a walk 
through the somewhat forbidding spaces under the now-crumbling Gardiner Expressway, 
completed at great expense in 1964 as one of the key elements in Metro Toronto’s urban 
expressway plan. This east-west commuter corridor is one of the most visible legacies of 
                                                  
1 On change and complexity as the defining features of the city see Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, Seeing Like a City 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016). 
2 “The radical re-imagining of Yonge Street,” Toronto Star, Sep. 25, 2015. 
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auto-centric infrastructure planning in the densely-built core. It also, however, testifies to 
paths not taken: a connection to the southern tip of the unbuilt Spadina Expressway and an 
eastern extension of the route were left uncompleted, symbolizing by their absence 
Toronto’s 1970s move away from expressway building. Just beyond the Gardiner the city’s 
railyards, since the 1960s substantially adapted to house the GO commuter rail and bus 
system, offer another point of entry into the city from its fringes. Both expressway and the 
GO hub speak to the reality of Toronto in the twenty-first century: that of a sprawling, 
polycentric urban region of six million inhabitants—2.6 million in the city itself—in which the 
old downtown core remains a major economic hub.  
The rebuilding of downtown has, since the 1970s and the Eaton Centre project, has 
continued apace. Yonge has experienced significant redevelopment over the last forty years, 
particularly in the zones bookending the main commercial strip. Today, the absorption of 
the southern stretch of the street into the office and financial services district, begun in the 
1950s or earlier, is virtually complete. With a few exceptions—stately nineteenth-century 
buildings and a few incongruous stretches of low-rise retail—most of Yonge south of Queen 
Street is now a concrete and glass canyon flanked by some of the most valuable office space 
in the city. Meanwhile, at the north end of the strip, a residential development boom is 
remaking the College Street intersection and environs. The College Park residential and 
commercial complex built in the 1970s around the former Eaton’s store is now dwarfed by 
the 78 storeys of Canada’s largest condominium tower. Moving north, block after block of 
Yonge’s low-rise retail landscape is punctuated by construction hoardings or pits for tower 
footings. The fortunes of development corporations continue to be made on Yonge Street.  
The idea that thousands of people would be living—or want to live—within spitting 
distance of the Yonge Street Strip is itself very much a product of the 1970s. A natural 
outgrowth of the era of “people planning” was a revisioning of downtown not just as the 
centre of the metropolitan region and a place of business, but as a community. This image 
for the core, already evident in the debates that surrounded the city’s original “people 
place”—the Yonge Street mall—became a central tenet of the reform urban planning of the 
1970s, and was enshrined in the Central Area Plan in 1976. The ongoing return to the 
central city and planning policies that encouraged residential densification helped to 
effectively double the population of the downtown core to 200,000 residents between 1976 
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and 2016. Today, with a total of 1,600 storeys of (mostly luxury) condominium residences 
proposed for the Yonge corridor north from the Strip to Bloor Street, some believe this 
policy has been too successful: Toronto’s chief planner recently stated that it is time to “hit 
the pause button” on redevelopment, and downtown politicians recently floated the idea of 
a construction moratorium very similar to that proposed for apartments and office towers 
by the newly elected reform administration in 1973.3 
Since the 1970s the former Eaton lands have been entirely rebuilt. The centralization 
of control achieved through the long and costly land assembly process not only paved the 
way for the complex’s galleria and department store building, but primed the rest of the 
superblock for transformation according to market demand. Over several decades the west 
side of the superblock has been filled in with a million square foot office complex (1983), a 
luxury hotel (1991), and a combined commercial and educational building connected to 
Ryerson University (2006). Many of these uses echo those set out in Viking and the 1966 
Eaton Centre, although they lack the aesthetic coherence so central to those schemes. 
Meanwhile, Trinity Square was completed in the early 1980s, and continues to provide a 
popular island of green space in the heart of downtown, surrounding still-vital Holy Trinity 
Church. In stark contrast, the other “people-friendly” features activists fought to have 
included in Eberhard Zeidler’s original design—benches and trees on Yonge, direct entry 
into retail stores from the street—are gone. Doors to the street have been converted into 
window displays, and false façades down the length of the mall have cut the sidewalk width 
nearly in half, with the intent of channelling as much street traffic as possible into the 
profitable Galleria. Today’s Centre presents Yonge Street with a blank wall, reminiscent less 
of the “mall connected to the street grid” imagined by Zeidler and the project’s citizen critics 
than of the archetypal suburban shopping centre.4  
The Eaton Centre’s commercialized public-private space remains a runaway 
commercial success for tenants and developer Cadillac Fairview. However, little today 
connects it to the corporation that made its construction possible, and was for decades its 
most significant tenant. In 1997, after years of speculation about its declining profitability 
                                                  
3 “Toronto reaches for ‘pause button’ on Yonge Street redevelopment,” Metro News, Oct. 19, 2016. 
4 Zeidler, Buildings Cities Life,” 184-86. 
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and competitiveness, Canada’s greatest retailer filed for bankruptcy. The positive corporate 
image that Eaton’s had worked so hard to preserve could not stave off failure in the face of 
broadening competition and the constant drain of overexpansion. Stores across Canada 
were sold off, including the Toronto Eaton Centre flagship, permanently closed by its new 
owner in 2002. There was considerable pathos as the massive seated statue of Timothy 
Eaton, which had cast stern glances at downtown shoppers since 1919, was removed from 
the mall lobby to its new home in the Royal Ontario Museum. After years as a Sears 
department store, in 2016 the former Eaton’s premises were taken over by upscale 
American retailer Nordstrom. Simpson’s has similarly been replaced, its elegant main store 
now occupied by department stores—Hudson’s Bay Company and Sak’s Fifth Avenue—that 
have weathered difficult economic times by moving away from one-stop shopping to focus 
their attention on luxury fashion and accessories. The department store giants, responsible 
for the demise of many a smaller competitor from the late 1800s onwards, have in their 
turn been edged out of the market by low-cost, big box retailers and aggressively-marketed 
specialty stores.     
In fact, today’s stroller would be hard-pressed to find many familiar landmarks on 
Yonge’s present-day commercial strip. Music hotspot Friar’s Tavern has become a Hard Rock 
Café music-themed restaurant; Sam the Record Man’s store replaced by a Ryerson 
University student centre; Clark’s Shoes a Burger King. Of the watering holes and music 
venues of the 1960s and 1970s, Zanzibar is the last holdout, still eking out an existence with 
strip shows and as a Hollywood movie set. As predicted forty years ago by the embattled 
Downtown Council, in the long run many of Yonge’s independent retailers and service 
providers have disappeared or moved further north up the strip, replaced by chain outlets 
better able to capitalize on the street’s crowds and pay its sky-high retail rents. Many—
most—are American-owned, reflecting a Canadian retail sector more than ever dominated 
by brands whose reach and economies of scale are truly global. Those national chains that 
have survived have done so by adopting the same aggressive marketing strategies and 
economies of scale as their foreign competitors.5  
                                                  
5 In 2010, 53% of Canada’s top retailers were foreign-owned and operated, with the vast majority being 
American. Industry Canada, Canada’s Changing Retail Market, 2010 (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2013).    
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Structurally, certain elements of the strip remain intact. Many of the century-old buildings 
that housed Yonge’s small shops and services for decades still remain. Their persistence 
which speaks to the cost and difficult of land assembly on this stretch of Yonge, 
downzonings following the Eaton Centre development, and a wave of heritage designations 
since the 1980s. Today forty Yonge Street buildings between King and College are listed as 
City heritage properties, making them more difficult to tear down. This has not, however, 
prevented their gutting and re-adaptation through what one architect has referred to as 
“urban taxidermy,” offering an historic streetscape diorama that masks stripped modern 
spaces within.6 A Starbuck’s café has taken over the premises of the Oddfellows fraternal 
society (1891); a 1940s bank building is now home to a mass-market fashion outlet. 
Meanwhile, buildings with less storied histories have been covered over with metal and 
glass façades and corporate branding. One side effect of this process has been that whole 
buildings have in many places been taken over by a single tenant, dramatically reducing the 
density of uses—offices, apartments, secondary businesses—that our visitor to the strip 
observed decades ago.  
Consolidation of a modern corporate shopping area is most advanced around the 
intersection of Yonge and Dundas Street, now the busiest commercial crossroads in the city 
and the most visibly changed section of the strip. The north entrance to the Eaton Centre 
dominates the corner and is the main reason for the shift of shopping and pedestrian 
activity north from Queen and Yonge. Diagonally opposite but very much in alignment with 
the Centre’s modernist aesthetic, the north-east corner block was entirely rebuilt in the 
2000s as an L-shaped theatre, commercial, and restaurant complex called, successively, 
Metropolis, Toronto Life Square, and 10 Dundas Street East. Like the Centre whose style it 
mimics, this private redevelopment project was facilitated by extensive municipal action, in 
this case the expropriation of key land parcels by the City.7 And like the Eaton Centre it has 
been blasted by urbanists and architects for its uninventive industrial exterior—
“horrorchitechture,” according to one—and yet remains immensely popular with downtown 
crowds.8 10 Dundas forms the central platform for an accumulation of gaudy billboards, 
                                                  
6 Robert Allsop, “Are we killing Yonge Street?” Now Magazine, July 6, 2016. 
7 The story is related in Beth Moore Milroy, Thinking Planning and Urbanism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010). 
8 “We don’t deserve this horrorchitecture,” Toronto Star, Jan. 14, 2008. 
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gigantic television screens, and corporate logos that now covers three of the intersection’s 
four corners, advertising Yonge’s shopping and entertainment possibilities even more 
comprehensively—and inescapably—than the neon signage of a previous era. If in the 1970s 
comparisons to Times Square were used to identify Yonge with criminality and sleaze, today, 
more often than not, they refer to this miniature version of New York City’s sanitized—but 
still crassly commercial—“electric pandemonium.”9 
On Yonge Street, the local has given way to the global. Those critics of the street’s 
rebuilding who in the 1960s and 1970s saw it as a victory for the corporate city were in a 
way correct. The trend on the street, as described here, has been towards the centralization 
of control over the urban landscape, and the replacement of diversity with more 
profitable—but homogeneous—consumer opportunities. Yonge today provides more than 
ever before—more retailers, more entertainment, more sales—but few of its offerings are 
                                                  
9 “Iconic Yonge-Dundas square a major city asset,” Toronto Star, Feb. 4, 2008. 
Image 4.1: Yonge-Dundas Square at night, 2010. The Eaton Centre is on the far left, and 10 
Dundas Street East on the right. Little is visible of the Strip of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
although the bright lights and crowds remain. Pedro Szekely/Wikimedia Commons. 
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substantially different from those available in Chicago’s Loop, London’s Oxford Street, or a 
suburban mall in Bangkok. In this respect the street’s story echoes those of other successful 
Main Street shopping areas across North American and the world.  
This change has not, however, dampened enthusiasm for downtown Yonge as a 
shopping area. The many observers who from the late 1960s argued that redevelopment 
would curb the street’s human vitality, or even “kill” it—they imagined windswept, empty 
streets—have been proved wrong. Despite its new clothes, Yonge today is as much a vital 
marketplace and an exciting (or frustrating) pedestrian street as ever. The renovated Yonge 
and Dundas intersection is now Toronto’s busiest, with 120,000 crossings per day, three-
quarters of which are made by pedestrians.10 People continue to come to Yonge’s 
modernized shopping core at all hours of the day, and in that sense it remains one of the 
most successful elements of Toronto’s public realm.  
Still, it is a public realm whose boundaries have shifted. Another large-scale change 
visible on Yonge is that from the public to the private, also understood as the enclosure and 
commercialization of urban space. This study touches at several points on the history of the 
different regulatory regimes used to manage Yonge Street as a public space in the postwar 
decades. It explores how ideas of the street and its economic, social, or civic functions 
collided with the reality of competing uses, expectations, and public moralities on the Yonge 
Street pedestrian mall, and how the Eaton Centre’s privately managed, publicly accessible 
galleria was built to avoid those same conflicts. The lessons of that era have not been lost 
on today’s planners. The final major addition to Yonge’s streetscape since the 1970s is 
Dundas Square, an acre-sized plaza at south-east corner of Yonge and Dundas. Completed in 
2002 as part of the same downtown regeneration initiative that produced 10 Dundas East, it 
offers seating, washrooms, fountains, and wireless internet. The square is a natural meeting 
place, and in warm weather it hosts daily and nightly events ranging from protest marches 
to concerts to fairs.  
                                                  
10 City of Toronto, Signalized Traffic Pedestrian Volumes, 1999-2012. Raw data available online at: 
http://www1.toronto.ca/City_Of_Toronto/Information_&_Technology/Open_Data/Data_Sets/Assets/Files/sig
nalizedTrafficPedestrianVolumes.xls 
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However, Dundas Square is not, strictly-speaking, public space. It is a public-private 
partnership managed by an arms-length board made up of city officials, citizens, and 
representatives of downtown institutions, a governance structure very similar to the 
committees that ran the 1970s pedestrian mall. Permissible and non-permissible uses—the 
latter category includes smoking, and unlicensed vending, and artistic performance without 
a permit—are set out clearly in a dedicated municipal law.11 Private security and 
surveillance technologies, paid for through event fees, enforce those rules and in doing so 
create a much more circumscribed environment than the classic city street. The contrast 
with the other three corners of the intersection, often crowded with buskers, evangelists, 
and leafleteers, is noticeable. In her account of the square’s creation, sociologist Evelyn 
Ruppert describes it as a place that exemplifies the “secure, consumer, and aesthetic city” 
imagined by today’s planning professionals; local activists have protested it as part of the 
creeping privatization of public space.12 If this study is any guide, Dundas Square is also the 
product of an earlier era that established an obvious public desire for people space 
downtown, and offered new models for creating and managing it.  
Other themes from the past are inscribed within Yonge’s ongoing transformation. 
One is danger. Downtown Yonge today remains a site where Toronto negotiates its fears 
about urban insecurity, where crimes that go unremarked in other parts of the city become 
the focus of emotive media coverage and public soul-searching. In 1977 the murder of 
shoeshine boy Emanuel Jaques riveted attention on the Strip, provoking political 
mobilization, a renewed citizen-led morality campaign, and repressive action by City 
authorities against sex shops and, soon after, Toronto’s gay community. Today it is gun 
violence that captures public attention and maintains Yonge’s reputation as a danger zone. 
In 2005 a 15-year old girl named Jane Creba was shot and killed at the height of the street’s 
busy Boxing Day sales, victim of crossfire that erupted after an argument between two 
groups of young men. Her tragic and pointless death triggered public anger and anxious calls 
for a police response, resulting in one of the largest murder investigations in the city’s 
                                                  
11 City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code 636: Public Squares, revised June 2015. 
12 Evelyn Ruppert, The Moral Economy of Cities: Shaping Good Citizens (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2006); Christopher Smith, “‘Whose streets?’: Urban social movements and the politicization of public space,” 
Public: Art, Culture, Ideas 29 (2004): 156-67. 
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history, involving dozens of officers, undercover surveillance, and more than 250,000 
wiretap intercepts.13   
Once again, a tragic murder that promised to unify the city also revealed deep 
divisions. In 2005, as in 1977, a single crime with a young victim was seized upon as an 
example of a larger social problem—in this case, gang violence—and used to justify a 
massive police response. The rhetoric was much the same, too. The detective in charge of 
the Creba investigation proclaimed just a few days after her death that Toronto had “finally 
lost its innocence,” echoing almost word for word similar pronouncements made in the 
Emanuel Jaques case.14 The explicit homophobia of the 1970s was replaced with a more 
subtle racism, in which attacks on gang members—Creba was white, her accused killers 
black—were broadened to criticism of the city’s large Jamaican-Canadian community. Of 
course, black Torontonians were already intensely aware of the costs of gun violence. 
Creba’s murder came at the end of a year—media called it the “Year of the Gun”—that saw 
a record 359 shootings and 52 gun-related homicides in Toronto. The victims of this 
staggering number of gun crimes were overwhelmingly African-Canadian men, and most 
were shot well away from downtown crowds in the city’s low-income inner suburbs.15 None 
had triggered a similar outpouring of public grief or anywhere near the same commitment 
of police resources.  
Another persistent theme is nostalgia. In the 1960s and 1970s many Torontonians 
expressed attachment to an earlier version of the street, in many cases harkening back to an 
idealized downtown (and a city) characterized by public propriety, social cohesion, and 
safety. They contrasted this image with unwelcome changes occurring at the time, including 
the development of youth culture, the mushrooming of sex shops, and Yonge’s general 
orientation towards popular entertainment. Today, somewhat ironically, the version of the 
street they decried—the glitzy, loud, neon-lit Strip—is widely nostalgized, the subject of 
documentaries, poems, and journalistic musings about the city that once was.16 Photos of 
                                                  
13 A critical account of the crime and its aftermath is Anita Arvast, What Killed Jane Creba: Rap, Race, and the 
Invention of a Gang War (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016). 
14 “Police cast keen eye on videotapes,” Toronto Star, Dec. 28, 2005. 
15 40 of 52 shot and killed in 2005 were African-Canadian men. Wendy Chan, Dorothy Chunn, Racialization, 
Crime, and Criminal Justice in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 59-60. 
16 See for example David Brady Productions’ three-part documentary series Yonge Street Rock & Roll Stories 
(2011). 
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downtown Yonge in the postwar decades outnumber those of any other street on the 
popular Vintage Toronto facebook group, where a community of nearly 100,000 reflects on 
change and personal attachments to the city’s past. Among the many who decry the 
takeover of Yonge and Dundas by big brands and billboards, the 1960s and 1970s are held 
up as a period when the street was more exciting, freer, when it was “cool.”17 Even the 
street’s “marvellously sleazy” sex shops are occasionally singled out for fond remembrance, 
as in one recent memoir of Yonge’s punk music scene, although in most narratives they 
continue to be portrayed as one of the principal causes of Yonge’s decline.18  
The power of public attachments to Yonge’s the past was made plain when, after 
more than forty years operating on the Yonge Street Strip, music store Sam the Record Man 
closed its doors in 2007. Ryerson University’s proposed redevelopment of the site was very 
nearly derailed by public outcry over the loss of this iconic business, which so many people 
in Toronto—and indeed, southern Ontario—remember as their point of entry into the world 
of pop music and record culture. A citizen campaign quickly emerged calling for the 
university and the municipal government to preserve Sam’s trademark sign, a two-storey 
pair of spinning records illuminated in red neon. Within a few days more than ten thousand 
people had showed support for online “Save the Sign” petitions, in many cases accompanied 
by personal memories of the store. The result has been plans, nearing completion in 2016, 
to mount the neon sign on a City-owned building where it would face Dundas Square.19 
Similarly, as the sandblasted and otherwise restored Old City Hall nears the end of decades 
as a provincial courthouse, a new public discussion is beginning about its adaptive re-use. 
Citizen voices unmistakeably favour keeping the building whole and in the public realm, and 
proposals very similar to those advanced by the Friends of Old City Hall in the 1960s—
museum and community centre, among others—have begun making the rounds.20 
The debates over planning, development, and public space that defined the period 
studied here have not been resolved; instead they resurface periodically, often with new 
                                                  
17 “That time when Yonge and Dundas was cool,” blogTO, Jan. 23, 2016. 
http://www.blogto.com/city/2016/01/that_time_when_yonge_and_dundas_was_cool/ 
18 Liz Worth, Treat Me Like Dirt: An Oral History of Punk in Toronto and Beyond, 1977-1981 (Toronto: ECW 
Press, 2009), 195.   
19 “12,000 pinpricks of light online to save Sam’s iconic sign,” Toronto Star, June 1, 2007; “Sam the Record 
Man’s iconic sign to spin again,” Globe and Mail, Feb. 11, 2016. 
20 Edward Keenan, “Don’t bring a mall into the municipal temple,” Toronto Star, Sep. 30, 2015.  
311 
 
participants and updated stakes. Just as they did in 1955 or 1975, in the twenty-first century 
people continue to view Yonge Street through the dual lens of problem and possibility. As I 
write, the old refrain that “[d]owntown Yonge isn’t what it used to be,” has re-entered 
common use, this time in reference not to diminished sales or sleazy entertainment, but to 
the loss of diversity and vitality created by breakneck speed of redevelopment.21 City 
officials and property owners are clashing over the 2016 designation of Yonge from College 
to Bloor Street as a Heritage Conservation District, a measure designed both to recognize its 
long history and to limit the terms on which private redevelopment can reshape its future.22 
Meanwhile, the Downtown Yonge Business Improvement Association—successor to the 
1970s Downtown Council—has released a report calling for Toronto to “build a great Yonge 
Street” through investment in pedestrian improvements and downtown cultural 
programming.23 Yonge today remains a street in motion, a dynamic commercial corridor and 
public space whose story is intertwined with that of the larger city. It continues to fulfil its 
role as a connector, not just of people and livelihoods, but of past, present, and imagined 
futures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
21 Robert Allsop, “Are we killing Yonge Street?” Now Magazine July 6, 2016. 
22 City of Toronto/DIALOG, Historic Yonge Street: Heritage Conservation District Plan (Toronto, 2016). 
23 DYBIA, YongeLove (Toronto: DYBIA, 2015).  
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